Dilemmas of power; 8; Debate -- Richard J. Barnet vs. Klaus Knorr

The. WB in Baltimore in cooperation with the Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting and Johns Hopkins University present the annual undergraduate student project. The 1971 Milton S. Eisenhower symposium. An 11 part series of featured speakers presenting formal addresses followed by informal question and answer sessions. This year's topic Soviet American relations or dilemma is of power. On this program a debate between Richard Jay Barnett co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies and Klaus nor professor of international relations at Princeton University. The topic of the debate the pace and extent of disarmament. Dr. Eisenhower ladies and gentleman perhaps the most pressing problem facing the United States in the Soviet Union is that of arms control.

Today's forum will focus on the necessity pace and extent of Arms Limitation the issue being debated by two outstanding scholars in the area Dr. Richard J. Barnett co-founder and co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies was educated at Harvard College and Harvard Law School. He has served as a specialist in international law for the U.S. Army a fellow of the Harvard Russian Research Center and a visiting professor at Yale University. During the Tenet Kennedy administration he was an official of the State Department and a consultant to the Department of Defense. He is the author of a number of books including who wants disarmament and intervention and revolution. Dr Klaus nor William Stewart Tod professor of public affairs at Princeton University holds an LLB from the University of Tubingen in Germany and a doctorate from the University of Chicago. From 1941 to 1945. He started as an economist at the Food Research Institute of Stanford University in

1945 Professor Norge on the faculty where he played an important role in the research program of the Institute of International Studies. He was called to the first faculty of the Princeton Center of International Studies when it was formed in 1951. He served the center as director from one thousand sixty one to one thousand sixty eight. And since 1964 has held the Todd chair of public affairs an important contributor to a number of academic fields. Professor Norris books include military powers and potential. And on the use of military powers in the nuclear age. Dr. Barnett. Of the. Thank you. Dr. Eisenhower Chairman ladies and gentleman. We are now in the twenty seventh year of post-war disarmament discussions at the dawn of the nuclear age in August 1945. A wave of revulsion and horror swept

over the world for the first time the idea of human extinction coming about as a result of deliberate supposedly rational human acts became a theoretical possibility. Today the destruction of the earth as a hospitable environment for man would be the certain outcome of what the Pentagon likes to call a nuclear exchange. And that whether or not an American atom survived as the late Senator Russell once demanded he must to begin the process of civilization again. The final gap in the never ending arms race that has frightened the American people with Farmer gaps. Missile gaps and the submarine gap is a civilization gap. But we all know this every president of the United States since Truman has said something like the Sens that Arthurs Lazar once wrote for John F. Kennedy civilization must put an end to the arms

race or the arms race will put an end to civilization. But why after 27 years have we accomplished so little. Primary reason I would suggest is that the United States which has always been ahead in the arms race has never seriously considered basing its national security on anything other than superiority in nuclear weaponry. When I was in the Kennedy administration all attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union for parity or rough equality in weaponry were turned aside by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that we had an asset which we could not surrender. When some of us pointed out that the decision to match or to attempt to overtake the United States. It was in the power of the Soviet leadership to take that indeed they had more discretion to direct resources away from the civilian economy to the military than we did even though it hurt them are the answer from the Chiefs was

something to the effect that they would not there. Well that was 1963 and 1964 and since 1964 if we are to believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves they have dared indeed. The consequence of our great Sperry already and the stunning victory over the Cuban missile crisis which the candidate in which the Kennedy administration knowingly risked hundred and fifty million lives. This is President Kennedy's own calculation for the humiliation of Khrushchev and his overthrow by a group dedicated to catching up with the United States in nuclear arms. The same joint chiefs who privately disparaged the Russians as contenders in the arms race. They were always Alarmists in public particularly around budget time but much more cautious much more realistic in their assessments in private. They are now worried about the Soviet buildup and I am too. After spending

