Crocker Snow Reports From Germany; M.S. Chandler

One of the most significant and far-reaching developments on the continent of Europe is the gradually improving relations, diplomatic and economic, between the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. No longer is the Iron Curtain an accurate image. Trade and even travel between and among the Western European countries and their socialist counterparts of Eastern Europe has drawn the curtain aside. A key to this development is the divided country in the center, Germany. In recent times the Federal Republic of West Germany has affected a slow but very definite change in its outlook to the east. A new flexibility and tolerance of hard political facts is an evidence of this so-called Thispolitik [?] has been a cornerstone of the country's first grand coalition government of the leading Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties, which came into power a little more than fifteen months ago. To discuss this trend in Europe, its characteristics today and its implications for the future I have with me here in the studio two men uniquely qualified to do so. I M.S. Handler, long time correspondent for The New York Times in Eastern Europe and

Bonn and Dr. Stefan Thomas of West Germany, one-time head of the Eastern Department of the Social Democratic Party and presently the director of the international department of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a leading educational foundation in the country. All right gentleman, talking first about Thispolitik. We have some interesting developments in recent days, notably the change of power in Czechoslovakia. I wonder how you interpret this news. [Handler]: You probably are better informed on developments in eastern Europe than any of your compatriots who are working in the same area because we have a long association with the problem. Do you have any evidence that the accession of Mr. Dubcek as the first secretary of the Czech party. And the dismissal was allowed by the Czechoslovak party and the dismissal of Hendrick as the secretary for ideology the Central Committee. What may affect

the attitude of the Czech regime in its relations with Western countries, specifically with your own country, or does this change over simply reflect a struggle over domestic policies in Czechoslovakia. [Thomas]: Well, the thing that I think, you know, this events in Czechoslovakia and Prague has the most significant importance and consequences. As you may remember [unintelligible] I think we discussed it years ago, you know, when we discussed the Eastern European problems, When you were in Germany, there was always the question of whether something might turn up in Poland, in Romania, Hungary, in any country [unitelligibl] but the Czechs will never do it. This kind of opinion, I always found superficial and absolutely contrary to the whole spiritual intellectual makeup of the Czech and Slovak nation, and then when you see it since the last three years was this kind of very

interesting development in the intellectual word in Bratislava, in Slovakia, and in Czechoslovakia and Prague, there I think are the first signals of very important changes in this kind of intellectual infrastructure of the country, and uh, all visitors went to Prague or Bratislava and who had the chance to talk to the people who really are important in the, uh, intellectual world. They all came back with the most fascinating reports about their own way of thinking about this kind of escalation in critical thoughts against the Czechs studying whatever [unintelligible]. And for us in Germany [unintelligible] there was always the same kind of Essercizen. There was the two men of the Stalinistic regime where, uh, always was the question when will [unintelligible]. Well I think Dubcek means a new chapter, not for internal reasons, but a new chapter in the whole development inside the Soviet bloc and definitely in the

history of Czechoslovakia, and I think there's two points. One point and that I think is a very intriguing, very interesting point: Dubcek is a Slovak, he comes from the Slovakian Communist Party, and you know how the history of Czechoslovakia always was that the Slovaks charts [?] the Czechs, that they are dominated by the Czechs, where here for the first time you have the man number one is a Slovak. He is, he belongs to the younger generation and I think he is posing to alternative towards a new pragmatic development inside Czechoslovakia, there's no doubt about it. And, uh, you just mentioned Hinricht, who has been sacked two days ago. I was really fascinated when I saw the news in the New York Times. I thought “Well, that is a further step and this points of liberalization and pragmatisation of Czechoslovak policy. And the second point was for me Koutsky [sp?] at the Budapest conference where he mentioned his own Czechoslovak, the view of the new by Dubcek developed Czechoslovak policy towards Western Europe and toward Germany, not to fall

in this kind of slogans about imperialistic, warmongering Western Germany as it was tried to suggest by the eastern, Eastern Germans, by Honecker and the delegation from Eastern Germany. Here was the first signal from this side that the Czechs mean business with us. Business means following up with the new elements which have been developed by the new German Ostpolitie. Mr. Chairman you just mentioned this event and I think that’s a very [unintelligible] I suppose we're going to discuss it further more. But I think here was a Czech, a positive Czech response to the new initiatives of Brandt’s foreign Ostpolitic and this is based on one chief element. Detente, understanding, good neighborhood, and trying to liquidate the tragic chapter of the past, which were the past of the Germans against the Slavonic nations of the East.. [Interviewer]: You've said that you feel that this Czech development is directly due to the Ostpolitik, but you also feel that it's, it's due perhaps to the Romanian example and Mr. Ceaucescu and so forth

[Thomas] It is part of a process which really started years ago. The process of I would say, um, uh, well em, polycentrism; you know the famous polycentrism. I think after the 20th Party Conference fell in 56 that later historians would mark the kind of turning point and Czechoslovakia now is drawing the consequences of this portrait of national defense association inside the Soviet bloc, and I think while Dubcek is not Ceaucescu. They are all different. I think we all should try to see all the countries in the Eastern Bloc according to their own national frame, to their own national substance. But definitely Czechoslovakia. This Dubcek decisions is going this way of stronger, more marked national independence, and stressing this fine, very fine deed. [Interviewer]: Did you witness this when you were a correspondent in Eastern Europe?.

