The First Amendment; Edmund Gullion

The following program is made possible in part by a grant from the courier corporation of Lowell Massachusetts [intro sting] WGBH radio Boston in cooperation with the Institute for democratic communication at Boston University. Now presents the First Amendment and a free people. An examination of civil liberties and the media in the 1970s and now here is the director of the Institute for democratic communication. Dr. Bernard Reuben. [music sting] Welcome to another edition of First Amendment and a free people. Tonight's guest is Dean Edmund Gullion. For 29 years Dean Gullion who is now the head of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. 29 years he was with the foreign service after his graduation from Princeton. Among other things he was first chargé d'affairs in Saigon after the war

and ambassador to what is now called Zaire which was then called the Congo. He's also had a very adventurous diplomatic history in Helsinki London Greece and other places and has served on disarmament panels for the United States he certainly is a distinguished observer of diplomatic affairs and foreign policy. My co-host today is Carol Rivers author of Growing up Catholic in America among other things and a member of the faculty of the school of public communication at Boston University. What I'd like to do is dig right into the subject which is what is the impact of the First Amendment um situations in the United States are having on foreign policy. I'd like to read just a little quote from Walter Lippmann who in his landmark study public opinion which was published in 1922 said news and truth are not the same thing and must be clearly distinguished and went on to say the function of news

is to signal an event. The function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts to set them into relation with each other and to make a picture of reality on which men can act. So my first question is to directly to Dean Gullion and it is what is the picture of reality about First Amendment happenings in the United States about the struggles over freedom of speech press assembly petition and all the rest. What's the impact of this on our colleagues and friends in other countries. Well mixed very mixed mixed in reaction and also depending upon the from where the observer is are seen. Obviously this couldn't happen except in America. I don't think in any country in the world would you have seen a president pushed from office largely through the activities of the

press. Nor do I think that any country would you have seen the press together with elements of the Congress busy digging into the really innermost recesses of what are usually called state secrets in the investigations of our CIA and FBI and things of that sort. Mixed I say. Certainly there is an affirmative. And that's probably predominant. People must admire the fact that we do permit this much freedom to our press. I think however that there's beginning to be a kind of a backlash effect to this as it goes on and on and on and on. As the observer States and populations begin to ask themselves how this would be if it were played out in their countries and some kind of rule of reason seems to suggest itself to them is not the United States it's zeal for exposing its innards and

literally tearing itself apart. I think that they're likely to underestimate our resiliency. The place of our press and media in our national life. But when they project this kind of experience into their own countries they would they would consider themselves having arrived at a very sorry plight indeed. I think one thing that the press has to consider is its obligation to the goals of American foreign foreign policy and in what is it. If I'm an editor who is leaked a story about what Henry Kissinger has said he wanted his conferences abroad. Am I expected to support the goals of the administration and my export expected to support goals I personally feel are good for the country. I think there in terms of foreign policy there aren't very many guidelines for the press at the moment. There used to be

a sort of hands off attitude which was that the president was some kind of philosopher king and what he said about foreign policy was sacred writ and you didn't question it. That's changed a lot. I don't think we have yet worked out what the rules ought to be and when do we say yes we ought to sit on this information we ought not to go after it because it's bad for the national interest or we should say in the interest of the freedom of the press this information should be gotten out to the public. I think there are very few guidelines on that. I'd like to get Dean Gullion's reaction to that. Do you think that it's possible to work out these rules for living together between the press and government on foreign affairs. Yes although I'm skeptical of rules per se, the essence of the matter often escapes rules and the essential issues are very very difficult to define and there are all sorts of gray areas with respect to what Carol Rivers said is should a pressed man ask himself

whether his function is to advance national policy or the goals of national policy. No no I don't think so. It certainly is a foreign affairs bureaucrat I never thought that it was the role of a newsman that I was working with to advance United States policy or even the particular part of it that I might be responsible for-- all I want him to do is act like a news man, report it as he saw it. I did not want him to distort it and I did not want him to act in such a way as if you were purposely motivated in order to embarrass United States policy. Well supposing-- How do, I don't know how you make rules about this. There are various efforts to make rules. There's a national. There's a bill a criminal enforcement act, I forget the name of the title of the bill, which would include among criminal offenses the leaking of information that is harmful to national defense. Senate of Senate one senator compiles a lot of these suggestions together and is frightened a great many people.

