The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; The Rhodesian Plan

ROBERT MacNEIL: Good evening. Tomorrow the United Nations Security Council takes up the problem of ending the five-year-old war in Rhodesia and achieving black majority rule. The Security Council is acting at the request of Britain to advance a joint plan worked out with the United States to remove the white minority government of Ian Smith through peaceful transition to black rule.

Rhodesia, once a British colony, declared itself independent in 1965, and the Smith regime has so far resisted all efforts to make it share power with the black majority. In the meantime an increasingly costly war has been waged between the Rhodesian army and guerrilla forces backed by neighboring black African states and supplied by Soviet arms. By official Rhodesian estimate, more than 3,000 troops on both sides have been killed in the fighting, with an additional heavy toll in civilians. Only today the Rhodesian government extended the call-up for soldiers to strengthen its army and also increased inducements to soldiers now in the armed forces to stay in.

Tonight, a closer look at the prospects for a Rhodesian settlement, with the two chief negotiators, American Ambassador Andrew Young, and the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, who at this moment is on his way over here from the United Nations and should be with us shortly. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Before we talk to Dr. Owen and Ambassador Young, a quick look at the plan they`re pushing. It has both a goal and a timetable: the conversion of what is now known as Rhodesia into an independent nation known as Zimbabwe during the course of 1978. Zimbabwe would have a democratically elected government based on a one man, one vote principle. This would be the heart of the nation`s new constitution, which would also contain a bill of rights prohibiting discrimination and guaranteeing personal and property rights of individuals. The present government, headed by Prime Minister Smith, considered illegal by the British government, would first turn control of the country over to a transition government. This would be headed by a British official and a special representative appointed by the United Nations. They would have the responsibility for conducting the elections and maintaining order, with the help of the present Rhodesian police force, augmented by U.N. security forces.

In the long run a new Zimbabwe national army would be organized, based on guerrilla forces but incorporating elements of the current Rhodesian army. The election of the new government must be completed within six months after the transition government takes over.

The final part of the plan calls for a development fund to be financed by Great Britain, the United States and others to help revive the country`s economy. The crucial first step is a cease-fire in that current war between the army and the black guerrillas, to go into effect the minute the agreement is reached. Now to the details. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes. Dr. Owen, who`s mysteriously just arrived from the United Nations, first of all, when the Security Council takes up at your request tomorrow this question, what precisely is it you want the United Nations to do?

DAVID OWEN: I want the United Nations to appoint a representative to enter into these discussions, primarily dealing with the military arrangements necessary for a cease-fire. This may go somewhat wider than this, but essentially to try and bring the two armed forces, particularly their military commanders, into a situation where they can accept a cease-fire. That`s the crucial prerequisite, without which we can`t make any progress.

MacNEIL: Any thoughts on the identity o f this person in terms of his nationality...?

OWEN: It`s not a decision for me; this is a decision for the Secretary General. He`ll obviously want to talk around with all the various parties and try to reach somebody who`s mutually acceptable.

MacNEIL: I saw some reports today -- I think it was the Associated Press -- to the effect that you were asking for an American. Is that the suggestion?

ANDREW YOUNG: That`s certainly not the case.

OWEN: I think that`s one thing we can safely assume. (Laughing.)

YOUNG: Under no circumstances would it be an American.

MacNEIL: Would you be looking for a gentleman with a military history who would negotiate this cease-fire?

OWEN: I think there are some advantages in having somebody with a military background, because I think primarily it is going to be talking a lot of detail and nuts and bolts about what would happen on the day that Mr. Smith would give up office and that legality would be restored, but also on what arrangements are going to take place during the transition period.

MacNEIL: Dr. Owen, you said in your own speech to the General Assembly today you thought your draft resolution had much support. What is the evidence for that?

OWEN: Well, it`s been discussed a great deal with the African countries. And I don`t think we`ve reached total agreement quite yet; but it`s open, of course, for amendments and discussion. It may go through quickly, it may take some time. I simply don`t know what will happen.

MacNEIL: The African countries most immediately concerned are those that are often called the five "front-line" states -- I think we can see them there: Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, which surround Rhodesia. You and Ambassador Young went to see all them, didn`t you, in presenting this plan; have they all said, "Yes, it`s a good idea"?