one trillion and a half dollars on the arms race in all its forms the United States today has far less security than it had when the process began. More missiles are aimed at US cities and in many other ways the world has become a far more dangerous place for Americans to live in as well as for everybody else besides the US and the US as are three other nations. Britain France and China are stockpiling nuclear weapons. Ten more nations at least are on the threshold of becoming nuclear powers among them nations like Israel and Egypt with powerful internal pressures to use such weapons for their very survival. Advances in nuclear technology now mean that nuclear weapons will become cheaper and more available. And there is no reason why nuclear weapons should become and should not become available on the private market just like any other weapon. Most wars are accidental only in the sense

that they involve political miscalculation. The reality is that we have yet to conclude an agreement that seriously inhibited our military capabilities. The test ban was a welcome anti-pollution measure but far more nuclear tests have been conducted since 1963 underground they were conducted in the entire previous 18 years. And in this period the most dramatic and destabilizing advances in weapons technology have taken place. There is a fundamental inconsistency between a meaningful disarmament agreement and an ideal military posture. You cannot seek security through the arms race and disarmament at the same time. Now why choose disarmament. The reason is not that disarmament makes war impossible that one time it was possible to talk about banning all weapons under an international agreement in which the risk that someone would hide an atomic bomb would be substantially less than the risks of the arms race. And thats of course all that one

can ask of a disarmament agreement. But the risks of the War of the agreement be less than the risks of the arms race. And it would be the height of folly if one made that assessment of the risks not to take not to opt for the lesser risk. But that folly was committed a long time ago and it is now impossible to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and hence it is impossible to control the risks that someone might conceal a nuclear weapon and use it for blackmail. The great fantasy against which our elephant time nuclear arsenal is supposed to provide protection. But the real there is a real reason for disarmament and for radical disarmament. Very basic slashing cuts in our military budget and in our military establishment. It is a requirement I believe of our national survival and global survival because it is a precondition for the reorganization of our society and for a reorganization of Soviet society.

Just as every increment of the arms race strengthens those forces which in our society which have a vested interest in keeping tensions high in preempting resources and technology for the military and in militarizing the economy and society so deep cuts in military budgets which shrink the military establishment to some reasonable size increase the power of those forces in our own country and hopefully in the Soviet Union as well with an interest in building an economy of life instead of an economy of death. Disarmament is a crucial policy because it signifies a shift in the balance of power within domestic society. The argument for disarmament is not based on the belief that we live in a perfect world or even in a good world. Quite the opposite. The compelling need for disarmament is that it is a deadly dangerous world and it is growing more dangerous. The arms race is only one of several global perils exhaustion of resources maldistribution of wealth threatens to engulf mankind. The absorption of resources and above all

creative energy in fighting a hopeless arms race diverts attention from the incredible risks now facing the human family. Yes of course there is a possibility that some madman may launch nuclear weapons against us although it is hard to see how adding to the ten thousand nuclear warheads we already have will improve his sanity. If the Russians have not gotten the point now I'm afraid they never will. But fortunately the evidence is overwhelming that the civilian leadership of the USSR has gotten the point and has strong political interests of their own in ending the nuclear arms race through disarmament. It is possible to encourage those forces in the Soviet Union who have a vested interest in peace and a reordering of Soviet priorities. Instead of playing into the hands of the Soviet military or worse than stealing military secrets. Our most absurd illusion. The.

That's in a. World in which nuclear war remains feasible. And it's to my mind an obsolete and of serious political organisation. Yet as long as the traditional system off national military superiority is not modified fundamentally and proselytes armament comment themselves as a second order attractive approach to what making the present international system less prone to disastrous events and flop scale destruction. The twin purposes of arms control should be first to render the outbreak of interstate war and especially war between major powers less likely. And

second to reduce the destructive mess off or should it nevertheless break out to what the first objective and that of minimizing the present potations of major wars. International arms control can only make a limited contribution. Surely this objective cannot be achieved unless governments pursue foreign policies which if not peaceful do minimize resort to military power in the pursuit of external objectives. This will hardly happen unless increasing normative restraints internalized by elites everywhere effectively de-emphasize the use of force generally. Regarding the second objective of arms control that of making war less destructive should or are presently dominant arms control doctrine in the nuclear field

