United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Fulbright Hearings On Legislation To End The Vietnam War

Morning good morning this is National Public Radio coverage from Capitol Hill the committee is already in session Senator Fulbright at the bench did wish to establish my position as a witness and not only as a committee member because I believe that in that way it makes part of the record and commits one in addition to an over and above one's vote and action in committee and on the floor. Mr. Chairman the president in his television address to the nation April 7 and his remarks of April 16 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors refused to establish a deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from Vietnam. He declared his intention to continue the massive U.S. Air role in the fighting and to retain some residual ground forces until certain conditions are met the two conditions the president is set. I want Vietnamization and second the release of the p o w while we're still there. And Mr. President

I missed Charmin This is the key point because in my judgment President Nixon has thereby reaffirmed the veto of both Hanoi and Saigon over U.S. disengagement. He is the the president has defined his intention and Vietnamization as follows. The ability of the South Vietnamese to develop the capacity to defend themselves against the communist takeover not the shore capacity but at least the chance while the qualitative aspects involved in that condition must jam and make me conclude that Vietnamization continues to be the base of the president's policy. Therefore the issue is clearly drawn between those like myself who have joined in the ME so called McGovern at the older man and that issue is Shall there be a time certain for an open commitment no matter how the troop strength may be reduced. For we all know that even with a reduced

troop strength so long as we're there we can be drawn by again because the honor or the prestige of the Armed Forces the whole trip wire concept will take effect. Now the American people might be able to say in the one of our members raise this issue yesterday. If if an open commitment means about the same because there are no conditions attached etc. as a time certain well we'll go along with the president and we won't worry about the fact that he doesn't want to fix an actual date for practical purposes it will come out about the same. The difficulty is Mr. Chairman that we have no such expectation on the contrary. We have the word of a vice president of South Vietnam. The estimates that it will take 15 to 20 years of Vietnamization to succeed. Now as to the prisoners of war I think there are there's a very clear issue drawn to no one and I think every every co-sponsor

of the McGovern Hatfield reveal to no one in our solicitude for American prisoners of war. The question is how do we best rescue them. And we believe that the history of warfare teaches that prison is a release when wars end and to insist on retaining substantial US troops in Vietnam to induce the release of the presence of the law cannot judgment result in the stalemate on the prisoner of war issue as it already has rather than their release. So the key substantive issue is whether a time certain should be established for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. The president has opted for a policy of scaling down the level of involvement while leaving it open ended with respect to time. I feel this policy undesirable and I'd like to give my reasons. First I believe the scars in this country will not begin to heal until the United States is fully disengaged itself militarily from the fighting in Vietnam. But c'mon nation possibly win in Vietnam. That would be worth the destruction of the division.

Economic Social and more around which the war is inflicting on the United States. Let me cite a few examples of Vietnam why so weakened international confidence in the dollar that our world financial position is being jeopardized. It is so I wrote it the motivation of the American workers that are very productive and technological superiority our greatest strength is threatened. It is so dismayed American news that large segments of a lost faith in the essential effectiveness decency and humanity of ah society. In our culture and even in our credibility it is so strange now resorts us us to bring on a great inflation and a dangerously Rhodesian of confidence in the in our economy resulting in serious unemployment its most significant Dama be a non-issue that the testimony of what a man I can set up to have the most weight in this field office burns chairman of the Federal Reserve Board attributes the slow pace of pulling out of the recession. To be entirely the lack of

confidence of the consumer is a very very significant relationship. So the Vietnam stock along with this with these difficulties I've named is the deep aggravation of oxygen of our urban problems leading to the near bankruptcy of city governments across America and a deep sense of alienation and pessimism is now so prevalent in what used to be known as the most optimistic nation in the world. Not quite apart from 50000 lives lost 200000 wounded and a hundred billion dollars of treasure. Now as to the diplomatic phase of the Vietnam War is now an obsolete struggle as regards U.S. interests in Asia. Whatever justification they may once of have seemed to be for US intervention in what is essentially been a civil struggle. And I have long regarded any combat intervention as most of them problem continuing U.S. involvement is only tangential if not contradictory to the advancement of U.S. interests and nation. The real issue is a nation in the 70s and

80s will have little to do with the question of who rules in Saigon by way of reminder let us remember that it's now a moot question whether the communist government of Yugoslavia is more opposed to the basic principles of ah nation than the military dictatorship in Greece the issues we should be concentrating on our relations with China and Japan and the shifting quadrilateral power relationship in Asia among the United States Japan China and the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War has done more to complicate and strain our relations with both China and the USSR in recent is than any other regime and moreover it's given us a very bad name and a very bad position in Europe as well. And the domestic inflation produced by the Vietnam war is largely responsible for the protectionist claims which threaten a trade war with Japan. Our obsession and preoccupation with Vietnam over the past decade has led to the danger of U.S. policy being bypassed by events in many parts of the globe.

Vietnam has contributed heavily to the Terry aeration of the US position as I stated in Europe and in the Mideast. We've been so distracted and so locked into the struggle in Vietnam that we've lacked the energy the resort's isn't the mental freedom to give our best to the great challenges which have emerged not the parts of the globe. It's also time that we recognize that Vietnam has seriously weakened the United States in a military sense. This is seldom discussed Mr. Chairman. But it's very much on the minds of many of us. It's undermining the morale of our armed forces it's lowered the prestige and honor of the military profession in the eyes of millions of Americans and the vast and then properly funded expenditures on the Vietnam War which tied to inflation have led to a strong move for major cuts in the defense budget while the United States was devoting more than a hundred billion dollars to the end of the Vietnam War and holding the 1965 line which is the best we could do on our strategic forces. The Soviet Union unencumbered by Vietnam as leapfrog us

brought its nuclear forces up to strategic parity. Re-equip that's conventional forces in Europe and constructed a worldwide Navy competing with the U.S. Sixth Fleet for supremacy in the Mediterranean and other vital waterway. So when viewed in this perspective of competing priorities at home and abroad there's nothing in my judgment we could realistically see go again in Vietnam to justify the open my open ended commitment based upon the two conditions which I've mentioned Vietnamization and the release of the p o w which the president has in mind. I think the time has come for a confrontation on this issue between the president and the Congress and that it's in the interest of the president the Congress and the nation that it should be settled and I combo reluctantly to the view that there's no other one until we act in respect of the War Powers Bill which is also on the hearing in this committee to bring this about. Except to assert our ultimate power the power of the purse to bring an end to this improvident war which has done such a

vast and incalculable harm to our nation and to its interests in the most pragmatic times at home and abroad. Now I believe maybe other sponsors of this McGovern had feel down. But I believe that we would of course continue to supply financial and material aid to the South Vietnamese to assist this self-defense happens if there is not a negotiated political settlement. Moreover it's the big specter that will participate as President Johnson said and respectively of the Delta project in multinational regional construction assistance efforts. When the war is over as previously pledged Now I personally favor a somewhat more extended date. And there is an McGovern at feel only as Senator Hatfield testified yesterday in terms of the influence such as I had with the offices last year in terms of stretching as far as we can to accommodate the views of the president. So but for practical purposes

we may come out of the same place. So I personally favor establishing June 30 1972 as the cutoff date with the exception of such forces as might normally be stationed in a nation. We are assisting go through a mango or some other program about crime. Finally Mr. Chairman let me say that the recent operation in Laos where U.S. helicopters fighters and bombers played such a massive an intimate role in the South Vietnamese ground show the fallacy of limiting U.S. withdrawal to ground combat troops. If U.S. air power and residual forces that are remain in Vietnam until the army of the Republic of Vietnam masters the skills and weapons now represented by U.S. air and artillery forces in Vietnam the president's Vietnamization and withdrawal policy does not meet the basic mandate that he was given in 68 to end the Vietnam war for America. Thank you. OK send it Janet.

