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If we go to the office who in recent years not only have reviewed the vast literature of comparative psychology both books and periodical articles but I have also tried to assess our interpret the findings and formulate the conclusions that can be drawn from the experimental data. We cannot help but know three assumptions that are widely shared. One is the assumption of materialism. Not as a metaphysical truth but as a working hypothesis. A procedural decision to avoid theories that employ references to mind or mental processes as something distinct from neurological processes are distinct from observable or inferrable elements of our behavior. Thus for example Donal had 1058 textbook of psychology Wright's mind and mental. Refer to processes inside the head. The determine the higher levels of organization behavior in this book. We shal assume that mind is an activity of the brain and that our knowledge of it is chiefly theoretical inferred from behavior rather than obtained directly from self observation that is
meant for spectrum. He goes on to say that one theory of mind is animistic that I quote The body is inhabited by an entity having nothing in common with bodily processes. The other is physiological or mechanistic I quote. It assumes that mind is a bodily process. Modern psychology works with this latter theory only to which have ads I quote. There is certainly no decisive means available for proving one theory to be right and the other are indicating it's a procedural assumption procedural posture. Similarly Charles E.. Good method in theory in experimental psychology 93 says that the psychologist must follow J.B. Watson in eliminating mentalistic constructs such as thought ideas images from Psychological Science. Or if we had with them we must at least that the deny that they partake of something other than the material world. Otherwise he says we should be unable to investigate them at all with scientific method. Again it is clear that the materialistic assumption is made for methodological reasons. This is further confirmed by
the remark of TC that attempts to conceive those processes thinking reasoning conceiving anticipating as constituting a single noncorporeal agency distinct at all times from body quote have failed dismally as a basis for protection and science. A second assumption that follows closely on the first is also clearly procedural is stipulates that scientific method in the comparative study of human animal behavior must treat human animal subjects in the same way and under the same kind of laboratory conditions. In both cases the data or research must be objective observable items of behavior including in the human case the protocol statements made by the human subject as units of observable behavior. The third assumption is the principle of continuity. This law is at the foundation of comparative psychology. It's legacy from the theory of evolution in the context of which comparative psychology arose and developed
implicit everywhere in contemporary psychology and behavioral science. It is sometimes explicitly stated as a controlling or regulated principle of psychological investigation and interpretation. An article on the evolution of learning has a hollow Wisconsin writes I quote. If we are to explain learning in terms of evolutionary theory they have must be continuity from the simplest to the most complex forms of learning. The appearance of a radically new kind of learning at any evolutionary point period including that during which man developed is not in keeping with modern gene theory which had time to read that three times to you. It was terribly important statement. Hollo then criticizes that chance. One of the paleoanthropologists Internet biologist I quoted earlier for saying that man is not simply a very clever ape but a possessor of mental abilities which occur in other animals only in the most rudimentary forms if at all. He says How can how can drop
chance get geneticists say a thing like this which violates the whole principle of phylogenetic continuity and less critical right much less critical writer as a heretic see Judson Herrick. The evolution of human nature treats the continuity of nature as an established fact that he also admits that it isn't. I quote the continuity of the series of changes in both overt action and internal structure as we passed from the you know Gammick through the ranks of the animal kingdom up to including mankind may be regarded as established. I quote then in the next sentence I quote. He admits that is not established. The apparent interruptions of this continuity are successively closed as our knowledge of the facts is in August. Who will love to statements that God is not established if the apparent and interruptions are progressively closer as our knowledge of the lodges Francis Naylor more frankly admits. I quote that a scientifically developed evolutionary conception of man as a higher animal must be in line with the principle of continuity. Regard man as
merely superior in degree never is different in kind. Before going on let me briefly come on this point. In general it can be said that the comparative psychologist the behavioral scientist acknowledge that the complete and unbroken continuity of nature is not yet fully established. They had met at the scientific evidence is still far from complete but they also believe that all the evidence so far masters confirm it is no experimental findings tend to invalidate this assumption or even to cast doubt upon it. They therefore feel that they are justified in using it as a working assumption and carrying out further experimental work in the comparative study of the human whole behavior. Let me now attempt a brief summary of the state of scientific opinion in this field of research on each point. There is a majority clearly clearly a majority of prevailing opinion where and whether there is any dissent and have a it has a bearing on the majority opinion a report the dissent.
