Government, Politics, and Citizen Involvement; Professor Sacks

Good evening ladies and gentlemen and welcome to this the 15th in a continuing series of lectures and titled government politics and citizen involvement. The topic for this evening's lecture is the state constitution. It's implications for the citizen campaigns very fortunate to have as our guest lecturer this evening Professor Albert Sachs of the Harvard Law School. Professor Sachs is a leading authority on the state constitution. He received his undergraduate degree from City College of New York in 1940 and his graduate and his law degree from the Harvard Law School in 1948. He served as a walker clerk but two distinguished jurists from one thousand forty eight to one thousand forty nine he was the law clerk for Judge Augustus hand and from 49 to 50 he was a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. From 1950 to 52 he practiced law with the firm of Covington and Burling and he joined the faculty of the Harvard Law School in 1952. He was

promoted to a professor in one thousand fifty five. Among the courses he is taught is constitutional law the state and local government law and state constitutional reform is presently a member of the state commission to review the Massachusetts constitution and he is the principle draftsman of both the State Administrative Procedures Act and the Home Rule amendment to the Constitution that is being considered by our Constitutional Convention. This very evening my very great pleasure therefore to present to you this distinguished lawyer and teacher of the festa Albert sack. Thank you very much Mr. Olson. Ladies and gentleman you been hearing from a very distinguished group of luminaries and I'm not at all sure

that I deserve inclusion in that group. And I think I have an idea of why I was included. There are very few people who are qualified to talk about the state constitution. As a matter of fact I think it's accurate to say that the public by and large and I mean the educated citizenry is illiterate with respect to an understanding of state constitutions I think if we gave a small short simple test to a highly educated group of people they would all fail without much question about it I don't think it would even be close. And I have wondered about that. I think in part. It is the result of a

growing attention and interest in national affairs which inevitably increases when you have national media of communication. I think that the state constitution has something to do with our lack of knowledge and understanding and interest in it. The fact of the matter is that the Massachusetts Constitution like most state constitutions is almost impossible to read or indeed if one is able to read it almost impossible to understand. It is an extremely detailed extremely prolix document. It certainly doesn't look for anybody for an evening's entertainment.

It doesn't excite anybody. And one of our problems is whether we can do anything about that. You might be interested to know that in the Constitutional Convention on the Massachusetts constitution the last true convention that we had back in 1917 to 1919 the convention delegates voted to recast the document they voted to reorganize it. But everything in such a forum and order that it read from beginning to end and in some orderly way it was understandable but they didn't take care to do it in the proper fashion. And about a year or two later the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that all of that effort was wasted. But the

Constitution was what it always had been since approximately 1780 and that we just had to go back to the old style. Now I'm supposed to talk tonight not only about the Constitution but I take it about citizen participation in government. What I want to do is first to know that the state constitution like the Federal Constitution has something to say about citizen participation. And then I want to turn to citizen participation in government but I want to focus particularly on citizen participation in constitutional change constitutional reform how it might be done what it would mean. So far as the way in which the Constitution AIDS or

guarantees participation. I suppose we're all aware of the Bill of Rights in the federal Constitution. We all know that there is a First Amendment which guarantees freedom of speech and press and assembly and the right to petition for redress of grievances which after all add up to a guarantee of free citizen effort to secure a change in government or law. Fewer people I suspect are aware of the fact that the Massachusetts Constitution as originally written in 1780 which is some nine years before the Federal Constitution contained a so-called declaration of rights which certainly if you look at it has a similarity to the federal bill of rights. Somewhat more comprehensive and characteristically longer

but it does guarantee the same activities and that most people don't know how can citizens play a part in constitutional reform. Well I think that I'll first discuss the way in which a state constitution in particular our own Massachusetts state constitution can be changed and needs to be some understanding of just how the process of change can take place and then turn to some of the proposed changes some past some presently pending and some proposed but as yet not having received any particular Nazi having received sufficient support to be launched along the way. Basically there are three way in which the Massachusetts constitution can be