I think you summarized very well the some of the many views that have been advanced. It's a very rational meeting a very rational statement. I particularly call attention to your statement There is nothing in my judgment which we could realistically seek again and get them to justify an open ended involvement in Viet Nam war. And that together with your statement it is time that it decision be made in the by the Congress whether or not we will continue the war. I find nothing to it I can disagree with you on your statement. One of my good might ask you and you of your very long experience and everyone acknowledges you

are the most accomplished. Legal mind in the Senate is where I was being very much in touch with the people of your city and your state. I was impressed by the statements in yesterday's New York Times about the situation that has developed in your state in city one of the richest states in the union. Would you only emphasize and underline what you said here in a very specific way. But I detected in an exchange yesterday decay between a senator from New Jersey and some of the witnesses that perhaps the greatest obstacle to following what's a very rational analysis of our problem is a moral one I thought the senator from New Jersey felt this was a question in that he cannot bring himself to take an action which seems to. Implied that there is been a

mistake an error in our policy. It's a kind of mental block that we didn't accept everything you say as I do and I think most people cannot really contest with it but they are revolted by the idea that we've done all of this. And yet for no really justifiable in the end it bothers people that we had this up before. I don't remember whether you were here or not just about a year ago but we had some I thought very perceptive fact the most profound analysis of our situation particularly the moral aspects of this and and especially as testimony by Rabbi Greenberg Do you remember that just a moment you will hear. I was. I think those hearings may have been a year sooner and I think they would have been more appropriate today than they were then because the atmosphere and the mood of the country and of the Congress had not yet

developed to the point where they realize what the significance of this is. And I wondered if you would help me reemphasize some of the things that Rabbi Greenberg said instead of so well and I asked Mr. Reporter that in order to give the background in this hearing that his statement which is relatively short be inserted in the record at this point in order that anyone who reads the record will know what we're talking about. But I really feel that this is what bothers not only us but the president at least some of his own statements about and his predecessors statements about losing a war or the humiliation of the country or of taking an action which is less than complete victory although this does create a most important but very subtle psychological block to our taking the action which all of the reason

you've given and have been given you would indicate is this is in the interest of our country. Mr. Chairman I heard Rabbi Greenberg and I'd rather as I he was very eloquent they spoke from the depths of 5000 years of experience with a religion which beats in his veins. And he said in effect the highest morality is the morality which recognizes a mistake. That's what he said in effect and he said that you can. And make MRO what is moral. If you persist out of sheer stubbornness in a policy which human events has demonstrated to be a policy which is destructive rather than construct called to our attention the highest duty of man which is self review and self correction and self-censorship. And he begged us to get over what he considered the basis thought of our nature which is

persistence and irony. Now one does not have to as said of the case I think is intimate call what we did in Vietnam a mistake most most people feel very deeply about that in terms of so many lives lost who knows. Many people claim that Indonesia was redeemed from. Some kind of slavery or dictatorship because we were in Vietnam and many other things may have come of it. Maybe even our own realisation of the sensitivity to slipping into war and how dangerous it is not to realize what war can do to a whole people and how even we with all our strength could leave Luzon nation in such a decision. So I do not feel that the dead will have died in vain atoll but I think the point is and I certainly subscribe to that fully myself. But the high I'm around today is that when you recognize that the time has come seize the time and don't bow out of stubbornness or human perversity persist

in a course which cannot then be justified only because it's of course what you want to talk and pursued that for I believe that was the message of the right. I want to read it I will read in a moment a few passages a brief part of it. There is a great difficulty here in the nature of the mistake it strikes me that. The mistake was purely one of political judgment it was no great evil of Mohave ation that led to this war and this is what bothers people that they seem to feel that it would be the admission of a Albemarle mistake that is if there was something wrong with the motivation this came up yesterday very clearly about the motives of the. Out of the country are a body to his back years ago and this is when we first became involved in this as long ago as 1950. There are certain high points in this history of the development of our involvement beginning I would

say Short Well actually right after world war two and forty six our attitude toward toward this area toward development and hope in the minute a Viet Minh I would take 46 then 54 then 60. 61 65 there were different periods and decisions were made I don't consider any of those mistakes were motivated by in the thing other than a judgment a political judgment unless we as spies assume are presumed to be infallible. This is nothing unusual in political judgment by individuals who are given the responsibility for the decisions. It did not involve in my opinion any great moral degradation on the part of the people of the United States or of the Congress are of the executive. They

were simply political mistakes in judgment is in the interest of the country which any country every country has made. Every individual has made. And to disassociate that from a feeling of guilt I mean that is some way or other we are as a community very guilty of some great morrow that PPS of some kind. I have a feeling this is more important in the psychology of of making the decision. Such as you have urged in others a virgin and little different context than has been recognized. And that's why I think it's worth Krog spatially was you here and you having been on the committee. Do it just point out a few things he said if you will allow me it won't take long and I any time you wish to comment on it I would welcome it. Because I don't think there's anyone in the Senate more capable of commenting on it properly. I want to read just a few two passages. It will be a little disconnected because I don't wish

to read the whole thing. He says this realisation. The question I would like to focus on in the end his public life and the war as a model pedagogue of America. This generation this realization points up the model of disaster which is the net effect of the tragic error of the Viet Nam war. For the past five or six years the dominant moral message has been the continual few die out killing the body count the use of napalm and civilian destroying projectiles the deep de-sensitized zation of countless American boys in Viet Nam and countless people here to the human qualities of the enemy and of the innocent civilians that make up so large a part of the casualties. I think that is pertinent especially in view of the witnesses of the Viet Nam veterans against the war our little mind heard yesterday last night and in other ones. He goes on says another side of this war has been a tremendous blow to the respect for patriotism democracy and international

responsibility. Without commitment to such concepts there can be no healthy body politic. They are the lifeblood of a free society but these concepts have been invoked for years now in the context of up holding a series of shifting repressive dictatorships in South Viet Nam with a weak or nonexistent popular base. They have been using the context of political figures tried kangaroo style and imprisoned or in the car in the image of a police chief shooting guerrilla prisoner in the head without trial or mercy. The result is a tremendous cynicism and a loss of faith in areas which is significant and which keeps society wrong. Guilt by association with a policy error leads to a denial of the integrity of the valid concept itself and the fact is statistically the more aggressive supporters of the war had been least responsive to the needs of democracy and redemption at home as only

compound did the damage. Now I've come to I think the most important part of it. Even opponents of the war would do well to recreate the moral climate of the early days of our intervention. We can freely confess the role of idealism a feeling of American responsibility for the world order. There was a phase in which we saw communist China then in its commune period which seemed to deny the elemental dignity of man as expansionist and North Viet Nam as purely a Chinese satellite. In this phase the fear of another Munich and the conviction that we did not sell out or be indifferent last world war to repeat itself colored the judgment of many. This is what I think the error in judgment as distinguished from the idealism of purpose he put so. But when they did it was live events and facts and growing knowledge of Vietnam revealed the falsity of our assumptions.

Then I might placed a special burden of responsibility on on us to recognize our error and withdraw. We should have admitted that communist China was writ internally that North Viet Nam historically sought its independence from China that the South Viet Nam government could not or would not muster popular support. This inability to admit an error has been the tragic force. That has driven us deeper and deeper into the mire. Jews and Christians alike devitalized David the king of biblical fame as the eternal dynasty as ancestor of the Messiah. Jewish tradition points out that between David and his predecessor Saul It was David who made greater mistakes did more tragic evil thing then why was all stripped of the kingship and David immortalized because David could recognize and confess his errors and in the most

powerful contrition turn from his ways in redress injustice this is the true strain which a model leader must have saw was too weak. He would only rationalize and justify his errors. Power corrupts and he and his inevitably abuse only those who admit mistakes and accept the irony and tragedy of defeat. The assumptions can be trusted with power otherwise the power would inevitably destroy the others. Otherwise we have a mess. Jeez mo conception of manliness which places great emphasis on not being humiliated or defeated as if the greater humiliation is not in resorting to force to cover up error and the greatest defeat is not imploring good lives and vast resources into an escalating cruelty of frustration and seeking one last knock out such a conception

violates Jewish and Christian ethics of power. I think that describes what really is eating of on so many people which is bothering so many people and stands in the way of doing what your resolution wants us to do. It is true there is one great force for continuing the war. It is the deaths of over 40000 Americans and many times that many Vietnamese such as them are order of the world that any human sacrifice even for mistaken causes become great forces for these causes and evil for their frak profile eyes and response lest we betray those who have gone before. Shall we now go into the paths of the forty thousand and say we have erred and your children have died in vain. Shout all this patriotism and sacrifice me nothing. I realize the

full force of this dynamic but the only caught us bonding and sin must be shall we condemn another ten thousand Americans and another fifty thousand Vietnamese to death rather than not admit. This was a moral weakness of the Vietnamization policy designed to purchase time and not admit failure of the dead would cost many more lives in the interim. The problem of repentance is that the person who is gone astray feels he has gone so far and it has cost so much that he cannot turn back. Yet we are told to turn and live. The only answer is the motto is to confess to the survivors of the dead. The good intentions and the mistaken assumptions and the genuine patriotism which motivated their beloved ones dead. And I plead to them that if we can learn from this tragic error if we can