First with one exception to be noted. The prevailing opinion among comparative psychologists is that man differs from other animals only in degree and that his mock superiors in the light of all experimental evidence are not just a matter of opinion. That is mocks a period of superiority in certain respects. His uniqueness and degree in these respects can be accounted for without positing any psychological factors or processes that would make him unique in time. This position is taken by such representative authors as hollow head. Oz good Nayla may have thought Moss Scott. The one clear exception. But I've been able to find is a paper on the evolution of intelligence appeared in the Scientific American January 1965. I am a bit in the experimental comparative psychologist. He observes.
And from the early experimental work of phone dyke on I quote learning was thought to involve qualitatively similar processes throughout the evolutionary hierarchy and it was generally supposed that I quote differences from species to species. Our only difference is of degree. He then claims that experimental work done in his laboratory on Habit Reversal and probability learning suggest I quote that as we ascend the evolution NE's the evolutionary scale. We do not find a pattern of intellectual continuity but one of discontinuity differences in kind not just in the greater that bit a man regards these differences in kind is superficial not radical is indicated by a statement that I quote the brain structures evolved by higher animals do not serve merely to replicate all functions and modes of intellectual adjustment but to mediate new ones. This one exception hardly changes the picture but it does
raise an interesting question. Benjamin like most of the paleoanthropologists and students of human evolution I see no countries no conflict between the general general evolutionary principle of phylogenetic continuity and the recognition of differences in kind. As long as these are merely superficial based on differences in degree of complexity in the central nervous system. So here's the question. Why then do the rest of the comparative psychologists appear to think that the principle of psychology that a continuity excludes all differences in kind and requires the showing by experimental evidence or theoretical interpretation of experimental data that there are only differences of degree in the scale of behavior from a low orders through the higher up to men. One answer could be that they mistakenly identify a difference in kind with radical difference in kind. The latter does violate the principle of continuity. Failing to recognize superficial differences in time as an alternative to differences in
degree. They don't necessarily insist that all differences must be differences in degree. A more likely answer however is that their experimental work and their theoretical interpretations of it. Ah dominated by Lloyd Lloyd Morgan's camp. The methodological rule which says that we should not interpret an action as the outcome of a high a mental psychical faculty. If it can be interpreted as the outcome of a LO The other consequence of adopting this rule manifest in the following points about which there are general agreement among comparative psychologists. Experimental findings are said to show the different levels in the scale of animal behavior. There are only differences of degree with respect to one the capacity for delayed response to the capacity of a mental set preparation for response prior to overt
action. 3 the capacity for solving Dettol problems getting around blocks or hindrances impediments for law. The capacity for solving problems by trial and error. 5 the capacity of being guided by cues. 6 The capacity for solving problems by Insight 7 the capacity for reasoning for combining different parts of past experience and 8. The capacity for discrimination generalization abstraction and concept formation. Those eight things I said we present all animal behavior and learning in varying degrees from the lowest up to May or certainly in the very best all are the lowest. Very present to many if not the whole world of living organisms. Hollow in a paper on the evolution of learning. Summarize these results by saying that all the phenomena of learning and thinking without any sharp
distinction between learning and thinking for a bit you ation in the lower animals to abstract thought in the HIA can be ordered in a single system in which all the differences can be explained in quantitative terrier's that is differences in degree. I quote the existing scientific data indicate a great degree of intellectual can become the anality Among the Primates and probably a greater communality among all animals that have been commonly recognised. There is no scientific evidence of a break in learning capabilities between primate and non primate folk. In addition hollo and his students have shown that the experimental work on monkeys which in their judgment shows that. Learning or problem solving for its own sake learning for the sake of learning problem solving for the sake of problem solving is not an exclusively human trait. Although there are it's conflicting data and conflicting interpretations of data derived from experimental where an animal problem solving by trial and error and by insight on animal discrimination
