The First Amendment; Stanley Hoffmann

The First Amendment and a free people weekly examination of civil liberties in the media in the 1970s produced by WGBH radio Boston in cooperation with the Institute for democratic communication at Boston University. The host of the program is the institute's director Dr. Bernard Reuben. Where are we going in this world today. I am happy to help have help answer that question. Professor Stanley Hoffman professor of Government at Harvard University whose new book primacy or World Order has just been published by McGraw-Hill Book Company Stanley Hawkins professor of Government at Harvard and chairman of the Harvard Center for European Studies and also professor at the Harvard Center for International Affairs He's written many books including contemporary theory and international relations the state of war and got of his troubles the setting of American foreign policy. He has also edited other books. He is a doctorate in law from the University of

Paris where he did research at the foundation us you know all day. See also politic. Stanley Hoffman I find your book tremendously intriguing. Because while it's called primacy or World Order you don't present the plan for a new world order or reject primacy just out of hand. But what you do is give us the dilemmas. What would you call the essential dilemma that we're facing as we look upon the new system of national international interaction. I think the main dilemma is a conflict between what one might call it Russia no requirements for solving a number of very important global issues. To mention just one one could mention nuclear proliferation and the fact that this remains a world divided into something like a hundred and fifty Nations if incidentally there are other actors Dunder nations which complicated matters multinational

corporations for instance. And there isn't the slightest trace of a consensus on anything among those hundred and fifty nations plus the other actors so that there is a kind of maddening contradiction between. The global scope of most of the issues we deal with and the very traditional and fragmented and competitive conflicting way in which we go about in the dark trying to cope with those problems. Now one of the things you point out is that we've had various stages of international arrangements one stage we've just been through which is the Kissinger stage of confrontation and and representing power in a certain way. And prior to that we were we were more certain as to where we were in the US. And now we're uncertain about philosophy we're uncertain about values and economics. And suppose I read one sentence of yours starting with philosophy and I ask you to explain a little more about it.

You write philosophical isolation threatens elsewhere. First it has to do with the spread of tyrannical regimes in the world the mutilation of human rights the stifling of dissent. Yes I was you know I think. Arguing against what had been written a couple of years ago by one of my former colleagues who has since then like Henry Kissinger become a household word to me as being a skee who had written an essay who was the United States risk being isolated in the world because it didn't pay sufficient attention to the demand of other nations for equality and he was suggesting that the United States which has always stood for freedom didn't really grasp the importance of the demand for equality.

And that struck me as a not very convincing argument for all kinds of reasons which developed here and it seems to me that if one talks of American isolation I would rather see it in terms of. How should one put to the loneliness of democracy. The fact of the very small number of states in the world in which most regimes are not democracies in which in fact most regimes are also you know totally human rights and that that was more of an issue would seem to me than the somewhat debatable point about America's incapacity to understand equality. As a European I was always taught that the one country that stood for equality was the United States. Needless to say there are different kinds of equality but I don't think that an Indian in Egyptian or to anybody who comes from a hawk a lot of additional society. The

problem is America is that Americans do not understand equality and that was the argument I was talking to one of the problems is and stop me if I misinterpret what you meant. One of the problems that you point out is that our value system is distinct and different and isolated from the rest well and it may not be applicable to other problems. Would you go on a little without Yes I think this is one of the problems and this is one of the problems which have been plaguing and will probably continue to plague the attempt at having an official human rights policy which is in a temper which I sympathise in for all kinds of reasons some of purely philosophical Some indeed political. But it is impossible not to see that for many of the other governments in the world human rights policy by the United States means inevitably an American attempt to have American value or specifically democratic Western values spread all over the map.

And since their traditions are different their regimes are different. They're very unlikely to go along with it. And yet you point out I think one portion of the book that there has been genocide. Yes that has been ignored by the holders of say nice high values. Why is it that it's so in politic for us to be forceful when whole populations are being wiped out. Well I think that a number of reasons for this reasons I'm not saying excuses but reasons One is that quite traditionally in international law and international politics a distinction has been made between how governments behave toward one another and how governments treat their own citizens who are always seen as expendable. The other reason of course and this is again something which plagues our human rights policy is that in almost every instance. Our human rights concern collides with a strategic of any economic or political interest which leads us to close

our eyes are the most blatant example was the Bangladesh affair in 1971 it was very clear that what the Pakistanis was doing was genocide on a large scale for 11 months or more exactly. And yet the United States closed its eyes partly because it did not want to strengthen India and Bulkley because at the time leader of Pakistan was serving as an intermediary between us and the government of China. Now you can. Yes. So we didn't want to do anything that could upset that particularly delicate piece of diplomacy in addition to not doing anything. Positive nature we did very negative things for example in that day wasn't it. Kissinger Nixon policy to send gunboat diplomacy into the Indian Ocean in alleged support of Pakistan. Yes it was a perfectly. It was not only debatable morally it was also perfectly silly because by the time that fleet came everything that could have been accomplished by