dominant at least in the United States is clearly counterproductive. The doctor enough fine idea turns into relying on the balance of terror in order in order to minimize the outbreak off a nuclear war is calculated to do precisely the opposite of minimizing destruction. Should mutual deterrence fail it is the assured destruction of cities and populations which gives the posture of finite deterrence its chance to work. But it is a fairweather posture and should it fail. The results would be catastrophic and I will return to this basic weakness of the postulate wrong. In order to arrive at a realistic judgment of fastest possible speed we must note and evaluate the impediments to rapid progress that decelerate us so to speak. Among the three

principal decelerate US one is surely the normal preoccupation of top leaders with problems of the day whatever they are the problems that demand action now on issues which directly affect the locked electoral role or other political survival of governments and the notorious reluctance of government bureaucracies to strike out boldly in new directions. It is perfectly legitimate to urge leaders to give higher priority to the business of arms control than they customarily do. And you still rock the innovative capacity of bureaucracies but we are dealing here with impediments which cannot be wished away and which are deeply anchored in sticky realities. The second impediment is constituted by the reluctance of parties whose role and personal interests are tied to the preservation of military security through force or even to the

expansion and improvement of national military strength. Yet we are dealing here also with people whose very assigned role in society requires them that you timidly to look out for certain particular values in government and society. These are in our context the role specialists charged with promoting the value of national security. Whether they are military men or scientists they would be irresponsible if they did not bring their own concerns vigorously to the fore. Third there is the obvious fact that the achievement of Arms Control and Disarmament like the achievement of most valued things is not costless to the single minded pursuer of any one value cost in terms of other values may be irrelevant. But governments are not and cannot be single minded. They pursue a variety of goals and find that the pursuit of any one.

Often if not usually conflicts with a pursuit of another. This is the perennial problem of opportunity costs and tradeoffs. Take national security for instance to make rapid and far reaching progress toward design movement is apt to involve sizeable security risks. How much risk are we ready to accept for how much of the promise of disarmament. Bargaining strength tends to favor the party whose demand for agreement is the more efficient and it is by no means inconceivable that a party enters such negotiations less in order to achieve control then by exploiting the Arms Control eagerness of others to improve its relative military power. Having put the current US Soviet attempts at negotiation into product perspectives I will now mention the more important measures which I would like to

see seriously considered by the two governments. First any agreement designed to reduce the risk of a military encounter between the two superpowers resulting from inadvertence and poor information is clearly an interest of both. And I recently negotiated the improvement of The Hotline and the agreement to lay down rules for avoiding accidental clashes when naval vessels and possibly military aircraft maneuver themselves into close proximity are arrangements of its kind. Second I favor a freeze of the numbers of retaliatory nuclear systems with a distributive pattern that prevents the increase in particular nuclear weapons that have potentially a first strike or damage limited in capability and whose deployment can be monitored by national means of intelligence. Once a freeze is established a freeze of this kind. It should be possible to proceed with a mutual reduction in the

number of retaliatory weapons beginning with systems that are technologically obsolescent such as non mobile systems. Third I favor an agreed upon severe limitation on missile flight test parents flight tests. I understand that some test flights are required to check on the reliability of deployed we tell iterative missiles. I also understand that any limitation of this kind could not rule out the opportunity for cheating. I would nevertheless like to see this possibility explored very seriously since such an agreement would help to slow down the qualitative race and especially slow down improvements in missile accuracies. Fourth I favor a complete or nearly complete nuclear test ban again in order to decelerate the qualitative arms race generally but also in order to minimize nuclear proliferation. I take it that recent improvements in

seismographic capabilities permit nuclear explosions above allow yield to be distinguished from Earth's quakes. If a complete bem proved the negotiable because of disagreement on site inspection exempting underground explosions below a very low yield would still be a useful step in the right direction. Finally in order to facilitate arms control or progress it would seem useful to me to consider agreements of a temporary but renewable nature duration say for 3 or 5 years. Such time limits would probably permit negotiating States to take greater risks on behalf of nuclear arms control and to gain valuable experience while the agreements were in force. I will conclude by making two observations about the U.S. deterrence and defense posture to which less conservative arms controllers are apt to object. First assuming that this country is serious about achieving progress in nuclear arms control and