[Handler]: Yes, uh, the Czechs and the Slovaks, who've had to develop, have had to live with occupying powers for many, many centuries have developed techniques where of for survival which are quite unique in Europe. And that I always that it is always important to remember that the Czechs as Dr. Thomas mentioned in conversation before we came onto this program the Czechs in a manner of speaking maintain a double entry accounting system. The one that is visible and which gives certain, shows a certain balance, and behind that is the private one. And in my experience in Prague and Bratislava and in other Czech, Slovak cities. I always had the queasy feeling that when the man, when the men spoke to me,

and these were officials of the government, that there was always a double meaning in what they were trying to say to me. The history of the development of the Slovak Communist Party presents certain interesting problems and perhaps parallels. We know for example that the partisan movement in Czechoslovakia during the war developed in Slovakia. [Thomas breaks in]: “Mountains of the Beskids and the Tatars” [Handler continues] Rather than in, that rather than in Bohemia and Moravia. [Thomas]: That's right. [Handler]: I wonder whether there is a parallelism between the attitudes, political attitudes that emerge from people who take weapons to fight for their own liberation, as in the case of Yugoslavia, and those who rather collaborate actively or passively. Whether this forms a psychological background for the development of the Slovak

thinking of the Slovak political leaders. [Thomas]: I think, Mr. Handler, that you touched a very important psychological time. You know, I mean, you mentioned Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, I mean, that was no accident. 1948, no accident that there is a group around Tito, the partisans who went in the woods and the mountains, who fought the Nazis. There’s this kind of heroic bloodshed, which they really bought as a second phase of their own national independence, that they were the first to say no to Stalin in 1948 and then to break away in the summer 1948 from Soviet Russia. Well, that is a most heroic, courageous act and that really initiated support, as you remember, Gomulka, four weeks later, you know, for the Poles it was the same kind of feeling, not to become Sovietized, not become Russified, but going the Polish way. And I think here, this way of this kind of heroic past, written with blood, has a very important meaning for forming and for the formation of the will of independence. And the Slovaks were different, they were always different, the history from the Czechs, and, em, I think

here that they took to the weapons, took to the woods, and fought the Nazis by this kind of resistance fight. I think that had a meaning and you can trace it through the whole twenty years in Slovakia that there always was among the intellectuals this kind of absolutely reserved attitude to the whole policy of Praga, of Gottweid, Nowotny, [unintelligible] and all those guys, so I think the result now, that Dubcek, a Slovak, has come to Prague, is in a way, I think, a kind of historical verdict about a development that was [?]fascinating consequences. [Interviewer]: How about some of the developments in some of the other Eastern European countries? [brief crosstalk] Let’s start with, uh, Rumania. [Thomas]: Well, Rumania is definitely clear-cut, you know, I--I would say for us in Germany it was, uh, one of the most encouraging things, really, that the Rumanians, as a first, acknowledged and realized that the policy of the Great Coalition, as you mentioned, Mr. Snow, which we started in, ah, December

1966. This is a participation of Social Democrats for the first time in government after thirty-six years in Germany and this is kind of fate, you know, that a man like Willy Brandt, who is the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany was an anti-fascist, an emigrant, who lived outside of Germany and fought Nazis, fought Hitlerism. And, uh, coming from the socialistic, the youth movement and the socialistic movement of Germany. This has some kind of impact in Bucharest, in Praga, in Budapest, in Warsaw, and we are told, even in Moscow, they are thinking very very in a kind way, you know, that they have to start to differentiate, that you can't say that they are imperialist warmongers and all of this kind of things because Brandt as a Social Democrat, has never been an imperialist, he cannot be an imperialist! So when Brandt talks peace, it's meant peace. If he speaks about detente, they know it is detente and it is a new chapter in the German/Eastern European relations. And, uh, you know, it was one of the most intriguing things, when Brandt

went down to Rumania, to Bucharest, He talked for five hours with Ceaucescu. They were talking, two men of the same generation, coming nearly, you know, from the same kind of ground of a kind of social revolutionary background. There's this kind of appeal to change the structure and they went their own revolutionary ways, but they found their base of understanding. While Brandt didn't change the communist Ceaucescu, and Ceaucescu didn't change the democrat Brandt, but there was a base for peace and these kind of new relations between European, East Europeans, and Germany, so I think from this point of view Rumania is a very important point. But here I would like to make another point, you know. So flexible and pragmatic, the foreign policy of Rumania is, do not forget for one minute that the regime in the internal policy, is a very tough, rigid, communist regime, with, uh, secret police and all the things and, I mean, that is of course another question: how far the under-developed, I would say, uh, intellectual infrastructure of Rumania is really,

you know, eh, making it easy for a totalitarian regime to rule in this way. But what we have to register is that the foreign policy, the will to independence from Moscow is absolutely marked as the best example was the way how the Rumanians worked out in Budapest. And they didn't like to be offended! By nobody! They were Rumanians, Rumanian communists and they don't want to like to become Soviet communists. I think that is Rumania. Well, Bulgaria, I would say, well they will be probably the last in the whole chain, because here, it has a historical background, really, because the Bulgarians were always the most Pan-Slavist movement, with all kinds of historical elements of Czarist Russia trying to [indecipherable word] Bulgarians as a way to international independence in the 19th century and the links, the emotional links between the Bulgars and the Russians were very close for 100 years. And, um, as you remember, Dimitrov, after 1945, was a communist, Bulgarian communist. While he lived in Moscow he had quarrels with

Stalin, he died very soon, but he was the only authority, probably, who could have developed a way to a more Bulgarian independence. After Dimitrov, all the types who came after him, they were small, mediocre, provincial. But I think Bulgaria will need a long time to follow the paths of Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Well, Hungaria, you know, just a few words about Hungaria, well here I would say Kadar, of course if you see the tragedy of Kadar and Rajik and that he only survived by accident, the terrible terroristic regime of-of-of-of-of Rakosi, I think, uh, that he came as a man after the Hungarian Revolution, and the way how they tried to go their own ways, I think that's very interesting indeed too, I think they tried to find their own pragmatic Hungarian way, and, um, very interesting and concerning the attitude toward Germany, flexible, pragmatic, and open-minded. But, uh, in a way, still taking certain regards to the Soviet wish and will to have some kind of discipline.

