Toward a new world; The Arab-Israeli war, part one

The Institute on world affairs the Institute on world affairs held each year on the San Diego State campus brings together statesmen scholars military leaders and businessmen from all over the world. The purpose of this institute is the understanding of the problems and challenges that face man gained through knowledge and discussion. This year's theme was toward a new world and here to introduce this session speaker is Professor Minos generalise director of the Institute. We continue our. Inquiry in this. Effort toward. The establishment of some kind of criteria by we can evaluate the future. With a venture. In analysis. Into the area of the Middle East. This may come as some surprise to you because the listing was made erroneous leve reference to Vietnam. In the program itself.

Actually. The Middle East crisis is closest to us at the present time because of the. Very cursory albeit intensive impact it has had. Not only on this country but upon reactions throughout the world. It is a chronic crisis of a somewhat different variety but nevertheless one which is extremely important. And extremely dangerous if not treated. I would suggest with care. Here to treat it not only with care but also with considerable insight and great experience. He is a man whom you all know. We've had the honor of having you know a podium on previous occasions. General sly Marshall. You might modestly list himself as a military critic and a columnist I would list him as one of

the if not the country's leading expert on military matters military history. A man with great insight and knowledge in political matters a man who has made international world so much a part of himself that is actually second nature. One could discuss with him Martin phonied on. The facts. And developments of recent history. And judging from my own exposure to him learned something most every minute that one did not know. If he would do justice to his knowledge and if we were to do justice is knowledge we have to stay here much longer than the time allotted to us. I will not give you his lengthy biography I will simply say. That he has. Had intimate contact with military developments over the last generation. He has visited every part of the world has known all of the significant figures political military and

other has been able to probe. And fill in gaps. That exist not only in the minds of the layman but also in the minds of experts. And to do further justice to limit my own introduction. And simply say that we are on it again so. Have slam national podium to speak on the Middle East situation. Thank. You my dear friend when US. Ladies and gentleman of San Diego. To their card at any such reception as you are giving me this evening. A man must either be a son of parts in there of unusual merit and since I have always been a fool for luck I don't see

myself as to the cause. I appreciated the kind words with which I was put before you my friend Meno as far as a rule of life that I have always thought a good one that I commend to you and that is that it's better to feed a man a little Taffy while he's alive than a lot of effort have we have three dead. To that I add that I am particularly delighted to be on this campus for the third time within recent years. And I acknowledge here for the first time that I am in the most wonderful city in America. And I am also on the most forward growing and progressive campus in the state of California. And I must make myself clear. I am

told that every day of my life. Here tonight I tell you in all candor that if there is anything good about this speech it is strictly the result of the San Diego influence in my family and I had no responsibility for it. My friend the chairman spoke about the quick switch topics. This is a rapidly moving world and things do change suddenly. When the first approximation toward the end of May we took it for granted that I was going to speak on the situation in Southeast Asia because I have spent half of the last year with troops over there. Part of the time on a mission for the chief of staff of the army. Those months of December and January and February just past are in that cause.

And so. We took up that that would be my subject because neither one of us sounded at that time a crisis that was going to bloom into another war. And then it happened and I went on my way and I've been engaged with that. Piece of business ever since and I have just finished a book about the war. And I am glad. Though you may not be that we switched to subjects and I could talk about the unpleasantness in June of this year because it's fresh on my mind and I think I can bring to you a much more simpler and compact. Story of what happened. In those dynamic days in June. And it seems to me that the proper approach to it is to tell you first of

all how Israelis think about their national security surrounded as they are by enemies and their reasoning is quite simple and very direct. Egypt is the main enemy and if Egypt is beaten. The other Arab states will have to fold quickly and quit any military adventure and so the peninsula of Sinai has to be the main battlefield. And this is the arena that the Israelis concentrate on and direct all their thinking toward And since it is Sinai That's the decisive field then the war must be conducted mainly with armor or tank forces and there are two reasons for this.

That Sinai is fairly good tank country though we Americans who work with armor would not really consider it so since the countryside is beset with some of the highest sand dunes in the world. It's largely mountainous it's riven by great qualities. It's an area about twice the size of Nevada and far more fierce as to its terrain than anything in the state of Nevada. And so it's truly formidable as far as tank operations are concerned. But the other reason is this. The other reason is you know he is really thinking the certainty of UN or big power intervention against a going war. Within a few days of the

start. And so it has to be armor and rapid movement because the general staff of Israel gives itself from 48 to 72 hours for a victory over Egypt. Convinced that unless a plan can be developed within that framework the UN or the great powers will stop the war and there will be no chance to settle it satisfactorily. So the roar as Israel sees it perforce calls for. Armor and the use of air power. Some of Israel's brigades nor the terrain of Sinai. Far better than any Egyptian may know that they spend their entire training period their entire period in service working with problems such as they would confront in Sinai.