OWEN: Yes; I think they`ve got qualifications, there are certain aspects on the plan which they think ought to be discussed more, like everybody has got qualifications on certain aspects. The great danger is unscrambling the package, but obviously we`ve got to listen and try and find -- if we can find a greater measure of agreement than exists over and above our original proposals, well, nobody`s more delighted than I.

MacNEIL: Another report I saw suggested that you two gentlemen and your strategists were thinking that if the five front-line countries supported it, then the Soviet Union, or anybody else, wouldn`t be inclined to veto this in the Security Council. Is that your thinking?

YOUNG: Well, I think that we have consulted with the Soviet Union from the very beginning, and I think that Ambassador Troyanovsky himself said that essentially the Soviet Union supported the African position.

But that`s not to say that that`s their decision. I mean, they will have questions and concerns to express, but up to now we`ve found that while everybody has some problem almost everybody agrees that the proposal is a whole lot better than the war, and hopefully they`re willing to go one step at a time and see if we can`t put an end to the fighting and have a transition not to black majority rule but to majority rule. They might just elect somebody white. I mean, every one of these governments in southern Africa has white members in the parliaments and in their cabinets, and I think we ought to remember that Africa so far has not been -- with the exception of Uganda -- that racist once there has been a transition to majority rule.

MacNEIL: You`re not suggesting Ian Smith is going to get re-elected by the black majority, are you?

YOUNG: No, I`m not suggesting that at all.

MacNEIL: Why is American support so crucial in this, Dr. Owen? You said you wouldn`t have proceeded with this without American help and support.

OWEN: I think that a lot of the sort of pressures that are able to be applied to all the differing countries to try and make them see that this has to be a fair package, a reasonable package, are best done if it`s done in concert with another important major power, who happens to be a friendly ally of ours as well. And I think we`ve seen that in terms of discussions with South Africa, but also in terms of other African countries. And I think this initially started when Henry Kissinger got involved in Africa and it`s been carried out at an increased pace and tempo by the new American administration. They are involved in Africa; we are all involved in Africa. Africa is a conflict situation which is potentially very serious for the world. I don`t say it`s going to involve some of the immediate risks of the Middle East, but it`s not something the world can ignore.

MacNEIL: Well, we know how involved Mr. Young is in Africa because we`ve talked to him a number of times about it. Could you just clear up one point for me? Are you proposing that the present Rhodesian army be dismantled first and then an army re-formed on a base of guerrilla troops, or liberation troops, whatever you call them, or that the present Rhodesian army be held in existence and reinforced, as it were, by the addition of guerrilla troops?

OWEN: It`s more complex, actually, than what you`re proposing. I mean, what has been said is that on the transition day certain unacceptable elements of the Rhodesian defense forces would have to go, and then during the transition you would try to build up a new Zimbabwe army.

MacNEIL: What are unacceptable parts of the Rhodesian army?

OWEN: Well, the zealous scouts is one of the ones that`s mentioned most and that`s been discussed publicly, and that you would try to have by the time of independence an army based on liberation forces but containing acceptable elements of the Rhodesian defense forces, which would be an army which would be loyal to any president. Now that`s going to be difficult to achieve; nobody`s under any illusion about that. But to say that`s difficult, it would have been quite impossible to get acceptance to the alternative proposal that it should be based on what the black African countries see as Mr. Smith`s army. We`re talking about an independent country. This would be a country based on a voting population of something like three million, where Mr. Smith`s army, so to speak, although it`s illegal, in fact has an electoral base, if you like, for its legitimacy, such as it is, of 97,000. You`ve got to reflect the new realities of an independent Zimbabwe. But that army must be loyal to whether it be President Muzorewa or President Nkomo, President Sithole or President PZugabe; and that`s going to be difficult to achieve.

But if you don`t tackle that problem during the transition you run a real risk of civil war, and that no one wants. There was a unanimity, Andy, wasn`t there, on this.

YOUNG: That`s right.

OWEN: Absloulte unanimity, the danger of civil war post-independence. You can`t just concentrate on getting majority rule. You`ve got to concentrate on stability for the post-independence, and that`s one of the reasons why we`ve put forward the Zimbabwe Development Fund: to give that country economic stability.

MacNEIL: Unanimity among whom?

