Vietnam War Report; Hans Morgenthau

This is the Vietnam War report. Bringing you tonight an interview with Hans Morgenthau. Mr. Morgenthau has the Alfred Michelson professor of political science at the University of Chicago and currently on leave at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York a consultant to the State Department Mr. Morgenthau I was also one of the most vocal critics of the United States involvement in Vietnam. The following interview was conducted in New York by Paul Cowan of the Village Voice. Mr. Cowan You are now a full of the administration about the issue of Vietnam and thus a hero to the left. You know I remember three years ago when your name was far less attractive to doctrinaire liberals could you distinguish between your position and theirs. Well I think this is quite easy my puts my philosophy hasn't changed but me and you problems of foreign policy have changed and so often necessity I take a different place in suspect almost politics. And it took 10 or 15 years ago. I am not opposed to see war in Vietnam on

the New York pacifism or. Your leftist sympathies. But on slickly pragmatic comments because I think this is a war so wrong place for a reason long means which cannot be successful and even if we had a semblance of success is likely to be counterproductive. That is to say they will bring about severity of the suds which we are trying to avoid by waging it. Do you think that the kind of assumptions that have led to the peace offensive are assumptions that you would cheer. Well yes you mean you are you're speaking of the peace offensive which the government has been pursued who has been pursuing that in for a month. Surely I believe soon if the administration wants to get out of S.. Di lemma. And as I just reading to negotiate the only question is what is the basis of negotiations. And here

is a problem is very simple. Neither side wants to give solace to Vietnam and gives the other side a chance to take it. And he sees you Don Lemon's here's a problem. Before we go into that more deeply Could you locate the kinds of pressures that you think led to the peace offensive for example do you think there were more domestic than foreign. No I think Syria is centrally Silverside of two objective conditions under which we operate. For she administration is of course a way of see enormous risks which will confound it if it has to take a step toward further escalation of the war. First of all it is is a way of serving SKS a warm breeze. The Soviet Union was China a general escalation even busines the limits of Vietnam which are on a higher level of violence will within six months have exactly the same result as we have seen in the last year. Because today we haven't

won any victory. We have simply on a higher level of escalation existed the missing nine months ago or a year ago. We have the same position then we risk than the Viet Cong control about the same territory which they controlled a year ago or more Vietcong now fighting in towns Vietnam center a year ago and so your whole your whole business has really stabilized the situation but it hasn't gained us anything in positive terms and if you escalates the war father in all likelihood on a higher level of violence of six months from now I will be exact in the same position. Well surely these problems are known to the administration do you think that they've changed our conditions about negotiating. Ever nobody knows about this of course because you know it was easy real negotiations have been being carried on in secret but I would guess and I think that's a very good reason. I think we're good evidence for such a guess. So we have become much more flexible and much more. It's clearly serious about

negotiations in VBA. Didn't you say last summer simply because we are now face to face we have a crucial decision because if those negotiations should fail what we are going to do that. If that's true it still hasn't persuaded people on the American left or Apparently people in European or communist countries there's an open question I don't I don't know about your American left but certainty in Europe and Asia I think she is now a much stronger conviction. Not only is that retard we want to get out of the war but to be much more realistic in our boat to negotiations and maybe I didn't say last summer. Do you think our new approach our new approach to sharpen the differences between say Russia China the North Vietnamese government in the NLF. Yes I wouldn't I wouldn't doubt that. For our interest in Southeast Asia the Soviet in the US on power lines. Neither we nor Soviet Union

has an interest in seeing an extension of Chinese power and need to be a notice of you do not have an interest in an escalation of the war which might bring about a confrontation between the two superpowers on the battlefield. So your question I think I was the seriousness of our peace efforts has strengthened the Subby at hand the Soviet Hanoi and on the other hand of course the stereos to Chinese as a verbal hysteria shows that they are fully aware of it and I'm afraid as I know you my do yield to our. Promises and to see a Russian pressure. So this is I think a situation which is favorable to our interests and I think as you point your question indicates shop and see differences of position between the Soviet Union China.

How about the differences between the three Asian governments between between China on the one hand North Korea the North Vietnamese government on the other and the NLF is of course very difficult to say because we know nothing about internal relations. We can only assume forms your objective situation and to of course also indications of a more substantial nature is that Soviet call are very much afraid that Hanoi will send some down to the river because Hanoi is dunces a couple of times before. Furthermore now Hanoi is of course in a very bad position to challenge China because aside from to see our supplies reach noite gets from the Soviet Union or on Salon.com would have to pass through China. And if there is a real conflict between Hanoi and China China might simply close its borders to Russian supplies and then.