generalization and abstraction and animal reasoning there is no difference of opinion among the leading scientists in this field at the psychological factors and processes involved in animal behavior are identical with the psychological factors and processes operate Avenue in behavior. The snow the next day can I make going to make it as basic as I can make at this point stated negatively. The prevalent opinion among the comparative psychologists is that no new psychological factors or processes are to be found in human behavior and that no additional factors or processes need big posited to explain human behavior. This last point is emphasized by the widely shared opinion that non-verbal symbols and non-verbal symbols and non-verbal concepts function animal behavior as verbal symbols and verbal concepts. Function a new behavior abstraction. Generalization and concept formation
are not exclusively human abilities. Nor is the use of symbols. If we distinguish between verbal and non-verbal symbols to statements made by Professor Nesson the pitta mys The point being made. First when I want to quote is a major dimension of difference among animals is the sheer number of concepts. Sheer number of percepts and concepts available to the organism. Incidentally just where perceptions leave off and concepts begin is impossible to say. These terms percept and concept represent qualitative differences on a continuum to the to the extremes of which we apply differently. And quote The second quote is as follows. In all attempts to characterize the uniqueness of human intelligence the factor of language propositional language is emphasized by the language of verbal mediating responses represent an instance of extremely efficient central integration. But language does not seem to introduce any really new psychological process to
which I must add one of the statements taken by facts ahead. I quote animal studies have already shown that thinking does not need not depend on language since animals do not have language but do have fairly complex mediating processes. Human studies allow us to go further. Not only do important steps of thought occur without language they can be put the language after they have occurred. Though it is implicit in points already made. I have a minute from the summary. The unanimous agreement of the psychologists about man's unique possession of propositional language is one thing I haven't mentioned yet. The all with one exception that I'm when I wrote the sentence I just read it was unanimous since I wrote that sentence I found one exception. And the rigid exception here is by Professor FOP whose earlier book dated 1963 was not an exception in the book just published 965 science man and morals
he says. It's an amazing statement by the way although no animals appear to have a language which is one propositional to syntactic and at the same time free clearly expressive intention. Yet all these features can be found separately at least to some degree in the animal kingdom. Consequently the distinctions in Man of the animals on the ground that only the father possess true language seems to be far less satisfactory and logically defensible than it once did. Now in the book does not offer any evidence and empirical evidence and I've never seen it that there's any group of animals that has propositional speech or syntactical speech with without the evidence to support it. That's a mere obiter dicta. And if true language means the combination of all three of these fixes that remains true in spite of press of thought that only man has true language. So I'm going to let the exception as in the very weighty to me I'm going to repeat what I would have said anyway namely that this I can find no exception to the
statement among the psychologists development as well as among the paleoanthropologist. But your man's unique possession of propositional language and verbal symbols a reason why I didn't mention this before is because this agreement about this one point is the only point on which so far at least I find no exception to be taken into account. This agreement is the one exception to the proposition on the part of the psychologists that man differs from the other animals only in degree because here they can say only in degree sense they say that no other animal has the power propositional speech. Man has that the difference in kind not in degree. Even those psychologists who think there is rudimentary toolmaking in other primates and there are some who think that. Whether there's a shadowy line between tool using and tool improvising and then between tool improvising and tool making. Even those concede that sentence making sentence making is
confined to man no matter how this fact is explained. It constitutes a difference in kind between men and all other animals. However it is explained It is not explained the way the explanation the facts are. Our use of it. But if you don't explain it you don't explain things away by explaining them. And depending on how it is explained that difference in kind is he this way Fischler radical. It is either consistent with phylogenetic continuity or it mocks a basic discontinuity in the world of living organisms. Now the problem of interpretating the uniqueness of human language is of such crucial importance. But I'm going to develop the whole of the next lecture to it and all I can do now in the last few minutes of the saving is repay you for that lecture by focusing the problem for you. And I like to make one critical comment to begin with and the findings and theories that we review do they do the