YOUNG: I think everywhere we went there was concern that what has happened in Angola, where there is still a civil war raging almost two years after the declared independence, not be repeated in Zimbabwe, that that would have literally disastrous effects on the economies of Zambia and Mozambique, and even South Africa.

MacNEIL: So that no one political faction could control the army.

YOUNG: That`s right.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Yes, Ambassador Young, the one man, one vote question: is that an across-the-boards requirement, no literacy test, no qualifications of any kind? Anybody who`s a certain age is then eligible to vote?

YOUNG: Just like we have it in the United States.

LEHRER: Dr. Owen, is that a negotiable item?

OWEN: No, I don`t think it is. I think there is now actually very considerable unanimity. South Africa, for instance, has accepted universal sufferage in Namibia as part of the negotiations, and I think that South Africa accepts that that is going to be inevitable in Rhodesia. And I think that even Mr. Smith is beginning to recognize that that`s going to have to come.

LEHRER: All right, another point, Dr. Owen. The constitution would prohibit, as I see it, racial discrimination. Would it also protect the rights of the white minority after the black majority -- if in fact it turns out to be a black majority -- takes over after the elections? Are there special things in that constitution, or should there be, or will there be?

OWEN: Well, there`s an entrenched bill of rights, which will protect everyone, whether they`re black or white, and give them the basic freedoms of society. `then there are other areas where the whites will have some protection; the government will accept both the assets and the liabilities of the past. There`s provision for fair compensation if land is taken -- that the government couldn`t take it from, say, a white farmer without paying fair compensation --and an appeal machinery and things like this.

Now, all these are being put into the constitution, or the proposed constitution, after a lot of consultation, so there are some aspects which people are criticizing. By all means, let`s see if we can reach greater agreement; I`m not against that. What I am against is belief that you can just pick off those bits that happen to suit one particular faction and develop others. You end up with a whole business that has bedeviled the whole Rhodesian situation. There isn`t a great degree of consensus, and somebody has to try and say, "Now this is overall a fair package." And that`s what we`ve tried to do.

LEHRER: Ambassador Young, if the U.N. passes the resolution and gives you gentlemen what you want, or you and your governments want, what`s the timetable and the steps that should follow from now to the transition stage?

YOUNG: I would say that within the next few weeks that Field Marshall Carver and a representative designated by the Secretary General would begin to set up a framework to discuss the military arrangements and transition with all of the parties involved. Now just how that will go about I think will depend very much on Lord Carver and the Secretary General`s representative.

LEHRER: So people understand, Lord Carver is the British official who has already been semi-designated that if it goes to this period he would run the transition government along with a man from the U.N., right?

YOUNG: That`s right, and one of the encouraging things about our visit also was that he was a gentleman that was generally respected and known throughout Africa; he was respected by the Nigerians and the South Africans...

LEHRER: What about Ian Smith? Did he agree to him?

YOUNG: Ian Smith I think responded very favorably to the idea of Field Marshall Lord Carver -- I`m not used to all of these British titles, but ... they were impressive in Africa.(Laughing.)

LEHRER: Right. Well, look, Dr. Owen, what I`m really getting at here is that if you go the next step as Ambassador Young just outlined it, is there an interim step where you then would have to go, whether Lord Carver, the U.N. representative, or whatever, and get agreement from Ian Smith and his government before you could then proceed to the transition government stage, or is it taken out of his hands?

OWEN: You`ve got to have a cease-fire, and he is the person who controls the Rhodesian defense forces. So the first and primary thing is to get arrangements for a cease-fire. Within those arrangements people are obviously going to be concerned that the overall framework is right. Now I think broadly most people have thought that our framework provides the basis for negotiation. That means they`re not accepting every aspect of it. And in the final analysis, I might say, the Security Council will have to come back to them and they would have to agree the total package. And the British Parliament would have to agree it. And I can tell you absolutely straight, I`m not even going to put it to the British Parliament if I feel that the arrangements do not allow for fair elections, if I feel the arrangements are not sufficiently stable to ensure that the law-and-order situation would be reasonable during that transitional period, and also I want some assurance that a new Zimbabwe will be stable and won`t end up in a civil war.