No you would easy have to do Russian line or it would have to cut its Russian ties altogether and make a clear cut choice between between Russia and China. So at some moments they have been fortunate in being able to start a defense between Russia and China but if this conflict between Russia and China is accentuate it so annoying might be faced with a very painful choice in having to jump into one of the other camp and gave up serious relatively favorable position between two chiny into two communist powers which it occupies today do you think that there is an alternative policy that we could pursue that would in fact move Hanoi closer to Russia. But by our I think if we were to realistic enough to make a real distinction in practice between

Viet Cong and Hanoi which actually exists I think we could lose since the situation very much and we would have much greater room for maneuver. We need I think one of the main stumbling blocks to negotiation has been our refusal to recognize the Vietcong ACA as a full fledged negotiating partner which after all it is entitled to because it is the only organized political and military force which exists in Vietnam. Our side sees Saigon army and sea and I will and talks in effect what differences in diplomacy with the recognition of the Liberation Front mean well see liberation from on its interests and position and polish is not necessarily identical with those of peeping or na. And by assuming such existential identity you know of course the ball modes the identity you see is in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Well I'm a

prophecy and I think it is foolish in terms of our own interest we have all interest in in seeing to it as that see existing differences be accent a way that if we could place a Viet Cong out against noise into noise out against peeping and vice versa it would be in a much stronger diplomatic position. But by assuming such exists a monolithic relationship so that we are to be at KONG equal Sano in Hanoi equals peeping. We forgo a diplomatic advantage which objectively we have now in line with this. For years you've for a couple of years now you've argued the crucial mistake that America is making in Southeast Asia is to perceive China as a military threat rather than a political and cultural threat. How would how would the perception of China as a political threat. In fact change our policy in Southeast Asia and it would change our policy because we would realize that we are not to be at and the more we destroy in order to be a more we create a virus

which are Chinese are going to fail. For if we if we try if annoying to a client who kind of skew it so harsh and scary given. A lot of modern weapons. But when it comes to manpower and infantry weapons mortars and rifles wanted to Chinese can give it to us and it and after our geography is nothing to be sniffed in. Even so it is no longer as important. It's important it's different from what it was 50 or 100 years ago. Still it is a basic fact of international life. Let me press you a little further on this question though. Would the recognition of China as a political threat mean that we withdrew some troops there that we only try to defend bases that we increase an aid program that we send Peace Corps type programs and that even if we rarely see a political situation in South in Southeast Asia as you just a beautician of interests and power. We wrote. Be much less reluctant

to allow the Vietcong or actually say to recognize the fact that to be a Kong is a political force in South Vietnam. Because he would not be afraid so that let me say a Vietnam. A united Vietnam controlled by ho Truman would of necessity be an extension of Chinese policy means this is the obsession we have we don't realize it by using our carts cleverly and by making superstitiously common cause with the Soviet Union we have a good chance I'd least we had a good chance I don't know whether we still have it but certainly we had a good chance of creating an 82 is Vietnam under some leadership before dreamin. Because it's obvious that it's a lost sinkhole Jermaine wants to become a satellite of China seas you sick right. It's right at least escalate to for him as our military threat but rather by our

indiscriminating policy by our policy which is a much more militarily and politically or you know and we are tending to bring about a barrier sawed it off. Conc forming an reeling Holcim in into a satellite of China off driving her dream inducer waiting arms of China then we then if you were to pose you a much more reasonable political Who are you and discriminating and subtle sophisticated policy I think is my main objection to perceiving off China. Hanoi and Viet Cong is a kind of model but you see the very idea of retreat you fight but you will find in Burbage of a spokesman for the administration that we have to stop communism in Southeast Asia is an indication of these unsophisticated and I'm not gonna stick position which we take to AC. It's a

problem of China on oil and to be at Kong. In other words what was perfectly justified 10 or 15 years ago to look at Communism as a monolithic force is just out of date today. So if we were to define North Vietnamese as an Asian Yugoslavia does that mean that we would for example increase our aid to North Vietnam. Does that mean that we would send in technical programs there were once one still is if stopped what we were doing. So Blizzard indicated in his speech at Johns Hopkins University in August of 1965 she see Mekong Delta project is indeed a massive effort at a goodly aging economic and social conditions. We should allow ology nations of Southeast Asia to play a role independent of China none of it is an attempt at creating a new balance of power in Southeast Asia. And she ideas sound it would be much sound DAVID way implemented