changed. The most commonly used method is the one that is going on today and I suspect each Wednesday for some time to come. It is what we call the legislative method of change. In fact what happens is that the legislature meets the two houses sitting together as a single constitutional convention as they call themselves and they vote on proposed constitutional amendments. If a majority of the members this being two hundred eighty members senators and representatives if a majority votes for a particular amendment it goes to the next legislature. And if a majority in the same constitutional

convention four votes for that identical Amendment. It then goes on the ballot for a vote of by the people. If a majority of the people ratify it at an election it becomes a part of the Constitution. Now you'll notice this is a little different from the method basically used in the federal Constitution. There are a two thirds vote is required in the Congress. Each house voting separately and a vote by three quarters of the states ratifying that amendment at the state level we don't require more than a majority vote at any particular point. A majority can make that change but the process is meant to emphasize deliberation. A certain period of delay is imposed to make certain

that a hasty action is not taken. To some extent Of course the net effect is to reduce the possibility of change but that isn't necessarily bad. There isn't necessarily a good thing to have a large number of amendments taking place all the time because that simply makes the document longer more complicated and it may be more difficult for people to comprehend what's going on. The precise pace of change is something that you can't just lay down in any particular way. Can't just say that one particular rate of change is the best. Now that's the legislative method. That is the method that has been used for most amendments. A second method of change one that has been used

a number of times in the past as a method of change through a constitutional convention which is in no sense made up by the members of the legislature. Interestingly enough we don't have a provision in the state constitution for a change of the document through a separate constitutional convention. There is no reference to that in the document itself. The first constitution in 1780 had no provision for change at all. There it was. It didn't say how it was to be changed and so about oh I don't know 20 years later perhaps 25 years proposal was made that the people should vote on whether there should be another convention to reconsider the Constitution. This was a time you may recall when there was a Jeffersonian view that people should change their whole form

of government about every 20 years. The people voted that one down. But in 1820 the question came up again and this time the people voted for a constitutional convention and one was set up. And of course the method is to have the legislature propose a constitutional convention and. The legislature proposes the way in which the delegates to that convention are to be chosen. This is all done by statute. The convention then meets to some extent it may be controlled by the legislative statute. To some extent it makes its own rules of procedure and then that convention proposes. I Disha no amendments which are thereupon voted either way down by the people in a manner very similar to what the people do when they deal with

legislatively proposed amendments. We've had conventions in 1820 in 1853 in 1917 to 19 and each convention amendments were proposed. Sometimes just a few sometimes a fair number. In each instance the people accepted some or most but not all. There is discrimination in the process as we can see from looking back now. Why turn into this special mode of change. In what sense might it be thought to be better than the legislative method. Well first the constitutional convention shows it's chosen in this special fashion. Well generally require a different group of persons to be delegates from the group that

sits in the legislature. Of course there will be some overlap but there will be a tendency for the districts to be somewhat differently chosen. There will be a tendency for persons who might feel they don't have time to be regular members of the legislature on a continuing basis year after year but they don't have time to serve in a convention for a limited period. There is necessarily have factor of status or prestige there are people who feel that being a legislature does not necessarily put one in a very high level of prestige. I think that's very unfortunate but it is a fact of life. Being a member of a constitutional convention may be seen differently. In addition when you have a constitutional convention everybody gets the sense that they're

there for one job and that job is to improve the constitution whereas in the legislature dealing with these constitutional amendments is just one of a large number of jobs. In other words the convention gives you a chance to focus on the Constitution. In addition a convention will usually and certainly wisely recruit a staff to study the particular problems that it thinks it should be dealing with and usually will have a staff that goes well beyond what the legislature normally provides for these issues. And there is a sense of. Time availability and a constitutional convention which may not be present in the legislature that has many things to do sales taxes vs. income taxes

and school appropriations. Other issues that may seem to the legislators of considerably greater importance in the sense that they are much more in the public eye and therefore much more relevant to the inevitable problems of re-election. As far as the disadvantages of the convention method are concerned I don't know that one can point out any inevitable disadvantages. It is true that a particular convention can so to speak run away with the ball that's been handed to it. The legislature may attempt to restrict what it can do but that's rather a difficult thing to accomplish and a convention that takes the bit in its teeth may actually be offering more proposals than anybody ever imagined it would at the outset.