lend a modulator the use of power if we can set the model example of voluntary acceptance of defeat Well it is the only honest thing to do. Then these people will truly not have died in vain. They will become part of the sacrifice which brought about a deeper international model ardor and a United States tempered by Chad duty to use its resources to embrace and to heal the world and itself. I believe I believe parents and our people are capable. The response of love and understanding and acceptance which such a convention would invoke. We only lacked the modern leadership to have it made. Judaism has never felt that martyrdom. Our defeat is intrinsically Marrone superior to a righteous victory but inability to accept a tragedy. The ironic the possibility

of mistaken failure is to be less than fully human. Perhaps this is our national problem. Maybe this explains our lack of empathy for the suffering deprived and defeated in our own society. Wherefore we often condemn them to welfare without true charity deprivation without hope and status without faith or trust in them. Maybe we need to admit error and know defeat before we can triumph over poverty and racism and hates it. In our country by confessing our past errors and present defeats in this struggle too. There's a great deal more but I think this sums up buying better than anyone I've ever seen. But really we're faced with this particular time in AI history and if we can get over this and follow what I believe to be a very wise advice from a great moral leader that we could get back on the track

to the pursuit of the traditions and ideals of this country. I thank the chair very much I'm deeply moved. The blame rests as the chair was on time. As of as I noted before my recollection was that this was what the rabbi had said probably because it's a fundamental teaching with which I have lived and I'm so committed. I still really believe in and that's the motivation probably for everything that I'm trying to do about this problem. Probably embrace with my colleagues and I only hope and pray we may have the inspiration and the courage to do what I want to do the most good. If we don't do it I can't see anything very hopeful in the future. But I appreciate your coming in I think both you and Rabbi Greenberg have made a great contribution to our thinking. Thank you. Senator Pearce and you wish to address the nuclear bomb.

Mr. Chairman I have had a fortune opportunity through friendship and association in the Senate with the senator of New York to sort of watch him reach this point in the lands of the years. And so I have great respect for his for his statement today May I couple. Page 3 the. They commented we would continue to supply financial and material aid to South Vietnam to assist in their self defense if necessary. Together with the with the proposition that all remain and U.S. military forces and they had be withdrawn sent to him mean by that that air and naval forces would be withdrawn and leave only logistic and supply and materiel. People are exactly right I think that at this stage nothing else will do. I pass no judgement upon the dispositions of American naval and other forces throughout the world as they have been disposed for a long time will have to

judge them on their merits. But I believe that on the present conditions if we leave anything else in Vietnam it will only result in in the tripwire operation. And I never believe that you can bluff about these things in other words if you got a tripwire in the trips you're in and there's no fooling about it. Great nations can't bluff. And anyone who thinks they can is very ill advised and that's my whole point now. Whatever may have been the situation before now if you left any operable force there. A kind of temporary air ground. You would be establishing a trip wire and you must expect that you could be drawn back in in a big way and I don't want to see that. I can't recommend it but materiel support money and so on that I think we morally owe them having brought them or at least joined in bringing them to their present posture. Do I understand correctly that the extended day that you thought it was

is in recognition of the practical problems of withdrawing together with given the administration still more time together with given Saigon still more time to get in over all three and most importantly to hope because to avoid an American struggle as a war it's really for the better and to hope that the time might be found. Really the time the president himself has in mind and therefore that we will in effect be doing this together. This considering what may happen. After the Vietnam War is over anything could happen which could cause great resentment in the country. Great difficulty. We can't be afraid of it. But if we can avoid it by sharing the responsibility fully with the president then I think we ought to try to avoid it that way and I don't think that an extra six months is too much to pay for that with tragedy I say that means

we all know what it means. In times of blood and treasure. But still considering the long term history of our country for one senator of conscience I'm willing to pay that because I think it's so desirable if we Human League can to stretch ourselves in the Congress to meet the president halfway and agree with him in effect upon a date. That he has or they have to give. It means it's time. That the president is now withdrawing another hundred or two before December 1st. Do you think that by December 1st he should be able to announce a definite date for complete withdrawal. I think I think he should but I think I see no promise Mr. Senator I cannot. Dean here on the Republican side I see no promise in the conditions he has said that he will.

And almost that he can he has set conditions which take it out of his hands. And unless we take him off that spot and it seems to me that the president would be anxious to have us join with him and then a joint responsibility. But so important the decision. But he has now unless we can take him off that spot I think he stuck with the formula. But just getting bogged down in this quagmire for God knows what. I noted it is last day I gave a talk believe you ever would do it if you did put emphasis on remaining there to the Navy and the Air Force until such time as the people of that country able to handle their own affairs including their military affairs. And have they done that in the past. As Ed Bennett came in the past when the people of Indochina have been completely

peaceful and in agreement on all modern times they've been either under total ajar and war party. Oh yeah as I say I'm a total idiot whore and war and this is a really a really long long range object and the American people just can't do it. I mean if you were you were the guiding power on earth and able to keep order on earth in the tradition the British did for three hundred years maybe it on the take it but it's just tearing out every about 100 years before they were able to meet the conditions laid down by the president. Missed a key and you'd think he'd want to shorten the period says 15 to 20. Show that missed a key statement because wonder exultant shortening a period to make you think the problems can be settled in Paris so did Eva. There is a chance Senator I get it is one man's judgment. But if they are up against the need for negotiating themselves and they have to deal with

their with their own future in their own skins the likelihood is greater in my judgment that they will try to make a settlement more calm more acceptable. The power situation as it stands now and if we're there with all this power that we have to give them an underwriting against a realistic agreement. I believe however that it will have to recommend the complete withdrawal of abandonment of any big bases here a base which we might have in Southeast Asia or the South Pacific no one is rightly drawing from that era I made clear when I was seeking not to affect what security and commitment decisions we might otherwise make other than India. But I'm sure you would have covered the situation well either in this state where others have made and I have no question. I thank my colleagues.

Thank you very much and again I thank you again scent of the mellow so gracious as he was first on the list. Sentimental eh. You know you have to put paid statements in MLA. I do Mr. Chairman it is a day for the members of the committee. Proceed Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee as it considers various pending legislative proposals relating to the war in Southeast Asia. Specific Lee I am here to urge the committee's favorable consideration to my proposal which is step forth in SJ razz 82. In essence the resolution calls for total withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam within 12 months following completion of the exchange under international supervision along prisoners of

war. A cardinal principle of the charter of the United Nations is that of self-determination of peoples the maintenance of that principle is really why we are in South Vietnam. I am certain it is why the United States Senate by a vote of eighty two to one ratified the SEATO treaty on February 1 1955 several years before I came to the Senate and our best intelligence information indicates that since 1961 large numbers of North Vietnamese troops have infiltrated into South Vietnam numbering in the hundreds of thousands. There is no evidence of South Vietnamese troops infiltrating into North Vietnam. Commencing with the Geneva agreement in 1954 North Vietnam set on a course of developing a strong military power while South Vietnam did not do so. That's North Vietnam

had several years head start on South Vietnam and recruiting training and equipping an army so that by 1965 the prospect of loss of its freedom of self-determination by South Vietnam was imminent. It is generally agreed I believe that without the build up of U.S. military forces in South Vietnam. That loss would have occurred. Some of the members of the committee will recall that following my first visit in South Vietnam in January of 1966 I became increasingly critical of the way the war was being conducted. I warned repeatedly that the prolonged war strategy being followed would lead to greater casualties and greater problems. And I public I publicly observed that if there were some secret reason for sending our men to fight in that beleaguered country with one hand tied behind their backs then we

should never send them at all. My words fell on deaf ears. The Nixon administration inherited an extremely serious and traumatic war. After saying this war grow bigger and worse for nearly five years with almost five hundred fifty thousand American military personnel in South Vietnam I am thankful that the number has been practically cut in half. And that scheduled withdrawals announced by the president for coming months are very substantial. This reduction has coincided with our efforts to help the South Vietnam these catch up to the military power of North Vietnam which has of course been sustained by the financial and military assistance furnished by Red China and the Soviet Union. I am reasonably satisfied that by July 1 of this year. Ground combat operations can be handled by the South Vietnamese did. It will take another year however to complete the

job of enabling the South Vietnamese to operate and maintain their air force. Meanwhile of course our troop withdrawals will undoubtedly continue. Our goal as stated by the president is complete withdrawal of all American military personnel. The timing of that goal has not been announced but has been left indefinite depending upon action of the North Vietnam me use including their willingness to enter into serious negotiations in Paris. This indefiniteness troubles many of our citizens and has laid a foundation for some wild assertions that we will be involved there for years. Such assertions are apparently premised on the idea that regardless of what the South Vietnamese do to help themselves we will remain there. However I have always assumed and I believe it is the only reasonable assumption that we would follow a

