Vietnam War Report

There have been very specific offers by Hanoi to negotiate in the past which we have not accepted. That's just a fact. Yes it's not a wish. It's a fact that wreckage exists and I know them from the time that I was in the White House. This is Vietnam War report. The voice you just heard is that of Richard and good one former special counsel to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Mr Goodwin calls himself a moderate but passionate dissenter from the current course of escalation of the war in Vietnam. In a debate that rages between the extremes of immediate withdrawal and the cry to bomb Hanoi Goodwin is a special kind of dissenter. He objects not to the war itself but to the tactics that are being used tactics which he considers ineffective and wasteful of men and resources. Instead he favors a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam leading to negotiations with the communists. Goodwin supports his position with the information and experience gained during his years in the State Department and as a

special assistant at the White House last year. RICHARD GOODWIN published his views in a book called Triumph or tragedy reflections on Vietnam. At that time he warned against further escalation that escalation has occurred. And last week reporter Marvin M. Bauer talked a good one about his views on the more recent developments in Vietnam. Goodwin began by describing the policy making process that led to American involvement in Vietnam. Like one of the difficulties in Vietnam became involved in it gradually with life out I think at any stage until very recently contemplating that our commitments and engagement there would involve us in a major conflict. I think it was the original commitment of military assistance of some kind was made by Eisenhower at each stage the president the build up president thought that the addition of a few more military advisers or with a little more help might help the Vietnamese to win their

own war against the communist insurgents in that country. Those estimates always prove to be wrong. Well on the strength of the Commune is proved to be greater so the required a constant step up. But of course the major turn came in 1965 because up until that time we had always said this was a Vietnamese war that we would assist them but they had to win it as President Kennedy said in 1963. However in 1965 we felt that they could not of went it by themselves and therefore we began to transform it into an American war with the bombing of the north and the shipment of large scale American combat troops. And so the entire nature of the war was changed at that stage making it an American Basically American rather than a Vietnamese conflict. And I think in retrospect that if anyone had thought that it would involve us with 500000 men and 25 billion dollars a year and more than

10000 Americans would be dead by this time more than 600 American planes that it's doubtful that some of the decisions along the way would have been made. Goodwin was in the government at the time that these decisions were made. He was asked whether at that time there was anyone in the administration who raised the possibility that American involvement would reach the level it has now achieved. Well there was some fear but I think that people were generally over optimistic about what we could do with our military force and the way in which we could crush the guerrillas and overoptimistic about the capacity of the South Vietnamese to fight. And to look at a very different circumstance in 1954 when the French were fighting the communist guerrillas in Indochina. President Eisenhower was asked to intervene by the French to help them against the communists. At that point their General Matthew Ridgway will lead our forces in career and general Gavin went to Indo China and said that any if we did intervene that it would require massive use of

American troops and become a very major conflict in Asia. The result of that General Eisenhower decided that he would not intervene despite the fact that the military in this country and Secretary Dallas advised him to go into Indochina so that he made the opposite decision on the basis of military judgments and political judgments as well. Unfortunately I don't think we had as many people who were as far sighted about the nature of that conflict in years that follow. Without American assistance the French were defeated and forced to withdraw from Vietnam. But Goodwin says that this alternative is not realistically open to the United States he explained why the United States should not withdraw and discussed the other possible courses of action. I don't believe that we can withdraw from Vietnam I think all the other countries of Asia including some of the important ones like India must in the last analysis to be able to depend on American power to defend themselves in case of aggression by

China. If we were asked to withdraw defeated from Vietnam then I think they no longer could count on that American power would have in some ways to come to terms with a Communist so I think that's not a satisfactory solution the question is how do you resolve the war. There are two ways to resolve it either you can win it or you can have a compromise a negotiated peace. Well I think that up until very recently there were many people who wanted us to win the war. Now there's nothing wrong with our winning the war and myself would be very much in favor if we could win the war. But all the military evidence is that the only way to win the war would be to send millions of men to Vietnam. I mean actually virtually obliterate the peninsula. After all there are millions upon millions of Asians hundreds of millions of we cannot beat them at the manpower game. The bombing has proved very ineffective as a Didn't Great Britain in World War Two was even it did over Germany. So but there is no prospect of a military victory. It's not being against military victory it's at all the

evidence shows that we cannot win. Something is very hard for Americans to accept. And I think even in the government people like Secretary McNamara who have been very strong on the side of an American victory are beginning to say that we cannot win as has almost every military expert clearly many former distinguished generals on the outside so that our only recourse is to maintain the present stalemate in which neither side can win and try to seek a negotiated solution and I think we could do that with much greater vigor than we are doing now. Goodwin reiterated his call for negotiations but admitted that they might not provide a panacea for the problems of Vietnam. Right the key to Americans he says in Vietnam because achieving a negotiated settlement negotiations solution. I think that we have to realize and it may not be possible or that it may be a long time before that happens although I do think we missed opportunities to negotiate the missed opportunities occurred on several occasions