This is one of the. Reason is that a good many people have given for resisting this particular method during the past five or ten years and I think it probably represents a genuine fear. I don't myself see in any past practice any justification for that. It is rather rude the kind of fear that comes from the unknown rather than from any past experience. The third method of changing the Constitution is one that's rather recent. It was not possible to use this third method until an amendment to the constitution that was proposed by those 19 17 to 19 convention and adopted by the people in the forty eighth article of amendment to our Constitution.

This provides for change in the Constitution through the use of the popular unissued tive. Now this one is a rather fascinating one in the mechanics of it. First of all there are certain areas that cannot be dealt with at all through the popular initiative and that is so because the 48 thought ical tells us its These include matters relating to religion matters relating to judges or the courts. Local laws that is laws dealing with specific municipalities. Appropriations and certain parts of the Massachusetts declaration of rights particularly speech and press and so forth. You know other words certain sensitive areas are taken out of the arena of popular

change. Now the method of change starts with a petition which need be signed by only 10 citizens. They have a proposal for a particular constitutional amendment. They file it with the attorney general the attorney general examines the proposal and he must determine whether it is valid in the sense that it doesn't relate to any of these excluded areas and whether it's proper inform as a matter of fact if he thinks it's improper in form he's likely to explain to them why and they can probably change the form if he finally certifies that it is proper then they file it with the secretary of state who must furnish them with a large number of blank forms. And on these forms will appear the proposal duly presented but

with a summary that people can read in a somewhat shorter compass A and the summary is one that is prepared by the attorney general. Then these people have to go out presumably with lots of others to secure signatures. They have to secure a total number of valid signatures equal to 3 percent of the total vote for governor at the last previous election. And I guess that generally that will be of an order of 60000 votes perhaps 70000 votes something along that line. They have approximately three months to do this the constitutional provision spells it all out from early September to early December. Generally if you want to get 60000 valid signatures you have to allow for the fact that many people sign their

names in a way not quite proper they don't sign it exactly the form it is on the voting lists. They may get their addresses wrong therefore names can be challenged. Therefore by and large one should figure on trying to get perhaps 80 or 100000 votes. This is a tall order but not necessarily impossible. If they succeed this proposal then goes to the legislature and the legislature must consider the proposal approximately this time of year prior to the first Wednesday in May I think is the requirement and the legislature must vote in each house coming together in the usual way legislature must vote on it. If the proposal receives one quarter of all the. Persons present and

voting then it is considered to have gone through the first necessary step. In other words the fact that it has the 60000 votes behind it means that instead of having to get fifty point one percent of the legislative votes all you need is twenty five point one percent of the legislative votes and it goes to the next legislature if at the next legislature it gets twenty five point one percent of the votes it goes on the ballot to be voted on at a referendum by the people and it can then be adopted by the people in the usual way by a majority vote. In other words it is possible to have do it yourself constitutional reforms provided that you have a proposal that you want to back lots of energy.

Plenty of shoe leather and 25 percent of the representatives and senators on your side. Plus finally a majority of the people who are prepared to vote while I'm on the subject of the initiative. I will digress from the issues of constitutional reform just for a moment to point out that you can have a similar initiative on ordinary statutes and it is really this particular initiative the popular initiative for statutory change that's responsible for the recent reform that greatly reduced the powers of the governor's council. That was done by popular initiative through a statutory road. And that's rather similar to the procedure I just described. Again you have to get the petition you have to get the signatures

and you do need 3 percent for statutes as well as constitutional amendments. Then it goes to the legislature but this time being in a statutory form is voted on separately by the two houses. And here the required approval by the two houses of the legislature must be the regular approval. A majority of the vote. But if either or both houses turn you down as happened with the Governor's Council proposal at this point you're not lost. You go out and get some more signatures. The Constitution provides that if you got the first 3 percent that you got into the legislature the legislature turns you down. Now you can go out and by getting an additional half of 1 percent of the votes cast for governor at the last election. You can now get it on the ballot. That was done with the Governor's Council proposal when as you know the voters adopted it. Now these are

