WGBH Roundtable; Chinas Asian Policy

WGBH roundtable presents a discussion of China's Asian policy panelists include Peter SH Tang professor of government Boston College and Mrs. Merrill Goldman instructor in far eastern history at Wellesley College a special interview recorded last week will open tonight's program. Henry Koren director of the office of Southeast Asian affairs U.S. Department of State speaks with tonight's moderator Dr. I'm Milton Sykes chairman of the Department of Politics and dean of undergraduate studies at Brandeis University and now Dr. Sykes. Mr. Corn. I wonder whether you would care to tell our listeners hard information there is that indicates the degree of Chinese control of the events in either South Vietnam a louse. And I think that's something that is very difficult to ascertain. There you know are behind a bamboo or whatever kind of curtain you want to call it. And the amount of hard information is extremely difficult to come by. There is no doubt however that the North Vietnamese and their present

activities both in Laos and Vietnam. Are responsive to the Chinese Communist whose aim has long been. The takeover by whatever means is the most. At hand. Of the entire peninsula of Southeast. Well there are some Americans who look at the situation in South Vietnam drawing a parallel with that in South Korea to the extent that they would advance the thesis that North Vietnam has been fighting for control in this area for its own reasons and that this represents their effort. In which they have successfully managed to get support from both the Russians and the Chinese as time's gone by and that neither of these two great states really determines for them their particular policy with respect to South Vietnam. Could you comment on that. Well I think that's quite true there's been a balance out how noise

between the. Influences from Moscow and influences from Peking. But we must remember that. Moscow I was I was a miles away from the noise whereas Peking. And China is right on the border of North Vietnam and therefore despite what the North Vietnamese may feel or may wish they cannot help but be influenced by this tremendous force on their northern border. And whether. A man desires to play a middle role or not and no matter what the historical dislike of China by the Vietnamese either north or south he cannot escape for one minute the tremendous military force and even just the force of population of seven hundred fifty odd million which weighs on him and presses down from the north.

The financing of North Vietnam economy for some period of time has been made possible in part by the shipments of materials from Eastern Europe and since the Eastern European states have lined up with Moscow primarily in the Sino-Soviet split situation. Has there been any diminution of such material aid trade and so on from Eastern European states to North Hanoi or does that still constitute some form of leverage for the communist bloc that does not favor Sino and aside Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia. Well I think there is definitely a diminution. The one stock that we might cite is that some of the weapons that have been captured recently from the Vietcong and their activities and South Vietnam have been of Chinese origin before. They have been. Of Czech or other

European satellite and so whereas it's very difficult to document I would say that it's not you propose is probably correct that there has been a diminution. Since you mention the question of materiel before the South Vietnamese could I call your attention to the New York Times which indicated in some material that it contained that the largest portion of the weapons which the South Vietnamese pro communist forces of communist forces were using were homemade and ware not homemade represented on a bad basis capture of materiel and equipment of American make. There was no reference in those articles to material such as that you mention. Do you have any sense of the relative value or weight of this material material equipment for the South Vietnamese is it captured American equipment or homemade equipment. Or does this type of clipping that you're referring to play an

important role. Well it's a combination of all three I would say that the probably and I would be making an estimate without too much fact to go on. The majority of the weaponry. Is either homemade or captured U.S. material we must remember that U.S. materiel has been in Vietnam both in the north and in the South during our support of the French. Fighting from 19 50 to 54. And there's a vast amount of U.S. equipment there. There's also the equipment that we have been. Sending to South Vietnam. And it's inevitable that a lot of that has been captured at the present time however I might say that the amount of weapon losses on the part of the South Vietnamese forces is showing a healthy diminution.

