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I was reluctant as I said in the United States Senate yesterday to as the press has reported shift my position. I would like to have found. Circumstances different. I would like to have come back and. Advised our government to cease bombing in the north. But I found that while I was in Vietnam. That it is very difficult if not impossible. To have an of law. And not have a war at the same time. Even we would have to withdraw. All we would have to support our forces. That I giving them my. In Vietnam today. And if I believe that cessation of bombing in the north would bring ho team into the conference table I would be the first to support cessation of bombing in the not. But I am convinced as a result of my trip. That it is not the key.
Press sation a bombing is not the key. To a negotiated peace. At the present time. I believe that whole G.M. is listening to people who tell him. That the United States has a sharp division. In our body politic. And that if he waits that eventually. Public opinion in the United States will cause our government to unilaterally withdraw from Vietnam. I think he's wrong. I think that he ought to know that he's wrong. I think that he's patiently waiting. For the United States to show sign that it will not persevered and that it will not support our basic commitment in Nof Vietnam once he makes this determination. I do believe that he will then come to the conference table. And if he
says at that time. That he will negotiate for peace I will then be the first. I assure you to call upon our government to cease bombing in the north if that is a condition precedent. What was the one thing with you. For you would cause you. To call you. Well there are more than there was more than one ingredient. As I said the consensus everywhere that I went. Was that at this time. O CI was not ready to negotiate a shot of cessation of the bombing and merely with a drop of American and allied forces number two. I could not see leaving our men who were dying every day and I went into the
foxhole and into the hospital and I talked with our soldiers. Let me incidentally say that the morale was high. The combat efficiency was great. Soldiers even in the back areas were eager to go into the front because they believe so strongly in the cause. When I went into the hospital and I only went into one and saw four operating going 24 hours a day and the soldiers still back up saw the blood and saw incidentally that a great number of injuries were head injuries. Now when I was in World War 2 we were taught to shoot for the body. The target is the greater. But here there is a direction. From the NRA and we had to shoot for the head. And if the soldier is not killed he is so badly injured that he is rendered ineffective for the rest of his life. And when you see this you
come to the realization. That either you are in war or you are not in war. I believe in a limited war. I don't believe we ought to do anything that should provoke. The Red Chinese to come into the war. And this was a great subject of the discussion in my very lengthy report to the Senate yesterday. But I can't see it. Having our soldiers out there and not giving them everything that we have to support them and when we cannot then we should withdraw. What my position now amounts to is then person no assessment or reassessment of the conditions and the bombing in the not so I don't think that my. My position is necessarily a shift. I still want peace. I fervently want peace. I still support a limited war in Vietnam. The only position that I have shifted to if it all is very strongly is support of giving
all that we can within the framework of a limited war to our soldiers who are fighting in Vietnam. And I do this primarily because I believe it is the road to peace. Very well that certainly falls within what I would consider to be non escalation I believe in escalation to the degree that the enemy escalate. I do not believe that we should. Cut back. At any time when the enemy is moving up its forces. I don't believe that we can put our troops in jeopardy. I believe it is insanity to put out troops in jeopardy. And incidentally let me said I look for all the napalm baby is that I have been reading about. I look at great length to see if I could find them. And frankly I only saw one child
that had been burned by napalm. I don't profess to say that in the short period of time that I spent there that I could see everything. But I do want you to understand and to believe that I just didn't go on the tour that had been arranged for me by the military and by the pressure. I went elsewhere. I changed the schedule. I asked to see thing then I went to see things that were not on the schedule. I looked for the number of often that had been talked about. I checked into the foliation I found out that the mechanical that we are using in default the agent had no toxic at all. That it does not render the land unfit for production that it merely destroys the present crop of present foliage and I saw evidence that after that has happened that you can produce it in that man that it will produce crops after so and it is not dangerous to human beings. I further looked into the use of napalm
Napalm is being used in addition to clear the foliage being used to kill. But it is primarily being used in areas where the Vietcong are so entrenched. I do not believe that we have to use napalm. I would much rather see a Hughes tear gas to bring out those Viet Cong unarmed Vietnamese troops that are entrenched. I believe we can win this war using only the most humane if we can use that expression humane weapons that we have cost No weapon is really humane but this is war. And we have to take it as we find. And I think that the only and only when Hoshi man I understand that a negotiated peace is the best and only solution to Pete. Would he come to the conference table. I do not believe at the present time that he has made that conclusion yet.