I certainly see the need of it, now these-- you know in the zeal of competition among news men. I do think that the national interest often gets a bit bruised. I can remember going back considerable distance. I had some knowledge of the code system that was used to set up the Japanese fleet of breaking the Japanese codes. I was amazed to see in the Chicago paper about that time a full story on this code breaking operation which could have lost us the war in the end the only limits to the FBI went around and picked up all the copies of Colonel McCormick Chicago Tribune at the time. I always had the feeling that they didn't go after him because to go after Colonel MACC Cosmic as we used to call them in the early days was really because he invented everything according to his Chicago Theater the air speeches directed all presidents but I had the feeling that the reason they didn't go after him was because they thought that would tip the enemy off to have their-- you know it's not to the-- You've got all sorts of responsibilities to allocate here, there's the republisher, there's the

newspaperman and the fellow in the shadows or whoever cooperated with him in getting this thing. I don't think that that newspaper man should have been commended for his zeal or promoted. I think he might in wartime have been shot. But I think we're dealing with a wartime situation things are pretty clear cut something like the Japanese code. Let's talk about the Bay of Pigs invasion for example. Sometime after that fiasco John Kennedy observed to a reporter you know I wished I wish you guys would run that story would have saved me one of my worst disasters I think in that case there was no question on the New York Times who knew about the details of the invasion for there was absolutely no question that they should withhold that information. An interesting question. Were they they were acting in the best what they perceive to be the best interest of the nation and the administration, as it turned out perhaps that was not so. Possibly it would been much better for this American foreign policy had that information gotten out and had there been no Cuban invasion. This would have been-- it seems to me that this would have

been to expect that they have the vision 20 20 foresight to have done this I think the New York Times acted exactly right in that situation I think the question for us is in the present atmosphere do you think that the New York Times would again withhold that kind of information. I'm rather rather for they would not. Well supposing remember lives are involved. Yeah. Supposing that the New York Times were convinced that this was an ill advised stupid adventure in which lives would be lost. Does that change the picture. No, not in my mind. This is one instance in which it turned out to be ill advised. Very possibly merely because of some mechanical decision, tactical decisions not to employ the U.S. air power. But if you do this would be to give to the press a kind of a supreme arbiters role as to what who anointed the New York Times to be the arbiter of United States policy

I think was amended in Salzburg. Well there are differences brokers decisiveness Berger has a very different line of country than the editorial staff of a thing that is in our own community there's a recent the very very magically lower level operation you know recently there's been a president elected to Tufts and the students who are on the board visiting committees. And they are in there consulted their new journalistic consciences and decided there was up to them to publish all the names of all of the people who had been nominated and give an idea of their relative ranking. Well that didn't work out because the stories came out and embarrassed everybody at the time. But suppose we take a little look at it from the point of view of somebody overseas now he let's say he's in France or he's in Malaysia or and he's in Greece and he reads about all the troubles in the United States. If he's in Greece he's been through a

military dictatorship. If he's in France he's been under the great De Gaulle for years if he's in Malaysia his country is threatened by insurgents in the north. On the Thai border he's worried about the fall of Vietnam and so on and so forth. I get the impression there is not a clear cut case where he looks at the stories about the Pentagon Papers or the Daniel Shore case or anything that he can understand. On the one hand he sees a triumph of American democracy. On the other hand he sees a dilemma for the continuance of the American system of effective foreign policy. Where do you think he tilts in appreciating or depreciating in his reading these stories. I think that's a very precise way to state the dilemma. Say I repeat I think that there has begun to be a kind of a backlash about what is perceived as an excess of self flagellation and self exposure in the United States.

You certainly have to be impressed by Watergate in fact we exchanged the presidents without any gunboats in the Potomac or troll cars on Pennsylvania Avenue. But it goes on and on. And then this is compounded by the increasing division between the executive branch and the congressional branch in respect to foreign policy. This is a thing rather peculiar to America and citizens and subjects of many countries don't understand it with the alarms and confusions of an electoral year thing so it looks a little more confused. Sensational news played up by adversaries and their adversary nations that can exploit all of these ills of the American people and the American image. I think that very seriously there is a feeling of the United States is very giddy precipitous descent of prestige of self-image and certainly they perceive that there is

not in the United States a consensus on foreign policy. Carol I can see you want to enter the story here. Yeah I think that we're not the we seem be talking as if the press is perhaps the only one committing excesses. I think the press has realized there have been tremendous excesses committed perhaps because of abuse of presidential power in the area. The questions of Chile where covert activity were-- was carried on of a nature that alarmed and upset the Congress. The the activities of the CIA. You know I think that one thing that perhaps all these this cycle of looking into things has done is to perhaps put into I hope put into effect some reforms in terms of scrutiny of how foreign policy is conducted scrutiny of covert activities. I think that for too long all these areas being hidden and not