At this point. I'd like to pursue the Chinese Communist situation in the light of what is sometimes called the domino theory with respect to Southeast Asia. The argument is made that the loss of South Vietnam would in some way outflank certain of the other areas in Southeast Asia which have a strategic gain for the Chinese communists. And I wondered whether you'd care to comment on this because sometimes the average American citizen when he looks at the map wonders how one can speak of this territory in that context given the fact that the Chinese communists control so much of the mainland then they already from that viewpoint are on the flanks of both the Philippines and Indonesia for example. Well I think the look at the map will show that the so-called domino theory that you mention has great validity as a matter of fact if you recall. Just the other day President Kennedy was asked this question and

the interview by Huntley and Brinkley. Most recently in Brinkley and. He said he believed in the theory. I think it's the weight of evidence is. Just that if you look at a map you'll see that louse points a finger. Down through. Southeast Asia. It has a thousand mile border with Thailand and it has several hundred. Miles with Cambodia Laos. The hands are under the control of the communists would definitely. Put the communist menace directly on the tie and the Cambodian borders and it would be a very difficult pressure to resist. Similarly South Vietnam even though it has a long coastline it still has a border both with Laos and with Cambodia and South Vietnam

in the hands of the Chinese Communists would turn the flying again of Thailand which is in a sense the bastion of the free world in Southeast Asia. Similarly you could go look. West would into Burma and Burma. In the hands of the Chinese Communists would again. Exert pressure on Thailand with which it has a very long border. So all these states although they are politically separate and historically very much sometimes in dispute one with another in this strategic sense are very cohesive. And what happens to one is bound to affect whatever happens. The others I notice that you use the phrase free world and the phrase free people sometimes use referring to South Vietnam into Thailand. However this contradicts what is I would guess the image of many Americans who look

at both of these areas and regard them as being under with our Terry and if not repressive regimes. And I wonder what sense you use the word free people of free world in that context. Well I think one very simple way to define it is they're not. Dominated by communism and. Although they may not in the strict Jeffersonian sense be free they are still much more free than they ever would be under communist domination. If I may I'd like to refer to some remarks that you made at the recent New England conference by the State Department in which you referred to some of the troubles were having in South Vietnam and commenting on President Roh. You said that he was responsible for pulling South Vietnam together and giving it political cohesiveness. In what sense can it mean this. If one were to

relate the current difficulties with respect to Buddhists and students to his previous policies what do you believe that this represents a distinct movement away from a previous policy so that he can no longer be characterized as somebody who is pulling South Vietnam together and giving it political he's this. Well I think when you look back at what the situation was in South Vietnam after. The separation between the north and the south. You're recall what. Chaos there was in a country where there was various sects fighting each other for ascendancy and there was no central government which had any type of effective control over the entire area. This. Was able to do. He did make a state of the Republic of Vietnam and

the difficulty now is whether the measures of his government is taken. Is going to do. How badly these measures are going to affect whatever political cohesiveness and I think there was a considerable amount. Of. What effect these measures may have on that whether the country will. Remain. A unit or whether it will again break a break down and. Split into various factions. I wonder if I might ask you a final question which is rather difficult one. There were reports to the effect that in an effort to meet the criticisms the United States and the pressure from the United States and go didn't you indicated that he was prepared to have a solution that is called neutralised by and saw himself in a relationship with communist North Vietnam where he even went so far as to

say he could triumph politically over men in terms of some relationship between a neutralize South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Reason I ask this question is because it creates some question in the minds of many Americans who have a strong anti-communist stand about the nature of the leadership in South Vietnam which is prepared even though in blackmail terms as it seemed to be the case to oppose the United States initiatives to change their government by such drastic action as neutralization plus some relationship with the man. Well I don't know that nobody knew who would. Actually carry out such a threat. And whether he would be able. And if you really believe that. He could make an agreement whereby. North and the South were combined. And neutralized. I think that we must admit that nobody knew it is primarily

a nationalist if he. Is one of those who feels that. He. Can take on the weight of communism and. Gain ascendancy over it in. A number of others have thought they could do that with rather disastrous results. And I think it would be. A very. Difficult thing to predict that he and his position could carry it off. Well I want to thank you Mr. Gore for a very informative. Addition to by way of extension to some of your remarks at the New England conference and gives us the opportunity subsequently to take up some of the views that you've expressed as a base for further discussion here in the New England area. Thank you. At this moment I think it is time to take up for further discussion some of the views that Mr Korn advanced with me in the studio are Mrs. Merrill Goldman

instructor in far eastern history at Wellesley College and Professor Peter SH tang of the government department at Boston College. And I'd like to get right into our subject by restating the first proposition that Mr. Currin advanced that there was no doubt that North Vietnam is responsible to the Chinese communists. He then hedged a little bit by saying there was a balance of Hanoi. But despite what they feel they cannot help be influenced. In his speech he said that the shots are called at papering for Southeast Asia. And I'd like to begin by asking Mrs. Goldman whether she feels that the circumstances of the relationship between the Chinese Communists and the dissident movements in Southeast Asia are of such a nature that the Peking regime calls the shots in Southeast Asia. Well I don't know if I'd go along with Mr. Carney by saying that the shots are called backpacking in Southeast Asia. I believe that in North