Well, we talked about Czechoslovakia. [Crosstalk] [Snow]: Yeah, before we fill in the other tiers of Eastern Europe, how about you Mr. Handler, what -- do you accept a lot of this, or do you have some other interpretations. [Handler]: Oh, I agree with Dr. Thomas's analysis of the problem. But what I was interested in at this point while Dr. Thomas was speaking was, how far the Bonn government is prepared to go in seeking to establish a modus vivendi with Eastern European governments, beyond offering substantial trade and credits? Is the West German government prepared to make any political concessions, and would such a policy receive substantial support among the German people? [Thomas]:Well here, I think if you analyze the declarations of the Kiesinger-Brandt government, the speeches, declarations, decisions of the parliament in Bonn,

you will find that there is a line which is going beyond trade and cultural relations which are always the first steps a kind of normalization of relations between states and nations. There's the interesting formula of the government now and, uh, it's taken up and stressed by Willy Brandt again and again, the famous Gewaltverzicht Erklärung, the renunciation of force. Well, that is an interesting formula from the political point of view, and foreign policy point of view, because it means, from now onwards we have, as a declared will, only one means of politics, and that is by peaceful means to develop our relations and never again will be any repetition of the former German imperial Ostpolitik towards the European East. And I think that is a very marked kind of new development, and it has been understood in the capitals of Eastern Europe,

and we didn't mention Poland up to now, Mr. Snow, but if you kindly allow, I would like to get Poland now into the picture because this formula of renunciation of force has a most important meaning for Warsaw and the Poles. The Oder-Neisse line, the former territories which has been lost by Germany in Pomerania and Silesia and Prussia, and now the question, how will this come into this formula. Well, here I think this formula, if I would judge the policy, the Polish policy and [indecipherable] policy towards Germany. I think it could be the beginning, the beginning of a new, realistic assessment on the Polish side of the goodwill of the government, of the German government of Bonn. And it can be only the beginning because I mean, there are so many, many points and elements to be cleared is this, uh, tragic, terrible tragic history of Poles and Germans. So you cannot rush with any kind of thing but it needs, you know, a very slow,

patient approach. If you will kindly allow me I would like to, uh, give a citation of a very famous speech Willy Brandt made some months ago in Berlin as a commemoration of the 100 years birthday of one great German Weimar Foreign Minister, Walther Rathenau, who you remember was murdered by extremists in the twenties. Walther Rathenau’s memorial speech of Willy Brandt, there he gave a citation of the famous German philosopher Friedrich Nietzche, who once said that “all of the great events in history who were no good for the human beings nor that came by a sudden act, but all of the great and good things in history came by pigeon feet.” You say, you use that, “pigeon feet?” [Interviewer]: Pigeon steps. [Thomas]: Pigeon steps. Well, here you are, I think--and Brandt gave the citation, and I think it's part of the philosophy of foreign policy of the German government, that you have, you need patience, patience and patience. You need the whole collective wisdom and all the consequences of the barbaric experience of the past in order to reach

a stage of credibility of German policy towards the nations in the East, and I think here is the beginning, here's a new chapter. [Interviewer]: Speaking about Poland, now, just what significance do you attach to this recent, very recent study, this Bensberg--[Thomas]: Bensberger Kreis, yes. [Interviewer]: Right, which apparently advocates that, uh, that West Germany renounce its claim to the--to these territories in, ah, Pomerania and Silesia, and also I was interested to see that there was, from the basis of a small sampling of the public opinion, which they took, there was apparently a majority opinion of the people that they questioned, the West German public, which favored this policy. [Thomas]: Well, is a... well let's just in one sentence explain what the Bensberger Kreis is, because I suppose our listeners would be interested to know. Well, it is a circle of, uh, very respected Catholic intellectuals in the Federal Republic of Germany, writers, uh, thinkers, politicians and, uh, all kind, uh -- all ways of life, and

they worked for a long time, for months and months, in order to provide a document of this new assistant of the German Polish relations. And it's not an isolated act. I might remind you that there was a declaration of the German Catholic bishops, an address to the Catholic bishops of Poland one year ago. Then there was the Protestantic church, who did a very interesting document nearly on the same line as the Bamberger Kreis. I think all this documents prove one thing that is a public opinion in Germany for the public of Germany. There's a growing tendency to develop a new, realistic, and very pragmatic approach to the problems that we face, and which have been left after the Second World War on the agenda of the great politics. And, em, and you're absolutely right, Mr. Snow, this Bamberger document found in the pool of the public opinion. But

I have to be fair and have to make the other point, too, that of course a former great refugee organization representing his interest of the millions of Germans who came from the eastern marches of Germany, they voiced their not protest, but their kind of reserve towards this document and there's now a debate going on in the public opinion in Germany about those points. But I think in a pluralistic democracy, a debate is always a good thing because clarifying the mind and helping in the way towards these aims, which the government just declared: detente, understanding, and good neighborhood. So I think the meaning of the document is absolutely positive. [Handler]: Since the end of the last war, the anti-German policy represented the principle cement that tied the peoples of Eastern Europe to their new regimes, and as a result of more than two decades of propaganda, this question of the Eastern frontiers has become a very essential pa--part of the psyche of Eastern Europe.