looked at they became in some cases sloppy in some cases. Excessive And if as I think people abroad do they do not understand our internal convulsion. They don't understand this. We do this often and we do it a lot and we usually come out of it healthier. I think it's hard for foreign foreigners looking at us to understand that. It seems to be a conflict, the thing that we do to ourselves. You know it's beating ourselves over the head and the and the good results that come from it. Again the dilemma seems to be a conflict also between traditional diplomacy the traditional diplomats job and public diplomacy. We used to say that public diplomacy involves such organizations as the United States Information Agency to show how this democracy is alive and really works. But now we're entering a new phase where. The diplomats have to contend with the press as an independent public diplomatic force

as well as multinational corporations. As an independent diplomatic force. So my question to Dean Gullion is as we go through these machinations do we have to bring all parties together or get all parties to think industrial corporations. The press of the United States, people in favor of public diplomacy, people favor of traditional diplomacy. Is this a more complicated story than it first appears. Well the game of Foreign Affairs is so internet and complex that you need a computer to keep track of the players. It's more complex for no other reason that the simple bipolar confrontation has given place to this multiple arity. The administration has rediscovered the wheel and operating the balance of power which is a very complex sophisticated operation which in the nature of things is very difficult to explain continuously to any. And he says the citizenry American or others.

Bismarck might be able to do it with a docile set of Prussians. Kissinger is compared to Bismarck and medic and all the rest of it but he doesn't have that same kind of population. Certainly the greatest need for the conduct of foreign policy is the restoration of the consensus of the American people. It has been very surely shattered, not only by these dramatic events, but by the passage of time, the distance from World War II to generational change in this country turning inwards toward domestic goals. Don't you think that Vietnam which was a personal tragedy to a great many Americans was really the thing that shattered the faith in Foreign policy as you've been conducted. How did we get where we were. How did this disaster happen. Well I certainly think that it was a factor but by no means the only factor. And there's all the difference between winning and losing.

Vietnam was a grave defeat unless you come from the south of this country you probably don't know that-- Recognize defeat or the fact that defeat has its consequences. There again we talked about the Bay of Pigs. This need not have turned out the way it was but I would rather we didn't get into an exploration of the Vietnamese War. But it was certainly not the sole cause for this. Watergate had its causes and the fact that Watergate followed on Vietnam. I think really had more to do than Vietnam itself with this region the country certainly in the division between Congress and the executive. The fact that now and for some time to come it almost seems to be certain that the House will be the Congress will be a one party of the same party, whether the president is or not, is a factor peculiar to our national life. And it was something that you probably do easier in the 18th and 19th centuries it's very difficult it seems to me now.

So far as the diplomats role and playing a public diplomacy it is not the State Department's function to try to explain things to the American people through a kind of a network of news bureau in some more normal times the secretary of state and the president himself or the chief information officers of the government in foreign policy we have no ministry of information. We tried to set up one or even to set up these kind of your local small state departments. I think that Congress would object to this business pretty soon. Yet this hasn't been very easy to do because of the suspicion on both sides because this is a quasi-rejection of both the senator, the Congress, and the executive by so many of the American people. And because of the crises which have kept Henry Kissinger on the shuttle from him in the Middle East he just simply has not the time to do these things.

But I must say I don't think I would like things to return to the way it used to be in the foreign correspondents which was when you landed in a country you went to the American embassy and you got the brightest guy and he said Fill me in and he feel Jian. And you went back and you parroted all that back. Having been in several countries where crisis situations were going on I did that I went to the embassy and I got filled in. But then I started going to other sources in the country. I found that the embassy side was only one side of the story. And that to do as, unfortunately most American foreign correspondents did, was not to tell the whole story. Well let me speak about that a bit. You don't want things to go back as they were. Let me just hark back to a minute to the CIA and the plight of the transnational corporations in respect of alleged corporate bribery. The Congress has always had the role of oversight of the CIA. It didn't need legislation to

do this. It was a question of the national mood or of the mood of the Congress on this subject. They could have done it there was nothing wrong with the old way the old means Had they been exercised with respect to the relationship between the correspondent and the American diplomat. I think that what has been lost and I hope only temporarily is that kind of confiding relationship between an American ambassador or a State Department official and the press. In my experience I was always associated with complete openness I would show the car press van what I was filing from the State Department the biggest newsgathering reporting agency in the world. They would tell me what they were doing. We were separately helpful. Certainly no foreign correspondent it was worth anything ever limited his inquiries to the American embassy. It's often the best source of information because we just