Vietnam the shots are called by the Soviet Union and also called by the North Vietnamese themselves. And in Laos I believe the shots are also called by the Soviet Union. Though I think that Communist China has a little more influence more recently and also the shots in Laos are caught are called by North Vietnam. Now when it comes to the communist parties in Southeast Asia I would say that here perhaps communist China exerts more influence as opposed for instance to the Soviet Union. This isn't of course true in India but it is true I think in Burma and it is true I think in Indonesia. Would you care to comment. So far in the direction of the communist parties are concerned. Of course both the Miss or you winning and Communist China or the have a certain influence

on each of the communist parties in Southeast Asia. As you know the Chinese Communists have repeated and they emphasized the very important theme of national liberation movement and the various Communist Party is in Solti's Asia are actually the vanguard of such a moment. This is a somewhat different from of the Soviet theme that the Chinese Communists have practically replaced the International Communist moment by the National Liberation Movement. In fact the National Liberation Movement might very well be an integral part of the International Communist moment and the various communist parties or act as the nucleus of these organized efforts. I think for the various Communist Party of Asia

I mean the producer has been trying to say Oh of course the Chinese Communists have exerted their considerable influence. So you know you're not a specialty of the Communist Party all for the former. You know China was actually for instance organized youth organization in the South China and then also as a party in Hong Kong and himself or worked very closely with the Chinese Communists as well as the Chinese and I you know this and the long history of the party of course the renamed the Labor Party. It has been a closely linked with the Chinese Communist movement and the whole thing is our work under the Soviet

advisor to China long ago. So here for instance if we want to go into the present the relationship again I don't think that the North Korean armies or they have too much to fear you know regard to the Chinese Communist ambitions because after all what the Chinese communists want is not necessarily a kind of acquisition of territory or exertion of extra influence but its advancement of national liberation movement which in the US would like to have fun for themselves. Well I think there's a little problem you posed in some sense and perhaps it's my way of stating the question it makes for the difficulty when Mr. Currin said that the shots are cooled and he means that the country's direction in terms of strategy and objectives are really decided in Peking. Now

I wouldn't dispute for a moment the history that you present relations between communist movements in Southeast Asia to either Peking or the Soviet Union. But it does as a matter of. Concrete policy make a great deal of difference as to who they are responsive to and what in fact they are doing in terms of solving local situations. Perhaps I might put it this way. It is often stated that the Chinese communists are militantly aggressive today. In fact Mr. Currin in his speech said that the credo of the Chinese Communists is to be militant aggressive and this is translated over into the image that Americans have. Chinese Communist policy is this in fact the behavior of the Chinese Communists in this area. Or are these indigenous Communist movements with valid support from Moscow. A vow I would support from Peking which are developing their own strategy and tactics and their own national objectives.

And is this national liberation movement that you speak about then really a solution for the local population because if it is that in those terms it makes a good deal of difference as to what kind of response American foreign policy would make. Would you care to comment please. Oh what I meant by a national liberation moment. Of course it's a term used by the Communists and it's for instance coined for the U.S. in various economist documents and as you say it. For instance in regard to the Chinese Communist appearance as aggressive and mid-end I would say that all the communist parties are minute end and they are all aggressive. If it's I mean Observateur from our point of view and of course the communists the war turned the table Iran would be to the other side to refer to the Western policies as aggressive. For this reason they have given support to two of the swordsmen armies. So you

know they are the sole cause of the National Liberation Front delegation of sorts which he has been visiting in China for some time and the man himself received the delegation and for that purpose morsel issued a statement in support for the source against the so-called wastes and on Dindin for instance. Question. So far it has made it and it's a very unnecessary kind of element for all the communists to operate so far as the national liberation movement is concerned of course that this is not necessary to apply to and to the entire population. It's a for the communists to guide their action. The national liberation movement is to fight the Western influence especially to get rid of the United States