time policy which would give South Vietnam only a reasonable chance to catch up to North Vietnam and thus be able to defend itself and maintain its freedom of self-determination. I am satisfied that the reasonable chance well have been given by July 1 of this year in so far as ground force operations are concerned. And by July 1 of next year in so far as the more complicated Air Force operations are concerned. There is one concern uppermost in the minds of most Americans and that is the safe return of our prisoners of war. No nation with a conscience could desert these brave and unselfish men. President Nixon has stated that a result he will force would remain in South Vietnam until they are safely returned. And it does not require much imagination to see that this residual force would contain sufficient air power to make it

very costly to North Vietnam. However I am troubled by the indefiniteness of such a policy. Likewise I am troubled by this so-called fixed date proposals because these proceed on the assumption that North Vietnam can be trusted to negotiate and arrange the safe return of our prisoners by the fixed date. By its flagrant violation of the Geneva agreement on treatment of prisoners of war I suggest that North Vietnam is not to be trusted. It would be cruel and inhuman to commit the fate of our prisoners to leaders of a country who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted. At the same time it is obvious that the concern uppermost in the minds of the leaders in Hanoi is that all American military personnel be withdrawn from South Vietnam. Accordingly it seems to me there are sufficient inducements to enable

both sides to get together. The inducement on the one hand to make an exchange of prisoners of war are in line with the proposal made by President Nixon in his address on peace in Indochina last October 7. And the inducement on the other hand is that upon completion of such an exchange all American military personnel will be withdrawn from South Vietnam within 12 months. It would be my earnest hope that such an exchange of prisoners could be completed by July 1 of this year. And the complete withdrawal of all military personnel by July 1 of 1972 would coincide with the reasonable chance proposition to which I have earlier referred for South Vietnam to go it alone. As far as military manpower is concerned. Naturally as long as Red China and the Soviet Union see fit to provide financial and military assistance to North Vietnam

similar assistance would have to be provided South Vietnam. If a military power balance is to be maintained. I have often asked a rise 82 in the hope that it can serve to bring a man of goodwill together. It can get our prisoners of war back safely and soon. It can get our military personnel out of South Vietnam according to a fixed timetable which will enable an orderly withdrawal of some 200 70000 men along with such equipment as will be removed. You know just explain them my my dad which would require a great many months in any event and it can give a reasonable chance to a fundamental principle of the charter of the United Nations to which the United States has along with most of the other nations of the world pledged its support. Thank you Mr. Chairman that completes my stay.

Thank you Senator Miller. Sentimental is indeed the usual rule in circumstances such as this that the exchange of prisoners takes place after the cessation of hostilities or an armistice. Rather than before. Oh Mr. Chairman this is not a usual war. Not at all certain that there have not been exchanges in some part prisoners of war during other wars. Certainly in so far as putting them in neutral countries are concerned. It's my recollection that that happened in a limited extent during World War Two. But I don't think that we ought to be too bound by precedent of previous wars because I think most of us recognize that this is not a usual war at all. And it not being a usual war I think cause for unusual action.

And I believe that. We have the inducements in my proposition here which would enable us to move more rapidly we're not moving at all in pairs and it's quite evident that North Vietnam wants to have all of our troops out of south of the UN. That's their number one number one goal. It's also quite obvious that most of our people want to have our prisoners of war returned safely. And the sooner the better. And so I offer here as I said it means of bringing men of goodwill together those who will talk about a residual force until our prisoners are returned and those who talk about a fixed date. The trouble I have with that residual force is its indefiniteness my my proposition gives us a definite time period. This sooner the prisoners of war exchange the sooner our American military personnel will be out.

And I think that that would be an inducement for North Vietnam to engage in serious negotiations in Paris at least it's worth a try Mr. Chairman. Yesterday Senta hockey testified that he had recently been in Paris to talk to the representatives of the. I think both annoy any NLF he said and I believe I quote correctly they kept insisting that the setting of a withdrawal date must precede substantive discussions on the prisoner of war issue. If that's true would this make any difference to you. I mean if you could accept that is being your position. Well Mr. Chairman I think we have found that as ations chain I would suggest that that would be the opening gambit. But if they're really interested in withdrawing it was Dragos North American force then we have a chip to offer them.

And furthermore I must say that I'm not at all impressed when the leaders of a noisy jest too is that if we will only fix a date for withdrawal of all American personnel then they will talk about an exchange of prisoners of war. I for one am not ready to commit the fate of our American prisoners of war to people who cannot be trusted. Now if they had demonstrated by living up to the Geneva accord on principle on treatment of prisoners of war that would be one thing. They subscribe to that agreement and by failing to live up to it and I think it's generally recognized that they have failed to do so. I suggest that they have forfeited the right or the privilege of being trusted. Do you feel that the others involved in this have lived up to the Geneva Accord. Well Mr. Chairman you always have a

mixed bag in a war but I I haven't seen any new news in the newspapers about North Vietnam taking any action such as we have taken when any violations of the Geneva Accord have occurred. This of course is one big difference between a closed society and an open society. I think that most of us would rather take our chances of being a prisoner of war on our side than a prisoner of war on their side. Is that the principal reason why you say they cannot be trusted. Is there any other reason why you think they cannot be trusted. Well I think that there are other reasons Mr. Chairman but the reason I offered ties in species ethically with the prisoners of war issue. I'm not saying that they couldn't be trusted in some areas. But I'm interested in the prisoners of war and they have demonstrated that they can't be trusted with respect

to the prisoners of war and therefore I suggest it's cruel and inhuman to trust them and to commit the fate of our prisoners of war to them. What it seems to me if you cannot trust them then there is no point in even contemplating negotiation series. There's no possibility of negotiation with people you cannot trust. All right think that we can have negotiations with people we don't trust Mr Mr Chairman. I think this goes on all the time. What counts is the deeds that follow the negotiation. And that's why we are usually very careful to make sure that there is a quid pro quo and that the deeds on one side are matched concurrently or very closely to concurrently by the other side. I I don't for one moment suggest because we don't trust the negotiators on the other side of the table that we can't have negotiations and negotiation subject of course to deeds that match the words of the negotiated agreement.

Church protocol center member as I understand it your proposal is that they should give us our prisoners back now and we should end the war later is that it. Well not quite. Senator my resolution calls for a complete exchange of prisoners of war as outlined by President Nixon in his statement to the nation on peace and Indochina. You will recall I think that it was indicated at that time that we have about 25000 of their prisoners they have roughly twenty five hundred of U.S. and Allied prisoners so it's about a 10 to one exchange. Frankly I have never heard of such of the exchange proposal but we have apparently a greater regard for human life than they do and so I suppose the 10 to 1 ratio is 10 to 1 ratio is to be expected but they get their

25000 back we get our twenty five hundred back and when that happens within 12 months we're out. Well then I was right when I said that your proposition is for us to get back through the exchange process our prisoners now and then we would agree to end our participation in the war later. Well not right within a fixed time 10 of 12 months that is precisely correct. If they are they made an offer to us do you think we would accept it. Well I said they can't they can't be trusted. I think that depends upon how much they want to get the American troops out of South Vietnam I think it's well understood that if a proposition such as this is approved by the Congress that it would be a very powerful inducement for the president to announce publicly that this would be the United States position.