disarmament it would be counterproductive for the United States in an Uncertain World. To weaken its relative defense and in terms posture unilaterally it seems to me very uncertain that a Soviet leadership which is obviously attached to Atmel Soviet security would voluntarily reciprocate. It would be tempted more likely to accept any security windfalls and though perhaps this is less likely Soviet hardliners might be tempted to aspire to Soviet military superiority and exploiting such superiority. I know that a sizable reduction in defense expenditures is a desirable objective in its own right and substantial substantial and progressive nuclear and other control and disarmament should gradually bring considerable economies however to exact economies first before international agreements justify

them would seem to me to put the cart before the horse to do something at once dangerous and at a cost to the prospects of arms control and disarmament. Admittedly the beginnings of serious Armstrong drove will result in only marginal savings at best. Yet such savings should be regarded to my mind as a benefit which pales in significance compay up with making this country and the world as a whole safer by minimising the outbreak of nuclear or any other kind of major war and of curbing the scale of destruction in the event military conflicts materialize nevertheless. Thank you. We'll move into a five minute rebuttal period now. Dr. Barnett. Dr. Noor is proposing.

What is essentially been the strategy of the United States since the end of the war from strength if in fact we build up we are more likely to achieve arms control agreements which he considers to be desirable. I think the evidence historical evidence is overwhelmingly against this. The Soviet Union behaves very much like the United States. Back to the military. Both sides are remarkably similar in the way they look at the world and neither one likes to be in the position of accepting a permanent Very already. I remember in 1968 when I was in this army and we made the argument now that we're ahead. This is a good time to negotiate. The answer always was well. Can one wear head. Why should we give up.

And of course now the Soviet Union is building up the joint chiefs come up with precisely the same answer. The Soviet Union is building out. We can't we can't have an agreement. I think that the worst thing we could have done if we were serious about trying to get an agreement in the talks was to go ahead and to go ahead with the ABM which we did considerably in advance of the Soviet Union and much as far as we can tell at a much greater scale. Dr. North talks about idealists but I cannot. There's nothing idealistic about the proposals for disarmament. I think what is what seems to me more more idealistic is the notion that given this dynamic. Given the enormous investment which continues to be made and the psychological political and economic dependence on military establishments of both countries that you can assume that mere rationality mere.

Rational notion of what the national interest pars is going to bring an end to the arms race in the country. So I say that before you get arms control you must have disarmament. You must have the kind of disarmament in which the power of these military institutions are curtailed and in which in which institutions are created which begin to look at the World in and begin to look at national security in nonmilitary terms. Because the great tragedy I think of this whole. Arms Race quite apart from the what I believe are the growing risks of nuclear war is the fact that there are other security dangers which are growing. In. At an alarming rate. Which the arms race can only complicate it has no way of dealing with the problem of pollution and other things that you're familiar with

that can only complicate them. So I believe that we really are back to. Where we were 10 years ago. If we believe that and I think the whole history of 10 years has shown that the kind of arms control that you can get by leaving military establishments at their present peak of power are meaningless agreements and do not attack the great risks of war that confront us. Professor Gore. Yeah I have to put the check myself against. And something that Dick down at center he criticized me proposing that US not negotiate about nuclear arms control except from a position of strength. I did not say that and I don't believe it. What I did say is that the United States

in preparing itself for these very important negotiations should see to it that unilaterally it would not find itself in a position of inferiority implied in Israel. It was a great clearly I think that the best time to negotiate when approximately equal strength prevails which is indeed roughly the case at the present time and I imagine this is one of the reasons why it has proved possible over the last two years to start serious negotiations. So I think there you just misunderstood me. Now it is on the other hand true that probably were he and I differ is on the notion of politics how these things can come about how I'm scoundrel and design can be achieved and I have I think in my initial statement indicate the three very difficult conditions that one has to evaluate before one can have a justified measure of how fast these things can happen how fast they can

