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The enemy's hopes are down. With your support. We will give you a success that will impact not only on South Vietnam. But on every American nation and the world. The voice you just heard was that of United States Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland commander of United States troops in Vietnam and our guest this week on the N. E. our Washington forum. A weekly program concerned with the significant issues before us as a nation. This week the first of a four part series exploring the war in Vietnam. I'm an E.R. public affairs director Bill Greenwood. Our guest General William Westmoreland recently appeared in the United States to answer questions about the war in Vietnam. One of those appearances was before members of the National Press Club questioning General William Westmoreland who is the president of the National Press Club and editor of U.S. News and World Report Mr. David Lee Roth.
We have more than usual number of questions today and I must say I a lot of them are very good it's a shame we can't ask them all but I hope you'll understand we cannot there won't be time. First question. General Westmoreland do you think the people in this country are really aware we're in a hell of a war in Vietnam. Well I must say you John Lennon are in a better position to answer that question I. Think. In view of secretary in view of Secretary McNamara is ill founded optimism a couple of years ago. Aren't you uncomfortable when you say we may be able to withdraw troops from Vietnam in a couple of years. A. My statement is to the effect. That it is conceivable to
me. That more than. Two years or less. It will be possible. For us to. Phase down our. Level of commitment. And turn more of the burden of the war over to the enemy's armed forces who are improving. And who I believe will be prepared to assume this great a bargain. Now I have made the point that at the outset this may be talking. But hopefully progressing and certainly we are preparing our plans to make it progressing. To our Ohio civilian marksmanship training. Any value to the American soldier in Vietnam. Marksmanship is an important part of the soldiers training and
I'm confident that a young man as has been exposed to rifle marksmanship at an early age that will facilitate is his training when he puts on the uniform. And you're considered military judgment. And in light of all known intelligence both friendly and enemy. Do you see. Who do you think will be the victor in the Army Navy game. Well it's but a bit awkward for me to be parochial since I have a joint command but I say Go Army. I am. Several questions along this line I'll read one of them. You say the enemy has not won a major battle for more than a year. What major
battle did they win. And did we admit it at that time. Yes we did admit it and it was not really a major battle but it was a significant battle. That occurred in the spring. Of 1066. I believe that it was in March. It was the Battle of the Shah where he attacked with at least a regiment. He overran a and isolated. Civilian irregular Defense Corps cap. And which we had Vietnamese and US Special Forces. We had 10 American presidents. There were about 350. Vietnamese irregulars. Some of them more than you are. The attack took place at night. Garson was
overwhelmed. It was overrun. By enemy since that time has had control over this valley. Which is in Western to a town. And. Province along the. Provincial of border just north of the provincial boundary. I consider it a significant victory because it facilitated his infiltration. And gave him control over a piece of real estate in South Vietnam. Which. He had not been able to. He has not been able to. Duplicate since that time. Gen.. None of the phases you outline mentions surrender by North Vietnam. What is the significance of this omission or was it really animation.
Well it's rather difficult or difficult to conceive. Of a military total military victory in the classic sense. And I think one would have to assume that such would be the case if the enemy were to surrender. We're fighting a limited war. The limited objectives and with limited means. Ground war is confined to. The territory of self Vietnam. You might say in a strategic sense who are on the defensive now let me hasten to add that our tactics in South Vietnam are very much opposite. But strategically speaking we do have an offensive air campaign to the north along his lines of communication. Which is a very important part of our strategy. But without.
Ground actions to the north. The enemy's territory is invaded and this is not in cost and that's what our national policy. It's difficult to conceive of a surrender but it is not difficult or difficult to conceive that. The enemy may decide he can't win. And the longer he holds out the weaker he will get. This is in fact happening. But he does not yet apparently realize this. General we're bound to have a few armchair generals and we can't resist asking a few tactical questions one of them is what is your rationale for fighting the enemy on such unfavorable terrain as our side as such on favorable terrain to our side is back to 0. Why not concentrate our forces in more defendable areas. How many man does the enemy have near
Doctorow. The enemy has near Doctorow to address the last part of this question for us. Approximately eight thousand. Four regiments the North Vietnamese thirty second regiment North Vietnamese sixty six regiment. North Vietnamese One seventy fourth regiment. And the North Vietnamese 24th regiment. These of these regiments are not in all cases up to strength. The enemy. Had planned to. Win a large victory and to see. A piece of real estate and South Vietnam in the province of the continent. He had planned to launch this attack on the twenty sixth of October but he could not get is look just sticks. Potsherd for the attack in time.
And therefore he was unable to to drop off and the attack. At all. But he was in a position to do so until after the first of the year. Now this was one of the three places where he had planned to attack in order to capture the world headlines on the occasion of the inauguration of the new president on the thirty first of October. If it had been a major national day on 1 October during which time. There were in. Saigon. Many many. Dignitaries who had come to Saigon to intend the inauguration. So such a victory would have served is as a psychological and propaganda purposes. Now if he did not jump off in a stack because we preempted it. We attacked him. Before he was able to
get sacked. Now this is not particularly unfavorable terrain for us to fight and as a matter of fact comparatively it's far more favorable to us and it is to him. Because we have the helicopters. We can land on the top of the hills with can cut down the trees we can make. The landing zones on the top of a mountain where we can move an artillery by helicopter. But the enemy has no such mobility. He has to rock. Our used pack animals but and the main he uses carve a labor of human bearers to move his surprise had very great difficulty getting the porters to do their job so he had to take combat troops and this is one reason he could not get himself in position to attack. Toward the end of October.
