American Experience; Freedom Riders; Interview with Raymond Arsenault, 4 of 5

[Arsenault] The uh Kennedy administration faced a tough situation after the siege. The end of the rides didn't seem anywhere in sight, they knew they couldn't afford from a public relations point of view, any more violence, and the same was true for the state authorities in Alabama. They faced the prospect of the riders going into Mississippi and more violence and they- that's the last thing in the world that they wanted. So this set the stage for negotiations between Bobby Kennedy and other members of the administration and Mississippi authorities, primarily Senator James O. Eastland who was a personal friend of the Kennedys. He was politically very conservative, he was an arch-segregationist, but he could play political- political hardball in a pragmatic way and that's what he did with the Kennedys and so or the course of three days the Kennedys and Eastland worked out a deal which would protect the

Riders, of course the Alabama authorities were involved as well to get the Riders to the Mississippi border. It was all predicated on the notion that there would only be one bus, as it turned out there were two, and Bobby Kennedy felt-- no, too much? [Interviewer] No, I'm sorry, I was wondering what that was- [Arsenault] O-Oh oh. I'm sorry. [Interviewer] But it was too much. [Arsenault] I'm sorry. Ok. Ok. Ok. [Interviewer] Ya, you lost a lot of energy here now, so you got to get us energized! [Arsenault] Ah ok! [Interviewer] We got to get his energized, but a you know, but- [Arsenault] Okay, ya started a little slowly. Um Want me to do it again? [Interviewer] Yeah, I would cut- you just cut- [Arsenault] I can just do the [Interviewer] But but but- [Arsenault] I can just do the- [Interviewer] ?Not that?- [Arsenault] Ok. [Interviewer] Okay, you ready? [Arsenault] Just a second. Um. [Pause] Okay. [Interviewer] Mhm. [Arsenault] When the siege was over, the discussions were going on in the Harris House, but the Riders were still Alabama and

the Kennedy administration and the state authorities of Alabama still faced the problem of getting the riders out of the state, uh g- get them to Mississippi, through Mississippi, hopefully to New Orleans. So that sets up the stage for negotiations between the Kennedy administration, primarily Bobby Kennedy uh and the city authorities, primarily Senator James O. Eastland, who was a very conservative white supremacist, um but was a personal friend of the Kennedys and was a political pragmatist in many of his dealings and they worked out a deal where he and Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi promised that there would be no violence in Mississippi, that they were using the National Guard and a combination of a kind of military-like operation that they would make sure that the Riders were protected as they made their way west from Montgomery to Jackson, Mississippi. [Interviewer] Great, let's cut. Let's cut. [Arsenault] The Alabama authorities would be in charge on the

part of the route from Montgomery to the Mississippi line and then they would hand over authority to the Mississippi National Guard and they would um make sure that there would be no violence from the Alabama line to Jackson, Mississippi, the state capital. [Pause] [Interviewer] So to me the idea it's it's not kind of Mississippi's idea, so talk about wha-wha-what Mississippi's solution for the Freedom Riders. And I think-- [Arsenault] So just start with that? [Interviewer] Sure. [Arsenault] Mississippi had a somewhat different character in terms of its maintenance of race relations, than Alabama. It was known as a white citizens' council state, not a Klan state, I mean there were Klansmen there, but the white citizens' council ruled, and their view was to work through public authorities, to work through the legal justice system, to work through the politicians, um to have at least the- the- the superficial notion of uh of civic order and so that's what they did. They came up with the idea of arresting all the Freedom Riders for breach

of peace. This was the implicit deal worked out between Senator Eastland and the Kennedy administration. I uh don't think that the Kennedy administration leaders wanted the Freedom Riders to be arrested but they knew this was a very high probability that there would be no violence in Mississippi, but there were also be no protection of their constitutional rights as well. That segregation and Jim Crow would rule in Mississippi and in all likelihood the Freedom Riders would end up behind bars. The authorities in Mississippi, Governor Ross Barnett, Senator Eastland, um I think most of the other politicians, believed that the way to handle the Freedom Rides was to arrest them, to uh to intimidate them really and I think the Kennedy administration was not totally averse to this, I think they thought that the Freedom Riders would learn a lesson and that this would would quiet down the whole movement and that's exactly what they did but it