And I think we've done a pretty good job of saying that such a combination of Legislative and Executive Branch action is matched by deeds. I don't think I have any qualms about it if I were in Hanoi You wouldn't know shit. You think you could sell out to you to the government the people of North Vietnam. Well Senator you know that it isn't a matter of summing it to the people of North Vietnam in their type of the society it's a matter of summing it to their leader. Yeah well then do their years. That's right you think that could be sold to their leader. I think it's worth a try and we're not getting very far the way things are going along as prisoners of war. What you say you're principally interested in. Isn't it true that the number of our prisoners of war keeps on increasing the longer we participate in the war. For example just in the last year of our participation the total number of our prisoners in their prison camps

went up from an estimated thirteen hundred sixty eight to fifteen hundred eleven. So it doesn't follow that the longer we persist in the war the larger the number of prisoners of ours they will hold. Well it seems to be going their way of course. I think that this is one reason or I think that we can expect that as we continue with our we withdrawal of forces that the numbers will not increase appreciatively appreciably. But as long as we maintain air operations and as long as they shoot some of our craft down I suppose we could expect that there will be some additional prisoners just as long as they persist in fighting in South Vietnam I suppose they can expect that their prisoners will increase too. Is all the more reason for trying to wind this thing up and the sooner the better. And we're not getting very far on it. There is a place that I agree with you in a

manner. And I think that when we wind it up we'll get prisoners back quickly and that's been the history of the past the past wars it's been the history of this war it was the experience of the French. I think that that will also be our own experience. Well Senator you have trust and confidence in the North Vietnamese leaders and I'm sorry I do not share. It's not a question of trust and confidence. There's just one thing with the North Vietnamese one and that's for us to leave. I think that that's what they wanted where the French was concerned. And when the final commitment was made for withdrawal then it was easy to easily enough to arrange for the release of the prisoners of war that was the French experience. I think that will be our experience. History is the witness to my position and it seems hard for me to understand why the north of the enemy is having only one leverage on us. The prisoners of war they hold and having only one desire we're concerned the withdrawal of the

United States from active participation in the war. Why they would agree to release prisoners that one leverage they have until they get a commitment from us with respect to our decision to withdraw. And. I just think that's the quid pro quo that makes sense and it's the only quid pro quo that makes sense in this situation. Well Senator may I respond by saying that while you think we get our prisoners of war back after we withdraw what happens if you think wrong. Let me make it perfectly clear since that question is silly in my judgment the the commitment that the Frenchman when they finally agreed to lead led quickly to an agreement with respect to prisoners that's not so difficult. I think once the president of the United States makes clear that we're going to leave and negotiates a fix to date for the completion of our withdrawal it will then

be a comparatively easy question to negotiate the withdrawal the release of the prisoners in the French case the prisoners were released as the withdrawal took place. I think we could insist upon the same thing and that would utterly eliminate the cause of your concern namely trusting them because such an arrangement would permit the release of the prisoners as the withdrawal proceeds. And I see no reason why that should present any difficulty. And there's nothing in the North Vietnamese position at Paris that suggests it would present any difficulty. Pro quo is a commitment to withdraw and withdraw completely. And that's exactly what my resolution provides for. Yes but your resolution provides yet the prisoners first the withdrawal later. That's right I don't think it's likely given the most human experience to expect that that would provide a viable basis for a successful negotiation. Senator we might give it a try. Now I might say the coverage of these hearings continues in the 15 seconds

on the eastern Public Radio Network. This is WGBH FM Public Radio in Boston. My proposition and that is that if he thinks wrong. What happens to our prisoners of war. If it's his son or my son who is a prisoner of war Senator I don't really want to get to the facts first before we withdraw. I think I've answered that question. Well Senator you talk about phasing it phasing out troops while we phased phase the exchange of prisoners of war. This has some possibilities I'm not going to deny that. But just so we make sure that those prisoners of war in North Vietnam in North Vietnam are matched by sufficient inducement of American military personnel in South Vietnam. To make it worthwhile for North Vietnam to recognize the quid pro quo. Now that's an extremely difficult balance to figure out. I think that the proposition I advance might

lead to negotiations along that point. I'm not locked in on this. I don't claim to have a premium on what is going to be a basis for a negotiated settlement. All I'm saying is that the way things are going now in the stix day proposals putting the fate of our prisoners of war in the whims of North Vietnamese leaders isn't going to do any good either. And I'm trying to reach a middle ground here which will bring all of us of good faith together. I have no more way to play that you don't trust the government. We have a government of South Vietnam. I think this is Senator that South Vietnam is so dependent on us for financial and military assistance just as North Vietnam is dependent on Red China and the Soviet Union for financial and military assistance. That

in so far as the proposal that I have advanced is concerned. We don't need to worry about the attitude of the South Vietnamese. You have confidence the government of South Dakota depended on the United States. Well for purposes of my resolution and that's what I'm interested in that's what I'm appearing here for the committee on. Yes I do. Now I must say this that I think most of us would feel much better about the situation in South Vietnam. If we had genuinely supervised internationally supervised elections in South Vietnam of course that's been a proposition that the United States has advanced in Paris for a long time. We haven't had any takers on it. We're winning we said before. Let the chips lie where they may. We don't have to have American supervisors of elections let the

United Nations set up the mechanics on that we'll let the chips fall where they may but we haven't had any takers. Assuming that the election which I believe they told was that he or any of the other willing candidates for the president and they have almost as many as we have could win the election and the federal government be tossed out of office could really still have the confidence in the government that we do know. Or would we still have to run a government in order to have confidence in it. Senator I don't think anyone knows the answer to that question but I would say next is that regardless of how the elections this fall glow I believe that the reasonable chance proposition to which I have alluded in my remarks will have been attained as far as ground operations are concerned by July 1 of this year's far's air operations are concerned by July 1 of next

year. And that reasonable chance proposition I think embrace is the willingness of the people in the nation or country concerned to exercise their freedom of self-determination prudently. And if they see fit to throw it away I don't think that we should be bound by that. I don't think that we should be bound to stay there for years just because in the exercise of their freedom of self-determination they threw it away. But you wouldn't want a condition South Beach or Cambodia or Laos showed no willingness to maintain a government who is entirely satisfactory to us that you would let them have their own way. I think Sun I don't know of a member of the Senate Senator Akin who doesn't feel that way. I think that that has been a policy that. That this Senate is a whole has agreed upon and that has been advanced by

successive administrations. In fact I have never heard any disagreement over that proposition when I've been in the Senate that we would continue to do better with whatever government the people of that country see fit to put in office. Well when you say continued to do business I don't believe that the proposition has been put quite in that frame. I think we've stated loud and clear that we are going to do abide by the results of genuinely free elections under international supervision in in South Vietnam. And some people look at it up this way well suppose they vote for the Viet Cong and put them in office and our answer is Ben so be it. That's that's for them to decide. The way things are going here do you think we might need to add a national supervision for election in November 72. Well Senator what are you going to say I hear Senator Kerry.

There's a trace of embarrassment in your question because I had I think all of us had been in other countries. But your young democracy where we may need a little critical comment in an informal conversation and someone is thrown it right back in our lap and suggested that perhaps things might be a little better in Chicago and New Jersey. Like I don't know. I suppose we could have called the senator to water under the rules of the Senate for his gratuitous comment about our state quite seriously. I have no apologies to make for New Jersey. Nor nor nor am I here to defend it it will take care of itself as it has in the past. No questions thank you and if I can get it.

Well Senator Miller always makes a forceful argument with sincere argument. I applaud your concern for a present war we think about him. Occasionally I think I know you've spoken many times on this subject. I also planted if you lay out for his grave some of the history of this war. I know it but the past doesn't help particular president but still from the standpoint of history for people who have not kept up with the events which led to this war particularly many of our young people I think it's very good if you lay out the beginnings of this war. And I must say that every president beginning with President Truman President eyes and I had a most limited degree. President Kennedy President Johnson. I had always as which was supported by the Congress and with very little protest from the

American people until the casualties rolled in the last few years. I see said a man who does deserve a great appreciation and a greeting would poke out with one other man the first one in the United States Senate and the whole Congress I must say that I don't see any of that any of these proposals whether George of the AT field McGovern or the President Nixon's keeping residual force there. The prisoners of war or anyone any of us may introduce guarantees the release of our prisoners of war. I think that a negotiated settlement for all of Southeast Asia offers the best prospect. I would make this comment and I think you'd agree with me that it can convention which applies to prisoners of war not only calls for all those who adhere to it saying to kill or at least ratification to obey it. North Viet Nam was one that was handed to the convention

and say for they for the bad. And I have the opportunity to pay it but they refuse to tell you refused. But that convention also requires every signatory to support it in a more concrete way and that is continued urge through every means possible that prisoners of war be relieved from whatever and be treated humanely on whatever side. And I believe that many countries throughout the world have ratified at Grady have not abated that command. So I appreciate what you said but I still believe that a negotiated settlement of all the problem is the only way we're going to be should be assured that the burden of the orbiter. Thank you Senator and I think you know I hear you're a share your view that the

quickest way to end this is at the negotiating table. This is another reason why I I am concerned about the so-called fixed date proposals. It seems to me rather obvious to take state the polls have an almost complete tendency to undercut the possibility of negotiations. Of course we haven't had any serious negotiations in pairs but I don't think we ought to destroy that option. And who knows we may have something moving over there tomorrow or next week. And if it does that is the quickest way to end this war. Let's hear that big game a sham and Senator Miller I don't suppose you can measure pain or agony but I'm sure

that their humanitarian feelings regarding the prisoners of war affect us more deeply than anything else. I would command every suggestion made by anybody at any time. This regard and I don't have a question Mr. Chairman but I am. I recall that there is a restaurant and they make private ins press press and it not not too much in point but I believe in 1953 there was a release of prisoners of war in the Korean conflict prior to the armistice. So that's not very much in point but it does give some credence to the bios of the senator and I thank you very much for a statement. Thank you very much Senator. Thank you Mr. Chairman. The next witness is a honorable Adley Stevenson on ASC on May 17th and Stevenson Yvette pleased to have you this

morning. You proceed. Thank you Mr. Chairman I'm very grateful to you for this opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee. I might say at the outset that it's been a very refreshing experience for me to move to the Senate. Oh I was struck maybe from my former somewhat but it's quite good. We heard of people in the nation right little about the morality of our actions in South Vietnam. Most of the public officials seemed preoccupied with body counts with short term military and political expediency seasoned all too rarely with principle. I was I say very gratified to hear the words. Q And Senator

