As we see it: Vietnam '68; Harrison Salisbury/Robert Scalapino

And it seems to me that the people who were arguing a few weeks or months ago that if we really de-escalated our side of the war there could be and would be peace in the light of an offensive that was certainly planned as early as September that massive organization and preparation and that was committed in the very midst of a truce period and a truce period in a holiday season that these actions at the very moment when we were conducting a more course of the ethical authority move when we had deliberately signal our interest in some de-escalation by refraining from bombing Hanoi and Haiphong area and utilizing a third presumably friendly source to Hanoi to test their interest in the GO SEE. We got our answer it seems to me. On January 30. And that answer incidentally if it had been the answer we gave if we had used the truce period to launch a major offensive if we had taken

on the cities in this disastrous fashion with thousands of casualties. I really wonder what our moralists would have said. Sometimes I think there's a double standard. Quite frankly we are versus how the coming of you and I cannot help feeling that unless we are prepared on the one hand the stand firm on the one hand was certain that the principles were just in mutual reciprocal military de-escalation. Some kind of politicization of this conflict so that individuals within the South have a choice. But the forces participate in the electoral or political power comes through the barrel of a gun. And that willing to move from full force will guarantee.

But the people. It seems to me the principal and the beginning of the sequence from the Pearl Harbor in the earlier era of certain regions in ism is rising and understandably so but it seems to me the crucial test. Is. That we are not in massive escalation and produce the results that we want and the risks but

we think through that route to a third world. We have a series of questions that we want to ask speakers before going and perhaps we should give an opportunity for Mr. celebrated the aspects of the point of view expressed by Mr. scalloped. This cannot be dismissed as a struggle and then we might give you an opportunity to comment further if he wishes to have continued bombing of the north toward the achievement of our objectives. You know I don't really have any very sharp comments to make a Mr scholar said because we obviously have very.

Areas in which we disagree. I rather agree with his final summary and I think he agrees with a good bit of mine to the question which probably remains one of evaluation. Between the two viewpoints has to do with the present posture of the Vietnamese. These are the negotiations and possibly what in fact might occur and even generally if the settlement in Southeast Asia were proceeded with I think that any any and any specific to this would probably be brought up more sharply in the questioning and any comment. Like one of the north. Question which I want to say at the outset was undoubtedly the most difficult debate and decision taken at

least militarily during the war. I do believe that one of the factors involved in this was the feeling that the privileged sanctuary formula could not go on indefinitely. The more one read about people's war technique the more one I think realizes this is a rather sophisticated approach to the problems of developing or emerging and in a sense you allow countries to get every man every stick of a weapon every bit. Just things to their borders without any risk without any danger and all of the damage takes place on the enemy's side. Then it's very difficult for me to conceive how the people's war technique cannot be successful or it seems to me then

and I stand with favor. Incidentally not bombing China at the time of the Korean War because I felt and I think I still feel that that wouldn't want China into the war making for a very undesirable expansion of that war. But North Vietnam is already in the war and to me the central issue was not could we interdict successful way or drive Hanoi out of the war. But when were we going to say that there were some real risks involved in this kind of international behavior. We'll go back and forth from time to time. First Mr. Salisbury or Mr. scalloping on am I chance to answer first the following questions. Mr. Scapino first on this one. How much political support and what do you base your answer. Well I think that one should honestly stated that I doubt that

anyone with any assurance want of the relative support of the Communists and the non communists in South Vietnam. What measurement have really are precise and accurate. My own belief and I will give very briefly the evidence which is base my own belief is very strongly that the communists could not win a free and fair election if such would be held which is probably rather mythical. I believe that they could not win a free and fair election because in such an election in my opinion the Vietnamese people would vote as they tend to have voted in recent elections heavily up on the basis of their regional religious sect. This division this is not a nation and this is one of our great problems. The nation building problem. I think it's quite obvious that the communists have doubts that they could win elections themselves. You know it isn't structured for competitive