And. I believe that we could should continue the war that our bombing should be limited to the most strategic military targets. I do not believe that the Johnson administration our our government or particular should buy high and should bomb air bases in mainland China. Or should do anything which would bring about. Read China's entry into this war agree with them. I believe that the bombing should not be in civilian populated areas. I think it should only be on strategic military target and that includes supply that includes troop movement that includes ammunition that includes reserves that
includes anything military and anything that can be used to supply the military. Steel mills Yes. Factories that are supplying military and military equipment yes anything that is the wall supports the war. Yet here with another. Thought here. While when I said that I thought the war could last another decade I meant thereby that even if the war would have come to an end today and hopefully it will. That we're going to be in Vietnam for a long time. The magnitude of the problem is overwhelming. The development of the social economic problems political development in Vietnam is something that I could not possibly have imagined until I went to see for myself. And we're going to
need to continue to stay there. We are practically helping to build a country from scratch. And we're going to have to give economic aid and we're going to have to give military assistance because the South Vietnamese even though they are been through it are beginning to build the beginning to build. There's a great need to supply security for this development. And I think realistically speaking even though we are in a very bad situation and we are and we have made mistakes to be sure. But we are beginning to rectify those mistakes and it's going to take time and the American people might as well get ready and get accustomed to it because it's going to be a costly thing. But I think it's something that we have to live up to that. But no one within the country of North Vietnam far as I
know as bombing is concerned I'm opposed to any invasion by our troops and our. Allies because the war is the war in Vietnam. That's that's all the war taking place inside of Vietnam I don't think it should take place anywhere else. With the exception of bombing ammunition and strategic military targets in the north right hope of the war. I think it can. I think what ultimately is going to happen is that the 17th hole which was intended as a temporary in line is going to become a permanent law. And I think that you're going to have a man in communist government in the north and hopefully you're going to have a civilian form of government in South Vietnam with the £17 al being the border. And then you're going to have cause internal conflict both in the north and south.
They're not all people in the north and that common it and all people in the South are not non-comic that understand all of them are going to want their way of government just like all people in Massachusetts and that Republicans and all of them certainly hopefully and that Democrat and I think in the end I think it will be getting it all over the world today you've got to to Germany you've got the two Asian east and west. You've got it in Guerrero and I think you've got to have it in Vietnam I think ultimately that's going to be the answer. Senator we're going to actually ask only what actually. Escalation which would be the sending of alchol what is Vietnam that's beyond the £17. Ethical nation would be the bombing of civilian population centers in North Vietnam. Escalation will be the bombing of Haifa or the mining of the high point of escalation would be
pursuit of made into Red China or the bombings anywhere on the border of the Chinese mainland. And the Liberation Front. I don't believe there can be negotiations without the inclusion of the National Liberation Front. Actually get thinking you speak of those who you know watch you but if you say that you talk to those who actually know what you think you direct. Well. I tried my best to get close to people who knew how to me and. Who had been in the home know I. And that's one of the reasons why I tried to get into the prison a camp a prisoner of war camp. It was not on my schedule. There were those who were a bit reluctant to let me go into prison or walk camp but
I did and I've had experience in World War Two as an Army intelligence operations officer and I had my interpreter and I question the prisoners of war prisoners of war both from the north and from the south. In addition to this I've talked to a very knowledgeable member of a very distinguished international press corps that is in Saigon many of them who had knowledge and when I got to Cambodia I talked to one American newsman who had been there for some time who had been to Hanoi. I talked to Alfred Bichette who was staying very close to my hotel. I'll talk to him a great writing. I met the representative of the Hanoi government in Cambodia though I subsequently asked for a meeting
with him where we could get down to real discussion and of course he said that at this time he did not feel that the discussion between us would serve any significant purpose. And so the answer to your question is only that I tried my best within the limited time that I was there and not only applied to Vietnam and Cambodia but the other countries that I went and talked to intellectuals. To get all I could about hope. His personality how I think who the people are around him what pressures are upon him because we've all got to look at this thing just like it's here President Johnson listened to his heart listened to his hawks and he listens to people in the Senate and people in the house and his private friends. And we must presume that holds him in the train and I know he's going through mental gymnastics
all the time and I think that at some time hold him and probably was ready to move toward a negotiated peace. There is a possibility that we have mis read some signals along the way. There's also a possibility that the resumption of bombing after the Texans may have been premature because from what I could gather is that the man and people in there aren't just don't move as quickly as we do here in the United States and in the Western world that they take more time. They try to. Not make quick decisions and as you know the tap shoes were rather a relatively short period of time and so perhaps we did make a mistake in relatively early resumption even though our government had reason to believe. If you look at the Aero photographs that there was beginning to be a build up in the