Javits Exchange this morning about the morality of our actions in South Vietnam. As you said Mr. Chairman our motives in South Vietnam have not been evil since the very beginning we have justified our military involvement in South Vietnam as a moral effort to bring freedom and self-determination to the people of that nation. Only this month Mr. Nixon said I quote Never in history have men fought for less selfish motives not for conquest not for glory but only for the right of people far away to choose the kind of government they want. I heard Senator Miller express some of the same sentiments. And yet it seems that instead of supporting the people of South Vietnam in their search for peace and freedom we are instead supporting a regime which is committed to military victory and to

a prolonged war at the expense of a war weary people. Our policy it seems to me is not to end the war but to continue it as a proxy war between nations for so long as that is our policy. I fear that the strain upon our lives and upon our treasury and upon our conscience will continue. Marshall Key has said it will be 15 or 20 years before South Vietnam can defend itself like. Many of the other recent witnesses before this committee to support the withdrawal of all American forces by an announced date. Because I believe it's morally right to believe that such a move could start serious negotiations and ensure our disengagement. But I recognize the risk in Syria and in terminating our military involvement in Indochina.

Without a negotiated settlement covering amnesty for the people of South Vietnam. That withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam and the return of our prisoners from the north. I would like to suggest therefore that we fasten more attention upon the possibilities of a political settlement which could not only hasten our departure but also leave behind a durable and representative government which could depend for its survival upon the support of the people of South Vietnam and not upon the continued military involvement of the United States. The people of South Vietnam will elect a new House of Representatives in August to be followed by the election of a president in October. Because our massive military presence enhanced is the power of those in office. It threatens to involve us in South Vietnamese electoral politics. If only by an appearance of support for the

present regime in the forthcoming elections frequent visits to South Vietnam cabinet members Bester bunkers tours of the countryside would present to the high visibility of U.S. materiel and personnel throughout the nation are perceived by the people as expressions of United States support for the re-election of President too. There is moreover the chairman's reason to be concerned that United States support for the two key regime political support is as real as it is apparent. The New York Times of February 2 reported and I quote national surveys if they had the means public opinion which are prepared and analyzed by the United States mission in Saigon are being used to assist president have been to in his re-election campaign this year. End of quote. The surveys referred to are conducted by cords monthly and off forty four provinces and the results are turned over to the UK government. The

questionnaire made available to the New York Times contained three questions relating specifically to the forthcoming elections which men are most likely to run. What kind of man should be elected and what are the decisive issues to give Mr. cheerly answers to these questions is I believe to promote his self-perpetuation rather than the self-determination of the people of South Vietnam. Earlier this month our distinguished colleague Senator Church called attention to United States Information Agency programs which help the South Vietnamese ninnies ministry of information disseminated pro-government propaganda in response to questions from the distinguished chairman of this committee. Senior US IAEA official in South Vietnam stated in March 1070 before this committee that US I a had conducted POWs in South Vietnam presumably to determine whether the propaganda was successful in

fostering more positive public attitudes towards the two key government. Those hearings also indicated that you us-I A has used its resources in South Vietnam to assist the Vietnamese government in developing means of communicating with the electorate by providing it means government technical and professional advice. I don't believe Mr. Chairman that the United States can be true to its commitment to self-determination in the world and also support the election of one candidate or another. However covertly in South Vietnam to do so would be wrong. It would repeat mistakes of the past. It may be that other governments skew free elections in the Third World is inconsistent with their interests but I would certainly hope. I believe that it is better politics and morally right for the United States to align itself with not against the rights of self-determination we are

the first articulated as a nation United States support real or apparent for the re-election of President you could discourage the candidacies of men committed in South Vietnam to a settlement and to coexistence with North Vietnam General Minh has said as much publicly it could distort the free expression of the popular will in the elections by inducing the electorate to vote for those in power or to vote not at all. Senate concurrent resolution 17 reaffirms the neutrality of the United States in the South Vietnamese elections it calls upon the president to implement a policy of strict neutrality. And it also creates a bipartisan ten member congressional commission supported by a stamp in South Vietnam throughout the election campaign do over see United States policies and activities which might interfere with

the South Vietnamese electoral process. The commission would help assure the people of South Vietnam that we as a nation are truly committed to their rights as a free self-governing people. The resolution goes a step farther by expressing the sense of the Congress that we shall as a nation support only a freely elected government and therefore no United States military assistance will be available to any government which requires order tains power in South Vietnam by means of a coup or other corrupt or coercive means this declaration of policy is intended to deter any who might seek power through corrupt or and undemocratic means in these elections. Commission would consist of five members from the Senate and five from the house. In all probability they would not hold a debt of good views about our Indochina policy. But so long as they endorsed the principle of United States neutrality towards forthcoming elections I know of no member of Congress who does

not. There are divergent views on other questions will underscore the breadth of United States support for free elections. The goal of strict United States neutrality towards the elections is also reflected in the fact that commission's mandate is directed at U.S. involvement in the elections leaving it to the South Vietnamese themselves to decide whether to invite foreign observers to monitor the entire election process. This resolution if adopted not as suggested by some would would not interfere with the internal affairs of South Vietnam it assures the people of that nation voters and candidates like that we are serious about not interfering. I thought Mr. Chairman at first to include five additional presidential and point teas on his commission but concluded that the impartiality of the commission would then be questioned by the South Vietnamese. There is too much evidence that President Nixon is perceived in South Vietnam as supporting the re-election of Q and key Becka

bunker was quoted in the South Vietnamese press last year saying the United States supports the reelection of President two in one thousand seventy one. The American Embassy in Saigon denied the statement attributed to Mr Bunker but the fact remains that is how our position is widely perceived among the people of South Vietnam. I believe that the people of South Vietnam are also more likely to respect an expression of political neutrality if it comes from the elected representatives of the American people and their Congress and through a appointed commission or even a commission with appointed members. Given the. Sensitivity of the South Vietnamese people to any interference in their domestic affairs by foreign governments. I'm hopeful that the commission would be welcomed not only by the people but also by the government of South Vietnam could be

helped in its effort to assure the noninvolvement of the United States in the electoral politics of that nation. The intent of this resolution is not to defeat President you but to neutralize the political advantage which our military involvement affords and to ensure it disadvantages not augmented by the activities overt or covert of Representatives of the United States government during the forthcoming campaign by affirming our neutrality in the campaign. This resolution may encourage more candidates to commit themselves to a negotiated settlement of the war and by lessening the advantage which even the appearance of United States support gives the existing regime. This resolution may encourage President Chu to heed the desire of the people of South Vietnam for peace and for reconciliation. It is to be hoped that any men who gain power in the elections through a broad expression of popular support would be strengthened in their dealings with the

NLF in the north. If for the first time in the war a South Vietnamese president took the oath of office with a broad base of popular support. I don't believe it would go unnoticed by Hanoi. In closing Mr. Chairman let me I suggest that the forthcoming election in South Vietnam is anything but a peripheral issue when viewed from the standpoint of United States interests United States policy a fair election is the only victory that we can hope for. Once having achieved that victory it will be in the best possible position to carry out this with total and honorable withdrawal of United States forces for the South the enemy is the election is at least as crucial. They can withdraw from a land mutilated by a quarter century of war and they have no assurance that the war will end for them when our troops go home. It's up to the South Vietnamese

government as Mr. Nixon has often pointed out to hammer out a political solution and to bring peace to Indochina. At this time and from this distance it's impossible to predict whom the South Vietnamese will elect this fall. But a fair election is the best vehicle for transforming their desire the desire of the people of South Vietnam for peace in the way mandate for peace. For that reason a fair election will be a political and a moral victory no matter who wins a victory of greater lasting importance and all of the real and imagined military victories which preceded it. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much Senator Stevenson. I think you have brought a very interesting proposal for the committee. I would say one thing bothers me just the mechanics of how does a senator or a congressman who none of whom I know of speak the language are familiar with the

person personalities involved how do they really operate to promote a fair election. What do they do. Well first Mr. Chairman let me just emphasize again that I am not suggesting supervision by the Vietnamese and the conduct by duty at the mes of their elections I'm simply suggesting that we oversee our own involvement in South Vietnam to guarantee that we the government of the United States don't distort in the course of the election campaign the will of the people. I would I guess suggest response that question to be far easier for the United States Senate the House of Representatives commission representing the two bodies and a stamp to oversee our involvement as opposed to the South Vietnamese the conduct of their own elections. This resolution kind of contemplates a staff so the enemy's speaking staff on the ground in place in South Vietnam

as soon as possible after the resolution were to be adopted to continually not only to continually oversee our own involvement and also to continually assure the people of South Vietnam. We are really neutral in the in the in the elections. My own feeling from talking with many now is that a resolution is simply not enough resolution committing the United States to neutrality in the elections. It needs more to make it stick. It needs more to continually assure the people of our bonafide nice nest. The purpose of the commission coverage of these hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee coming to you live from Washington will continue in 15 seconds on the eastern Public Radio Network. This is WGBH FM Public Radio in Boston.