influence and they want to also get rid of the United States allies which they're looked upon like case or points running dogs. If we should follow this up further. Actually the North Vietnamese interest at present can only be expressed or only be demonstrated by their I mean leaders or rulers in the party and in the party or the Wellcome. Of course the ADA from both Moscow and the peak in evident in their Moscow and Peking have for taking a kind of different roles or picking the respective points and separation of responsibility or division of labor. So for this for this purpose possibly Moscow I mean the picking would have much more to do you know regard

to the present North Vietnamese struggle. Mr. Tang I'd like to ask you you said they have taken Moscow unpicking have made have a division of labor between them. Do you mean this in competition in these communist parties in Southeast Asia in other words do you think there is they've decided on a division of responsibility or are they competing for influence and the communist parties in Southeast Asia. I think it wanted to follow the logic of international commerce the movement. I think there is a likelihood that there could be a division of labor between the two parties. The Soviet and the Chinese because after all phases of study mention the long term goal that the communist revolution or communist revolutions could be divided into two factions two phases or two. Kind one for instance on the car I followed in

the pattern all for the school year or Russian Revolution. The other would be a kind of a revolution which is represented by the Chinese. In other words. A kind of revolution might be a more visible in their more advanced countries. And the other kind will be more visible in the and the developed countries so for this reason I mean the four part girl convenience you might say that there is a possibility of division of labor as they should. This will be the party no one has to deal with and the leaders of the free word especially in the United States and there they have the two I mean more emphatically the so-called peaceful coexistence. Why the Chinese communists. I mean they're also accept these same things these peaceful coexistence but they do not want to make the peaceful coexistence. The general line of the foreign policy of

all communist countries. Because they don't want to have a peaceful co-existence to replace the other elements of the relationship between the communist countries especially mutual assistance along the line all for proletarian internationalism and also the aid getting to the and the developed countries for the purpose of a national liberation movement. I think you are presenting a very interesting view. First time I would like to point out that there are really serious differences of opinion with the position that you expressed. For example in a recent study the Brookings Institution by Oliver club Jr. of the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc in Southeast Asia. There's an interesting paragraph which reads as follows. In 1060 communist China accordingly proposed the reversion to the usual G line of one hundred forty nine G's a prominent communist irritation in China that national liberation struggles after the Chinese model should be supported elsewhere in

Asia. In effect this would mean concentration of Soviet economic systems not on Bush one nationalist countries such as India Indonesia and Afghanistan but on China. Back to economically and militarily by the Soviet Union communist China would logically spearhead the national liberation movement in Asia the gains would fall to China. It was not a global strategy but rather a design to harness Soviet power to a Chinese effort to restore their ancient empire in Asia. And of course Mr club then goes on to say that the Chinese Communist line was not only detrimental to Soviet global strategy and their position within the Communist bloc but has little promise and was heavy with risk. I think that a good many people would tend today to agree with this estimate. In view of the shop division in the Sino-Soviet bloc over just precisely this point he goes on to say and this is the thing that I was trying to get at that communist China none of us displayed an increased aggressiveness particularly in the Himalayan region. And he goes on to discuss Tibet and the reaction to

the dock seizure power and so on so that it's in this sense that for example I'm quite sure that Mr. Currin talks about the Chinese Communist as being militant aggressive in their foreign policy as against let's say the Russians who are after all now negotiating with us to sign some kind of test ban treaty and who are. In the stages of some effort to work out another version of peaceful coexistence all of these really facets of the same mind in the sense that we have two horses in tandem here or are these policies which come in conflict with each other. Would you care to comment. Well I would tend to agree with you on this point Mr. Sachs. It seems to me that in light of the recent conflict between the Soviet Union and China in so many areas that would be difficult for me to believe that at this point they are sharing the

responsibilities or dividing up the communist parties in Southeast Asia. Along any organized lines in my impression in looking at this area is that there is a very fierce competition between them at this point and that their whole idea of the role of the Communist Party in this area is totally different. Where as the Soviet Union wants to the communist party to gain control by. Parliamentary of possible peaceful means the communist Chinese are advocating other more revolutionary means. So I find it difficult to go along with your idea that there is a division of responsibility between these two. I agree with you too that there is the possibility of competition between the Soviet party and the Chinese party in the activities of the leadership in Seoul to East Asia. I think the in fact they saw that a party had brought this up in the July 14 the open letter to all of the various a party organizations and the