when the communist indicated a willingness to negotiate. Since the stated policy of the United States is to be willing to negotiate with almost no preconditions Goodwin was asked why the administration let the chance to negotiate past by. Well I I think it's very hard to understand why we didn't negotiate at that point when both the foreign minister of North Vietnam and the chair chairman premier of the Soviet Union said if we stop the bombing there could be a negotiation I think the problem is we've gotten so deeply involved of the administration is that it felt its own prestige was at stake and that it couldn't stop the bombing unless it got what it called something in return without making clear what something was so that it just seems to me that it's proud of this being caught in the psychological trap and these old routes of thinking that make it very difficult for you to break out and reach a peaceful we have nothing to lose. Of course if we stop the bombing and if the negotiation had not gone forward there'd be nothing in the world to keep us from taking what military steps we thought were necessary

after that. And I think a great great opportunity was lost. Good one has repeatedly said that it would be impractical for the United States to seek a full military victory in Vietnam. Nevertheless the American generals responsible for the war have consistently maintained that the war can be won. Goodwin commented on the general's position. Well I think that's the job of course isn't it to win a war as a man like General Westmoreland a very patriotic and skillful man I think that they do feel that therefore if they're not winning now the answer is to apply more force. However that's exactly what we've been told from 1961 on consistently year after year we started with 600 men now we have 500000. And we're told that a additional more man or more bombing would win the war on each stage we've been told well it is not adequate. The other side is getting stronger. So but it just seems to me that if you look at the history of the past six years it doesn't give you much cause to be optimistic about

listening to the same old recommendations by the same people. Rather I think we can listen more to the voice of some of our very distinguished military men like General Gavin who led the for help lead the forces on D-Day in Normandy. General Ridgway was the commander of. Blast a land war in Asia and career and men like this distinction and undoubted courage to say that the build up in manpower and bombing is not going to win the war but I think we're on this psychological treadmill where each time something fails we feel we have to go up another notch in a cause that just makes the war bloodier and more dangerous without winning any more. The generals clearly advocate a military solution and the escalation that that entails. But is there anyone in the administration who effectively presents the opposite position Goodwin's replies suggest that the administration is far less confident of its position than admits. Well I'm sure there are some people within the administration who have a.

Sense of trying to pursue other courses and other alternatives. In fact I believe from my own personal knowledge that's a really relatively small proportion of those who are now conducting the present policy of escalation who really believe in it. I think they find themselves again caught in this treadmill of it doesn't seem to be any any choice and of course bound as members of the government to follow and implement the president's decisions. I don't think there is a strong voice of restraint I think there are many voices of doubt within the administration itself and at very high levels. One of the main reasons for doubt over escalation is a specter that Goodwin himself has raised the possibility of a wider war that could put the United States against communist China or Russia and which could even involve the use of nuclear weapons. Goodwin was asked whether he thought American policy had brought us to the verge of such a war. Well of course no one can predict what would cause or of anything would cause China or Russia to

intervene. It does seem to me however that it's very difficult for either China or Russia to stand by and witness further steps that we might take that would lead to the destruction or even the conquest of North Vietnam. That is an independent communist country. Both of those countries have treaties with Vietnam with Vietnam which they are obligated to come to its assistance. And therefore even though they may be willing to they are willing obviously to stand by and watch us. Our involvement in South Vietnam in fact I think the Russians should be very glad of our involvement of South Vietnam it is draining our resources it is hurting us elsewhere in the world it is raising their prestige and hurting ours. So from the Soviet point of view this war is a very fortunate thing in many ways because it's the way it has distracted the attention and the resources of the United States to this part of Asia and because also they have no reason to wish to have the Chinese have a victory since the Chinese are probably more bitter enemies of theirs and of ours. So but I think there are a lot of reasons to think that they won't come in but once we begin to threaten the country or North Vietnam for

example should we invade North Vietnam as when we invaded North Korea and move north it seems to me that the pressure on the Chinese and the Russians to come in in a more active way will be great and I don't think they just come in by sending armies but perhaps by flying air defense by moving an anti aircraft battalions manned by Chinese or Russian crews. And in this way we continue this step by step process which has gotten us involved in this war and which might very well if we keep up our process of escalation involve us in a much larger war. Now it isn't only that these risks are bad but we seem to be taking them for no particular purpose because every time we take that step which increases the risk of a larger war it doesn't help us much in Vietnam. So it seems to me that's foolishness to take great risks for very little gain. If fear for the safety of North Vietnam could bring China or Russia into the war. American bombing of the north which some critics have called aggression takes on critical significance. But Goodwin denied that the bombing by itself could be considered