backfired in a major way. Most of these Freedom Riders were college students, I think there was a perception that they were in part on this for the experience, it was maybe not a lark, but it was not something that they were completely committed to and I think that was the serious mistake of perception because once they got into the jails in Mississippi, particularly when they got to Parchman prison, they turned those jails into a university of nonviolence. The more they were persecuted, the more they felt that they deserved to be kind of non-violent soldiers, the philosophy of unmerited suffering. Uh It solidified them, it made them the shock troops of the movement, it gave them time to discuss tactics and strategy and it put all those people together and the collective experience was exactly the opposite of what the Mississippi authorities and the Kennedy administration expected. Uh far from ya- running back to their families and and

and um submitting to the intimidation, they grew in stature as as nonviolent warriors. [Interviewer] Okay, let's cut for a minute. I think we're fine. [Arsenault coughs] You want to take a break, you're alright? [Arsenault] No, I'm fine. [Interviewer] He's got the- he's got the whole thing figured out, "we'll just arrest them all," talk about how how the Freedom Riders countered that. [Arsenault] Well Barnett and Eastland thought mass arrests would be the answer, that it would intimidate the Freedom Rides, it would end them, but it had exactly the opposite effect. Um, the Freedom Riders that were committed to jail, no bail. Uh to filling the jails if necessary, to calling on more and more riders from and more places and that's what they did during the summer of of 1961. Far from being intimidated, they got a sense of their own empowerment, uh the sense that they were not alone, that there were more Americans uh from from all walks of life who were willing to get on those buses and to go into Mississippi jails if necessary.

So they became the- the shock troops of the moment and it was a a a gr- a ah formula for a a growing sense of of their own power and their ability to survive, that this was not just a a a f- fleeting- a fleeting tactic that that they could- that they could turn this into a mass movement, which is actually what they did in the summer of 1961. [Interviewer] Okay, let's cut. Um. [Pause] [Arsenault] Well the early arrests in Jackson, um Ross Barnett, the other Mississippi authorities, thought that would bring an end to the Freedom Rides but it had exactly the opposite effect. There was a countermove by the leaders of the Freedom Rides, it said "well we'll just put out a call for for more riders, we'll fill the jails. People come to Mississippi from all over the United States and they'll come bearing the philosophy of 'jail, no bail' and they're not going to let themselves be bailed out, they're going to fill the jails to overflowing if necessary." And in a sense they were turning an operation into a movement, into a mass

movement with no end in sight. [Pause] [Interviewer] Great, thank you. [Inaudible chatter] [Arsenault] Want me to talk about that? [Interviewer] Yeah. Yeah. [Arsenault] Well during those first weeks after the siege in Alabama, the Freedom Rides becomes a movement and there are all different ways for people to participate. There are fundraising activities all over the United States, people hold prayer vigils, even those who can't uh find it in, you know, their lives to actually get on those buses, uh they become connected to the Freedom Rides. It becomes a movement in a very real sense, they become part of a movement culture. It's something that they expect to continue and they pull out all stops to make sure the Freedom Riders keep coming and that they have resources and it becomes something much larger than the the the you know- the original operation that first came out of CORE and then out of out of the national movement, it becomes truly national in scope. [Interviewer] Great, cut. Ok, so- so

as as the jail in Hinds County begins to fill up, talk about Ross Barnett's next move. [Arsenault] Ok. [Arsenault] As the jails in Jackson and Hinds County began to fill up, Governor Barnett had to find somewhere to put all these Freedom Riders and there was the prospect that more and more were going to come, so he came up with the idea of sending them to Parchman Prison. Parchman, the most fearsome prison in the south. William Faulkner in one of his novels called it "destination doom," uh it was- I'm I'm not sure how much detail you want me to go in here. [Interviewer] Let's start again. [Arsenault] Yeah, um [coughs] [Interviewer] Just stop for a second. [PA] This is room tone uh, with uh- we think is a shower. [silence] [Inaudible muttering] [Interviewer] On one hand you know, so Russ Barnett says-- [Arsenault] As

the, uh let me start again. As the Freedom Riders began to flood into Jackson and Hinds County, Mississippi, Ross Barnett had to make a decision. You know, the the jails were overflowing and he decided for a couple reasons to send them to Parchman Prison. Parchman was the most dreaded prison in the south. In one of William Faulkner's novels he referred to it as "destination doom." It was not uncommon for people to go into Parchman Prison but not to come out, it was a dreaded, dreaded place. And it wasn't only a problem of overcrowding, Ross Barnett I'm sure thought that he could intimidate them. That just the thought of Parchman would scare people to death and that this would break the back of the Freedom Rider movement. It had exactly the opposite effect, but but Barnett couldn't've known that, he couldn't have known what he was dealing with the Freedom Riders. [Interviewer] When you say it had the opposite effect, so um, so you know, what happened at Parchman for for the Freedom Riders? [Arsenault] When the Freedom Riders gathered in

