Latin American perspectives II; Episode 20 of 38

Latin America perspectives a series of information and comment about Latin America with Dr. C. Harvey Gardner research professor of history at Southern Illinois University. These programs are recorded by station w s r u FM. Here now is Dr. Gardner. You've heard it and you've probably said it. He can't see the forest for the trees. Biblical literature put it somewhat like this. You can see the speck in the other man's eye but not so the log in your own eye. It adds up whether old or new to a matter of perspective. A capacity to view things in their true relations or relative importance. Let us take this issue of perspective into international relations especially those involving interventions of recent vintage in 1065 the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic and it was not the first time we had gone there in one thousand sixty

eight. The Russians intervened in Czechoslovakia and it was not the first time they had gone there. In each instance Russian and American early and late the reactions based on perspectives were at least of three different kinds. First there was the outlook of the nation in which the intervention occurred. Secondly there was the perspective entertained by the intervening state. And thirdly there was the perspective really an array of outlooks of third powers if you will all the bystanders. When in 1905 and incidentally five seems to be the unlucky number for the Dominican Republic we went in 1905 in 1965 and oh yes 8 is the unlucky number for Czechoslovakia. The Germans went in in thirty eight. The Russians went in and forty eight. And they're back again in 68. But back to 1005 for a

moment. When we intervened in the Dominican Republic then there was no economic competition no ideological competition. Indeed if Europe was occupied at all it was with those sinister plans that suggested alliances in the making for the war that was to break out called World War 1. And so there was no check no barrier and the United States went its own way. In 1965 However when we went into the Dominican Republic it was not simply a matter of our Again doing as we pleased but rather there was also an impact on the interim American system. Call it Pan American ism. Call it the Organization of American States but call it what you may. There is an interim American system and the action of any one major power within it has an impact on the rest. In like

fashion in 1965 there was an impact on the UN. There was a world organization in one thousand sixty five the like of which there had not been in 1995. And oh yes there were some special policies that we had in 1065 such as the Alliance for Progress. And again there was impact on the special programs the like of which we had not known in 19 five. But then there is this matter of the Russian position in reference to chuckle so fuck you. They went there. As I've indicated in 1948 when Cold War was settling when they were making Central Europe safe for themselves when they were achieving they hoped for all time that defense in depth the like of which they had not known when the Nazis years earlier had plunged eastward into Russia. And so there had been a Russian

insistence upon certain conditions and chuckles of Akio in one thousand forty eight. And it is again a Russian insistence that found them there in one thousand sixty eight. It may at first blush seem to be somewhat frightening indeed. Unpatriotic and un-American to put the United States and the US are in the same bag. In reference to this matter of intervention but let us look for a moment since we're trying to achieve perspective since we're trying to see this in some sense other than just the limited viewpoint that is our own naturally. Let us consider the fact that both the United States and the US S. R. were dedicated to status quo. When we went into the Dominican Republic in one thousand sixty five we did not want a revolution. We did not want a change and the Russians have gone into Czechoslovakia in 1968 because they did not want a

revolution. They did not want change and so I say that the intervening powers were both dedicated to maintenance of status quo. Also there is a sense of security. A search for stability that the United States wanted in the Caribbean that Russia wants in Central Europe we have for a long time with our naval power with our controls whether it be at Guantanamo or in Puerto Rico or the Canal Zone or elsewhere. We have for a long time made a truth of the statement that the Caribbean is our sea that we exercise. Had Germany there the Russians have insisted upon a similar control. And of course they have formalized this in such as the Warsaw Pact and any deviation from it becomes a chink in the armor. The strength of the unity the sense of stability and security that they had sought in that land region. If in a wider region to the south of us we seek security.