findings in theories that we brew viewed from the psychologist apart from the fact of language established the proposition that human animal behavior different only in degree. Do they tend to confirm the assumption of the complete and unbroken continuity of nature. My answer to both questions is negative because the method like the methodological postulates that govern both the experimental research and the theoretical interpretation of the data could lead to no other results than those obtained Lloyd Morgan's cannon can almost be interpreted as an injunction to the researches find only differences in the grain. One could have predicted in advance that scientists operating with those postulates would find data in support of differences in degree and no contrary data that whatever the evidence of the DID find would be interpreted by them as signifying differences in degree and as being consistent with the assumption of continuity. Hence the results can hardly be taken as confirming the continuity of nature or as presented in providing us with a
decisive scientific solution of the question of how man to smother animals. That being the case the problem of interpret ing the uniqueness of human language is of crucial importance. Let me focus your attention on that problem by reviewing now the approach of the problem that is made by biologists psychologists and of behavioral scientists. What what in detail let me get this clear what in detail is the substance of the agreement that I say exists throughout the whole scientific community on the fact on the fact that only man has propositional or syntactical speech there are five points. First the scientists agree that while other animals I'm spelling out what that agreement amounts to that while other animals communicate and employ expressive cries ingestions they do not use symbols that are parts of speech and they can be combined
in a wide variety of ways syntactically to form that different declarative or derogative sentences. Second they agree that while the so called language of the bees may give the appearance of the involving declarative statements it is a purely instinctive performance and does not represent even the slightest degree the same kind of highly variable linguistic performance that is to be found in human speech. Third they agreed that the lack of speech by other primates is not due to the lack of vocal apparatus requisite for speech. And they confirm this by pointing to the imitation of human speech sounds by birds that are not able to form sentences of their own. Further they agree that while animals can learn to respond to verbal cues as dogs and domesticated animals of all kinds do they cannot initiate or use verbal cues to elicit their behavior responses on the part of other animals or men.
And fifth they agree that man's possession of propositional language is carbonated with and probably derives from the size and structure and complexity of man's cerebral cortex in which respects man is vastly superior than degrade other primates and to all of the animals with the possible exception of the bottlenose dolphin. To whom I will return again and again. Within the framework of these agreements. There is a basic disagreement between the paleoanthropologists on the one hand and the comparative psychologist and the OP the paleoanthropologists stressed man's difference in kind. By virtue of having speech in addition as well as we've seen they point to other differences in kind toolmaking organized commune life cumulate of cultural transmission. They do not for the most part make language the root or source of these other differences. They regard all these differences in kind as springing from one and the same
sauce Mansa period brain capacity and consequently they treat them all as superficial differences in kind not inconsistent with phylogenetic continuity. The comparative psychologists in spite of conceding that man alone has propositional language stressed man's difference in degree from other animals. They tend for the most part to regard the other differences toolmaking come in alive cultural transmission and the difference is of degree rather than of kind. They use man's possession of verbal symbols and propositional language to explain his great superiority and degree in the other respects. And they explain his unique possession of verbal symbols and proposition language not merely by his reference to his appearing abridged by reference to his superior brain capacity which is a difference in degree but also by reference to a Sapir you degree in Man of the same psychological factors of processes that are operated in other animals such things as a generalization abstraction
concept formation symbolization reasoning. Now though on both sides of this scientific disagreement. No philosophers involved is us. You've just won two groups of scientists. There is concurrence in the proposition that man's unique possession of language is not inconsistent with phylogenetic continuity. The comparative psychologists minimize the significance of human language by making it a superficial difference in kind in two respects not just one. It is therefore up to removes from being a radical difference in kind. For the paleoanthropologists it is superficial because they assume a critical threshold in the nor logical continuum above which language occurrence for the comparative psychologist. It is official not only for that reason but also because they supposed that human language result from man's having a superior degree of the same psychological factors that are operated in other animals.