by political and military measures coordinated with the economic and social idea. Well it looks like no matter what happens to this particular piece offensive we're going to try to use political remedies in South Vietnam for example there was a meeting last week in Washington of the people who are interested in working out civilian programs. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman is going to South Vietnam. Couple of former. US director of education is going to South Vietnam. The rumors are that even if the war should expand we're not going to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong we're not going to continue with so many search and seizure missions in the south but we are going to try to boost the kind of program the general Lansdale has been talking about for so long. Of course your idea is sensible. But I thing it is not likely to succeed under sea conditions of war. Here we have faced with the same dilemma the French were faced with and yet you had kind of the same thing. On the one hand say we are killing peasants in large numbers. On the other hand he

wanted to create a confidential friendly relationship between themselves and suppressants but its very difficult to do without at the same time I give as example which was reported in surprise a couple of months ago a few billion. 8 percent a day for the United States was in a village rebuilding a school and doing a great deal for us a peasant in one night in one second the whole thing was destroyed by American bombs. You have to make up your mind what you want and you cannot build with them on hand and to start with the other and your idea of discriminating in terms of targets is of course when you do that when you have a gun in a white you and trust so much moonshine just can't be done. And so I think the idea of choosing is in itself a birthright to create a

civilian social substructure in South Vietnam upon which a political structure can be built. It's not it's very unlikely to succeed under conditions of war. And furthermore you haven't got any indigenous. Political force in South Vietnam. We see exception of the Viet Cong. We talk about some military but the military themselves are split. They can't even go to a common united front amongst themselves and foresee him ourselves the South Vietnamese population. So government in Saigon is an abstract concept. What does the government of Saigon govern. It isn't even capable of governing effectively so militarily because they have to arrest from time to time. A couple of courses of offices in order to maintain some sort of simply so they have this kind of situation where see the so called government is has absolutely

no population where nobody feels any loyalty to the government. How can you expect to create a politically viable entity in South Vietnam's just simply isn't possible. It seems to me that at the bedrock of that paradox the deeper paradox that we touched on before the program began and that is that even even should America concentrate on building up political and cultural forces in South Vietnam. Still there's the problem of a white country trying to build up. Surely you see you have an existential problem. So why man coming to Asia to create. In terms of its own valueless in you society this is a kind of a find. And you may see perched colonialism vitamin Spiridon freed from all that see about Diggler

selfish handicaps from which it suffered in the 19th century but it is still Survivorman Spiridon which the Asian peoples are not likely to consider to be legitimate and save one heart a man to be miscible into our own way if you want to put it very strongly then to be happy in our way and I think this existential handicap. That's a right man Court goes into South Vietnam to create something viable which she has imagined to be good for two people without two people of the early having decided whether it's good for them. So this idea simply is obsolete it just can't be done. It could perhaps be to have been done a hundred years ago and it was perhaps done in so far as colonial administrators were and extremely enlightened. But today whatever siméon its intrinsic merits of the idea. She seemed to no longer possible book

because for better or for worse she see indigenous population is not going to accept western values and comply with a plan for social and political bent them and which we have devised for as I have said before. So you're not I want to soften your own ways and to be happy and I was. So then finally you see only the most limited kind of relationships between Western come to all countries and Asian countries relationships based on a flow of goods relationships built just through or you might you can think all three off military government in a very general way let me say if invents a Chinese army should start marching which I personally think is very unlikely we will defend Thailand or we will defend whatever country you have in mind to defend Japan and we have such a treaty was Japan and I think they are Asian nations who who appreciate knowing how weak say obviously

a store what China and a way to come I would generally support that statement the chips are down. We'll certainly be glad to have American support this into a second world war it's the same Congress very happy to be liberated for by American troops from Japanese control. But it doesn't go any farther than thought so from that point of view. The prospect of large bases being built both in South Vietnam and Thailand and throughout Southeast Asia makes that makes sense to you would you think that there too were going too far. Well into short on you can do that because this kind of thing building of bases. It's a very potent for the off China is possible only and is relatively risky only because China is weak but it is I think it is the height of the thing

this is strong China it shines a procession of a stockpile of nuclear weapons and however limited delivery systems. He's going to tolerate the display of military power of the United States at its very borders. Do you think that China will have a different attitude toward bases at its borders and say Russia did toward bases in Turkey. Yes because China has a different attitude towards the outside. Form any other country you see traditionally China guarded itself. See only solve on power in the Middle Kingdom. Governing from a mandate from heaven. And even in the 18th century when a British diplomatic mission meant peeping to make it great agreement reached the Chinese government. So the Emperor told them to go home. China didn't need anything from the outside world and they got the King of England as it were potentially