north which would be detrimental to our troops and this was the reason our government gave for resumption of the bombing in the north. But all that is to say that I did try to determine the my whole G-man the influence upon that mine which resulted and has resulted so far in the decisions and as a result of this I drew my conclusion that at the time he is not ready to make a negotiated peace. If you have something that you have contact with you know when you should leave. Just to hope I had made known my interests. I had hoped the North Vietnamese and the Cambodians would believe that. This was not a mission and on which I had been sent by anybody because it wasn't. And I thought that if they wanted to talk to someone who came with
objectivity and. And with open mindedness and that they had some message that they wanted to convey. That if I believed in the in the sincerity of that message that I would convey that message that I had the proper forum namely the United States Senate floor. But even though I hadn't spoken to date that some day that I would know I was dissatisfied with the briefings that I received in Washington. I got more frankly from my lunch lunches and discussions with the press than I did frankly from the briefings that I had received in Washington. What I took issue with Mr Ruskin I met on two occasions and I will say there were heated discussions but they were very lively discussions to be sure and which I with my inquisitive mind asked many many questions and I was. I was really concerned. And I sat there on the
floor of the Senate for almost three months and I listened to briefings and I talked to everyone I could. And after the resumption of the bombings in the north I just couldn't sit down any longer. And then I made my move back and there was a big gap in Washington. They showed up. With an actual saw. In the main But I think that our government has. Has. Failed. To really get the message of this war across to the American people and to some degree the press. Has its responsibility also. I'm not talking about the. Local press. And I say local in the terms of the United States press I'm talking about Saigon and I said this to members of the press. I had a meeting with about 25 of them. One evening which lasted late into the night and we discussed it and I said
things that are coming back home are just not as I find them here in many many instances. How is it that you haven't been able to get this across in your writings. Why aren't the American people better informed about what's going on here about our commitment what we are doing how it's being done what the magnitude of the problem is. Why don't you get into the question of the napalm and into the question of defoliation. Where are these off and where are these people who are homeless wandering around as a result of Abita during indiscriminate bombing of American from the American employers. These are the questions that I want to know gentlemen and I want to know why we're not being informed why hasn't the president been able to sell. This walk to the American people as as as as a just war or a 10 minute mistake and say well you made a mistake but we're making the best of a bad situation why didn't this message come across and I think it is coming across I don't know to real. I'm hopeful that it will.
Why. Are we having to go xmen doesn't know me very well. I don't I don't succumb easily to arm twisting. Number one the president didn't try to twist my arm and number two I don't think my twists very easily. I met with President Johnson and the prime my discussion was concerning the war in Vietnam and the question we discussed many other things but this was the primary discussion was about amount to half the conference. Johnson is quite correct Mr. Grossman is quite correct about that but he's wrong about the president attempting to twist my arm and he's wrong about my being twisted. I know that Mr. Grossman and I have great respect for him is very keenly concerned about this war as many people who supported me in my campaign for the election to the United States Senate. But I think they would be even more
disappointed if I came back and told the UN truth about my findings in Vietnam. Purpose of my truth my trip was to search for truth and I did that and I believe I found truly to the best that I was able to find that you returned and I have not. And there's a number of critics academic and otherwise and you know I think you've got to think if you think you want to talk about all of them well I wish everybody could see I wish that. No member my friend my member's colleagues in the in the Senate in the house could go. I know this in a practical matter I wish that every American could see first hand in making judgements. As to what's going on in Vietnam. There's a lot of opinion that runs the show for example that KE is a military man and he's running things just didn't the fact he is a member of the directorate primarily consisting a military
band to be sure. But key is not the only voice by any means in that direction. Number two there's a belief that this essentially is just a sham. I went to this am I sat and listened to the debates I talked to the president. I had dinner with various members of the family young intelligent dedicated politician who will be the future leaders of South Vietnam. I put very penetrating embarrassing questions to them. I got into the question of 21 how much real responsibility is the director and really running the show. What do you think about this what do you think about that. I was impressed frankly with the quality of the leadership with the independent thinking and judgment. I was very very impressed as I said in the Senate about the lack of anti American bitterness. I know that. New York Times and
Time magazine or some others have come back in and said that there's rampant anti-Americanism. When I was in Adelaide and I was in Africa and I was out of places and where I want to I've seen anti-American bent even from our allies. I've seen the sense of an occupation of a country. I don't get that feeling you get and I don't see this anti-American sentiment. I walked around I went out at night after dark I didn't see it. You don't see soldiers all over Saigon like it was at the beginning. I think it shows a political and sound judgment that we are doing everything we can to avoid the impression that we are occupying Vietnam and so I think it means people in the main bad those of course who don't want us there. But the one thing that I want to call to your attention which perhaps I did I did not say and I don't remember yesterday in the Senate.