member of the membership at large of the Soviet party. The Chinese party wanted to use the so-called national liberation movement and to use themselves as a kind of voice. The amazing guy the main guidance for the other parties in order to gain leadership from the Soviet party. So there is a possibility but I mentioned up the possible division of labor. There is also some reason behind it because of choices. If there's no competition then of course there is logic division of labor between the various communist parties especially the leading ones. Says a while talking up the possible competition and also the Soviet at the mission all for the existence of such a competition. We might

also try to see just what would that make them compete or where that least competition will go on planes I can give you at your best creation. This would probably be based on their reaction all of the various communist parties in regard to the test ban treaty new test ban treaty a worse Congress in Moscow on the 5th of the on the 5th of August the 5th and at the same time of course they will open for the kind of signature for the various countries including the communist countries but they're not being manned for instance rejected the treaty and then they follow the same kind of thinking of the Chinese communists. Consider this treaty it was that we meant to peace rather than a step toward peace. Just like the most Koreans. So whether the Chinese party is afraid of

the Chinese Communist forces to the north or whether this is the kind of reasoning based on their interest and their own conviction then of course it's an interesting question to trace. But so far science stand I think the Chinese Communists probably do not want to use this tool called the Great Nation chauvinism to dominate North Korea Viet Nam but rather forces or try to claim to defend so-called Marxism Leninism by friends rigorously. I've also in the course of a struggle against terrorism. Well I might take a minute now for a break too when you know it's that those of our listeners were just joining us that we're conducting a discussion on communist Chinese policy in Asia. And with us this

evening is Merrill Goldman a structure of far eastern history at Wellesley College. And Professor Peter SH tiring of the Government Department Boston College. Your moderator is dean of undergraduate studies arm and sacks of Brandeis University. Perhaps we might make this discussion a bit more. Precise by taking a specific case study it is alleged that the Chinese communists in their militant aggression have engaged in major operations with respect to India and that the actions in Tibet and the actions in the dock region where some 12000 miles of territory square miles territory which the Indian government claims is in the end have been seized by the Chinese communists. Would you characterize this seizure of this territory and this behavior in Tibet as an example of militantly aggressive policy on the part of the Chinese communists in their

conduct of affairs in Asia. GOLDMAN Well if we had to call the Chinese communist militant way aggressive I would say of all the areas where they were in danger perhaps they would be most aggressive in India. My impression of the events in 1962 which was sort of which brought brought the conflict into open was that the Chinese had built a road in the dock connecting Tibet with Singh Yang and that they had gone out to defend the territory in which the road was built and after the Indians responded the conflict broke out. So I think it is in this area in India where I would say that the Chinese communists are most aggressive. Would you care to comment on your regard to the Sino-Soviet the conflict over the front here ending conflict.

Rather it is also a Sino-Soviet since the Russians are giving aid to India. This is very interesting of course but I would not say right away that at least it is kind of a manifestation of the Chinese aggression. Because if you will for instance ask the question to any of the Chinese I mean Chinese or Russian nationalists communist Chinese they would say that these front Hiers were actually with the Chinese for. Over a century at least. And I can submit to you that these frontiers are also acknowledged by the Soviet Union because in the Soviet and US I can refer to you my own book and there's a footnote there which mentioned that they put in the maps in their 1959 solve it at mess Mira. So we're nice published by the US saw a

ministry of the Internet fails Ministry of the interior and in 1960 for instance all refer to the same Chinese source and used the Chinese as the stand at the source and they in fact they have the region and the port involved doggle the military highway you mentioned postural and that's the Ching area this is all included in the Chinese territory of course. It's Mog that with the dotted lines that is also in line with the Chinese approach. So here for instance I might say that I mean you regard to the sino Indian conflict. India is just probably as much responsible as the Chinese Communists because the Chinese