of China and I think much of the nonsense which Chinese politicians talk about the relations between China and say outside world today take more powers. Recent statement as a result of this he started conception. That's only China. Then sour non-descript nations which really are of interest to China only are slipping and I think he sees a basic difference between this kind of ethnocentrism of China and. This is a union which I saw she has you know had of course much more value gated and much more intimate relations which outside China even that argument then would distinguish you from from people who have called it the outside doctrinaire liberals. It seems to me that the usual argument about China is that it is now experiencing the kind of xenophobia that Soviet Russia experienced at the beginning of her

history or America right along U.S. I think speaks in a phobia of China is of course the hot Socialist side of C but I sense off of it's a moment unchallenged American military power it's but if I mean imagine for a moment how we see a map of Asia looks to a Chinese. Wherever he looks he is the seventh fleet. Or you know I mean I can fly and stayed with an American army or I'm nearing airfields and military strong points and so forth. Obviously the Chinese are bound to be nervous knowing such have nothing it's a moment to oppose these enormous American power but I think what you call it goes much deeper than thought I think it is a historically conditioned and culturally conditioned attitude towards the outside world which I find extremely disquieting and dangerous and all the people who have talked to Chinese leaders

testified to the ignorance of the Chinese of south side which is not only server side of it. Isolation because it isn't a member of the United Nations not recognized by a number of by most nations bodies also Silverside often selfish self imposed ethnocentric conception of its relations of China with the rest of us. To some people it seems that there's an analogy between the idea of the white man building schools building health programs and so forth and so on for peasants in Asia and the great society in America President Johnson for example making speeches about precisely what steps should be followed in Watts does that kind of an argument. I think the argument has merit for my end of President Johnson and altering the mind of Ambassador Gold. Looking at the speech he made I think in September 1965 and United Nations and what we're trying to do by way of what we call nation building

improving sees social economic and putting conditions of underdeveloped nations. You see a logical extension of what we're trying to do foresee underdeveloped sectors of American society. You know it's part and parcel of the of the concept of secret society. I'd like to shift the focus of the discussion for just a second to the kinds of protests that have gone on in America against the war in the first place do you see a difference in the character of of different sorts of protest some of which are are more apt to change American policy than other dogs that share our kinds of protests. I mean you have a strictly doctrine a Uppal leftist voters which is simply a budget killer money for station of a protests against American societies. I mean assumed an expression of alienation. We should be able to grasp any but the issue you know to make it safe

and you have I think another poll tests which are spaced upon a pockmarked assessment of siméon it's all for the war ends of policies which have led to civil war and which sustain it. And so those two are entirely different. I mean my opposition to civil war is based upon an assessment of the chances of winning such a war and to achieve political and military objectives for which we should mean I might as well be an American channel or an American member of the U.S. Foreign Service expressing my opinion on this war. I well you wouldn't last very long lines in such positions but since you see this is a basis on which I operate ask myself what do we want to do what I said chances of achieving citizen means we have to listen. And I've had a very negative conclusion.

I think I think there's a very curious third form of protest that hasn't been defined very adequately by anybody and that is that a number of Americans who've been involved for example in the civil rights movement tend to see in the war in Vietnam a comparable comparable kind of problem and tend to want to cut out for themselves relationship with what they called Were I of course a. Doctor mother looking at a king is a prime example. I have great difficulty in connecting your opposition to the war in Vietnam with the civil rights movement in United States and I think it's a constituency for two movements is quite different. You know I have watched closely some of some attempts which have been made to go apolitical movement Ricci's committed to see opposition to it of war in Vietnam and visible motion of civil rights. I have great difficulty in sensing that sis is going to be a sound and.

Successful movement I don't thing you see large masses support. See the civil rights movement and see large groups who would support opposition to say a Vietnamese war really identical and have the same philosophy as the same political aims. I think this is an artificial attempt to create a mass political movement. Richard in my view is not likely to succeed because if it's the fish out it there are some analogies between the two problems which you brought here for example analogies between the Great Society efforts of Johnson at home in the war in Vietnam a broad front. But I gather you don't think that those analogies are strong enough to wield any kind of well I say our U.S. stance here up I don't entirely different level. We want to bring about a better life for our under privileged groups resents your country and you want to bring about a better life for C underdeveloped nations throughout the

run. There is no contradiction between the two and. See the suport us offi of these kind of your money and mission of the United States watts of a canard to support this is a civil rights movement in the United States and vice a versa. But what we are talking here about civil war in Vietnam and you see as the administration wages of war in Vietnam in order to gave people of South Vietnam ceased opportunity to partake in secret society. So if one biological one would have to expect to see supporters of the civil rights movement are to support the war in Vietnam which obviously some do and others do not. I think the whole thing is intellectually and politically quite impossible and I think it my my I tend to answer your questions shows me at least more clearly than it did before. How incompatible those two movements are different movements.