No one talks about communism a democracy. Idiology is a soft history. The thing that I find. And it went through all of Southeast Asia was rampant nationalism. What the people were concerned about was their own country. Cambodia for example they didn't want us there but they don't want the Vietnamese there. They don't want the South Vietnamese there they don't want the North Vietnamese there. They want Cambodia Cambodia the same thing with time and the same thing with Vietnam. They don't want us there for any prolonged period of time. They only want our assistance as mom as it is necessary in order for them to become stable and no more. And this is true. And the same thing is going to have to guide our thinking in our judgment in the years to come. In Far East Asia these people have been living under
French and colonial domination of other countries for many many and generations and they want independence. They want freedom. That's what the money across the world. They don't want us telling them what to do I anyone else telling them what to do. Same thing in Taiwan. They're so preachy and so point out that they don't have to take American aid anymore that they can stand and walk along. This is the thing we've got to watch. Not so much communism versus democracy. And communism is only going to thrive as long as people are hungry and homeless and don't have a little plot of land where they can raise their rights once they have been if that's your rants against comics and I think that our military force is just a part of it. That's not our great strength technical know how and show how we can give to these people in order for them to become
stable. It's going to be your best boardwalk and Comet. Then the jobs I think we can lower the levels. Man can't fire an artillery piece or fly a plane and there are good things that he can do in the army you can use females to do and many straighted work to relieve other men for combat troops. You can pay them way now you can equip them well you can give them some dignity and some status and you can have a my mission fighting force. I think you can do it without a draft version of the draft and have only a legislative draft ready in case of a national and catastrophic. Emergency which would need more than your regular army. That's my position on the draft now and I intend to make that position known to the committee.
I found no indication of it. Time did not permit it. I did get complaints that Negroes were being discriminated against. So if I have the assignment and the promotion you know Ryan and great officers I had no real opportunity because I only talked with a few. I had no real opportunity to try to get some supporting evidence. Ever ever any great magnitude. And so immediately upon my return to Washington I wrote a letter sent it to the defense secretary Mr. McNamara telling him of these claims and allegations and asking him to do it invest in-depth investigation and be found to be the case of cost to remedy it immediately
after the told him that I would be pleased to receive his report on racial progress. Oh boy. But on that morning a road trip and race remain proportionate I am sure. Yeah I think that probably is true. And from the best information I can get it is true but it is based upon the fact that Negroes Alvar in tearing to remain in.
Series
Vietnam War Report
Episode
Senator Brooke
Producing Organization
WGBH Educational Foundation
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/15-90dv4h33
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Description
Series Description
Vietnam War Report is a weekly show featuring news reports and panel discussions about specific topics relating to the Vietnam War.
Description
Senator Brooke On Vietnam
Created Date
1967-04-10
Genres
News
Topics
News
War and Conflict
Media type
Sound
Duration
00:30:56
Embed Code
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Credits
Producing Organization: WGBH Educational Foundation
Production Unit: Radio
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: 67-0065-04-10-001 (WGBH Item ID)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Generation: Master
Duration: 00:28:25
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Citations
Chicago: “Vietnam War Report; Senator Brooke,” 1967-04-10, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed April 23, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-90dv4h33.
MLA: “Vietnam War Report; Senator Brooke.” 1967-04-10. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. April 23, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-90dv4h33>.
APA: Vietnam War Report; Senator Brooke. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-90dv4h33