Do you think there is a possibility that the... after this debate that you describe has run its course, that the West German government may take the bull by the horns, and by formal declaration renounce the--its reserve claims to these--to the older national frontier? Do you think that may, that may come someday, in order to disarm this East anti-German sentiment in Eastern Europe? [Thomas]: Well, Mr. Handler, that is one of the--the questions, I think, one of the most crucial questions of German internal politics and German foreign politics, and, uh, I f I might cite you, you just said a “bold step” and then you said “someday it might come.” Well, I would stress much more the second point you made, you know, “some day it might come.” That means a realistic assessment about the necessities which has been left but, I think that it will not come today and not tomorrow, because you know, if you look at

history, there's no nation who gave up territories, [unintelligible] there is no example in history. And then if you look at the Polish- German relations, their relations for 1,000 years, the Polish state just celebrated the last year 1,000-year history of their existence as Catholic Poland. Well, it's 1,000th year of German-Polish relations, and I have the privilege on my mother's side to come from this part, it's a privilege to study in Warsaw; I speak the language, I think I know a little bit about the Polish-German history and all that, you know. Well, I think, this kind of history, which has been intermingled over centuries, which had pages of close, harmonious cooperation between Poles and Germans. I want to remind you, 100 years ago, when Poland had no national independence, there was a wave in Germany among intellectuals and poets, so-called, [Pole?], der polnischer Frühling, you know, in 189--, [corrects self] 1848. There were wonderful Polish songs written by German poets.

All that, they have faces of close harmony, well, but then came, you know, I mean, the partitions, Frederick II, and then Hitler, Auschwitz and all that, what [?]. There is no Polish family what didn't suffer under this barbaric occupation of Poland. Well, here we have, you know, these elements of the past, so I think it will take time, it will take time. And we need patience, we need a lot of patience. But the most important thing is, uh, that, uh, Warsaw and the Poles must start to understand that there's a goodwill towards the common road of both nations; that, I think, is a most remarkable thing. There can be no declaration today about the renunciation of those territories; it must be, as the German government says, a question which will be settled by the peace conference. But I think that as far as can--I can, uh, judge, the opinion of the government and the public opinion of the Federal Republic, that this goodwill towards a new, good relation with the Polish nation will

be dominant at this peace conference and there will be found a way of a--a mutual, mutual, uh, kind of, uh, I would say declaration about this issues [sic] of the new frontiers and these former territories, and I think I would like to, um, infuse here another dimension if I may be allowed, Mr. Snow. I would like to stress the European point of view. If you take the kind of commitment of German policy and the German public opinion towards the European dimension. If you take the initiatives of Willy Brandt, trying to get Great Britain and Scandinavia. I mean, that is a German initiative: trying to overcome the reservation of the goals of the French [?] and their opposition towards the entry of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, because it's felt by us in Germany that Europe is a new, concrete, realistic dimensional future political development in the years to come. Well, what does it mean? If all these European nation [sic] form a really politically new, institutionalized

form of political existence, then the Poles are European, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Rumanians. All that can be seen from a new aspect, and then the question of the frontiers and the question of the quarrels of the past will be relitigated [?]. It should be seen in a new relation. I think that is a way towards this kind of solution. But there can be no spontaneous act of renunciation of any territory. [Handler]: Certain of the German industrialists, like Berthold Beitz of -- [Thomas]: Oh, yes! -- [Handler]: of Krupps, advocated a new policy toward Eastern Europe long before... [Thomas]: Oh yes, he did a lot of trips, as you remember, to Warsaw and so. [Handler]: long before many other people did--groups in Germany. How active is the industrial group in West Germany today in advocating this new change? This new attitude? [Thomas]: I think, Mr. Handler, very active indeed, because, as you remember, the whole structure of trade of the industrial Germany has and had

always traditionally a great turn toward the East. The famous Osthandel of the Federal Republic of Germany. So what Beitz did was, really, he took up the same kind of traditional bonds, which the German industry had for--well, since they became industrialized towards the East. So there's that traditional ground and if you take the affairs in Poznan--well, take the Leipzig affair, and take the affairs in the eastern parts of Europe--there you will always find the German industry stands as a most, uh, I would say, zahlreichste-- you know the... [Handler]: The most represent--they-they're the majority. [Thomas]: Well, they are dominant, really, in the affairs with the whole industrial products. So here, I think, is a quite natural inclination by this kind of industrial, uh, exigencies of German trade and production to find [unintelligible] and ways to in--increase the flow of trade towards Europe, Eastern Europe. [Handler]: I find it interesting that we've talked for more than half an hour and East Germany hasn't been mentioned.