Communists for instance have a credit there a well you know regard to the front DIA or Saddam and with their poor and with Burma the agreement with the Burma nine thousand six they actually have ceded to Burma manage areas which the Chinese tradition of the consular of Europe India. That's right and these are areas where even the Chinese also wrestle with no such just a simple but in that that's true about Burma I would agree with you there but I think the Chinese have are more aggressive when it comes to India and I would like to ask you another question if you say that the Russians recognize these borders. How do you explain the Russian support of India in this conflict. All the Russians support the. Given to India of course is a pro-reg duty to the consideration that if there were larger to make the so called International United Front work better there would

the shore to the west that they are not particularly in favor of the Chinese method and action. In fact said the Chinese genius also points to the Soviet interest because after all they submitted to Mr. Hi a way laid two of the Soviet Central Asian republics and it more or less in and Yan frenzy. But if it is beneficial then how can you explain the obvious support. Yes of course you know. It. It's a not too hard problem to think that the Soviets do not mind too much about the what has already been protected and the Chinese Communists of course in this regard are not very happy with this story as they have accused the Soviets for allying with the

West and also ally with the so-called Indian reactionaries in fighting or in this struggle against the Chinese Commies. When I went I wonder if I might interject here. I notice that you specified that after all the roads which are in these areas do go to a certain Central Asian areas which are joint border areas between the Soviet Union and Communist China and I suppose in terms of our discussion of communist Chinese policy in Asia this is part of Asia too. Would you care to comment on the news reports which seem to indicate that the Chinese Communists had a complaint against their Soviet friends with respect to these border peoples and accused the Soviet Union of aggressive acts towards China by stimulating these border peoples to revolt. This the road then would somewhat pale into insignificance wouldn't you say. That is true I fully agree with you know this was a

what I said the benefit to the Soviet Union. In regard to the military highway. That is a base down in normal conditions. I mean normal logical consideration. But right now I think it's hard to imagine how the Soviets could act that aware in regard to the Sino-Soviet the border itself. Usually the Sino-Soviet border should be regarded as the rear or the back yard of the two communist Giants. There should be no trouble at all. But right now the Chinese Commies brought up the instance of which Not at present but for the last year and also these sort of years and the Chinese Communists accuse each other in regard to the treatment given to their respective citizens. Even along the trans Mongolian railway the

Moscow and Peking I think also we cannot exclude all the possibilities that the Soviets do for instance beyond the normal means. The Chinese communist might also react in the same way. It's rather strange that they should such and such a fashion. But of course these occurred. This has to be taken into consideration I think. We can try to trace just go where the one side is correct the other side is not getting back to the in the dispute between India and China. Could it be that the Chinese started this dispute in part to show the Russians. Perhaps they resented the Russians giving so much aid to India and they wanted Russia to come out and say whether they had to back one side or the other and that this dispute gave them this point and sort of it was made with making the Soviet Union

two sides at this point. Not necessarily I think they saw me as a poison in 1959 the monster that they added to it. They have graded the for the old currency of the sino Indian dispute. And they're now the hope that this could be a Sutter. I make a bully but I think what they saw have really gone out of the too far the Chinese Communists of course could not justify the assaulted action with the so called the proto tiring internationalism by which stand out and the Chinese saw vs. Sure the problem when the back up communist China instead of India. And this all of us not only. Have given the Indians the kind of war more support but also given I mean given the Indians made it their weapons

even over two planes and build factories for the Indian honoree this is of course what you would have the Chinese communist anymore. It's quite clear that this is a fairly complicated situation and that the issue of militant aggressiveness certainly has been challenged in some measure by what Professor Tang has said. Suppose we move to another area as a case in point and try to characterize communist Chinese policy. Let us say Thailand for a moment particularly in view of statements such as the following that in 1953 it referring to communist China established a type of autonomous region and then where there are several hundred thousand ties the region became the headquarters for the Peking supported free time movement led by the exiled Tory leader. Pretty fun I'm young through the Thai communist party composed entirely of Chinese Peking has gained considerable influence in Thailand's labor unions and Chinese schools and the Chinese press.