Parchman, even though they were in cells of two, they were able to communicate enough to have a sense of this collective experience, that they were experiencing the unmerited suffering that Gandhi had talked about. That they were doing what non-violent warriors do, that they sacrificed themselves in a sense and it it made them tougher, not weaker. They they had a sense that they had made the right decision to become Freedom Riders, 'cuz this this had put them in a situation where they could not necessarily become martyrs, but they could display their commitment to non-violence, not just as a tactic, but for many of them as a way of life. As as as a way of uh breaking the back of the the- the immoral structures of Jim Crow and of racism in the south. [Interviewer] Why don't you talk- [Arsenault coughs] -a little bit about the fact that they set up university- [Arsenault clears throat] - where they would communicate and and and and and and it was this kind shared education

and also if you can, I think you made a point um um before that was really fascinating i- i- is that many of them-- [Arsenault] One thing that happened at Parchman is that they got to know each other. That they became not just individual groups of Freedom Riders, but they they had a shared experience and they're from different parts of the country, they were different races, different religions, some cases different political philosophies, and it all got blended together. And uh they- they didn't all converge necessarily, but there was a kind of Freedom Rider experience, Freedom Rider philosophy, if you will, which emerged in Parchman. It became almost a university of nonviolence even though the- you know, the physical situation was difficult, but they used freedom songs, they used whatever conversations they could have, they had a lot of time to think, a lot of time to meditate and a lot of what happened there was was not to Ross Barnett's liking because they became tougher. They became even more committed, they became the shock

troops of the movement. [Interviewer] Great, great. [Arsenault] Now that- that's gunna, that part of that is um- [Interviewer] Let's cut. [Arsenault] As the wave after wave of riders came into Mississippi, Bobby Kennedy and the Kennedy administration, had uh they became alarmed. He called for a cooling-off period and but the more he did that the more it heated up. It uh it was a very dangerous situation from his perspective. [Interviewer] Mhm. [Arsenault coughs] And he actually calls-- [Arsenault] Talk about that? [Interviewer] Yeah. [Arsenault] Oh, okay. Let's see. In in mid-June, Bobby Kennedy arranged for a meeting with several leaders of the Freedom Rider Coordinating Committee uh with him in his office in the Justice Department and the idea was to figure out some way to get the Freedom Rides either called off or toned down

or cooled down, as he had said. And what he did was to try to uh to offer them some grant money if they would change the focus of the movement as they saw it from non-violent direct action, things like the Freedom Rides, to voter registration. As it later turned out, uh t- the notion that voter registration would lead to less civic disorder and less violence on the part of the white supremacists was probably wrong, but that's what Kennedy and most people in the Justice Department and the Kennedy administration believed at the time. So um they- they offered ?us? money. Harry Belafonte was one of the go-betweens, and uh this became a a a major uh point of debate within the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee later in the summer as to whether they should- should change their focus from from non-violent direct action to voter rights registration, and this would become a a big choice that the movement has to make over the next few months. [Interviewer] So in effect, uh- [Arsenault coughs] -RFK offers them a

bribe. [Arsenault] Uh, sss- some people considered this to be tantamount to a bribe. Um, and and certainly the people who were more interested in non-violent direct action, there were already people within SNCC, within the Freedom Rides, who were arguing for a move towards voter registration, so they in a sense welcomed the Kennedy administration's pressure. But there were others who felt that this was tipping the balance. Diane Nash, for example, was one of those who felt that way and they ultimately decided to create two wings in in in SNCC, one dedicated to non-violent direct action, and one dedicated to voter registration but the notion that they were being pressured by Bobby Kennedy and by the administration made a lot of people feel uncomfortable, and even even those who thought it might be the right thing to do didn't like the idea that there was something like a bribe being offered to them. [Interviewer] Okay. [Arsenault] Um.