politics. It's structured as a paramilitary organization that take power by force and the government it's never contemplated seriously in my opinion. The competitive route and this is one of the problems of compromise. The only evidence that one can cite it seems to me is rather circumstantial and subject the child number one whenever the communists call for general strike. They have very well there are calls for boycotts of elections have been I think by the singularly unaffected. You know this may be no more than a test of the relative strength of government and non-governmental pressures but it is at least some kind of cut that they've made in the recent path offensive. My understanding is all of the evidence is certainly preliminary and I would want to re-evaluate it. But my understanding is that where they didn't call for general uprisings where they did ask people to join the Democratic and peace front that they set up they had

remarkably small degree of success and that no mean figures even those militantly opposed to the government have joined the NLF or its front type organization. It seems to me that such evidence as we have does not suggest that the communists have a control over the majority of the people. Now what I would say is that the average peasant in every society wants security. He's not likely to be in conflict conscious of political issues in the sophisticated sense and my own guess is that the real crisis in Vietnam is over who can provide individuals with security. Neither side is doing very well at that at the moment and probably the president is genuinely bewildered as most Americans. I think that's about as good a sum Asian as you could get in a political situation. And in South

Vietnam. There's an enormous amount of actual ignorance on our part and I think probably it persists in South Vietnam itself as to exactly where the people stand at this moment. But I don't think you find any very strong evidence that they are flocking to the NFL at this point. It is quite obvious I think to anyone examining the care and the extensive preparations they made for the Tet Offensive that they must have either support or ability to intimidate very very large segments of the urban population in Vietnam or they would not have been able to infiltrate their forces and their arms and distribute them with such great successors. I think that we must recognize that as a as a very genuine thing and I don't know I'm not prepared to say which was the dominant factor intimidation or or a sympathy what I would do I would prefer myself to err on the

side of assuming more sympathy for them than too little I think good. Often we allow our own wishes or feelings to be dominant as a guess and this is just a plain guess and I give it to you in that form of the dominant feeling among most South Vietnamese at this time is that war weariness and a desire as Professor scallop you know puts it for security which is the one thing in their life they don't have. They're constantly being blasted burned destroyed and by everybody that's involved in this war I'm talking about the peasants and I'd like to get out of it. I was I was impressed myself with the elections which were held in the south even though they were held under very difficult conditions and and ones that probably don't stand up so well by American standards but then there are some places where our own elections don't stand up so well by our standards either. What impressed me about them was the

fact that while the advantage was obviously to the government people the ones that were elected was the ability of other politicians civilian politicians or affiliated either with the traditional religious organizations or regional organizations or persons taking a middle view were able to roll up a rather substantial book and I would not be at all surprised that if it were possible it certainly is absolutely impossible to take an honest vote in South Vietnam. Candidates who would who would say a plague on both your houses would win by a landslide. Do you believe that most South Vietnamese want America to continue its current role in Vietnam. Do they primarily view us as protectors of their freedom and independence or as unwelcome outsiders prolong non happy war with yourself. Very first because I think we've answered that in part in the previous question and no generalization will apply here

where because of military action or operations of our own we have destroyed villages or parts of cities and sometimes two and three times over. I'm certain that the people in that area would like to have us go away. They don't seem to feel that we've given them very much security. On the other hand I think that there are substantial. Elements in South Vietnamese society who do see the American presence as a guarantee against a communist takeover and possibly a night of long knives or something of that kind Certainly the generals in the military the government people who have committed themselves so deeply to the war effort into association with the United States can be depended upon to give us as much support as they're capable of doing because this is the way their future lives. Beyond that I don't know I'm sure that you'll find in many places anti-American sentiment. You don't have to have American

troops carrying on a war in your own country to develop anti-American sentiment you just have to have American troops in the country period. If you have enough of them you're going to get anti-American sentiment and we have had latest count over 500000 in Vietnam. There is nothing with which I would disagree in terms of what was just so very small very just so I would only add in this way I think that one makes a division between the elite and the peasantry in a very complicated fashion. There are clearly at least in terms of some of the districts I have visited in South farms of enormous cordiality that develop between American rural A-type officials the sort that went out into the countryside for purposes of helping other kinds of programs under way and the local inhabitants for many of them indeed it was

perhaps the first time the local officials ever interacted with them intimately and for their own benefit and one could cite countless exam. Of friendships developing at the grassroots level between American unions and indigenous people on the other hand I quite agree that when in the course of a military battle your village is destroyed. It probably doesn't make much difference who destroy you're unhappy and you're resent. Now we've had all sorts of testimony on how the reactions go. Some say that the president has resent that the Viet Cong using the village and making it a target. Others have been saying that the president has resented the destruction when he didn't have any control over his own security and future in terms of lead elements too.