Except that many of the people who are protesting the war in Vietnam also renounced the whole set of Great Society programs for example they called the War on Poverty of an effort which is culturally imperialistic they call the Voting Rights Act too little that kind of critique expands their whole Arianna but this is a relatively small is of course possible. So if it's the great society between the United States should fail or leave a large. Go sector soon after people of the United States unsatisfied as I'd say man you would have a strong board test movement which would oppose both the domestic and foreign policies of the United States. What you see is this is not a assumption on Rich. Dr. King operates quite a secant I mean he's one of the moderate leaders of C a civil rights movement to see who believes very strongly by

peaceful protests. You can change the structure of American society. What I would what I would anticipate if I would accept the prime is that see two movements quality SG is a great radicalization of the civil rights movement in the United States realizing so hopelessness of getting an implementation of civil rights by American consensus and then spilling over into opposition to American foreign policy. Nice to see a movement very similar to see the socialist movements on European continent before the First World War I mean opposing the whole business cover to listen in in domestic Lee and internationally but Seuss's and Mia. What ject of it or more possibility which certainly doesn't exist. One of the reasons that I've gone to take a gun to this point at such length is because of the distinction you made in your recent New Republic article between consensus and government by consent and

the fear that seemed to emerge in that argument in that in that article that there were that many people who are now protesting would find themselves protesting beyond the consensus. Yes this possibility exists but tests and materialized yet mean I was pointing here to two possibilities to dangerous but not to act on it. You know Dr Al-Ittihad which have so have become so personal potent and have I touch themselves to such a great number of people thought a political movement has evolved from them. I mean so as you may see AI and electoral problems CABG which I'd like to point to which may have political consequences but I haven't had any large scale put it the consequences yet. In that article to you you began to describe your own career as a dissenter saying discussing for example a campaign of criticism against you. Would you go into that it's more than what I have been struck by see lack of

objective argument against my position. And she had time to answer part of a great number of different people who discredited me personally as a scholar as if this were an argument against my position means that started of course on a large scale and on a very elaborate scale with my television debate to be funded last summer and then was continued in all kinds of publications in the New York Times market seen in Harper's in columns and so forth are really trying to show that I was incompetent personally to give a reasoned estimate of our policy in Southeast Asia but not taking one after zero out of two points I had made and say he songs there for such and such reason he's wrong here. Those actions actually isn't simply saying this guy doesn't know what he's talking

about. Forget him we surprised by this by such a campaign as I must say I was. I was surprised because it would never occur to me and let me say to go in to see past performances of Mr. Bundy or anybody else you know that his song in Vietnam. I mean I feel strongly enough about Russia knowledge of my position with regard to Vietnam. So I don't need to resort to ad hominum arguments and I think it shows a weakness on the part of the other side. So I did must resort to such arguments. To me the striking thing about your position on Vietnam is that it is so far from doctrinaire it doesn't certainly doesn't match the criticisms of the left of the war in Vietnam it obviously doesn't match the administration's critique. And it seems to me a rather sad comment on the state of American intellectual debate in America that that kind of fact is not recognized as correct I mean take for instance your

statement which the New York Times saw fit to pull in by Pharmac by a colleague and from a friend of mine a soldier of foundation diversity who first makes a point that I have really no business to talk at all because I'm a European. And secondly it makes a point that I as a European I don't dast American president who has power and says this was true in my relation to kind it isn't in my relation to who Johnson would be to my relation to any place and because he is an American and I am a European with this kind of thought or argument I find simply valeting. Have you found that your relationships with with official Washington have changed consider knowing the course know about and I am no longer a consultant to the Defense Department just was super terminated. I mean certainly once a basis of my good decision but I'm still a consultant to the State Department and I have hit their lease and leave out of close relations with people belly closed

2C Valley High conses of the government especially as it got to Vietnam. Not on my initiative but on Sirius so I don't think my whatever influence I had before and what I respect I enjoyed in government has very much suffered because one shouldn't forget lots of people into government who agree with me will only Conde Conde express openly what you think and you are probably grateful to me that I say what they would like to see but can't. Tonight on the Vietnam War report you have been listening to an interview with political scientist Hans Morgenthau conducted by Paul Cowan of the Village Voice. We would like to encourage listeners who wish to express their opinions of the ideas aired on this program to write to the editor of the Vietnam War report. In future programs a special section of the report will be reserved for selected reading of these letters. This news may address letters to a Vietnam War report. WGBH FM Boston Massachusetts. The Vietnam War report is produced for WGBH by George Mitchell.