Oh well that's so much [crosstalk]. [Snow]: I was just wondering whether or not the East- uh, public opinion... I'm not speaking of government dependency, at least in Europe is hostile toward East Germany as it was in the 50s, whether qualitatively they are more friendly toward West Germany today than they are toward East Germany, which was the case in the 50s. [Thomas]: Yes, I know, as I say-- [Handler]: Is that still true? [Thomas]: Well, I'll tell you, in some ways it's still true, I'll tell you, but for--for different reasons, if I might say. You see, Eastern Germany, Ulbricht’s regime, but is--develop--economic development of eastern Germany after they made up their mind about this kind of totalitarian mis-organization [?] and that started in January 1963, after the Six-Party Congress, and there were the terrific economic reforms. Eastern Germany is today the most decisive, important trade

partner for the Soviet Union -- [Handler]: That's true -- [Thomas]: and the dominating industrial state in the Soviet bloc. What does it mean? It means a terrific sense of self-confidence. This kind of cocky feeling of the German Communists going to Praga, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, and trying to tell them what they have to do in their relations for instance towards western Germany. You know here's a very interesting situation: here is a new German government in Bonn trying in a very fair way to develop a new policy of understanding and détente towards Eastern Europe. And they in Pankow try to isolate Western Germany and to tell them in Eastern Europe don't trust them, don't believe them and they don't like it. So here you have a new kind of empty feelings against the Ulbricht regime, on their own kind of national independent feelings in Warsaw and all these countries because, uh, we know better. We have to normalize our relations towards the German nation, and German nation means, in the majority, the

Federal Republic of Western Germany--of Germany, and here, ah, I think there is a complicated background of this kind of relation. To sum it up, the Ulbricht regime and the communist functionaries from Eastern Germany, they are not popular. And no credit. They are not popular there. And if they--you speak about Germany in Eastern Europe, it's always meant the Federal Republic of Germany by quantity, quality, and importance for the political point of view. So here, and, in order to conclude this point, they know it in eastern Berlin, and that--that explains partly this kind of hysteric, eh, I would say, eh, hectic activities, which they resume again and again, in order to stop this kind of [unintelligible] which I would call points of normalization between the relations of Germany and Eastern Europe. So I would say for new, for different reasons, this kind of empty feeling against the German communists is still kept up [Interviewer]: Of course, it’s not all one-sided, I mean, there is, historically there's the Hallstein Doctrine. [Thomas]: Ja, also, the famous Hallstein Doctrine.

[Interviewer]: and, uh, how about you Mr. Handler, when you were reporting in Eastern Europe and also in Bonn, how did this--did this strike you? Didn’t this seem to be a pretty, uh, diplomatically [sneezing] aggressive posture for West Germany to take? [Handler]: It seemed to us at that time that the Hallstein Doctrine did the Germans a great disservice, because it, uh, it curbed the field of action in which the West German government could operate. But I think since the abandonment of this Doctrine, the new roads, new avenues have been opened up for the West German government. But what I was going to ask Dr. Thomas was this. How much political weight does Pankow have in Moscow compared to the political influence of the other communist governments? [Interviewer]: You should perhaps explain what Pankow is. [Handler]: Well, Pankow is the seat of the East German regime. [Thomas]: Well, actually, if you allow me, eh, Mr. Handler, as a Berliner I would

say Pankow is a suburb in Eastern Berlin [laughing], and they've got, you know, their residential quarters in the suburb, so, you know, we say Pankow because it's the residence of Ulbricht and this whole politbüro central committee and all that. Well, so let's stick to Pankow; our listeners now know, you know. Well, um, Pankow, I think you know, concerning this relation, Pankow/Moscow, I would say they have, of course, high standing as a scale--you say scale?--the scale of this kind of priorities and value. For the reasons I mentioned. It's the most important trade partner, it's the most important deliverer of highly industrial goods--because, I mean, Eastern Germany's got the same industrial efficiencies, the same workers, the same engineers, the same brain, as the workers of Western Germany and this terrific capacity of industrial production. All that is highly valued by Moscow. And then, of course, I mean, em, the key position of Germany as such, I would say--you remember, you know, from the whole history of the 50 years of the Soviet Union, for

Lenin, Germany was the key to the European revolution. If you take it out from Lenin via Stalin, Kruschcev to Kosygin, Brezniev, Germany or what they call "nemtsy" if you're speaking Russian, you know, is a kind of permanent element of importance in our lives, you know. So I would say the importance of this German factor as a whole strategic and tactical thinking of the Soviets will stay dominant, you know, for all time to come, because who has Germany has Europe. And that was, I mean, and that is kept as a kind of eternal rule for the thought of Moscow. So I think here, from this point of view, Germany, Eastern Germany, the Pankow regime, will have the specific meaning and the specific importance. But but. What I think we should see is that after '45, of course, new active and absolutely new qualified relations developed between the Poles and the Russians and all of the other nations towards Moscow. I think there is this

deep ingrained knowledge among the Poles, and you know by history they never liked the Russians, never never never. But now the raison d’etre is telling them we have to develop this kind of absolute loyal relations to Moscow. So here, I think, is--you must differentiate in all the feelings toward--from Moscow towards all of these kinds of countries in Eastern Europe. But Germany will stay in a high priority in the scale of evaluation of Moscow. [Handler]: In this connection, is there any evidence yet of the emergence of advocates of national communism in East Germany? [Thomas]: Well, that's a very interesting question, yes. Well, I'll tell you... [Handler]: Or is it too early? [Thomas]: I'll tell you, I think, you know--well, there comes a -- if I might add -- another question and let's try to answer it. What will happen after Ulbricht, you know? I mean, because Ulbricht [unintelligible] I mean, he's a man of 75, coming up to 75 years old, and now already a lot of questions are asked in our circles [unintelligible], what would come after him? After him?

Because, as it is in every totalitarian regime, if a top man is leaving, there's no [vacant?], and no system. For new developments will come, so after Stalin’s death, there’s this terrific transformation of the Soviet Union and Ulbricht, at the last chapter of his own way, he became the father figure in Eastern Germany. As you remember, it was not always like this, you know, there were phases when he was on the way out! But after '58-- you can't explain it now, why--but after '58, I would say, in the last 10 years, this man developed as the absolute authority of the highest standing of acknowledgement inside Eastern Germany and inside the communist international world. Well, when a man like this leaves, well, look at the other guys, you know, of the Politbüro and all the boys around. They are names of absolute mediocre caliber. Honecker, Zinderman, Axen, Verner. Who are they? Just provincial politicians, provincial communists, without-- no--no meaning whatsoever. Stoff. Well, there's an interesting figure, as a man, as a prime minister and the executive man.