aggression. Well I don't suppose the bombing of Vietnam was aggression from the North Vietnamese or sending troops and supplies into South Vietnam and which is our ally and we are retaliating in this way against North Vietnam. I don't think there's anything in the rules of war that can pay you to stand by and let your opponent or enemy move his forces against one country where you can move your forces against him. There's a difference so I don't believe we're guilty of aggression at all that's not the problem the problem is is it wise to bomb North Vietnam and it seems to me that that's a different kind of problem. Is it sound policy to bomb the Viet-Nam and if you look at the history of the bombing and see how little it accomplishes it has not stopped infiltration infiltration has increased by the Defense Department's own figures steadily. So it seems to me that the bombing has very little impact. Moreover we have been told quite explicitly at least we were several months ago that if we would stop the bombing there could be a negotiation. And one of the

reasons we began the bombing was in order to persuade them to negotiate and then when they say they will negotiate if we stop the bombing refused to stop the bombing. I can understand that kind of a policy. Yet despite his desire for negotiations Goodwin warned once again that they were only part of a solution to the problem. Now while the negotiations themselves of course are an end of the war and as outlined I do know you never get to the end unless you begin to negotiate. Some critics of the American policy have suggested that we have avoided negotiations out of deference to the military leaders of South Vietnam who want a total victory a victory which would be won largely by American armed forces according to these critics. The administration is letting the government in Saigon have undue influence over American policy. Goodwin was skeptical of such charges. I don't see what their leverage is in forcing us to do things that we don't feel are in the

interest of the United States. I mean with a I don't think we have to do that and I think we can. Do what we feel we do and should always do what we think is in the interest of the United States. But a good one did recognize the possibility that the United States might let itself be pushed around. Goodwin was critical of the uncompromising position of the ruling military junta in Saigon but did not expect that the forthcoming national elections in South Vietnam would change the situation. He was confident that the hunter would ensure its own candidates victory. Well I think everybody who's looked at it several senators have made speeches about it. Cetera very. Skeptical about the forthcoming election. But it seems that in Vietnamese politics and even desire to begin discussions with the enemy is a disqualification not on the part of the people but on the part of the military who decides who can and cannot run it. Goodwin said the elections would be sort of a public relations charade on the part of South Vietnam and

the United States but he said I hope it could be more than that and I think it might bring in power a government that would have the top companies to begin to make its own effort toward peace. Despite his desire for negotiations and his objection to the cost of the war over such a prolonged period of time Goodwin recognizes that the situation will require many years to resolve. He favors the painstaking process of pacifying each village by sending in teams of experts to help the people as the best way of winning the war if necessary. But he still is disturbed at the slow rate of progress. A rate of progress is soft. In fact almost nonexistent but that doesn't seem to be any end of the tunnel. Goodwin is also disturbed by the size of the burden which the United States has taken upon itself the extent to which we are forced to deal with all the problems that arise from a war which was originally supposed to be fought by the South Vietnamese.

I don't see why the United States should bear all the burden the burden of fighting the burden of negotiating the burden of making the diplomatic decision for the people whose country we've come in there to defend. And bear so little of it even in terms of the fighting. The fighting is done not by the South Vietnamese soldiers but by the United States. This burden is costing the United States in direct outlays of manpower and money. But Goodwin also talked about another kind of cost of the war a cost of missed opportunities. We talk about the cost of the war it's not simply that and that more than 10000 American dead Americans over. Money but it's also been lost every schoolchild to urban areas to us long ghettoes to our pollution of our rivers all the things that we could have tackled and have had and I've been Vietnam. Nevertheless Goodwin does not think that this cost has generated substantial opposition to the current course of the war among most of the population nor does he think that the anti war and anti draft movements will have much effect.

I think on the whole most Americans who go into war feel that this is that if they're not fired up with enthusiasm for war I do feel that this is their duty and their obligation to the country and they do go. Freely and I don't think that has they're going to have very much of a political effect long run. I think that we've gone through many wars in this country and the one thing one of the obligations of citizenship it seems to me. Is to stare at. The picture of the situation created by the current American policy on Vietnam is a grim one. As Richard Goodwin sees it what does he think of the chances of President Johnson's changing the nation's policy. Tada for a man to say that he's been taking. A course that hasn't been correct over a three or four or five year period especially when it's been so costly. It's a very big man to admit that sort of thing. So I don't think anybody can predict what the president will deliver which of course he he will take I think before I think and hope

he'll take that course which is. Best for the country. Regardless of his political. Political consequences I think that course is to pursue. This to the harder negotiations to halt the escalation I mean and then to pursue a negotiation and do what needs to be done including stopping the bombing to achieve a negotiated peace. Otherwise I think we're in a very deep conflict for a long period of time. And a more dangerous one. This has been a Vietnam War report. This program was produced by Marvin M. Bauer. This is Jay Feldman speaking and inviting you to tune in next week at the same time for another Vietnam War report.