Chinese obvious target is the loyalty of Thailand's economically powerful Chinese minority numbering 3 million of Thailand's 26 million population an emergency that minority could play a destructive economic role. But as a natural enemy of time nationalism its revolutionary potential is greatly limited. Now is this sponsorship aid significant threat to Thailand and does it represent from the viewpoint of our discussion a major facet of Chinese Communist policy at the present time in this area. Would you care to comment the first time. As you just all aligned. It's true that the Chinese Communists have radio to do in pan and when I visit the pan in the 1960 I interviewed them many of the overseas Chinese there as you said there are about three million strong and they have found the fortunes many a science of worthless Chinese overseas

Chinese themselves because many alpha children were brought to communist China for education training and so on and they could either to go to Singapore from there get to the man and so this kind of topic has been going on for some time and the overseas Chinese would be very much concerned about this kind of development. The Chinese communist government is interested in the advancement the awful calmest moment in pan and just they are interested of Osmund of the calmest moment else well in Seoul these days and probably even beyond Southeast Asia. So the Chinese Communists or doesn't they make use of the overseas Chinese instrument in order to advance the cause they represent. There's no

doubt about that. I think here of course we are facing such a situation. We have to face similar in many other parts of the Southeast Asian area especially for a new state of Malaysia. My friends probably take this up later. Well I think that since most of our listeners are probably aware of the news dispatches which have appeared indicating that there is a clear effort on the part of the Chinese communist to affect the Singapore component which is predominately chinese of the new Malaysian Republic that there is a possibility here of Chinese Communist leverage. I'd rather turn to sort of the bigger picture in a sense. Suppose you have to look at the general policy of communist China over this past decade. And consider the fact that we have in one way or another negotiated with them. We don't recognize them at Geneva

and we've negotiated with them both with both respect to the Laotian and the Korean situations that we have worked out an uneasy truce in Laos and we have perhaps a less uneasy truce in Korea given the stability of the South Korean government. How would you tend to characterize the communist Chinese Communist willingness to engage in that kind of diplomatic negotiation to end military conflicts in the Asian area. What do you suppose pushes them to suspend military hostilities rather than to continue. Would you care to comment. That Dead Silence is golden. Taking a little bit back my question if you feel if the Chinese communists really want to push to the point of war with the United States and direct confrontation militarily.

Well you phrased it better. I feel that I don't feel they do want to push to the point of war at all I feel that up till 19. Oh I would say about nine hundred sixty one I think on the whole they sort of except for the Korean War of course they've sort of withdrawn I don't feel that they have been that much engaged with foreign in foreign affairs or external affairs I think that after 1961 there's been a sudden burst of activity in this area they Chinese have become come in conflict with the Soviet Union the Chinese have tried to exert their influence and the Communist movements in Southeast Asia the Chinese are trying to exert their influence in the underdeveloped areas in Africa and in Latin America. And this might be due in part to their conflict with the Soviet Union. It also might be due in part to the fact that their internal problems are such that they want to distract their population and give more attention so they can divert themselves more with their external affairs. But I feel that up to this point that the

Chinese have been very reluctant to engage in any external activities outside of their own immediate region. How do you you. Yes I think I for I agree with you or that the Chinese Communists will not try friends in the year ahead of the United States to the point of war because of the Chinese communists. As you know are not well prepared militarily. And they have or that pays the friends of the United States in Korea and I actually it this was not to their liking and they were actually there drafted for that job by their Soviet comrades almost at their own infancy so can it make them a little more explicit. You say the they were drafted by the government. I mean actually points of the invasion were all for North Korea South Korea by in North Korea was a program

precipitated the Soviet moves. But the Chinese Communist or Korean forces in October after almost four months of fighting. This was actually probably read to the weakness of the Soviets themselves since the Soviets were willing to supply the Chinese Communists with arms and actually the Chinese Communist armies already and they're very poorly equipped and they were much better after a war. So the Chinese Communist army is in Korea since I had the chance interview some of the W's. They were actually composed all full for his many of their former nationalist units so all the Chinese communists and there

felt that they could spell them without too much consideration. But it would be kind of hard to bring the Chinese economic resources and the Chinese Communists in everything in their will to try to stimulate all kinds of a revolutionary movement which might be allayed by the communists in Saul's East Asia as a part of the overall national liberation movement following the Armada. But there will not have to resort to con the full full fledged war against the United States that will be very stupid to do so. Because all of the all the problems sought by the experience in guerrilla warfare at least in the national liberation struggle could reach eventually without that