India and by the population of Bangladesh had already been accomplished so it really was totally full of gunboat diplomacy. Now in addition if you follow the what I would call the halfman thesis of recognizing what the economic order is and recognizing its fluidity of that we should have a one in the same time perhaps been an influence in regard to ending the genocide there and secondly recognize that India was probably the main Yazid of our interest. Yes we have recognised but we had very bad relations with India. Nobody was trying to say two things which are indeed in contradiction but both need to be said one is that it is necessary at this point to think about global problems in global terms rather than in nationalistic. For all kinds of reasons some of a obviously what if everybody thinks in nationalistic you're going to have

a hell of a mess. Some reasons are equally important but less obvious and it is this kind of fragmentation of power which makes everybody's power completely mixed up with other nations. But at the same time one has to realize that the obstacles to any kind of global of rational solution are enormous precisely because there are very few universal values and the only hope that I can see is to build on the very few. Universal values that do exist and one is a very universal desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust and it alone is the universal desire for economic welfare. And it seems to me that these are two weak reads but it only reads we have and that they have to be exploited developed strengths and protected because that is only universal values the political values are not universal on the values of western democracy. Obviously

not prevalent in Uganda. Let us say our conception of freedom is obviously not the same as that of the Soviet Union. And yet we have to find a modus vivendi even with people with whom we do not agree. In finding this way of living together. Is it possible that we could lean over so far that we would not recognize that we would be tearing down the underpinnings of this fragile thing called democracy which is a minority form of government everywhere in the world and it could disappear if we went too far. Of course and I'm not suggesting that we should compromise in any way through foreign affairs. Some of our basic institutions I do not think for instance that negotiating a new international economic D2 entails accepting. And as I and Mr. resolution state it's limitations to freedom of the press censorship or anything of that sort. So I would

not go that far still it seems to me that if one looks at the American experience the danger of the United States pushing the spirit of compromise with others so far as to undermine its institutions is a much lesser danger than the danger of the traditional. True approach to international politics. I'm stronger I'm better and therefore I'll teach you. Of the two burials. Excessive desire for compromise and excessive toughness. It's the second one which strikes me as more characteristic of American diplomacy in the past. Stanley Hoffman I have a problem with the enigma of the modern world that you refer to. You mention the word macho. Some of the most macho countries on earth are third world countries who seem to be imitating 18th and 19th century nationalistic tendencies. Yes and we also I think have had the greatest amount of involvement with those

countries as against other kinds of systems and yet if you take a look at what is going on we'll say in the conference in Paris. And you know it's gone information or any of the international conferences the United States is looked upon with the greatest suspicion by the third world while the Russians seem to be. Able to deal with them and yet we know the cynicism behind their approach. Yes what do we do about it. I think we shouldn't think two things One we shouldn't take those kinds of ideological displays too seriously because when it comes to negotiating their interests they trade their of their trade their credits their technical assistance. It is still to us that they come and on the whole they have very few illusions about the Soviets the Soviets have not made themselves a popular in concrete dealings with the World countries their North African Arab policy has been a shambles has been a shambles they have not left the best of memories in Somalia in Guinea or even I'm told by people

who are there in Ethiopia. On the other hand obviously we should resist any kind of international steamroller attempt. Legitimizing things like censorship restrictions to freedom of information and I think on the whole we still have enough influence to be able to resist these attacks. I get a feeling that you're a great critic of Henry Kissinger. I also get a. And his approach I get a feeling that you're calling for a new kind of diplomacy in which let me just hypothesize for a moment might lead to an international trade department at the federal government level where foreign policy was not in the traditional manner but we don't actually have the federal government trying to do everything it can to aid and abet international trade balance of payments. Yes it seems to me that more and more multilateral diplomacy begins to look like domestic bargaining. It's more