they can go and the extent of the achievement that can be expected over a short period of time. From that point of view I sort of don't believe as Mr. Bennett says that the reason why and nothing much has been accomplished a nuclear arms control so far. And when this mistake of the United States it is also the mistake of the United States to say it's primarily predominantly United it was a mistake of the United States is simply not true. And I would also say that while it is true that what has been achieved so far over the last 10 years or a dozen years in the area of Arms Control and Disarmament is not very much. It's not a great achievement. And it certainly is not enough when compared against the requirements to achieve a situation in which mankind in its various divisions will be more

secure and safer. But by any sort of historical comparison the achievement is not all that that has been a great deal of progress not as fast as I would like to see it but just the same. One should not say it's insignificant because this is the kind of business which governments too have to learn how to do and how to do it well and I am on the whole really not enormously pessimistic certainly not as pessimistic as Mr. Barnett is about the future prospects of arms control nuclear disarmament. Thank you Professor nor We're going to open it up now to a rather informal discussion period between the two participants. Dr. Barnett wishes to open. Well I think there are a couple of points I think in which you misunderstood me. I think that I certainly don't suggest that. Genie disarmament is all I would contend.

There's the principal responsibility it has from the beginning for the reason that first the United States had the monopoly of nuclear weapons had the most options and the most power and influence and prestige to set the frame of reference for the whole disarmament discussion. And unfortunately I think that frame of reference was set in the wrong direction. Today I think the Soviet Union bears increasing responsibility for it. I think that the Soviet Union for reasons of its own in the 1950s was far more interested in disarmament. Because it was the weaker power and because they had far greater demands on resources and a far easier way of allocating resources to the civilian economy than than we did. I still think that the United States has set the tone and is in a position to set the

tone for the whole world. On the subject of nuclear weapons. Well to respond to that very briefly. It seems to be nevertheless historically it is not an important point that while the United States of course was filed the superior military power especially in a strategic level right after World War Two. At that time the implications of nuclear military power are very little understood. And I think as soon as they were understood on both sides in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States the Soviet Union of us despite all rhetoric basically unwilling to negotiate before they had achieved a degree of parity. And I think this has been very clear. If one reads between the lines in their position over the last few years particularly and I'm not sure and I'm not saying they are they can be blamed for that. I think from this point of view I think in fact it's in line

with the implications of my own paper as far as the U.S. position is concerned. I would not expect them to have acted any differently. Regarding again of course if one organizes once in society and want to conduct war and two makes rights Well this seems to be just a vast exaggeration of what the United States has been about during the last few decades. As I've indicated earlier as long as societies we got themselves to have a security problem to some extent they make provisions in terms of money in terms of providing administrative structures and so on to take care of that particular value. And these the people who have been charged with that responsibility cannot cannot be criticised for doing that. This does not mean that these people do actually or should control the whole system and I don't believe that they have or that they do at the present time. But maybe this is a matter of opinion or just cannot agree.

I'd like to open the discussion to the audience. If there are questions from the audience please direct them to either of these gentlemen are both of them at the microphones to facilitate this. Please keep your questions short and do not touch the microphone. Thank you. What percentage of population loss would be acceptable to the United States or Russia. They would say if I would only lose 50 percent of my population and I could win the war I'd go ahead or if I'd lose 75 percent of my population I'd go ahead with the war. I would win. Could you give me a feeling for what you think that type of population loss would be acceptable to either Russia or the United States. Well what you are asking is ultimately an empirical question. And this can only be answered by the decision makers. OK this is this is an ultimately a subjective kind of thing.

Well given that I would like to make a point in the United States. OK I think that I think the question you raise is absolutely crucial. It's true that only the decision makers at the time can give you the accurate answer. The real answer. But I think that the whole system of deterrence is based on some reasonable estimate of what that would be and how human beings behave and I would argue that no rational leader no one that I know or would in my view launch a nuclear war or even one or two major cities will be destroyed. I cannot conceive of that and I don't see any evidence from.