the methods of change and I put my principal emphasis on the proposal was that the procedures that involve major citizen participation. If we look to say what methods have been used as I mentioned the legislative method is by far the most common. The convention method has been used three times in our history. The initiative method for constitutional change has not yet resulted in a single constitutional amendment. In fact an effort was made to secure some kinds Ditto tional amendments. I think in 1960 so if I'm not mistaken people went out to get signatures they didn't get enough signatures and the result was that it all. Fell apart. A different approach was taken by another girl. Their notion was that we needed a constitutional convention. I thought

that was the way we should proceed. Well the usual way to get a constitutional convention is to convince the legislature that it should pass a bill providing for one but the present legislature has shown no indication that it's the least bit interested in a constitutional convention. And so these people said we have another string to our bow. We will attempt to get at the equivalent of a statute providing for a constitutional convention by the device of the popular initiative. This of course led to great debate among various lawyers constitutional lawyers non constitutional lawyers as to whether this was an appropriate use of the initiative. It seemed to be a combination that was rather peculiar. I think the. Majority sentiment was that it was proper and they tried it. I think

the attorney general agreed that it could be tried. Here again they didn't have enough shoe leather. They didn't have enough energy. I think they got enough raw names to exceed the 60000 or so required. But when they went out it down and eliminated the names that were improperly listed they had too few. And so that has failed. I think one of the great virtues of having the initiative of vailable whether it be used to propose specific changes or whether it be used too in this. Second way of trying to get a convention one of the most important features of the initiative is that it puts a pressure on the legislature that otherwise is missing. If the legislature is convinced that there is simply no other way by which constitutional

change can be brought about than my own vote it sits in the driver's seat and its sole concern is with the question whether if I vote against this or that constitutional proposal will the voters turn me out of office. Now it's just a fact of political life that legislators are very rarely re-elected or are turned out of office because of the way they vote on some constitutional proposal. This is largely because as I said when I started most people are unaware of the state constitution and the various proposals for change. Certainly it's the rare Saul who knows how his or her legislator voted the last time.

That they considered a constitutional provision on some subject such as gubernatorial power to reorganize the state government and therefore the pressure on legislators to act in a one way or another on constitutional amendments is not very great. Well with this background let me turn to specific proposals for a change. I think for about 12 years or so constitutional reform in Massachusetts has just been dormant from about nineteen fifty forty nine or fifty to about 1961 or two. Nothing seemed to succeed. Proposals might get through once but they died the second time. Some never got accepted even the first time.

Recently we've had a flurry of proposals and some have succeeded in being accepted. The most important you know about the four year term for governor tenant governor state secretary treasurer attorney general and auditor. All of the statewide executive officers now have four year terms. I suppose the four year term for governor is very important in the sense that for the first time we give the chief executive enough time to formulate a program to see it throw to gain some experience without having to think about an election. Worked his way through an election in the middle of the process I think.

So the four year term inevitably will result in increased gubernatorial power if only because his appointments power is much increased even on the present basis. And so to me it seems like a major gain. There have been some additional amendments accepted but they're all very subsidiary. There is one providing for the continuity of the government in case of an emergency. There's another that straightened out what some said was a technical defect. In the previous provisions concerning the pledging of the state's credit. And finally there was one that now provides that either the governor or the Governor's Council acting alone can ask the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. When I say their subsidiary I think you can tell from the listing what I mean. Pending at the present time are

proposals that the governor and lieutenant governor be elected on the same ticket. A proposal that the governor have the power to reorganize. The executive branch of government subject to certain conditions I'll mention a home rule Amendment and these three are all fairly important. Also pending at the present time is a fourth but rather a subsidiary one I think providing certain authorization for the pledging of public credit for the industrial development of cities and towns. When I say these are all pending what I mean is that. Each of these has been accepted by one legislature. Majority vote. Of the two hundred eighty senators and representatives and they are now up for their

second vote. If they receive a majority vote in the current legislative session. They will then go on the ballot. At the next state election and if accepted by the people they too will become part of the Constitution. I want to talk about three of them at some length. But before I do. I think what I should do is to mention certain proposals on which at the present moment. No action. Has been taken. And it's not clear to me that any action is in prospect immediately. These include. A proposal to reduce the number of elective offices. And the usual proposal that one hears is that. In addition to having the governor a lieutenant governor run together we also ought to eliminate the secretary of state and the treasurer