happen to run the best Foreign Service. But he's got any if he's worth his salt he goes behind around and everywhere else to check out the story. But I wouldn't act today as I used to act then you wouldn't be as open though I certainly would not mind because I would I would think that I was in the presence of an adversary I expect there to be a kind of attention as you say as Joe Allsup used to say. He, Allsup, belonged to an extractive industry whereas the State Department and the government were necessarily return if one expects that kind of attention. But you don't expect that the story for the newsman and his how he can definitely embarrass one. Moreover there is no reason even if you have the best of relationships with the press. And they have a good opinion of you. One has no confidence that what you might say to Him for His guidance in confidence won't immediately be published and by some keyhole journalist who might get the Pulitzer Prize for it.

This process the invention of the Xerox machine as terribly complicated the conduct of foreign relations and just incidentally just crushed this kind of relationship that ought to and used to exist between press and the ?diplomats? if public diplomacy cannot be carried out in public. And it's getting awfully difficult to carry out in private. Are we suggesting that the situation will lead to increased tensions between states because there is no solution to this communication problem at the moment. There are going to be acerbic reporters, there are going to be jealous diplomats, there are going to be honest diplomats and noble reporters. But they are mutually very suspicious of one another, I think you you react and express that quite honestly. Does this lead to a plateau and breakdown of communication for foreseeable future? I think the clue is the words foreseeable future. I as I get

older I begin to be very much pressed for the cyclical nature of things you know as the generation proceeds to hand over to another and measure the generations much is much shorter term let's talk about the tenure of the working life of the hard driving journalist. In these 10 years in the field making his reputation now I think within that time these relations will change because of the nature of things I think that these of the 70s will will be alleviated I just think that's bound to happen no matter whether you set up laws or you try to define these things. Whether the journalist which would be a welcome effort tried or set up for themselves a code of standards as they will enjoin the corporations to do with respect to the to their operations abroad no matter what you do in that line it really depends upon the way human relations evolve. Now you are, you Carol and you Professor Rubin, are in the business of communications and let me turn the question on you. I have I would make the

proposition that at least in the short term the tremendous the communications revolution the telecommunications expansion has exacerbated relations between states rather than relieve them. I would also venture to guess that if anybody had told us 10 years 15 20 years ago that we could communicate instantly with satellites that everybody would get a 15 minute burst of foreign news on the TV news at night that the satellites could broadcast Inter-Parliamentary or enter Cabinet discussions if that was a thing I said told you that 15 years ago you said you know we're really the world is going to move toward something good. Instead all this frenzy of communication I think is exacerbated tensions rather than relieved them. This global village has turned out to be a rather harsh place to live in. I not only read many of the studies I wrote a couple of them myself and I know that that you have and many

of our colleagues have it is a very difficult time to live in we have the technology. On a recent program if you know the sort of pool service discussing cable he said the technology is way ahead of really the political scene. But we have a way out of it. I think we have to live with it because I don't think there's any way that we can slacken the pace that the communications revolution has probably changed diplomacy in politics in international affairs. And we have to find ways to catch up because we're not going to go back, I think, to the kind of pace we had 20 years ago and if we think we are, I think were kidding ourselves. why is it I think it will Rogers for some reason who said this is the only country in the world where people go to the poorhouse in an automobile. Is there any relationship due to this technological dilemma. We obviously have a social dilemma. We have an immediate crisis in American foreign policy, we are losing our allies faster than we are gaining them, we are losing confidence. We take great pride in our investigative reporters.

But if anything I get out of this discussion about the impact of the First Amendment on foreign policy is that we're living through the throes of a change in American society and American thinking and perhaps a reform mission of reporting and of foreign policy goals. Is that a fair assumption that one have second we have that it's a fair assessment but again I think that the wheel will turn and I'm not so convinced this Carol is that things will never be as they were when I want to think Caryl Rivers and I do want to thank Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. This is Bernard Rubin saying thank you. For WGBH radio Boston in cooperation with the Institute for democratic communication at Boston University has presented the First Amendment and the free people. And examination of the media and civil liberties in the 1970s. This program was recorded in the studios of WGBH Boston and was made possible in part by a grant from the

courier corporation of Lowell Massachusetts.