They work out map exercises and their maps on Sinai are very adequate and their maneuvers because they work all the time in training at actual combat exercises their maneuvers are over conducted over similar terrain in the negative to make sure that they've got traffic ability in the third rain that they will maneuver over. Now I am not going to elaborate on the events of last winter because I think most of you are familiar with the fictions that lead gradually toward the full blooming of this crisis. And you know they're Persis to broader trouble in the Galilee chiefly with Syria culminating in April in two large battles in the air between Israeli planes and Syrian planes and the shooting down I think it was of five making planes

in the course of those actions. But Israel was not truly alarmed. By the flare up in Syria because Syria just does not alarm Israel. As a military state. The Israelis their general staff look at Syria more as a nuisance and infliction the kind of a gadfly rather than a qualified opponent opponent. They cannot take seriously the military effectiveness of their neighbor on that flank. And even when Syria began to mobilize in late April the Israeli general staff regarded it as just one more false alarm. The first partly warning came in the week preceding May the 15th which is Israel's Independence Day.

And the tipoff was this. The interception of messages exchanged between Moscow. And Cairo in Damascus by the Israeli communicators in which the Soviets were advising the Arabs giving them some of the information that Israel planned a froze scale war against Syria. It was dead wrong. The Israeli general staff knew it. But they also realized that this might possibly open Pandora's box. Still in that week there was no real alarm felt. Then on 14th of May not answer sent General Fauzi to the mask and there was a great deal of publicity and fanfare about. That he had gone over there to help Syria in a stress situation under the threat of war.

And on the next day the 15th of May Israel's Independence Day Nasr began heavily to reinforce his field army in Sinai. And even then the Israeli general staff reckoned the crisis was just another one of those things. That it was intended to take the broom from Independence Day it would grow big and it would then collapse. Over the past 10 years however every main avenue into Sinai out of Israel out of the negative has been blocked. And monstrously fortified under the guidance of Russian engineers and these giant entrenched hedgehogs. Run 2 5 miles in depth. Covering the defiles for whatever bread is necessary to shoulder these defensive positions on one flank of the dunes or

bridges so that they blocked the main roads. The threat has long been there adding troop strength to the three and a half divisions of Egyptians present did not increase that threat very importantly. The fact is however that before May ended the three and a half divisions had become seven divisions. The less than 400 modern So we have built tanks that were there on the 15th of May had become one thousand tanks and there were at least 3000 cannon anti-tank guns along this front pointed toward Israel out of Sinai. The Mig squadrons had deployed into Sinai on four air bases two of them new air bases. What was the object of NASA's tour de force on the 15th of May. As the

Israeli general staff calculated that. He did not warrant want war he did not intend war. He was being badgered by the other Arab states. You are doing nothing. You talk big against Israel but you're doing nothing. And so he would make the big build up in Sinai. And he would claim credit for it. But you only have still stood there to serve as a buffer between forces. And therefore Israel still believed that the crisis would subside without war. And it was right about then the general policy wrote general Riki. Of the United Nations forces telling him that the UN IA should step aside secretary U Thant took it up.

Answering in effect. To the Cairo government any such demand should be addressed to me making such a request is your right and privilege. This was a mistake. It put the fat in the fire. And the Israeli general staff in Tel Aviv started once. That Nasr was left no choice. Either he would seize the opening or he would be discredited by his Arab allies. So he went ahead from the 15th of May Israel had proceeded with a leisurely semi mobilization. It's people in military not half convinced that the crisis could explode and all of that changed on the 23rd of May with a much trumpeted closing of Tire and sprayed by Nasser. From there on the Israeli

general staff and the army functioned as if they were on a war footing and within one week they were going like a well oiled machine. The fact is that the prolonging mission of the crisis the enforced wait was a favor a great favor done Israel by Nasser. This brought the army right to its peak. Israel could still not take serious seriously Syria now had six brigades mounting the Rockwall fortifications of the Golan pole looking down on Houla. Two divisions were behind this line 60000 are men altogether between the Israeli border and Damascus. But Israel did not reinforce its three brigades in the valley. Three big aides were thinking then of less than 10000 men facing

60000. For quite another reason that felt much the same way about Jordan. When Hussein went to Cairo and embraced Nasser there was no change. The Israeli general stopped by this time was convinced that Pharaoh believed he had it made and that the sheer weight of his Soviet armor and guns would make Israel crawl. That he would win it all without a war. That was their reading of the situation that he was so drunk with this idea that King Hussein got tipsy vicariously. But the Israeli general staff still figured that Jordan's army would put up only a token show and not give mine back. And this was one of Israel's major miscalculations. So only one brigade of reservists was on guard in

Jerusalem. That means that only one brigade stood ready to fight in areas generally called the West Bank. Where do Israel go wrong in this calculation for one thing I believe that the Israelis give Hussein whom I know fairly well marked credit for goodwill and common sense. And then he truly deserves. But there is something else. On the 1st of June. Quite secretly the Egyptian general Abdul Riyad who is now the chief of staff of the Egyptian army arrived in Amman. And he came for the express purpose of thing with Hossein keeping his feet to the fire and forcing him to fulfill his contract. And he did it too well. He destroyed