from the ballot make those two offices appointive. A proposal to reduce the size of the legislature particularly the house from the president two hundred forty to something closer to 80 or perhaps 100 or perhaps one hundred twenty. And a proposal perhaps to change the mode of constitutional amendment itself making express provision for the Constitutional Convention method whereby as in some states such as New York the voters get a chance to decide automatically every 20 years whether they want a constitutional convention. Now as to these that have not been mentioned at all. You'll notice the likelihood of getting the legislature to adopt them is not very great.

Our proposal to reduce the size of the legislature is the most obvious of that group. If you ask a group of legislators to vote on the proposition that half of them should not be here next year you get a negative answer. That's perfectly understandable. I don't suppose we can really hold it against them that they react that way. And yet on the merits the proposal has a great deal to recommend it. It's not joshed that we will reduce the expense of running a legislature that's relatively minor in terms in relation to the total size of our budget. It's not just. That. They can have a more meaningful process of discussion and deliberation if there are a few or I think that's true but the precise difference is a rather subtle one. And it's not just. But the legislator. Who represents twice as many people is to that extent a more

important person comes from a somewhat wider constituency and is likely on the whole to be somewhat better qualified person. Even that's a subtle consideration and may or may not be true. But if only because our legislators desperately need office space staff assistance an opportunity to function. Which I think we can provide only if we reduce the size as matters stand now primarily for that reason. I would think the change is a very important one. This much is clear. A member of the House of Representatives today perhaps takes the subway perhaps drives his car down to Beacon Hill. He parks or gets out of the subway. He walks up to the

statehouse. He literally has no place to stay. He has no office. He has no staff. If you try to reach him by telephone a page will go looking for him and will bring him to what amounts to a public telephone though of course it's not a coin telephone and it's really an incredible way for an important official to function. That's how they function. That seems to me impossible to justify. So then I think that change is terribly important to get its likelihood at the moment is tiny. The reduction in the number of elective offices is not something that I would. Give a high priority I think it simply reflects the fact that the public is able to focus responsibility on a small number of executive officials and you know in practical terms I think really able to focus only on the

gubernatorial candidates and beyond that it's rather difficult for people to remember just what a particular man dead. How does one tell whether a man whether a man's been a good treasurer what exactly has he done that we know about. The answer is very little. Similarly in most cases with the secretary of state and that's the reason for that particular proposal. I think it's a chance for getting through the ordinary constitutional process is small. In other words there are a series of proposals as to which if there is to be change very likely it will have to be by the initiative route or the convention through not the legislative. On the other hand we have presently pending three proposals that seem to have a chance through the legislative route. And the proof of that is that they passed through once. That doesn't

necessarily mean that they have the support of a majority of the legislature at the present time. I legislate your meaning in constitutional convention assembled as they call themselves may at times a vote for a particular proposal and a good. Number of those representatives. While this is only the first time around I will vote for it. Let it go to the next legislature will be around the next time and the next time we'll kill it. This has been done before. It seems to me that essentially this was done with a proposal that's perhaps a dubious one a proposal to limit the legislative termly the period of a legislative session to six months a proposal to that effect made at a time when our legislature was meeting around 11 months in every year.

A lot of people were tired about tired of reading them and reading about them in the newspapers. The governor couldn't get any work done because he had the legislature around the year and as it turned out a proposal was made to limit the sessions to six months. That was accepted once then the legislature behaved itself I think for one year and ran a session in about six or seven months and then they kill the proposal. Now we're back to somewhat longer sessions so that may come back. I don't know but what it shows is that winning the first time doesn't mean you will necessarily win the second even with the very same legislative body even though the changes in it have been very few. Now we have three. Pending the proposal that the governor and lieutenant governor be elected on the same ticket as one that has been made really for a long time as it appears to me having passed