So the Russians in a land region to the west of their land also are seekers of security. A third similarity arises when it's pointed out that the United States and USSR have in both the Dominican Republic and in Czechoslovakia operated from circumstances that find fear riding high because there are chinks in the regional security system. The fact that Cuba slipped out of the pattern of pro United States outlook became a member of enemy camp as of 959 finds us all the more insistence upon rapid action upon the insistence that there be no second such episode and so fear in part hastened us into the Dominican Republic in 1965. Meanwhile Russia has decades ago seen Yugoslavia go

her own way. But Yugoslavia is pinned down against the sea and goes nowhere in terms of contaminating in terms of opening up an entrance way for others in like fashion the USSR has seen Albania actually swing to the Chinese Communist cap. It too leads nowhere but Czechoslovakia with that long dimension it knows east west led all the way to West Germany led all the way to the camp of the enemy world. And so because of the Chinks that Cuba represented to us in the Caribbean and the Chinks that Yugoslavia Albania represent to Russia there was all the more this fear riding high indeed riding herd on the current actions that have been interventions in the Dominican Republic and in the area of Czechoslovakia. Both countries too have had a tendency to throw force in without prior appeals to world opinion. I suppose both have done so for these among other

reasons. For one thing you would not be sure that world opinion was on your side and therefore to appeal to it was to be rebuffed by it was to be delayed by it and your fears would not permit this delay. This rebuff and in a second place in both instances. Force was thrust in without prior appeals to world opinion because each power was in a position to do as it pleased because no major power was nearby to challenge it. Russia China no major power could challenge us in the Dominican Republic. No major power United States China could challenge Russia in Czechoslovakia and so you Russian in part because there was no one to stop you from rushing to make you even think twice. There also has been in both the American and Russian activity this the world of interventionism an effort to mask selfish self interest. When we went into the Dominican Republic we encouraged Nicaragua and

Brazil and one or two other countries to send contingents along with ours. Their presence of theirs was to suggest a respectability for our action. The Russians is to be remembered did not go in alone. They had East Germans and Hungarians and Bulgarians and so a joint action is presumed to add a mantle of respectability for that which is essentially a selfish self interest action on the part of a major power. In addition to the Russian and American similarities an invention suggests that you do not want the most obvious demonstration of power to continue for long when in the Dominican Republic the command of the intervention was surrendered to a Brazilian. It really fool no one. The money the materiel the real force was still that of the United States. But we wanted a Brazilian commander to assume that role. It's interesting that the Russians wanting to get away from the obvious exercise of power

pulled force as rapidly as they could out of major cities though it lurked in the villages in the countryside nearby and then to the United States and Russia have both been dedicated to the proposition that you do the job quickly and do it neatly and so you hasten to complete an intervention because the longer it stays in the news the more it hardens the antagonism of third powers the more it affects a perspective that you do not want entertained. If you can reduce the newsworthiness the short ness of the time that it makes headlines you have reduced the antagonism of third powers and you have of course achieved a fait accompli. This matter of doing it neatly and quickly also says eloquently that if you try another revolution any of you who are in our camp your chance of success is just as slim as this has been and so there is a bit

of the example thrown up to other dissidents who might want to depart from one's camp. A matter of perspective is with us always whether it be intervention whether it be in the normal activities that find the powers dealing with one another. There is today in Puerto Rico and a series of bomb attacks of arson attempts against U.S. owned property. Perspective calls for analysis of the why. What is behind this. Are these agents of Castro's Cuba. Are these people in the island who have a surge of nationalism. Are they individuals who are just opposed to big corporations taking over from small businessmen. We have a reason to be calm to learn what is behind it and then to assess the

circumstances and try to realize that there is a Puerto Rican perspective as well as a US perspective the world over the coverage of news is too often a dramatic nationalistic patriotic oversimplification. So intense is the concern about the who and what and where. That the neglect of one ingredient of journalism the more complex why is almost total. And so the expression you can't see the forest for the trees continues to be an apt one for we still need better fuller perspectives. This was another programme in the series Latin America perspectives with Dr S. Harvey Gardner research professor of history at Southern Illinois University. Join us for our next program when Dr. Gardner will comment on another interesting aspect of Latin American affairs. These programs are recorded by station WFIU FM and are made available to this station by the national

educational radio network.