Any psychological or historical evidence to support that. I think that the best you can say is that a person as crazy as Hitler. Might do that and maybe he would. Maybe a crazy person will come along and if that's if that's the vary in the situation the whole system doesn't work. OK then given that information like that might but that's not quite right. This one is really actually much more complex. Now this is what ultimately deterrence the threat value does utility times the probability of the threat actually being executed. It's a product of two different things and you have to take this into consideration and scenes among those people that have looked very carefully at the problem if a country is hit first where they would make any sense to make good its retaliatory threat. That is to say people

have looked at this nuclear dilemma as it has been called and do not find it very credible lead to retaliatory threat will actually be made good. This may mean you need it within the system and the probability of such will tell you ation is actually quite low and therefore if you damage the damage is greater and times the probability estimate gives you more deterrence value. Now what is enough. This is ultimately an empirical question Mr Obama would say he doesn't believe any leader in the world a sane leader he sent would be willing to jeopardize to as we have seen as he may be right for us. The point that I was going to bring is that if the United States were to just get rid of all of its weapons essentially saying we would never make a retaliatory effort. The proposition is that the Russians actually strike the United States given the pollution characteristics of. The atomic weapons they would end up.

I've read figures. I don't know how accurate but there's good evidence that they would end up decimating their own population due to the pollution characteristics of the weapons being used to such an extent that even if the United States not retaliate they could not afford to strike and therefore the whole question of parity and so forth was out the window the pollution characteristics of the weapons being used is a deterrent. I think one of the other element in this deterrence business that is often overlooked is the incentives that we used to assume. Remember joint chiefs always used to say in the 50s say that next year is the year of maximum danger that's the year when the Soviets will get a certain number of weapons and then the assumption was that they will strike. Because of their evil ideology and because of the kind of people they are and because of

their position in the world they will strike. It seems to me that the Soviet Union. And the United States are in certain kinds of competition and the Soviet Union is interested in weakening the United States in lots of ways as indeed the United States is interested in weakening the Soviet Union. But there is nothing to suggest that the Soviet Union had an overwhelming interest even if you get away scot free in doing that and I think that that also has to be taken in the equation I happen to think I'm against total unilateral. Disarmament. To propose that as a policy totally unilateral even though it might in my gut I think we could do that and not probably not have a nuclear attack but I would not want to put that kind of temptation on anybody and I'm not suggesting that. What I am

suggesting is that we could get into a situation where we have a fraction a small fraction of what we've got that we could get them to get a small fraction of what they've got. And even if it were a system under which they could cheat and hide and we did studies on this they could cheat to a tremendous extent it still turned out not to make any difference it still does not look like a rational thing for any sane man to do. You know you want to count well maybe two aspects of this. I also do not regard the Soviet system as being an evil system but neither do I regard the United States of being equally evil either. That's perhaps where the difference that is then on the other hand to rely on the environmental effects of nuclear detonations as a deterrent. I've just not seen anywhere I mean knows anything about the

subject either in this country and Japan or in the Soviet Union France or England who would want to rely on that. For deterrent purposes. Maybe this is just such a new idea that nobody has yet sufficiently examine it. I do not really believe there is much in because I think these effects under those circumstances will be highly controllable if the other side has no nuclear weapons to retaliate worth. It wouldn't take these large scale applications of nuclear weapons for the other country. In that case in fact it would all need. All it would need is a threat. Knowing environmental consequences of any kind I question Dr. Barnett. This is more of a comment on a supporting statement rather than an idea. You said that I get the impression that you're one of your primary dislikes of the ABM was that with the American and with America going ahead with the system before the Soviet Union

you felt that this endangered the SALT talks and I was wondering why you made that statement. When the Soviet Union already has the ABM system around Moscow I believe it's called the galoshes and are building it around Leningrad and ours will not be operational till the middle or late 70s. First place a different kind of system. The Soviet system is basically an anti bomber system and that assumption that it's a very classic example of how the arms race works that was was initially built by the United States against supposition. The Soviet Union was going into a full scale ABM system. People then testified before Congress that wasn't the case. Now apparently I haven't looked at the latest things. Perhaps now that they are going into the woods. Wouldn't surprise me at all if they do. If they did I think that the basic point is that.