During the last week of May as as the Freedom Riders called for more- um let me start over again, I don't want to say Freedom Riders.Um, ready Ok. During during during the last week of May, as the Freedom Rider leaders called for more Freedom Rides going to Mississippi, Bobby Kennedy knew he had to do something so he decided to go formally to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the ICC, and to ask them for a sweeping desegregation order. They were really the only federal agency that could effectively take down the signs, the the "whites only" and "colored only" signs that had been a fixture in bus stations and railway stations all across the south for for generations. It was under under their purview. But they were a notoriously slow agency, uh they uh- they were- and conservative as well, there was only one Kennedy appointee on the ICC, so Bobby Kennedy knew it was going to take time, but he hoped that the gesture on May 29th, when he went to the ICC and asked for this sweeping order that this would lead to the cooling

down. That he could- that he could go out now in good faith to the Freedom Rider leaders and say "look I've made this move, the sign's going to come down eventually, why don't you call off the Freedom Rides, why don't you cool down?" that was- that was his hope. Of course it didn't work out that way, but I think he- he legitimately thought it was a good possibility. [Interviewer] That was his hope, what was the response? [Arsenault] The response of the Freedom Riders to the ICC was "thank you"-- [Interviewer] Sorry, it's to Bobby Kennedy, not the ICC, right? [Arsenault] Ok. [Clears throat] The response of the Freedom Riders to uh Bobby Kennedy and to the to the request for the o- the o- desegregation order from the ICC was "thank you, uh we're glad to see that you finally done something, that you're listening to us, that maybe something will happen, but this really doesn't have any bearing on our decision to call for waves of Freedom Rides into Mississippi. We ne- we need to keep the pressure on and we're not about to call off these

things and we know that it's going to be a long time before the ICC acts, if it ever acts and so uh we're we're not going to uh we're not going to risk losing our momentum, we're going to keep the Freedom Rides going and uh uh--" not sure what else to say. [Interviewer] Well well uh, just give me an ending there. [Arsenault] Well we're going to keep the Freedom Rides going and we're going to keep up the momentum and and we- we uhh are not not about to uh put our faith in in in a con- in a conservative organization like the ICC until it actually demonstrates that it deserves that faith, that it's actually going to respond to your to your call, there's no historical evidence that there's any real high probability that they're going to do that. [Interviewer] Okay, let's cut. ?That looks nice is that good? [Arsenault] Yeah, yeah. [Pause] [Arsenault] When Bobby Kennedy went to the ICC in late May he surprised almost everyone by asking for a sweeping desegregation

order. He wasn't asking for a whole loaf, he was asking for the whole loaf-- did I say "half a loaf"? [Interviewer] No. [Arsenault] Oh gee- Okay, I'm just going to start over. W- w-when Bobby Kennedy went to the ICC in late May and asked for a desegregation order, uh it was a sweeping request. He asked for the whole loaf, not a half loaf. Many people were surprised at how bold his action was. Nobody was surprised that it took the entire summer. They- they held hearings, there were a lot of testimony, but but finally on September 22, when frankly the the CORE and the Freedom Rides were having a real problem with resources, it wasn't at all clear how far they could um could could go, how long they could hold out, the ICC came through with just exactly the order that Kennedy had asked for. It was effective November first so there was still time to go, but there were no Freedom Rides that fall, they waited until the order was issued

effective November first and I think Kennedy and the Justice Department had hoped that that would be the end of it. But of course the leaders of the Freedom Rides were not going to to to uh you know, blindly trust that just because the order was in effect November first that the buses would actually-- and the terminals would actually be desegregated. So they decided to have a series of test rides, and more than 700 riders got on those test rides during the first couple weeks of November to see that the signs had actually come down, that people could actually get on those buses without fear of intimidation. And for the most part um they found that in fact the uh the desegregation was a reality, not in every community, and there were lawsuits that that came later in some of the smaller towns in Mississippi and Louisiana uh but by the summer of 1962, desegregation was a reality in virtually every community uh in in in the south. This was shocking, this was- uh

despite the um the promises of the ICC and of the Justice Department, I'm not sure anyone fully expected that there would be this unambiguous victory, the first one of that the civil rights movement had ever had ever won. I mean, the schools had been desegregated on paper many years earlier but they hadn't actually been desegregated in the deep south and this was a case where those- those signs actually came down and behavior actually changed and it sorta cracked the mystique of of Jim Crow, that they could actually do this and of course it it it uh- opened the floodgates for many other uh higher expectations. [Interviewer] Okay, let's cut. [Arsenault] Ok. In September, 1961, after hundreds of arrests, more than 300 people in Parchman Prison, the resources stretched to the limit, finally on September 22, the ICC issues its desegregation order. The effective date was November first so there wouldn't be