And so I think, after Ulbricht, there will be this kind of dual-- dual kind of regime between Honecker as the party secretary and Stoff as an executive. A little bit comparable to Kosygin/Brezhnev, government and party. But then, after this kind of [pact?] for the first time, for the first phase after Ulbricht’s death, then the Russian process will start. And then, I think, you know, that's all open. All open--and many things depend on the policy, which Bonn will develop, and the way of peaceful persuasion towards one aim--one aim, I would like to say, towards the humanization of this terrible, eh, wall and partition of Germany. Minefields all of this. I mean that is such an absolute [?] inhumanity, in the twentieth century--the Wall and the frontier--that I think this will be the one aim. And here, many imaginative possibilities, absolutely possible. So, I think, you know, it's not an isolated process and you must see the close

interdependency, interrelation, of the [unintelligible] inside the Soviet Zone, and the policy which the other part of Germany will be developed towards this new development. [Interviewer]: You speak, Mr. Handler, about the possibility of a more, more nationalization in the Communist Party--[Handler]: National, no, national is--[crosstalk]--[Interviewer]: Well, yeah, I understand but I--I think another interesting issue is the fact of whether there can be an existence of any communist party in West Germany. This has been outlawed since 1956 and I see there's now increasing talk in West Germany about permitting the Communist Party. [Thomas]: Well, Mr. Snow, I tell--that's my personal opinion, it was from the very beginning so, and many of my friends shared my opinion. I think it was a great blunder of the federal government to declare the Communist Party illegal. Because, you see, by the developments after 1945, the communists became an isolated sect in the public opinion of Germany. You see, By the normal procedure of elections, they lost their seats in Parliament in the Federal Republic of Germany. They lost their seats in the Bundestag in the

parliament in Bonn. And there was no necessity to create a party illegal and to give them a kind of heroism and a kind of subversive activities where they could continue their own work. I think it was a blunder and a mistake. So, the discussion today is centering about this, to--undo the blunder! Uh, but communism in Germany, I think that will be later what historians have to state, is no kind of political alternative anymore. After all that what happened in the direct confrontation with the communist realities in the other part of Germany. I think nothing counts more in life and politics as the experience, and I would say, the, eh, the--kind of, you know, things which you see, because that is the strongest there's a Stalinist argumentation, and I think the difference between the life in the Federal Republic of Germany was a kind of pluralistic democracy, freedom and liberties; on the other side the Soviet experiment in the other part of Germany. Well, that is the verdict of history about communism in Germany. Therefore, I think national communism, if I might just return and conclude this point,

has no political-historical chance to become any formative force in molding and influencing the future developments of the German nation. [Interviewer]: Do you think it's likely that it will become a legal force? I think that that's really what I was interested in. The party will be legalized? [Thomas]: Uh, well, I'll tell you, it is a little bit difficult because by institutional law, you see, the government--the parliament passed a law which the Supreme Court then delivered in forbidding the Communist Party by analyzing the totalitarian character of the party. You must change the law again, and there's a very complicated procedure by parliament and the highest court, you know, so I think it's a question of debate and discussions. But it has no really political importance. [Snow]: Dr. Thomas, in this connection. The ability of the East German intelligence service to penetrate-- [Thomas]: Yes! [Handler]: the government departments of--the Bonn government and government. The very

substantial number of cases, cases of espionage, even reaching into your security apparatus, defense ministry, etc..., does [Snow]: Does that have any significance so far as the social fabric of West Germany. [Thomas]: Yes, well, I'll tell you, it's really a very serious problem, because, you see, we are an open society. I mean, I mean any intelligence service, you know, operating in the [3rd world?] public, I think it's the easiest target ever to operate, because open, democratic, accessible to everything, and there's kind of attitude... You know, I think every democracy is handicapped in a way; I mean, the easiest thing is to secure yourself against any kind of penetration and intelligence, so it's a totalitarian society, with all the terroristic elements, all that. But I think all of the services operating in the Federal Republic have a relatively easy [unintelligible] to operate. Well, here, I think the only remedy, really, is--is this kind of political

consciousness--Bewusstsein, you say consciousness?--this kind of, you know, spiritual attitude of a citizen in a democratic society to differentiate between kind of, I would say, really important elements of news and information, which you cannot divulge to anybody whom you don't know. And a kind of national discipline, I would say, and, eh, this kind of easy talking which you'll find in Bonn quarters on any cocktail party you go and all this kind of thing, you know. So I think, for the time to come, after every case the security measures have been stringent and certain precautions have been taken. And so we have to continue in this way. But if, uh, we, I--I think, you know, it’s so elementary, integral part of our own freedoms and liberties of our Constitution are the framework of our democratic society. So I think we are very careful to overdo it concerning all kind of measures in order not to, also, invalidate our own freedoms and liberties. So we are in a real dilemma, but I think that is a dilemma in any democratic society. [Interviewer]: Getting back to the broad picture of the trends in--throughout Europe, ah, one way that I