I think that the situation is enormously complicated quite frankly I think that the communists have given every avenue. But they would be as rude if they took over this country against civilians who oppose them as against the military leadership. In fact among the civilian leaders that I have talked with they have no doubt that they would be marked for assassination even if they opposed the Juki government if they in any sense got in the way of the government and I think it ought to be remembered that in the period before 1954 scores on scores of vigorous nation was who were enslaved but also refused to work with the Communists were assassinated. They ran all the way from the head of the crowd to the head of the Trotskyites in Saigon. The common denominator was their relationship to the noise communist led government so that I would say those people who've

taken anything are by and large and most likely make a last minute. These are by and large depend upon the outcome of this drug as nearly as we know how much support is there for our current policy among the countries of Southeast Asia and of Europe. Mr Rau skulking over. When I was in the class in September and October and I traveled Japan Korea and the North to very much in the south and it was not only my impression but in my discussions with people I would hardly concur with some articles which Mr. Drew Middleton wrote for Mr. Saal very paper The New York Times in so Corps and on coming the stage is concerned at the governmental level there is a very strong support for our position. There may be differences of view on our tactics.

There may be differences of support for our particular stance one way or the other but constantly the refrain that was given to me was that the Communists must not win in Vietnam. You must not withdraw your presence or it will dramatically affect. The future of this entire region. And men like Prime Minister Sato have staked their own political future and the political future of their party on this stand. So the Thais. So in considerable respect the Malaysian leadership more privately and more cautiously the Burmese and the Indonesians. But you can go down the list and even print CNN on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays says these things on Tuesdays Thursdays and Saturday he says. You know. Now in Europe I think the picture is somewhat different. I would not deny for a moment that I haven't been in Europe recently particularly at what might be called the grass roots. There's strong opposition to our

position in Vietnam and I think for a variety of reasons this does not include war with the government. Certainly it does not include the British government and it does not include the West German government at least as that government is represented by Prime Minister Kissinger but I think that if one sits back and tries to calmly analyze this problem one want to say at the outset that a major world stage in the final analysis has to take policy positions which it feels are in the interests of global peace. And it's primary need is to be respected not to be loved when we supported and game our primary priorities to Europe in the 1940s and early 50s I for one having been in Asia during that period remember the enormous attacks upon our policy by Asian leaders. And I'm not talking just about communist leaders I'm talking about the narrows and the subcontinent and even some of the more moderate Asian

nations who asserted vigorously that we were up holding Western imperialism that we were such that the decadent capitalist states that we were moving in to give Western Europe a new lease on life so that it could dominate the world. Now there was some merit perhaps in these charges but in fact we were right and they were wrong. The creation of a balance of power and your revitalization of Western Europe was crucial to our interests and ultimately to those of Asia. I'm convinced that the part of the objections in Europe historically see will appear in the same light. And the feeling that we are leaving Europe and establishing a new priority is a natural and understandable apprehension perhaps fear but in fact the Pacific area is a vital area for the future peace of the world including Europe. And unless we fail I'm convinced history will see it in this light.

I would have a slightly different view of the European situation under posters gallop you know both as to the reaction of the European governments and the public and indeed to our own order of priorities. I for one feel that we have reversed the order of priority in a rather startling fashion so far as the application of our power is concerned and have done so to the jury aeration of the American position in Europe. I continue to feel that Europe is the number one priority area. I don't regard the South-East Asian area as very high on the overall order of priorities. I feel profoundly shocked crying at the loss of an American. Prestige and authority and influence in Europe and it can be felt in every country including of course

to the large powers which continue to support us publicly. England and Germany all of these countries are increasingly divided politically on the American policy and indeed Mr Wilson in England has as his position is tends to be weakened internally by the support that he gives to us publicly to the extent that he must counter. They owe it to him and as he did fairly recently by making various gestures and I think they're just gestures in the direction. Of creating a possibility for a negotiated settlement. And you have not. You can't travel through Europe today without running into an almost universal attack upon American policy in Southeast Asia. And it is linked directly to their own feelings of security. They feel that the United States by becoming so involved there not only has