The real meaning of these disarming negotiations are not small technical differences where you have a limited ABM agreement or not. It's it's a signal each side is looking at the signal of the other as to whether they're moving up or down and if you take if you're a Soviet planner and you look at the United States in 1971 you look at the defense budget and you look at Merck. And you look at the administration going ahead with even with the strong play of the Senate to stop the way just have a moratorium. I would conclude virus of your plan or the United States was interested perhaps in a limited agreement which would not materially affect its military capabilities but that it had not that it was not moving in the direction of substantial arms control and I think that I think you're right.

Did you want to comment on. Yes I would like very much. On his last point. But I do not make these comments let me say first of all because I want to argue against the arms control thing I'm so much in favor of it. But I do want to argue against some of the arguments that I'm hearing. For example this last statement that if the Soviet leaders look at the US defense and defense budget going up and up they can only conclude such and such and such. The fact of the matter is as far as strategic weapons are concerned the U.S. budget military budget has been going down not the total military budget because as a result of Vietnam days of course increased a great deal. But as far as strategic systems are concerned in terms of percentage of Gross National Product this country has been spending over the last two or three years already and is scheduled for the next year to spend a great deal less than it spent in the early 60s are in the

middle 60s. Sim at the same time the expenditures that had really gone up from this point of view understandably expenditures because they have been catching up. That is to say if people look at what is happening to expenditures on the other side the picture is just factually completely the opposite. Now I'm not saying that in order to infer from it we shouldn't conclude that the Soviet Union is up to get military superiority. All I want to do is really correct statements which are really factually not true. I would like to defend the statement just very briefly because I think it's important for us. We spend about six billion dollars a year on it and the Soviets probably are not they're not sophisticated about what goes on in the United States of course is strategic. Part of the defense budget has gone down during the Vietnam War. But they also read what the military the military has of these 13 major weapons systems

of a strategic character which they have already said you know there are just four. Major projects in which. There is a strong likelihood of strong support for a strong likelihood that we're going to go forward at least at least this that the Pentagon has said and the administration is probably going to be taken up with these systems so that. The United States particularly is going ahead with which is stage. So I don't think that just the budget really is

very gentle and technics would you move your microphones up please. Next question. This is directed to Dr. Nora. You mentioned earlier that after World War 2 the Russians were hesitant to negotiate about disarmament. Today China is developing nuclear weapons. Do you feel they're ready to negotiate as far as disarmament is concerned and if not what will be their effect upon the future of disarmament. Well I I cannot give you really a satisfactory answer to that. The Chinese say they have on general and complete is going as fast as possible. I mean this is their announced position. Now many countries have announced position positions like that and many right came right down to it that wasn't Panny not much more beyond rhetoric in them that is the Soviet Union that's made these statements before the United States has made these statements before. So this is again an empirical question I don't know.

It is very clear to me that if China goes ahead and develops itself as a major nuclear power that effective nuclear arms control and disarmament will have to involve China of course it can no longer then be a bilateral thing between the Soviet Union and the United States and will become probably a much more complicated than it is at the present time. But I don't think I can give you really a satisfactory answer to your question because I would have to know exactly what how the Chinese leaders feel about it and I don't know that. Thank you. I'd like to address this question to both of you. During the 1960s and the 1950s disarmament policies tend to centered around strategic strategic arms doing the primary cause of war as a possible breakdown and security within the strategic sector. However presently with the virtual parity of Soviet and American general purpose forces in some areas specifically the

Mediterranean it's viewed as possible now that nuclear war could result as a as an outgrowth of conventional confrontation. Do you think in light of this that there can be disarmament proceedings in which conventional forces and nuclear forces are treated to different planes or not treated at all. Yes I do I think that it's essential to both. I think that. There is a strong interest of the United States in disengaging from areas of the world in which they are in conflict that is their strong military reason for doing that. The problem I think the problem the problem is that both sides have

been engaged in competitive intervention. Again I have to say my view on this but the Soviets are catching up and are imitating us more and more in doing this. I think again I think that I think that there is a possibility of really bold diplomacy in trying to encourage both to back off. It's tempting for the Soviet Union to play this great power rope there are very great risks to it which they appreciate and the political effects. I think the political games in terms of spreading communism to the extent that they're interested in that which I think is not very great. Someone out there they give military aid to Egypt and