The government in Saigon I mean that's been one of the major efforts on our part aside from the actual military operations through the last six years to be rather difficult in a short time now to say we we didn't mean it we don't we're neutrally don't care whether you support the government or not. Well sir I think it should be tried I think assurances could be given especially if there assurances coming from the Congress it would be difficult to get just a resolution read up to declaring neutrality I suspect for many of the people of South Vietnam to distinguish between the Congress and the executive branch of the government. But if the resolution is also followed by the activities the existence and the activities of the commission of the Congress. In South Vietnam I would surely hope and think that it could be of some help not only in circumscribing the

activities of the embassy and USA Accords and other agencies but in continually assuring the people too of our real neutrality and the murdered and the more necessary after what is already transpired after the electioneering that we have and may still be doing on behalf of Toulon key press this commission could find out to a great extent what really is going on. One of the reports that one of the requirements in the resolution is that it report periodically and in early to the Congress so that if such activities are continuing the Congress can take appropriate remedial action. Well that would be a great accomplishment because the committee has attempted to get the results of the polls which you mentioned you mentioned the questions that were designed to assist President. Q But up to now the executive branch refused to make those available to this committee. Maybe the commission would be more persuasive on the executive branch

especially if they were more in tune with their policies. Senator Casey thank you Mr. Chairman. Senator thank you too for your contribution here and your thoughtful thoughtful suggestion and the thoughtful and moderate way you've presented it. I do have a couple of questions about the matter of whether the election in South Vietnam is likely to or could be counted on presenting a picture of the National will there of the will of the people there. Elections are not historically very common and in that part of the world.

I don't mean they should be discouraged in any sense but I think it's not quite correct for us to put upon an election and the weight or the value but we have come to put upon elections here and this leads me to and I just want to sort of lay out my line of thinking and then I ask you to comment in your own way. This leads me to to to state a question that I've had in my mind for a long time as to whether we are really there in South Vietnam where the primary and perhaps as has been suggested the sole purpose of permitting the South Vietnamese to decide their own form of government and their leadership. We don't do this in many parts of the world where the leadership.

I think obviously not maintained by the will of the people but rather by our dictatorship. One former and or another of of process which we regard as important. We don't do that and I don't think it's adequate. Never has been for us to state that our purpose of being in South Vietnam and Indo-China is to present and insure for the people of that particular small area of the world. The right of self-determination. I think it's quite inadequate an explanation. And and and. And so I have I question whether to put so much on an election in these circumstances is it is wise or right. Then I. I recall

other times when we've been closely involved with another country say Britain close of World War 2 or the European phase of it. I don't think anyone in this country would have suggested we stop giving all our assistance to the to the Kingdom of Great Britain or to its stand leadership just because there was an election coming on. Churchill was replaced by a Labor government. So much to our surprise in some people's minds dismay though this was very short lived. I don't think when other words and this really is the weight of my point that we ought to stop doing things we think are necessary for our broad purpose in South Vietnam because it may not as a matter of our intention but as a matter of collateral effect have the have they have they have the be

favorable to a regime that happens for the time to be in command of the of the South Vietnamese government I wish you'd comment on that full range of Quest great thought. Observation Center case. I would agree I think this war has been chasing after a purpose for a long time but if there's any one thread of continuity between all of the justifications which have been from time to time advanced in support of the war it has been self-determination hasn't it been rather than I would interrupt again but hasn't been rather more. Wouldn't it be more fair to state it this way that we would certainly not stay there if the South Vietnamese wanted us out. But we're not there for the purpose of giving them the right of self-determination I think that's going to come in I think ostensibly at least the purpose has been to give them their right to self-determination the president repeated it at least as recently as April 7th of this month. And if that hasn't been our purpose perhaps it should now become our purpose and perhaps not only in South Vietnam but more generally

throughout the world. Maybe this is maybe this is one of the mistakes that we've made OK. What are they getting at or did he hear me OK. But I'm getting a OK we're going to run a remote get out of here. Receding of the Senate. We need to not get in here you know it could just be quiet. Just leave them. He cried it is not ok. Yeah you can be quiet and it didn't happen for me. Senator Hayes. I'd like to hope at least that has been or is it seems to me or purpose should be withdrawal from

did not return it or cause new prisoners leaving behind it it is a terrible investment of blood and treasure something for our efforts. I fear the consequences of a unilateral withdrawal whether you call it being a musician or something else appear to what may happen in all of Indochina. I don't see how the unilateral withdrawal leads to the return of our prisoners. I don't see how it leads to an agreement on amnesty. The divisive elections in May be imperfect imperfect in this country. But it's the only device there is that the people have for expressing their will. I do or for or believe that we shouldn't distort it. We shouldn't interfere with it because we should

do the best we can within within imperfect device. Abiding by the expression of popular will in these elections regarding a free election. And I hope that's what it is. As a final. And fulfillment at long last of our commitment which I believe in self-determination freedom for the people of South Vietnam and then withdrawn and against a better chance of getting a political settlement which may lead to amnesty to a ceasefire to the return of our prisoners and hopefully also to a government which does which is able to depend upon popular support for its survival and not upon our military support. It's not a perfect answer and it's certainly not inconsistent with the views of others who support for example the terminal date for the withdrawal of all American Irish support that

as senator knows and I understand you from your statement that you do too. I just really what I'm questioning is whether this would not inject an added difficulty and complication into a situation which is already pretty complicated. Frankly I hope it might simplify it to get down to some basic principles like self-determination things and first of all have a broad general agreement. That's right. Concerns had a case here. Or a resolution I know from your statement as includes the intent that no US military assistance will be available to any government which requires or retains power and so we have no my means of a coup other corrupt

can of course leave me and that I take it you would be willing to let it stand as a condemnation of the action of this government and I would so I am giving considerable aid and comfort to the overthrow of President Jed. Isn't that something which you would condemn as long. Well I may. It amounted to going to states in the it's in the past. I frankly don't know to what extent we were a party to that coup. You been around here longer senator and I have a strong feeling if we were a party to it and that it was wrong. I mean I think desperation to us was wrong whatever the South Vietnamese did is a matter for other judgement but. I'm just trying to get at this sort of thing you're approaching. Well I think you can say yes I created it for the benefit of retrospective with the benefit of hindsight it was wrong and I am not sure this has been at the heart of much of my trouble in this world.