Hussein's army for a second of the king in so doing because that army did not have a chance unless aided by a Gyptian Air Force and that force was already dead before Jordan began to fight. That's one of the tragic parts of the whole thing. The death of the Egyptian air force that occurred within the first 80 minutes of the war. We should really call it the 80 minute war instead of the Six Day War. The decisive blow had been dealt. And the war in effect was all but over two hours before anybody in the United States knew that the war had begun. President Johnson did not hear the word until 4:30 in the morning. That the war had begun. By that time as I said. The decision was already Israel the decisive blow had been struck.

If we can claim to have instant global communication in this phase of our existence then this must have been an instant their war. I turn now to the events of 5 June. And I'm not going to get into the argument about who fired the first shot. But I do know that the 11 settlements in the Negev. Were sheltered that night before Israel went to war. Should they have waited for 13 to be shelled. I can't answer that question. I agree however with most Diane when he says that what happened at Sharm el-Sheikh was neck a big question and it should have been recognized as such by the United Nations General Mark to hord the chief of the air force of Israel is one of the

great original thinkers in that field. I'd say that the man is one of the true geniuses of the air age. He was just forty nine and approaching 40 at this time. The man of medium height. Quite bald headed and still very hi handsome despite the baldness of that head as some people are. And he's also of. Soft spoken like my good friend on my left. He looks and acts more like a college professor than oyur. As you well know the things the balance and heavy weapons. Had tilted radically against Israel since 1956 to the Soviets

having lavished modern armor and jet bombers and fighters on Egypt and on Iraq and on Syria. And they are they were out numbered in modern planes by better than two to one. And the prospect of death being rained on Israel from the sky was the grimmest and bravest the military problems facing Zoll the defense establishment of Israel. Everyone conceded that even the ground soldiers and a few agreed with what hole would propose doing about it. They said the prime minister. The defense minister General Diane and even the Chief of Staff General Rabin that he was thinking with the impetuousness of youth. Here I would dispel one allusion. Israel did not pull from a file A. Plan

tailor made for this law. There was no such plan. The main planning was done after the 23rd of May. This is true of the planning for the armored sweep into Sinai. It is true of the hordes planned for the air attack on Egypt. It was during the final 10 days that he was having his battle with his the periods to get them to accept his way of thinking. He proposed to throw everything at Egypt at the start. Taking a chance on Iraq Syria and Jordan America force. He would leave only 12 planes to guard Israel and throw everything else at each and those 12 planes would not even take to the air. Further of Egypt's 25 year basis he would strike only 11. 4 in the Sinai 3 in the Canal Zone. And the rest along Nile the

farthest south. Being at Luxor. But the 11 included all bombers and all MiG 21 bases. The other craft he reckoned could not really threaten the interior of Israel and he calculated also that the shock to the 11. Would paralyze the other 14. Now peculiarly he picked 8 o'clock in the morning for the strike. I say pick your leave because of the be the last hour that any other military man would think about. Your enemy is not only wide awake but he's also price charged with energy. And what you want in war and surprise. And he knew that they would be wide awake. When he figured that the. Egyptian pilots would probably

be at tea or chai as it's called since they conventionally take tea at eight o'clock in the morning and that made the chance for a surprise unlimited. And these are exactly the things he did. Eleven bases were pounded for 80 straight minutes. Then there was a 20 minute respite and then they were pounded again for 80 more minutes. All in Egypt. But the first right did it. By mid-morning horde was so confident that Egypt was out of the picture in other words. By 10 o'clock that morning that he was already diverting fighter bombers. From the strike against Egypt to help the armored advance into Sinai. That's how confident he was. Now I want to the spell to miss about this attack. Because they have been why a

widely publicized. And I learned a long time ago as a historian that once a myth gets in the service circulation truth has very little opportunity good to contend against. The myth well circulated becomes history no matter how incorrect it is. The first myth is that the planes went out over the Mediterranean and came at Egypt from the West in order to. Create deception. I have for example a map here from. The London Times which gained wide circulation because that was how British experts figured out the strike must have taken place. The New York Times then reproduced it and was picked up by our news magazines and so now everybody accepts the fact that they swung through the middle far to the westward through the Mediterranean and no one has looked at the fact that had they made that circle they would have not had a fuel enough to get back to Israel which of course does

have some importance. These planes went out of Egypt from northeast to southwest. Just taking ashore cars out over the Mediterranean and great for the target area. And they were flying only 50 to 100 feet above the sea staying under the radar beam. And that's how they did it. The real power of that morning. Was not that the radar might pick them up but that they might crash into the sea because they had a peculiarly glassy sea. Absolutely no motion had there been just some. Just a little kick up in the surface of the ocean that have been the strain would not have been anywhere near as great.