So it is not on fabled terrain for us we the enemy is at a disadvantage because of this mobility. We have killed many many a North Vietnamese troops far more than we know about. During his engagement. We don't know how many of B-52 strikes and kill we know they've killed many because we've seen the secondary explosions attack air. I know it killed many which we don't know about. We bombed in the jungle in the mountains it is right piece of territory and it's difficult to cover with troops. So this body count figure which we reported is in my opinion very very conservative. Probably represents I would say. 50 percent. Are or even even less of the enemy that then been killed. Now why do we fight him on the along the Cambodia and
Laos border. Well if we didn't fight him there we would have to have to fight even. Further and learn. By virtue of his movement he would cut the roads he would and he would overrun hamlets and villages. We have a major refugee problem on our hands. We would find that. For eventual and district seach would be isolated and we would be able to communicate with them only by air. And shortly we find ourselves involved in an enclave posture which would be completely unacceptable to me. We would have surrendered to unity. General have you all you need to fight the war planes helicopters pilots. Man.
As you know I I would be receiving a total of five hundred twenty five thousand troops. This will give me a well-balanced. Hard hitting military force. Our country is capable of sustaining as long as required. That will be backed by a proper logistical much. Since we have built the ports and airfields fuel tank farms that did not exist when we started deploying troops in the summer of 65 at that time we had one deep water port three small jet capable airfields one civilian run peak oil tank farm. We started from scratch. I had no. Vote just to troops were engineers. We had to we had to build this physical infrastructure so
that large troops could be deployed and support it. And my major concentration during that first year was to build in an undeveloped country. This physical infrastructure the facilities required to support ground troops in sustained combat. Is a matter of passing interest. This is the first time in our history where we've had to deploy large ground forces and fight them in sustained combat in an undeveloped country and North Africa we inherited this physical infrastructure such foreign ports as. Cast of Iraq or Iran years already. In Western Europe of course. So we had her day care today modern sophisticated physical infrastructure. And even in Korea we had the fine port of San and later in China and from the single port of Incheon we were able to support our troops deployed across the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula but not so in Vietnam.
We had to bill because of the yagi of the country the long coastline. The nature of the terrain the location of the enemy. Mother the porch airfield. Where house complexes peak oil tank farms etc.. Compared with one in the summer 65 one deep water port we now have six paired with three small jet capable airfields in the summer of 66 we now have eight. We have mobile fuel tank farms. We now have the logistic wherewithal to support any strategy we wish to pursue and to support in sustained combat forces that I will receive the first year the RA for every two men I got in I had to put one building this space and manning it and only one could go into combat. My troops were few. I had to use fire brigade tactics to keep this enemy off balance.
I wasn't hurting him I was just confusing. It's only been in the last year where I have had the strength and the logistic support to put any real pressure on the enemy. And during that second year for every three man I got in I had to devote one to building this logistics fact and manning it. This year out of five men I get in will go into Khan into a combat role and only one will have to augment the logistics base. And by next summer. I will have 61 percent of my troops. In a combat role and this compares very favorably. With 57 percent according to the report I received for career and World War 2 the point I want to make you say is. That we have had the wherewithal. To put real pressure on the enemy for a little over a one year. This applies to the enemy in the south. And it also applies to our air pressure campaign
in the north. Because the target restrictions did not permit. Putting pressure on the enemy along along these lines and lines of communication. And his support areas. And during the first year of the war. But now we have the wherewithal. To continue to put pressure on the enemy and to accelerate that pressure. And I feel the force that I will receive is going to be. A well-balanced. Hard hitting military organization that can sustain the pressure indefinitely. The young man that man this force. Most of them are young men. I'm an exception. As are there for one year and then let's say volunteer to extend.