any real hope that the signs, those "colored only" and "whites only" signs would come down finally that had been there- in those stations for generations. [Interviewer] Let's cut. [Arsenault] Oh, [Arsenault] I'm sorry that's too much- [Interviewer] Yeah, I'mma- [Pause] Okay, Ray look at me. [Arsenault] Ok. [Interviewer] Let's get that energy up-- [Arsenault] Alright, alright here we go. In the fall of 1961, after hundreds of arrests, after more than 300 people were in Parchman Prison, after the resources were stretched to the limit, the ICC issued its order. It gave Bobby Kennedy and the Freedom Riders what they'd been asking for: a sweeping desegregation order. It was effective November first, finally on November first, the signs, the "colored only," the "whites only" signs that had been in the bus and rail stations for generations, they finally came down. CORE initiated a series of test rides, more than 700 riders and to almost everyone's amazement, um there was almost complete compliance with the- the desegregation order. Not only did the signs come down, but blacks actually sat

in the front of the bus and whites sat in the back, in some cases and they were able to go into the terminals and order a cup coffee, and to go into the restrooms, for the first time in their lives in many cases and to feel like full- full American citizens. So this was the first unambiguous victory in a long history of the civil rights movement. The schools had been desegregated on paper in 1954 but they hadn't been desegregated in fact. This was a time that within less than a year of the beginning of the Freedom Rides, they actually did what they set out to do and it was a a a a a reality that cracked the mystique of Jim Crow. It finally said that "we can do this," and it- and it raised expectations across the board for for greater victories in the future. [Interviewer] Okay, let's cut. [Pen click] ?Is?- that's the worst thing you can ever do, is when you name name numbers then we can't- then we can't cut, it's like they name- there's three things, "one, two,"-- anytime. Ok.

[Arsenault] The Freedom Rides demonstrated more than anything else the viability of non-violent direct action in the south, not just the upper south, but the south, including the deep south. That they could go anywhere, they could go to places like McComb, Mississippi, they could go into the small towns of Louisiana and they could exercise their constitutional rights and not get killed. It's the first unambiguous victory that the movement had ever had. It also extended the movement culture. It didn't just win a a legal victory, it made people larger than themselves, it demonstrated this this inner power, this sense of self-respect, that uh they were part of a movement culture, they were part of something bigger uh than even they had believed at the beginning of the Freedom Rides. So it is an enormous step forward, it's a kind of tipping point in the history of civil rights struggle and it it unleashes a kind of

grassroots, citizen politics that's gonna be felt for years and decades to come. It's one of the main reasons why the 1960s is so different than the '50s. It's a it's a sense of empowerment, that ordinary people can do extraordinary things, that it's their role to make sure the constitutional rights and that democracy and freedom and justice are sustained and that there- that these things matter and it's part of citizenship to do this. That's what the Freedom Rides were all about. [Interviewer] Okay, let's cut. Um --if you-- [Arsenault] Part of the risk of the strategy of the Freedom Rides is that it depended on dealing with Mississippi justice, that the Mississippi legal authorities and the political authorities were in control. You had to abide by Mississippi law. One of those laws stipulated that you could only stay in jail so long and after that point, in this case it was 39 days, you'd lose the right of appeal and you'd

lose your bail money, you'd lose whatever money you had to put down and that's what CORE had to deal with. So they had to make sure that most the riders got out within 39 days and they also later had to make sure that they came back for an arraignment, the mass arraignment of the riders was arranged for August 14, 1961. And some of the Riders at that point had gotten out of Parchman Prison, they were all over the country, in some cases all over the world, and it would have bankrupted CORE, it would have bankrupted the movement, if they had not come back. Some Mississippi authorities suspected that the riders would be too cowardly to come back, that once they got out of Mississippi, uh they'd be fools to come back. But amazingly I think all but nine came back on that August 14th date, and it was an incredible victory for CORE, not just in a legal sense, but I think in a moral sense that those those the- those kids, and most of them were kids, were so committed that even though it meant coming back to Mississippi, they came back go willingly, in many cases enthusiastically, and of the

the course the rallies that they had in Jackson on August 14th, it was like a carnival of nonviolence. There are pictures of them smiling on those buses that they came back, of course they were they were seeing each other in some cases for the first time in weeks or or months but it gave a sense of this movement culture that had emerged at Parchman and elsewhere during the Freedom Rides.