they put the leaders of the Communist Party. I think that they have an I think it's in their interest as a as a state to try to back off from that. Seems to me that the United States should try to create the kind of diplomatic environment in which the Soviets will come to perceive that interest as strong as possible. I think that's I think it can be done. I think it gets harder and harder each year as we go on. Well I really I generally agree with Mr. Bennett I said except for the fact that I don't accept the kind of cries ation of the United States as being the major source of legal progress in these mountains. Well that's sort of a struggle evaluation I guess on which we differ all over his room. One last question you said before that you favored

stopping the progress and development of forward weapons such as the ABM and cetera. Would you clarify the parameters of your concept of this armament by commenting on specific non-strategic weapons development such as B-1 bomber F-14 fighter and the new hunter killer submarine. I think it's I think the most. Production cut off there I think. I think the most serious credit and cut off in 1964 before he got involved unfortunately didn't take him up on it. I think that's regrettable. I think the forward

momentum. The fact that you've got. It's not just new weapons coming out that really doesn't bother me so much as an additional nuclear bomb. It's just a waste of money really going to change. The world much if we have a nuclear weapon the ones that are more than sufficient to blow everybody up. That incriminated weapons isn't going to make much difference. What does make a difference is that you've got your most creative people you've got your most important segment of the industry you've got your government geared to thinking. What I think is a basic illusion that these additional weapons are somehow good and as long as you have people doing that they are immobilized from thinking about alternatives. They talking about the risks of disarmament or the risks of arms control without really addressing. We have very serious problems I think we have a very serious economic problem in this

country. Conversion of industry. I think it's to some extent this is about a faith that the real evidence that's been done. The real study that's been done and what you've got is a series of. Madison Avenue reports by the government like the Ackley report which always use almost the same language saying yes of course this country can and can convert its military production without a planning etc etc.. The same words used over and over again. And in fact the planning has never been done and where the next administration has made cutbacks in the military it's had disastrous local economic effects of Route 128 in Boston California. And these are real problems these are real security problems for the United States which

nobody is looking at. And we continue to talk about with one or the other submarine or whether it's good to have a submarine at 200 feet or whether we should have something on the floor of the ocean and all of this I think is quite meaningless. Nor would you care to comment. Well perhaps it is a matter of a far reaching disarmament which I would be in favor of it if it's done multilaterally I think it be a very good thing. I mean I do think however that and studies have been made to the fact that several studies that this would be no major problem of economic dislocation in the United States because if it does happen it will not come from one day to or through the other it will be the result of a gradual process stretching over a number of years and perhaps a decade or more so that any kind of economic occupational

adjustments would not be very great. And a kind of planning that is required is really very simple basically if you reduce one type of expenditure in the economy all you have to do is increase in an additional expenditure for something else accordingly and the planning that is really required is that by Congress if this kind of planning has not been done so far is because the problem is not acute at the present time. But surely if it became acute as a result often negotiating a far reaching arms control schemes with other countries in the world the Congress would see the necessity of making direct kind of planning. What sort of expenditures either by private consumers in terms of tax cuts or what other public expenditure should take the place expenditures that would be foregone the type that went into the military sector of the national security sector before and as I said nobody expects these to be anything but a gradual process that even the adjustment difficulties would not be very great so from the economic point of view I see

no great obstacle to progress in that direction. Thank you gentlemen. You've been listening to a debate on disarmament pace and extent between Richard Jay Barnett co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies and a class nor professor of international relations at Princeton University. On our next program the associate editor and chief political writer of his vest will discuss the origins of the Cold War from a Russian point of view. In cooperation with Johns Hopkins University and the Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting has presented the 1971 Milton S. Eisenhower symposium. Soviet American relations the dilemmas of power. The executive producer and editor is Thomas an original theme

music by Don Schwartz. For a printed copy of this program send $1 to dilemma's of our. Transcript. Number eight Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting. Owings Mills Maryland. 2 1 1 1 7.