difficult of course since one is dealing with people who has different conceptions of everything. But much of multilateral diplomacy are different from traditional diplomacy in one vital respect which is the irrelevance of force. One does not resolve issues about the price of energy or about the reduction of debts or about technical assistance by threatening to use force it's totally inadequate. So that what you have isn't it kind of diplomacy in which you have a fairly brittle coalitions and shifting alignments all the kinds of things you are used to. When we deal to be special groups on the domestic scheme and this is very different I think from what the public is used to in diplomacy meant traditional diplomacy exaggerate a bit but just a bit is still seen as a kind of hear all week confrontation eyeball to eyeball one guy blinks and the other one triumphs and the flag gets raised. Now that is still true of many of the diplomatic or

strategic confrontations in the world. But it is not true of the whole and huge international economic dimension which simply does not follow that model at all. In recent years the Soviet Union China the United States and so on were involved in Vietnam you know without going to the Vietnam conflict as in terms of its on the ground warfare you know. But as an example of the use of. Third world area for the playing out of 19th century politics. Do you believe that it is a confirmation of your theory that force is no longer valid as a major tool. Have we learned all powers the frustrations from Vietnam has that been a useful lesson. Or is there another one on the horizon. Well unfortunately there are still quite a number of areas of international politics where force can be extremely useful. First of all the Soviets have used force very successfully in their own sphere of influence because they

knew that nobody would stop them. And secondly force would put it the following where it is because there is an overall balance of military power between east and west. That a little force gets actually used in DD practice. If there weren't a certain Ecker Librium I think we would see much more force being used. But as long as it would scare and destroy the planet each side can destroy the other one. Then I think the risks of using large scale force in explosive situations are too high. Vietnam I think showed one thing which is slightly different but which is very important and that is that one does not solve what are essentially civil war situations by massive external intervention somebody we're seeing in the New Yorker recently started one of the lessons of Vietnam which the Russians might also learn in Africa is that people in a way build their own nations they don't let foreigners build them for them.

And I think I want tragedy in Vietnam was that we were trying to build a nation by fighting a war which was to a very large extent a civil war and it just could not succeed without ever being culturally interested which was you know extending much of what was going on now on the on the premise that you that you spoke just a few moments ago that the balance of terror as it was makes it an utility use for us. It could be interpreted two ways one one might agree with you. And secondly one might say it's very much like one thousand twelve one thousand thirteen thousand nine hundred fourteen where even the insanity won't stop the event. Yes but one very very big difference is that all of the military leaders in 1914 believe that believe it or force it not only they believe in false but they believe in a very short war with the possibility of a kind of smashing victory. And at present it seems to me that neither side and I insist on

the other side since they as a whole rather potent school of thought in America these days which tortures Soviet texts to make it seem as if the Soviets believed that they could win a nuclear war I think this is absurd. I don't think they believe it for one minute. Neither side believes that a large scale use of force involving Russians and Americans. I'm not talking about proxy wars but involving Russians and Americans could be anything but suicidal. That is a huge difference with 1940. Now when I'm seeing that it is the existence of a balance of terror that makes this world less dangerous than it could be. I'm not saying this to justify the level of the balance of terror. I think that we could cut our nuclear arsenal of Americans and the Russians could cut them drastically without any risk so to speak. Still if there was an enormous force I think it might have some political consequences. I also get another impression from your writing in this book

primacy a world power that you feel that both American power and Soviet power and coming Chinese power is all really redundant that it's antique in a certain way that it will not meet the needs of the modern world and that while you cannot tell the audience what the needs are that we ought to be on the search and not dependent upon our present use of power. Well I think that every nation which is not only it was obvious of the Chinese I'm thinking of for instance every nation in a sense tries to build itself up the way nations have traditionally built themselves up. In other words if you give yourself a huge army and a steel industry. Well that is indeed quite a redundant because what one discovers rapidly is that massive heavy industrial development may be exactly the wrong kind of development especially in countries which have not solved the agriculture problem and there's not a hell of

you can do with all those weapons. You can use those weapons successfully only in very exceptional situations and we can use them that we can use of force for deterrence purposes in Western Europe. The Soviets can transport Cubans to Africa in those countries when they get where they are called in. They have been very careful not to move where they have not been called in. Which means that it's essentially a political problem not a military one. It is then up to us to see to it that they do not get called in and that is not a military All right. So that indeed much of that enormous effort of building up colossal arsenals is wasteful creates proliferation problems and is a kind of traditional response which is almost I would say a conditioned reflex. One of your criticisms of Henry Kissinger as secretary of state was and I don't want to paraphrase.