kind of a full scale war. Major poll I'd like to say a few words here about Chinese foreign policy it seems to me that the Chinese have certainly been influenced by Marx and Marxism Leninism and so forth but I feel that the traditional history of China also has a bearing on their foreign policy in Asia I think that to a certain extent the Chinese still see themselves at this as a center of this area and they still feel that they want to exert their influence over this this area and perhaps as they had done before the modern period. And this doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to conquer this area geographically. But I do feel that they want to have a predominant influence within the area of Southeast Asia and even in the areas bordering India. It's true that the Chinese communists are influenced by their past. He's straight to a certain degree. Although they are communists

themselves but of course all we have to differentiate this kind of experience of from what we ordinarily and the Stan and the Chinese Communists probably are influenced in such a is such a sense that they will try to buy a responsibility there rather than to exercise that kind of authority or rise over this area. The previous Chinese communist empire building is not the based on the same concept as in the West. I think by that I mean why isn't the Chinese concept or how for such a five nations in which the large or big country where they have full service to render to their small neighbors rather than to for instance impose rule or control over them. But again points this is a contemporary era and this is a kind of struggle we face between the

communist forces and forces all for democracy. So here. The Chinese Communists or the tried to put communism a first of their national aspiration next their national. Probably it would be used only to promote or advance communism rather than to be exploited at the expense of international commerce movement. Well I think that Professor Tang has introduced a very controversial issue in reply to Mrs Goldman. The issue of which takes precedence Chinese national interest or historic interest expresses national interest and Marxism Leninism as a guiding revolutionary philosophy which itself imposes certain kinds of activity on the Chinese Communists is very much disputed one among specialists who deal with communist China and one might say that this is the main guessing game for the Chinese side doctors

as opposed to the criminologists who try to figure out what it is that lies the base of Russian policy. I think by way of summation I would like to say something to our listeners. Since moderate moderating a program of this kind imposes certain restraints on the moderator and at the same time affords him the opportunity to be judicious without taking sides. The advantage of discussion of this kind should make itself clear to our listeners in the sense that contrary to the stereotypes which we are so much want to fall victim to in American life the picture yesterday of China our friend the picture today of China our enemy the picture of aggressive militancy on the part of Peking as opposed to the notion that the Chinese communists do not want to risk war. The image of a Chinese communist power which is a prepared to

negotiate borders settlements which do meet with approval on the part of other Chinese professor Tang pointed out these represent differences of opinion about the behavior of a great state with which we are in clear terms locked in mortal combat today. We have our own soldiers facing them in two separate and distinct areas. We have I should say in one area but in the second area certainly by proxy we face them across truce lines and I would like to suggest that the riddle of Chinese Communist policy is something that thinking Americans ought to pay some attention to in an effort to clarify for themselves what appropriate American responses are. And I would like to leave you with that thought that it's not as simple as it may seem from reading today's headlines. Thank you and goodnight. You've been listening to WGBH roundtable with China's Asian policy panelists

included Peter SH Tung professor of government Boston College and Mrs. Merrill Goldman instructor in far eastern history at Wellesley College a special feature interview with Henry Coren director of the office of Southeast Asian affairs the U.S. Department of State was included in the program. Tonight's moderator was Dr. eye Milton Sikes associate professor at the Department of Politics and the dean of undergraduate studies at Brandeis University. This is the educational radio network. This is the BBC that I

am that the BBC. Let the. Exemption form. Many of the way Kleiman said that apply to public companies and these companies were meant to be designed for essentially for family and independently of the committee which consisted of judges and professors and practicing lawyers and economists. I found that this type of enterprise design for a small family of concern tended to be abuse because as I mentioned quite often companies re-established it private ones tend to be as family concerns and then converted into public companies just before issuing a prospectus

inviting subscriptions of coffee and subscription prospectus interest such as an object of certain provisions of common law forward and also the company but it is very hear this one commentator for example says it doubts very much better it is wise to to come back to one form of company which the Committee proposes should be long that has a minimum of two members and two directors for those for the giant public enterprise and for this small private enterprise and I think that if I personally would tend to agree visit and I think that to have something like all countries namely a special limited liability company side by side. I've seen this edge of public companies are very good very good person frequently thank you very much for coming here.

Well we're going to be serving coffee on the right of the room but I feel right there having more formal more pleasant people will be around for a while that you can part with. We're going to try to get to the schedule so we'll try to start the next meal is likely.