Now everyone`s going to have his criteria, so that this is a limited step in this sense, that the Security Council will have to discuss this again when the results of these preliminary negotiations are known. That`s when people would have to decide, Is this right? At the ceasefire taking place, U.N. sanctions would be lifted, legality would be restored, and Rhodesia would be set on an irreversible path towards majority rule.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes; there`s no scarcity of pessimists around about this, and some with some considerable experience in Africa. And I know one of them in particular who said to me, "Look, Ian Smith has hung the scalps of Harold Wilson a couple of times on his belt, and Henry Kissinger. Why shouldn`t he do the same with Young and Owen?" Why is it different now?

YOUNG: I think it`s different because our two governments are together, and because we have a situation in the Security Council that has begun to establish a kind of trust amongst all of the members of the Security Council. We`ve not have the full okay, no enthusiastic support, say, of the People`s Republic of China, but there has not been any overt attempt to interfere. The same with the Soviet Union. The Africa group is essentially united, at least in trying to move to this first step. There`s much more of an international consensus. And I think to Dr. Owen`s credit, when he talked to the front-line presidents in Lusaka, he talked to them as though he was talking to John Vorster in South Africa. And when he talked to Vorster in South Africa he talked as though he was talking to the front- line presidents. There was never an opportunity for anybody to hear what they wanted to hear. They got it straight, and I think they trusted it. And I think that the record of President Carter and this administration so far has inspired a new confidence around the world. This combination is new, and +I think the hopes and trusts that we`re trying to build on are very new but also very fragile. And everybody says, "Well, we don`t know." Even the people who are saying that they will take part in this exercise are still not willing to believe in it.

OWEN: It could be fouled up; there`s no doubt about that.

MacNEIL: Yes. Mr. Smith is a very agile gentleman. I was wondering, for instance, on the question of one man, one vote, has he, to your personal satisfaction, the two of you, actually accepted the principal of one man, one vote?

OWEN: No.

MacNEIL: Because he said in an interview in a program you were on on the BBC last night that he was not in favor of the vote for everyone over twenty-one; there had to be "qualifications for a franchise." So he hasn`t made that step yet.

OWEN: No. Most people, when they`re entering into negotiations, don`t finally commit themselves on things. There are certain basic principles of the settlement which are really unable to be changed. I don`t want to get too much into defining what is negotiable and what`s not, but there is no doubt about it that one person, one vote is nonnegotiable.

MacNEIL: Do you agree with Ambassador Young that the atmosphere is greatly different now than it was...

OWEN: I think it`s different. I think one`s got to face it that the liberation forces, through their own fighting, have made people come to grips with this problem. I regret the fact that there`s been this violence, but this has been one of the factors which has brought the Rhodesian regime to face some of the realities of life. I only hope that we don`t have a situation where a barrel of a gun is the final arbiter. That would be, I think, very disastrous, both for southern Africa generally and for the future of Zimbabwe.

MacNEIL: We just heard -- we got a story on the Reuters newswire just before you came in -- that the Smith government has extended its military call-up system and offered more financial inducements to young men to stay in. Does that not sound as though Ian Smith is preparing to dig in his heels?

OWEN: He`s going to negotiate and try to protect the people whose interests he looks after primarily, which is the white population. Now that is, as he sees it, a legitimate aspiration and we can`t deny that. He`s not going to agree to arrangements that put them in jeopardy. Nor would I agree to arrangements that would put them in jeopardy and their life in jeopardy. There are a number of people who have got sticking points, and I tell you I`ve got sticking points and the British government has got sticking points. And if we were to be forced into a situation where we would have been asked to put our names to something which we didn`t think is fair, we wouldn`t do it. And furthermore, I make no secret of it: if I was forced into that situation I was use the veto in the United Nations. I`m quite tough too. (Laughing.)

MacNEIL: (Laughing.) All right, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: The question of the liberation forces and back to that interview that Prime Minister Smith gave to the BBC last night, he also had this to say about that: "A future army based on terrorists is a mad suggestion. No one in his senses would believe that this would be of assistance to Rhodesia." Ambassador Young?

YOUNG: Yes?

LEHRER: What do you think of that? That doesn`t sound like a man who`s willing to change the army or willing to give on that point.