wants and being before the legislature now a second time. I think that has finally come to be accepted. I don't know to what extent it's getting a shove forward from the recent unpleasantness between a former governor and a former lieutenant governor by that may play a part as sensually one of the purposes of an amendment like this is to treat the governor and lieutenant governor as a team to regard them as a single Teka in much the same way that we think of the presidential candidate and the vice presidential candidate at the federal level. We don't think of the vice president as somebody who is an independent politician charging off in a direction of his own. And yet that is precisely what I would kind of governor has been for quite a period of time in the past up to now it has been entirely possible

for a governor to be from one party and the lieutenant governor from another. That was true of governor of all BS administration the first time. And in that situation when the governor leaves the state we get an acting governor from another party. Rizal is the governor can't really leave the state if anything important is going to happen unless he gets some sort of an agreement from the lieutenant governor which I suspect will be available. Most of the time. But it oughtn't to be necessary they ought to be from the same party. I don't think this one is hard to justify and I don't think it has too much opposition at the present time. The proposal to give the governor power to reorganize the executive branch is at the other end of the spectrum I think it is very controversial. In fact I have a good many doubts that it will past the present legislature.

We'll know very shortly. The proposal. I just I believe yesterday got some very important support. The reason I have my doubt is that a measure of this sort inevitably gives power to the governor and by that very process it does to some extent take power from the legislature and the legislators are sensitive to this. Those who are in clear opposition will inevitably cry executive dictatorship. It's difficult for a governor who supports the proposal to defend himself against the charge that at some time here a successor will be usurping something it's never quite clear what and the result is a proposal of this sort runs into very heavy weather. What is the proposal. What does it do. Or essential It provides that the governor shall have the power

to propose plans to reorganize departments or sections of departments in the executive branch. Perhaps to terminate a particular division in a particular department or some section or bureau of a division. Abolish it in a fact. Having the work done somewhere else perhaps to transfer it from one department to another perhaps to consolidate some divisions so that there will be one where before there were two or three which would reverse the usual process. And the governor makes this plan. And then he submits it in effect to the legislature the legislature has 60 days to act on it.

If in 60 days the legislature takes no action then it becomes law. If within the 60 days either house of the legislature by a majority vote of the members voting votes against the governor's proposal. It's defeated. In other words this is by no means unqualified gubernatorial power. It is a gubernatorial power to initiate a proposal with a legislative power to turn it down. It is somewhat different from what we usually think of as between legislature and governor we think of the governor as the vetoing official. And here in a sense the legislature has a veto but it isn't quite as different from ordinary practice as one might think because the.

Facts of Life far that much legislation is initiated by a governor. And it goes through the legislature and in fact legislators voted up or voted down. And finally it. May come back to arm in the form of a bill he can sign or it may not. How does this proposal differ from the usual system. It differs in one important respect. The proposal of the governor cannot be amended. It must be voted up or down in the form in which he submits it. And that's really crucial to the whole idea of executive power to reorganize because experience shows that when a governor sends an ordinary bill over to the legislature proposing to reorganize the division of action the department of why what happens is that key people whose jobs are at

stake who don't like the idea of being transferred from department y over to department Z. The thing they do is to go from their office to the legislative office and they immediately object. Some legislators take up the cudgels. They say this is a fine plan of reorganization but let's just do one thing with it. Let's leave Division X alone. Or let's leave Section Z of Division X along and the result is that by the time it reaches the gov. It's just not recognizable. The amendment tries to give the governor of the power to force the legislature to act on his proposal. That is its most important characteristic. It is true that the legislature might not act. The Amendment doesn't

force the legislature to act. The amendment does require that any committee hearing this proposal must report it out to the houses within 30 days so that a committee can bottle it up. From there on it is a matter of whether either House will act. And I suppose you might say this is one of the situations in which a constitutional provision would put inertia on the side of a gubernatorial proposal rather than the opposite. That seems to me all to the good because as I view it change of this sort is essential. The Home Rule provision is I think somewhat intermediate in the likelihood of its acceptance. I think it's certainly much more controversial than the governor a lieutenant governor proposal. But. I think