So it's not a question of the boys being brought home the boys are coming home after one year unless they volunteered to stand and we're having a great number who do in fact volunteer to extend. I found innocent via Matt that the young man developed somewhat of a missionary zeal. And I would like more of you to come over and see this missionary zeal at first hand. The. Premier found brown dong is considering inviting us congressmen and senators to visit North Viet Nam. Which U.S. senator would you like most to see Santa and do you. And do you think such visits would help or hurt the war effort. I think it be a holiday and appropriate as a military man for me to address that question. What is the status of the construction of the McNamara wall when will it be finished and the
related question has any thought been given to an atomic irradiated barrier to prevent infiltration. On the second question many many ideas have been explored and I would suspect that. These ideas have included the one that you have mentioned but. With respect to the first question. Sorry that my camera has to address this matter. And I don't believe I can add anything to what he said. General what is your comment on the problems encountered with the M-16 rifle or its ammunition and what is being done about it is it is the matter cleared. There are some modifications being made to the M-16 rifle that I'm sure will make
it a more reliable weapon. But the M-16 is an excellent weapon. It's a best if it's for a. Firearm. Troops have ever taken in the battle but it does require care. The man who man it must be trained and its care and its operation. This becomes not only a function of training but a function of discipline. They have. There have been a few complaints which were well-known to you. A few so-called bugs in the weapon which don't render it ineffective. But which if. If these bugs are corrected and they are being corrected it will entail a lot. Less maintenance. With respect to the emanation. Frankly as a technical matter and I. Don't know enough about it to discuss it but I do
know there are some experimentation as to the composition of the power that will result in less residue. But the present power is adequate. But I say again a man has to know how to maintain as well. Who are the cynics in the press corps in Viet Nam that you referred to on Meet the Press. Hasn't the Five O'clock Follies given them reason for cynicism. Well I can't be specific my statement I think during the. Week to press performance on Sunday was that there were in Saigon A. Number of individuals that I would categorize as cynical. There was a group of sonics and and Saigon.
Saigon was a city of rumor. From time to time were stories based on. Isolated instance the stories for trying the situation as a generality. I received my information course from many visits to the field and from reporters that cover the entire map of South Vietnam. And I. I feel I have a pretty good idea of what's going on and I have done a number of stories which I think have been somewhat misleading. Perhaps not intentionally so in fact I'm confident not intentionally so but. Based on isolated. Events.
Which of course are news worried or newsworthy but which are not necessarily for a trader perspective. But. I cannot. Be more specific as to. Identifying any any cynics. And as a general statement I I think the reporters covering the war in South Vietnam are doing a good job. It's a very complex task. Of war different from many that we've experienced in history. It's it's difficult to make an appraisal of how the war is going because you cannot fall right on a battle map. We've had to resort to certain statistical data. And although we've we've tried our best to make this just testicle data accurate.
I'm sure there's been cases where there have been some actresses but I think the end actresses have been. On the conservative side. As much as on the exaggerated side. I think on balance this to Siskel information that we put out is. AS. Is as. Precise as as a human shit machine can produce. I know that the press have had a feeling that a lot of these reports are subjective. And they are. We have attempted to introduce into our system certain checks and balances to make these reports subjective. And this is a matter we're continuing to work on. We're doing our best. We we are honest. And our reporting. But we're certainly not infallible. And
within the system. Thank you. Was. Will. The. General Here is a real straight out just playing question. Shouldn't the running of the war be left to the military. Well of course this war. Involves a political psychological and diplomatic factors eyes. As well as military operations. I think it was poll in March which said that war is too important to the left exclusively to the generals. And I think. At this time in history and the other complexity of this confrontation that Camacho is still right.
At. Do you favor declaring the port of Haifa off limits to shipping including British. Well I would like to stop the introduction. Of arms and ammunition into North Vietnam that will be eventually used against our aircraft or against our troops and the south. Is a difficult problem to. Do to. Accomplish this. With respect to introduction of equipment by sea and consideration of international law. And other factors. So this is one of those matters that goes beyond the military. I. Will drive your point. Without passing judgment
on how we should stop the introduction of these. The supplies and the materiel that will be used against us. I would. Like to see it stopped. That was United States Army General William Westmoreland commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam and our guest this week on the again our Washington forum. This program was produced for national educational radio by WMU FM. American University Radio in Washington D.C. It's heard abroad over members stations of the Armed Forces Radio Network. I'm an E.R. public affairs director Bill Greenwood inviting you to listen again next week for another edition of the U.N. our Washington forum a weekly program concerned with the significant issues before us as a nation. This is the national educational radio
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Series
NER Washington forum
Episode
General William C. Westmoreland
Producing Organization
WAMU-FM (Radio station : Washington, D.C.)
National Association of Educational Broadcasters, WAMU-FM (Radio station : Washington, D.C.)
Contributing Organization
University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/500-x34mr246
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/500-x34mr246).
Description
Episode Description
United States Army General William C. Westmoreland, commander, American troops in Vietnam. Part 1 of 4: War in Vietnam. Westmoreland: "The enemy's hopes are dim."
Series Description
Discussion series featuring a prominent figure affecting federal government policy.
Date
1967-12-19
Topics
Public Affairs
Media type
Sound
Duration
00:29:39
Credits
Host: Greenwood, Bill
Producing Organization: WAMU-FM (Radio station : Washington, D.C.)
Producing Organization: National Association of Educational Broadcasters, WAMU-FM (Radio station : Washington, D.C.)
Speaker: Westmoreland, William C. (William Childs), 1914-2005
AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 67-24-40 (National Association of Educational Broadcasters)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Duration: 00:29:28
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Citations
Chicago: “NER Washington forum; General William C. Westmoreland,” 1967-12-19, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed March 29, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-x34mr246.
MLA: “NER Washington forum; General William C. Westmoreland.” 1967-12-19. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. March 29, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-x34mr246>.
APA: NER Washington forum; General William C. Westmoreland. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-x34mr246