neglected Europe but it is a rather than introducing a degree of security and the world is in danger in such security as does exist. I am also much struck and alarmed by the ability of the Soviet Union to maneuver in the semi vacuum that's created by not so much our withdrawal from Europe but our complete interest in Europe. Our complete inattention to European problems. It is certainly made things much easier for the Russians I don't think they have taken all the advantage of the situation that they could but they certainly are taking a good deal of advantage advantage of it you only have to look at the weakened ties in NATO and the and the emergence of. Rather comfortable position for the Soviet Union even in Germany to see how things have gone. I think this is serious and I think we must keep it in mind and I don't brush off the criticisms of our policy

by the Europeans because I agree with them so often so far as Asian opinion is concerned. I don't think that I have very many differences with Professor scallop you know and his impressions are more recent and fresh than mine. I've been in Europe four times and within the year I've been in NATO only only at the time I was in North Vietnam in December a year ago and then before that in a rather extended trip a year ago last summer in which I covered all of the countries that Professor scallop you know did plus a couple of others such as Mongolia and Siberia. My impression at that time was that in many of these Asian countries there was a dichotomy in opinion. Some of them of course are benefiting and directly directly benefiting and very enthusiastic about our position over there notably Coleman and the Thais.

We could have no stronger ally and enthusiastic ally I think for our Vietnam effort than tie the ties all over recently there's begun to build up in Thailand a certain backlash of opinion against the Americans partly because of concern Mostar policy change partly because of the presence of so many Americans there partly because our enormous expenditures in Thailand are doing exactly what we said they wouldn't and what the Thais thought they could avoid we're producing in an inflationary runaway inflationary and their inflation in their economy and it's good may have serious consequences. So far as Joanie when in Burma's concerned when I have talked to him here and a half ago his opinion was quite cool about not he. He doesn't he has no objection to our fighting communist he likes that he fights them himself. He is much concerned about the Chinese He fights them too and in so

far as our presence over there could be regarded as a detriment to China. He would be all for it but he unfortunately didn't feel that it was adultery and he thought we were doing a very bad job of fighting the communists in Vietnam and in fact I think he would have been delighted to give us some ideas of his own and it might have been to our advantage had we taken him up on that offer. His viewpoint on this thing I think is one which you will find in other Asian countries or Cambodia. I certainly agree with the evaluation of see an Okie as he is a remarkable when male I suppose he's the only kind of a windmill that could keep Cambodia afloat in the sea of trouble that she finds herself. No telling what his opinion is going to be tomorrow about the United States China or anything else except we know that it will undoubtedly be different than it was yesterday. Some of the countries to me at least hardly seem to be countries and one of them is

Laos. I just don't know how one can evaluate the attitudes there. I'm sure that there are many people in Laos who who like and profit by our presence out there. Of course there is a milder feeling that they like to have the United States around. I think they'd much prefer to have the United States around without it being engaged in this kind of a war which as they fear might at almost any time escalate and get completely out of bounds. I think somewhat the same attitude may be expressed by the Indonesians the Japanese who are certainly our strongest supporters and that one country I believe of Asia that we must rely upon that we must maintain firm and close and warm relationships with supports us but shakes their heads sadly over what's going on. They can think of a lot of better things that might happen out there than what's happening.

You have been listening to as we see it. Sixty eight. A series of appearances of noted spokesman presenting their various views on the war in Vietnam. These speakers were recorded in the spring on the campus of Miami University in Oxford Ohio. As we see it Vietnam 68 was presented under the sponsorship of the Miami University Student Senate and was organized by Miami student Dave Spencer Burge. The speakers on today's program or Mr. Harrison Solsbury Pulitzer Prize winning journalist of The New York Times and author of Behind the Lines and a new Russia. And Dr. Robert a scallop Pino of the political science department at the University of California at Berkeley and author of the communist revolution in Asia and editor of Asian survey acting as moderator of the discussion was Dr. Rio Christensen of Miami University's

department of government production and editing of the discussions was performed at Miami University Radio WMUB. This is Bill Otter speaking for the national educational radio.