So again it's good to have the author of The idea here that when he couldn't solve a problem like Iran he bought it off with with immense racism weapon and since he won by the end of the case into Iran acquiring clients by enormous promises of sales of arms had become second nature and I think this is extremely dangerous. I mean again and again what I feel the policy of this administration this order is a regime that is very interesting because one of the first things that Carter did was to issue a kind of self-denying ordinance saying I should impose a limit and then I could bomb from that limit the limit has been violated from the first day on it was in fact very important to set that limit because now everybody can point to his own standard to him. So it is difficult to get out of that habit. One of the few hopeful signs of what is otherwise not the most clouded international scene is the willingness of the Soviets for the first time to discuss with us the limitations of those

conventional absolutes which they had always refused in the past I mean there may be a point when rationality begins to raise its head again. Well now would this be a political decision or does it follow another part of your thinking that they might have come to a realization of what it's costing them on their own balance of payments picture to carry on this policy. And the strain is beginning to feel be felt by them as well as by I would be the second one of the problems with policies is that it helps the balance of payments of the suppliers for France for instance which is a country that I study professionally. Large scale export of conventional arms is a very important factor. Huge hearts and huge arms industry but it's not an awful lot given away or subsidized. Some of it will not. Supplies. I think the strain is primarily on the boy. It's very interesting that during the recent Iranian crisis one of the first things that the Shah decided to cut cut back on all the acquisition of some of the most modern arms which he frankly does not mean now in Iran and previously in Pakistan.

We have seen the results of our policy and it seems to be the destruction or the threatened destruction of the regime that we back yes very often have we learned the lesson what do we do now. I'm not sure we don't. What would you advise us to have as a policy for example toward Iran regardless of what happens. Well I always thought that our policy of building up as if it could become in a very short number of years a major advance was a very important policy for all kinds of reasons they didn't have the bureaucratic infrastructure huge peasantry. Yes and also in order for this kind of a policy to be successful you need to have what pressure had in the 18th and 19th century formidably efficient honest and almost ruthless bureaucracy that is not what Iran had. At this point while obviously it is impossible for the United States to quote unquote dump the Shah largely because we have some reasons to believe that any post-trial regime might be worse not better even for the Iranians. I think we should

take some distance I think it's very bad for us to be so closely associated in any part of the world. We have a shaky regime not only on moral grounds but for once it seems to me that ethical grounds and purely Prudential ones coincide. I think one of the things we should have learned from Vietnam is not to embrace too closely every regime that has that has feet of clay. And yet the world is full of such regimes. Now we may have from time to time to support them because the alternatives are worse. But we should always be able to keep some kind of distance. It seems to me for one reason if not quite apart even for moral considerations if the regime collapses it is almost certain that the success will be very anti-American if it was 1944 and you could use the present knowledge and you are a delegate to Dumbarton

Oaks and they said We want three or four very important thoughts in three or four sentences that we ought to consider before we begin our formal deliberations what would they be. Ha. That would be the first one. What is the second. It's the reason it's difficult to answer is that after all the task of Dumbarton Oaks was to build an international organisation an international order Russian and what is so striking is that the bits and pieces of international order that have been established have rarely been under the auspices of the EU work and it has come in marginal ways. But. Why it is the surround that I would put much more emphasis on the importance of functional agencies rather than focus attention on the General Assembly and the Security Council which even in the best of

charters would reflect all of the political conflicts of in the world and it seems to me that if people are well aware of the importance of some of the functional agencies they would be less critical of the US. You know the words do the business of the world and then and then establish the values from yes from there. I understand that the takings of the clock has been absolutely delightful discussing your new book primacy all world order. Stanley Hoffman I find it very very thought provoking in the most basic sense. I love a book that tells us where we are and does it realistically and I think your book meets that test and I want to thank you for being here. Thank you very much for this edition. Bernard Reuben. The First Amendment and a free people a weekly examination of civil liberties in the media. Even 1970 the program is produced in cooperation with the Institute for democratic communication at Boston University.

I w GBH radio Boston which is solely responsible for its content. This is the station program exchange. This is NPR National Public Radio.