YOUNG: Well, if you go back a couple of hundred years, it`s probably the same sort of thing the British said about George Washington`, that the Boston Tea Party was a terrorist operation. And one of the things that impressed me by meeting with these so-called "terrorists", is the level of education that we have found amongst the liberation forces I think is well in advance of that of many of the countries that came to independence in the early sixties. I mean, there`s a well educated black population in Rhodesia. In one of the meetings we sat in, two of the advisors were Ph.D.`s. One of them happened to be on leave from an American university but a Rhodesian citizen who would obviously go back and assume a party in that government. You`re talking, I think, about people who tried for ten years to find a way to negotiate their rights and their human dignity, and only after ten years resorted to armed struggle, and even then have been rather restrained in the armed struggle. There has not been very much in the way of deliberate attacks on civilians.

LEHRER: Have the black leaders in Rhodesia and also in the frontline countries asked your-all`s guarantee that Ian Smith will not have anything to do with the government of Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe, after the transition period?

OWEN: I think what they`ve wanted is that he should give up power; and that`s always been a central part of this whole strategy, that they would not trust a situation in which elections were held under Mr. Smith`s government. That would be anyhow an illegal situation which they weren`t prepared to accept. So to that extent they`re adamant that he must go at the transitional period.

LEHRER: Are you equally as adamant?

OWEN: Yes. That is an absolute, there`s no question or doubt about it. If he doesn`t go, you couldn`t appoint a British commissioner, you wouldn`t have restored legality, you wouldn`t have got a lifting of sanctions, you would not have an internationally acceptable solution. You`d have a sort of internal solution, and that`s the thing which Mr. Smith has advocated at various times. But the South African government have made their position clear: that would not end the violence; it would probably increase the violence. If an internationally acceptable solution is not negotiable for either parties holding unrepresentative stands, well then you face a new situation.

LEHRER: How do both of you respond to the criticism that the United States and Britain shouldn`t meddle in the internal affairs of Rhodesia; let the Rhodesians, black and white, resolve it, and you folks are trying to impose an outside solution? Ambassador Young?

YOUNG: I think that the United Nations and the United States still recognize Rhodesia as essentially a British colony in rebellion against Great Britain. And the reason we have supported sanctions against Ian Smith`s rebellion is because of a request which the British government brought to the Security Council, and we`ve been operating on the framework that this is an illegal government.

LEHRER: You feel it`s a perfectly proper role for the United States and Great Britain to be performing at this point, right?

OWEN: What you`re advocating -- and let`s be clear about it -- what you`re advocating is just settle back and watch a bitter struggle take place in southern Africa, gradually running the danger of sucking in more and more other African countries, a continuation of the armed struggle at `very considerable price, a very real risk to the white population in Rhodesia, already at the moment leaving that country at a very rapid rate -- you`re advocating that we would just sit back and allow an armed struggle to end up in a very, very bloody conflict. Now I don`t believe that there is any member of the United Nations who can do that, let alone countries who uphold the values that Britain and the United States do. And particularly in Britain`s case there`s a legal responsibility to the country. I wish that this whole declaration of independence unilaterally by Mr. Smith had never taken place. We live with the situation as it is. Surely we all have responsibilities. I think this idea that you just cast this aside, do nothing, is totally indefensible.

LEHRER: Finally, Ambassador Young, I feel compelled to ask you a question: I haven`t noticed as many Andy Young stories as there were a few months ago. Have you intentionally set out to lower your profile after those earlier flaps, or what?

YOUNG: No, I think that the things that I say now people begin to understand much more in their total context. I don`t think I`ve changed. I`ve got a good association with Dr. Owen, and one of the good things about the trip to Africa, he really took the tough guy roles and he left me the high ground to sit back and be the good guy, and I`m really grateful for that.

OWEN:(Laughing.) He was very helpful in many different ways, and I don`t believe that we could have achieved as much support as we had had it not been working together, and both personally and between our two countries. We`re a long way from achieving a settlement there, and no one ought to be deluded into a false sense of optimism, but if the United Nations shows responsibility and helps us, I believe we could achieve a settlement.

MaCNEIL: Well, we`ll see as a first step what the Security Council does tomorrow. Dr. Owen, Ambassador Young, thank you very much. Good night, Jim. Jim Lehrer and I will be back tomorrow evening. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.