would interpret some of what you've said, Dr. Thomas, is that increasingly, both because of the more independence on the part of the Eastern European communist parties and because of a new, more flexible policy on the part of West Germany and particularly France, that increasingly there is a rapprochement, and so forth, but--but you have, you have indicated that perhaps unconsciously or indirectly you've indicated that East Germany is get--becoming more and more isolated in this process and I think that--[Thomas]: Yes, that's true. That's correct. [Interviewer]: Well, do you not feel that such a development would be would be detrimental to the long term confederation of Europe or... [Thomas]: I think, Mr. Snow, you detected a very important point. You see the kind of anti-German intransigence of the Communist Apparat in Eastern Germany. This kind of--their endeavor, and all that what they try, to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany by their own propaganda, this will be, I think, a futile endeavor because they can't succeed here. This kind of realism in eastern Europe

will go towards the acknowledgement of the Western German efforts for detente and peace and order. So they will not succeed here and I think the next stage will be, probably--and there I come again, after Ulbricht and all this, what will happen then?-- A kind of erosion pulses inside the communist Apparat in the eastern part of Germany. You see, there are, I think, thousands and thousands of, eh, high ranking managers, economic managers, intellectuals. You know, I mean, uh, the same kind as you had in Czechoslovakia. Well, uh, Mr. Handler, you know some of them existing and I only need to mention one name. Appel [?], it was men who committed suicide. There are thousands of Appels, that means thousands of people who are engaged in life and supporters of development in Eastern Germany and have their own mind independent from the communist Apparat in Eastern Germany. And I think they are our allies, really, allies of common sense, allies who will understand the--this effort of humanization of these terrible frontiers and

minefields, and I think, you know, I'm an optimist, I would say. I think common sense and, em, and a kind of--of--of method of politics leading towards understanding, humanization, and peace and all that, they will prevail in the long process and we will appeal to these forces. So one day, if I might have just a look in the future, one day I think a modus vivendi could be reached on this kind of inner German terms and that would be a great date. [Interviewer]: Mr. Handler, I'd like to get your ideas on this, precisely the same question based upon your many years both in Eastern Europe and Bonn for the New York Times. [Handler]: I'm rather puzzled by this development, you see, on the basis of preceding models of Eastern Europe. The rapid industrialization created a whole new class-- managerial class--which formed, really, the seed bed for the liberalization movement. We see this in Russia. The thing that

uh, puzzles me, though is, that, uh, is the question that was discussed several years ago. Namely, are two Germanys, two German cultures developing? Uh, people who are at work on this problem even saw two--changes in the languages in both part--yes, terminology. And is--were these, uh, studies badly documented? Are two German cultures developing? Two German Weltanschauungs developing? Because if that is so, then an developing? Because if that is so, then an irreversible And I'm not sure that, uh, these studies were well-documented, but they were suff--the evidence that was produced at the time was quite disturbing. I wonder how you people in West Germany see this.

[Thomas]: You've touched a very important point, I'll tell you. You see, I tell you, you see the line of Pankau today is there are two new, two German nations, slowly evolving in this kind of social revolutionary different process of development. Their own assessment is that for the first time in history, uh, the first workers--German workers and peasant state is emerging, the first one. And from this onwards and their own kind of historical philosophy, I think that is the new Germany. And we in the Federal Republic of Germany in the West, are the old remnants of the kind of imperialistic, capitalistic society, uhhh--sentenced, one day in a historical development, to be overtaken by this new progressive German force in the East. Well, that is the philosophy of Ulbricht, of the regime, you know. And, uh, they're already claiming today, and they just in these days, you know, they are, uh, discussing their new constitution, and that is a constitution of a new German

socialistic state, you know. Well, I tell you, 1968 and up to now, you know, the 23 years after 1945, it's all nonsense to speak about two German different nations. I mean, the--now the historical great cultural background of the German nation. [Unintelligible] [Handler]: But, you know, Dr., ah, Thomas, Dr., uh, Adenauer-- you know... [Handler]: But you know, Dr. Thomas, Doctor Adenauer. Yes. was very active as Bundeskanzler. [Thomas]: Oh yes, good heavens, yes! [Handler]: Even your colleagues used to say “Well, for Doctor Adenauer, Europe East of the Elbe was Elbe was terra incognita. [Thomas]: I know, well, he was a Rheinischer, he came from the Rhein, you know, he didn't like the territories... [Handler]: Now, the--the--the--and certainly the moral climate in West Germany, when I was working there, seemed to indicate that this saying was not only true for Dr. Adenauer, but it was true for

many West Germans. And that really there existed an almost--I was going to say subconscious--but almost conscious fear of east--Eastern Europe. I mean, Eastern Europe represented the great unknown threatening the Damocles sword hanging over the heads of the German people, because of a lack of knowledge. Because, after all, the West Germans are West European oriented, culturally, psychologically, emotionally etc... On the other hand, the people of Brandenburg--[Thomas]: Yes, Pomerania, Saxony, yes, yes, yes--[Handler]: Prussia-- historically, for 1,000 years, they were oriented toward Eastern Europe and not toward Western Europe. Their entire world outlook was toward the eastern marches. So that in a sense historically the East German does have a different psychology the different historical outlook than the west Germany.