Perhaps instead of aligning earth with the with which you contest with unpopular regimes with with regimes that come come to power through force and coercion and corruption we should be trying to align ourselves with regimes that come new powers. The result of the expression of popular will and can and can enjoy and depend upon popular support not only in Indochina but elsewhere in the world that if carried far enough I would have a factor of saying that we will allow ourselves only with governments been whose form of government we agree. And those are I think. Think what I'm trying to suggest. Think there'd be a unanimity is that we are committed in this world to self-determination its commitment to this we're this country made 200 years ago when we declared that it was our purpose as nation to set men free. I think we've lost

our way. I'd like to see us get back to that commitment we made to the to the freedom and the self-determination and the rights to self-government of people everywhere we were to have some obligation to take some part in the struggle of people to be free and every country wherever that may be going on. So I don't know it I wouldn't want to generalize to it to the extent to I do generalize it would seem to me that we should be trying to confine our support to those which do come to power peacefully and through democratic means do enjoy popular support in our progressive governments and then try to help them be free and self sustaining that with their military support not with military involvement but with the economic and technical assistance. This question may have been asked but as you know it underlies the basis of my concern and that is in proposing a commission of five senators and five members. To observe any U.S. involvement in the elections

would not need policy orientation of the press and some like it have a great deal to do with what they find and how can you devise attitudes about the basic policy from such attacks. I did address some comments to that question knowing of your concern. Serious guy I am. I think that there is no disagreement within the Congress about the principle here of non involvement in the internal electoral politics of South Vietnam. And that to the extent the commission was composed of congressmen and senators who did have different views about policy in South Vietnam it would only underscore our commitment to that principle of self-determination of American political neutrality in South Vietnam. Well I talked within the last few days to two shadows who have returned recently from Vietnam. Aspas

judgement on this ration of Laos incursion by one designated dead as a route to success in the other one. Last night as it made it as a relative failure but perhaps their point of view may have been governed by what they saw what they were taught perhaps by some predilection which they took to Vietnam with them and brought back unimpaired in the same market. Is not going to be the difficulty of a commission and some will say this is relatively good now this was relatively wrong in other words. Wouldn't such a commission simply refracted freed elections of the people in my life I don't think so I think the people action in this case is American political neutrality trial ity. And if there are some differences of opinion what do you no harm really comes of that. It the commission would be charged with reporting back to the Congress would be the Congress itself which

acted as the final arbiter I suppose in the event of any disagreements within the within the commission commission would have a staff it would try to assure the people of our committee our commitment in the Congress to neutrality and there shouldn't be any disagreement about it. About them in the case of supervising or overseeing American activities I shouldn't think there'd be opportunity for a great deal of disagreement over what constituted support for the re-election of Chu or somebody else. And what did and what kind of attitude of neutrality with the presence of such a commission be more helpful to the government and to those who are seeking to. So I don't know I talked with a very thoughtful and prominent general in South Vietnam. He returned from circuit

recently and he said that he should think that any one of the parties including President too would welcome this because it does afford them all an opportunity to come to power through an expression of popular support. And after that it happened. Whoever it is including President you name specifically I might be emboldened to make peace. It might be possible in a way that it isn't now to make peace with the with the North. He also pointed out that whoever putting President to came to power after what was a free election or at least free of American political involvement would have his hand strengthened greatly to be the north the north really would take notice. So I I can see how it could also benefit in other ways other

candidates general Mina said as much. He has expressed publicly a deep concern about the political activities of the embassy in South Vietnam. He's indicated that whether or not he even runs will depend upon those activities not so on the on whether or not the August elections are free of corruption and indicate the possibility of free elections in October. You may be encouraged to read this resolution would have passed. It might encourage other people to read and committed to peace to coexistence with the with the North. I don't know all I know is that it's a principle that I think that this country should adhere to and I can see no adverse consequences which might ensue is result of the advent of a firm commitment by the Congress to

self-determination and to the rights of self government of the people of South Vietnam. And I'm not sure we should be in the business of my second choice it was not my point. And actions in the United States are entirely free of corruption. But I'm for free elections here too. Senator I'm wondering whether you accept a Pennsylvania commission to examine the Chicago way. Maybe we can work out a reciprocal agreement. It might need a reciprocal agreement. What if you commented on the Fresno boy do you think we might get those prisoners of war. Senator I've already expressed my support for a terminal date as a means not only of ensuring her disengagement but also as a means of getting to go she started and I charge me to believe that should we announce publicly a terminal date that it would be very hard to win in return for the release of our prisoners.

Although I would assume that the release of prisoners would be coordinated with withdrawal of all American troops out of both is very likely that all American prisoners could be would be released before all American troops were withdrawn. But I also try to do indicate that as a result of free elections possibilities for a political settlement might very well be enhanced and that is part of that political settlement we could expect the return of our prisoners as well as other possibilities cease fire. A.T. for people in South Vietnam. Hopefully going into the war instead of as I think our present course indicates a prolonged ation of the war but a proxy war. I wish to put in the record the article in which I referred a moment ago February 2nd New York Times by Gloria Emerson

regarding the surveys and one by PJ in a Washington Post on the 20th and one from this morning's Post which is quite interesting it says the Navy command is now directing an effort to gather information etc. in the past for geisha project. He says one object is helping Viet Nam's police the United States would develop an information system for Saigon as Ministry of Interior the police on which cracks down on anti government actions and personnel to monitor evaluate and improve the implementation of the people self-defense broke the status of organization manned by weapons ammunition and training of forces in each family. Also its information program is to test says attitudes polls and surveys would be conducted monthly in Viet Nam to determine attitudes of the

Vietnamese people. Very interesting development Mr reporter will put all three of those articles in the record. Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. The next day when this is the animal water Mondale arnest 9:07 will want to hear it. You can imagine. Oh OK. Why would they like a bit here. That ought to make you be quiet after this go round pick a receipt at meetings over but we can't allow you to disrupt our meetings till we get through the center Monday. Chairman members of the committee. I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of the amendment which

Senator Saxby and I have introduced for hitting US participation in invasion of North get not as the chairman knows a senator from Saxby was here and intended to testify personally but he had to leave to make it 12 o'clock pointman and would be glad to testify on another occasion he might be back as before and he asked me however to point out that he has his own independent position on behalf of the government. Resolution different from the one which I will just. Mr. Chairman I want to emphasize at the outset that I believe that the only way out of the nightmare of this war is to set a date and bring our men home as one of his co-sponsors. I strongly support the Hatfields McGovern amendment to withdraw all of our forces from India China by December 30 for the passage of that legislation is the most basic responsibility of this Congress.

But while we still have a military presence in India China it is absolutely essential that every step be taken to prevent a wider war. That is why Senator Saxby and I have raised this crucial question should the president send our forces to carry out or support an invasion of North Vietnam with all an invasion could apply without the prior authorization of the Congress. This is not a question of whether the president's past policies have been right or wrong. Whatever one may think about the actions and can Bodi in Laos and invasion of North Vietnam is simply an issue beyond any of the old differences between the press. Didn't And his critics. The reason for that is plain. All of us including the president's own advisors must know an invasion of North Vietnam risks the involvement of communist China.

That prospect would carry implications at home as well as abroad. As serious as any of we have ever faced in the nuclear age I need not elaborate for this committee. The clear historical warnings we thought the Chinese would tolerate an invasion of a border state when our forces crossed into North Korea 20 years ago they were not bluffing when President Kennedy considered sending U.S. troops into Laos in 1961. The Chinese moved troops up to their Laotian border where they have remained. When President Johnson escalated the air war against North Vietnam and moved massive American ground forces into South Vietnam between one hundred sixty five thousand nine hundred sixty eight 50000 Chinese troops came into North Vietnam. They retired only when we stopped the bombing. It seems to me that China's obvious stake in North Vietnam defines all

too strictly the prospects of an invasion of North Vietnam. Either it would be effectively defeated by North Vietnam or it would be sufficiently punishing to invite Chinese intervention in either outcome of the costs and risks would be enormous. A decision to invade then is one of those actions so momentous for the nation so shattered by the unpredictable that the president cannot take it alone. There is of course a compelling constitutional argument for prior congressional authorization for invasion of North Vietnam. If the Senate and House should not take part in a decision of this magnitude there is truly nothing left of our foreign policy powers left in the Congress. Yet the constitutional issue also reflects a basic political reality. A president who took such a step without prior congressional approval would quite simply shatter our already fragile national unity.

And that's what our bill is all about. It does not exclude in the day Asian and North Vietnam it does not prevent the president from defending our forces in South Vietnam. It does call upon the president to recognize the extraordinary gravity of an action which could widen and prolong this war. And it brings him to share the great burden of decision as our nation's founders intended such burdens to be shared with the elected representatives of the American people. There is no need here to speculate on the motives or intentions of the administration. Whatever his reasons the president has explicitly continued to hold open the possibility of U.S. involvement in an invasion of North Vietnam. When Senator Saxby and I offered our amendment in late February there were numerous open threats of invasion from the Saigon regime although those threats and the public concerns they were roused have now subsided. We should remember that the invasions of Cambodia and Laos came in similarly

quiet moments. It has been argued that all the menacing talk about an invasion of North Vietnam was only an elaborate bluff. Part of the administration's tactics of ambiguity. I would like to read to the committee portions of two letters which suggest how perilously far these tactics can take us. These letters were written to a friend by an American officer off the coast of North Vietnam. The first letter is dated February 7th and I quote. Well they're playing their silly masculine on erotic war games again at our expense. I wrote you we spent most of last month in the war zone. You will notice by the missing stamp that we are there again.