Here too they posit a critical threshold in the continual degrees above which language occurs. Now this sets but I'm going to say now sets the stage what follows the admitted fact of the uniqueness of human language. That's raises a number of difficult questions that must be answered in order to determine the significance of the fact of the difference of that fact for the difference of man. Question. Question. Does man's possession of language result from his having psychological powers or processes not possessed in any degree by other animals. Does it require first explanation. Man's power of abstract or conceptual thought in a sense of those terms abstract and conceptual that cannot be applied to the ideational or thought processes of other animals. Those who answer this question this double question I just as negatively as do the comparative psychologist then have further questions to answer
two questions. First can man's possession of language be satisfactorily explained by this a period agreeing to which apart from his having language he has the power to form concepts generalized had lapsed fractions and so forth. Second question in the continuum of degrees in the continuum of degrees of these psychological abilities can we determine a critical threshold above which language it cuz and below which it is impossible. Now those who answer the first question the first major question affirmatively negatively affirmatively as do some paleoanthropologists and some others then face a second question. It is as follows. Can man's unique possession of abstract and conceptual thought and consequently from that his possession of propositional language be adequately explained in neurological terms. While the those who say that man has special
psychological teaches if they are going to find a continuity must find a below the level of the psychological a mineralogical level cannot be adequately explained in neurological terms those who answered this question affirmatively that it can be adequately explained in neurological terms must in addition to giving that explanation. Answer A further question in the continuum of degrees of neurological complexity. Can we determine a critical threshold above which conceptual thought and where that language occurs and below which it is impossible. Those who answer this last question negatively or the question about the adequate person say that those who s negative the question of the prior question. But whether or not. Man's possession of conceptual thought can be adequately explained in neurological terms it must offer than some other explanation of man's unique possession of the power of abstract and conceptual thought and consequently a proposition of language. Now unless these questions are answered satisfactorily. Unless they're
answered not by assertion or by assumptions but by well established data that are decisive in the sense that they eliminate all but one of the continued competing interpretations is false. The fact of man's unique possession of language must remain indeterminate in its significance for the question of how man differs from other animals. You have been listening to man and uproot the second of five lectures about the difference of men and the difference it makes. Our guest speaker for the 1966 Britannica lecture series given at the University of Chicago is Mortimer J Adler director of the Institute for philosophical research. Next week Mr Adler will talk about language and thought the difference of man and the difference it makes is produced for national educational radio by the University of Chicago.
This is the national educational radio network.
Series
Mortimer Adler lectures
Episode
Man and brute, part 2
Producing Organization
University of Chicago
Contributing Organization
University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/500-6q1sk197
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Description
Episode Description
This program presents the second part of Mortimer Adler's lecture, "Man and Brute."
Series Description
Series of five lectures by Dr. Mortimer J. Adler, Director of the Institute for Philosophic Research in Chicago. Title of lecture series: "The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes."
Broadcast Date
1966-07-28
Topics
Philosophy
Media type
Sound
Duration
00:29:20
Embed Code
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Credits
Producing Organization: University of Chicago
Speaker: Julin, Joseph R.
Writer: Adler, Mortimer Jerome, 1902-2001.
AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 66-33-2 (National Association of Educational Broadcasters)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Duration: 00:29:06
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Citations
Chicago: “Mortimer Adler lectures; Man and brute, part 2,” 1966-07-28, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed March 29, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-6q1sk197.
MLA: “Mortimer Adler lectures; Man and brute, part 2.” 1966-07-28. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. March 29, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-6q1sk197>.
APA: Mortimer Adler lectures; Man and brute, part 2. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-6q1sk197