And this speaks for this whole idea of--of two German nations who are psychologically oriented in quite a different way. oriented in quite a different way. And the fact remains if you just look at German names in Brandenburg, in Pomerania, Preussen, the number of names--Slova--Slavic names, ah, men who-- who governed, men who led, and men who commanded the armies. I mean, there is--there was a historic process of assimilation or even integration among the border peoples, and they have absorbed becau--the, the psychology of Eastern Europe. The East German doesn't look upon the east--eastern European with fear that is shared by so many of the West Eur--West Germans who are oriented, turned toward Western Europe, and this is a historic fact that can’t be sort of

pushed aside. I think it is a very important element in the German psyche, you see-- [Thomas]: Mr. Snow, if you kindly allow me now... [laughter] ... Well I think it's a most fascinating kind of point of line and it's very interesting and you're absolutely right and correct in stating this kind of points, point after point. You know, I would even add another point, I mean--in order then to make my counterpoints from a different point of view. You see, I'm a Berliner and I come by my whole family standing from the [Eastern Marches?], all that. And I live now in the Rhein, in the Fatherland of Adenauer and the Rheinisch people. And I tell you I agree with you, I feel different, you know, I feel different and one thing definitely, when they make the Karnival, the famous Karnival, is that the English impression, you know? Well, you know, I stay there as a stranger and I don't know what Well you know I stay there and I stay there and I don’t know what kind of jokes they make, you know, they and I laugh but they don’t, you know, it's this kind of thing you know. Alright. Correct, Right [?], and there's an absolute difference you know in this kind of attitude, reactions,

style of life, correct! But, you know, I would suggest--and that is my counterpoint to all of this kind of thing--that it's not relevant to, to the feeling as a nation towards a culture, and towards the whole Habitus of a life of anation. You know, don't forget, please, one thing. After 1945, there came a terrific mixture of all eastern and western Germans. They are nearly 10 million eastern Germans living in western Germany; they have been absorbed. Refugees from Pomerania, from the Eastern Marches of Germany. Then, you've got the same kind of interchange of, eh, eh, people who are coming from Rhineland, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, who lived in Saxony, who lived in in Pomerania, in Bonn [?] Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, and all of this. I think there was a kind of mass exodus from the East to the West, from the West to the East, all those kinds of things. So I think that is not prevalent anymore, it doesn't mean this, you know.

And then, if you take culture as such, if you take, I know the curriculum of the eastern, uh, u-- German universities; there’s Kant, there’s Hegel, there’s Goethe, there’s Schiller, there’s Leibniz, there are the great philosophers, the great musicians; all that is German culture-- [Handler]: All--all East Germans [laughter] [Thomas]: Well, here you are! you know they have just got caught. Kant comes from eastern Prussia, and, uh, Leibniz comes from Saxony, you know, and Goethe from Thuringia, Thuringia, the Goethe-Haus, the Schiller-Haus, you know all those, but Beethoven comes from Bonn if you don’t know. [Handler]: But Dr., Dr., uh, uh, excuse me for interrupting you, Dr. Thomas. [Thomas]: Yes. [Handler]: Historically, and I think when you--when one talks--uh, deals with the German people, I mean, the history weighs very heavily on the German people. [Thomas]: Oh, good heavens, yes. [Handler]: Uh, the fact remains that the German national state came out of the East [Thomas]: Prussia. [Handler]: Yeah, out of the--out of the West; the German nationalism and then

followed by German chauvinism came out of the East, not out of the West. The question arises, therefore, and it's a very serious question. In which part of Germany is the national feeling most, uh, alive? Is it alive--I know that 5 or more million refugees came to West Germany and brough with them their own culture, their own ideas. But where is the drive of German nationalism most alive today? Is it in Western Germany or in Eastern Germany? [Thomas]: Well, I'll tell you, it's a very important question because, you know, it might be important for the things to come, and all that, you know. Well, here I would say, the Eastern regime, to come and all that, you know. Here I would say the Eastern regime, the communist a Nazionalbewusstsein, a new national feeling of the DDR, our republic, our system, our regime, our future, uh, you know, regime, our future, you know. The new perspectives, they always come from us! We are historically--history's on our side and not this kind of decadent system in the West. Well, that is one part,

They try this very hard. I would like to suggest here from the experience I have, and I have a little experience on this. It’s not taken in by the new generation, no it isn’t, definitely not. You see there are new dimensions, new dimensions, and I think you know if you--if you analyze the Federal Republic of Germany with--on national feeling, there's of course this feeling, Federal Republic of Germany, these new elements after ‘45. But, I would suggest of course that there's a new dimension here too, and that is Europe, and you know in this kind of elements and new problems of the industrial revolution. We are going into the 3rd revolution the electronic, cybernetic revolution, you know, and then with this new European vistas, the new European perspectives. I think all of these feelings are reletavated [i.e. related?] Germany. You don't have any kind, I would say, of base, of a chauvinist nationalism Federal Republic of Germany. [Handler]: No, of course not. [Thomas]: You know, this NPD business will be a lunatic isolated lunatic fringe business on the periphery of our society. They will come into parliament, of course, next time ‘69--

they have been in Parliament '49. People have forgotten it. Von Thadden, the leader of the--uh-- he was in Parliament! Well, he’s coming back again. What does it mean? Nothing! You know, because 90 percent of the nation is consolidated in the Democratic Party of the Federal Republic. So that, I mean, this kind of emergency over showing nationalism is absolutely impossible, according to if you love us a piece of our own styles factor and only please do not succeed to imbue a kind of chauvinistic nationalism under a communist flag. It's against the rhythm of history, against a loss of development, and I think the young generation which is growing up in Eastern Germany, it’s a generation of an industrial society too. It longing to see our part of the world and to come together. So I think it's an isolated process which is against all that what historical developments will prove. [Interviewer]: We started out talking about Europe as a whole and the developments in eastern and western Europe and it's not inappropriate that we ended up talking more specifically about Germany of course but I want to thank you both Mr. Hiller and Dr. Thomas for participating.