not as doubtful as the governor's power to reorganize. Trying to describe a home rule proposal is at best a difficult business because home role has become a battle cry for some a shibboleth for others a rather tired and stale word for still others. And it means so many different things to so many different people that it's hard to know where to begin. In Massachusetts the facts concerning the legislature and the municipalities are these. A municipality is not permitted to take any action of any kind unless it has explicit authorization from the legislature to do so. This means if a new problem

arises which no one thought about before. For example somebody says we ought to have parking meters in our fair town and no one's ever thought about parking meters before because we never had the problem. You necessarily discover that there's no power to do this. Being new you must go to the legislature and get an authorization. Secondly the legislature in this state does not. Act on these requests for authority by conferring general authority on all municipalities through general legislation. At least much of the time it does not. Some of the time it dies. There are a variety of general laws which authorize cities and towns to zone or to have subdivision controls or to deal with the mosquito or what have you

but very often the legislature deals with these problems. One city at a time. One town at a time. The city of Lawrence has given permission to increase its Board of Public Works from three members to five members. This takes a legislative bill. The town of chad is given permission to eliminate the job of dog catcher. This takes a bell. The town of some of the women may be given the power to increase its appropriation for municipal advertising from five thousand to seventy five hundred a year. I know the bill and that is the way we have been functioning. While What's wrong with that particular method. Well I say two things are wrong. One initiative. It's necessarily stifled at a level

where it should exist. And to the legislature is dealing with measures in a way calculated to result in log rolling and politically irresponsible decisions and I say irresponsible in the sense that a group of men are acting on a problem about which most of them know very little and care less what the Home-Rule amendment now pending does is to say to the legislature hereafter when you deal with municipal problems you must do so by general law. You must deal with classes of cities or towns or all cities or towns. In any event not with one city or one town at a time. That is its principal effect.

It leaves Rome for dealing with groupings. When metropolitan problems are involved it has provision for special problems such as boundaries. Basic changes in government such as dissolution of a particular local government. And it has some emergency provisions whereby two thirds of the legislature plus the governor can deal with a particular city or town in what we think of as a particularly abusive situation perhaps one of great corruption. It tries to make room in other words for a flexible operation but it the basic idea is what I mention finally having limited the legislature and that's why it provides that the cities and towns are now free to deal with their own problems. To Lee extent

that such action on the part of the local government is not forbidden by the Constitution or by any general law of the legislature or by the way local charter. Now it's up to the local government in other words to decide whether to act. But there's no doubt that it will have the power to act unless that power has been denied to it. Somewhere along the line and finally local communities will have the power to draft and adopt their own charters tailored to their own needs by a process spelled out in the amendment. Now those are the basic provisions. You'll notice that what's happening with respect to the these constitutional provisions that are either pending or talked about is that they follow certain lines one they move towards giving the governor more power. Each of the moves in that

direction till they move in the direction of taking from the legislature and to some extent extent dispersing the power geographically. And three they tend towards an effort to simplify the political process so that the citizens can understand it somewhat more easily and may hold officials accountable more readily. Now that those are the three main trends. I think they're sound but I would just know one thing. There is no magic formula to all this. I don't think that if we had all of these proposals adopted and in operation we would automatically have a dramatic improvement in the quality of state government. I think what these proposals do is to make possible such an improvement but

they don't necessarily bring about the improvement. I think it should be clear enough from the experience of reapportionment of state legislatures that a good many of you have read about as you know many legislators legislatures in the United States Ramallah portion and to read the commentators one believes one would believe that they must be terrible legislators because of the mal apportionment and now that they're going to be well apportioned they're going to be fined not just like years and then suddenly one realizes that the Massachusetts legislature is one of the banks the portion of legislatures in the United States and has been for quite a while. And I think that's just a good reminder that this these changes don't automatically assure the millennium

what they do in decay is that in addition to getting changes of this sort we don't need to have people continually following what the legislature and the governor and the local officials do. And so to speak exerting the kinds of pressure on them that will produce a sound decision. There is no substitute Unfortunately for the intellectual effort and the energy and the shoeleather that are involved in the kind of rather dreary work that an initiative petition means. And that may or may not be a happy thought but it's the only thought that I can conclude on Friday I took a little longer than I should. Talk to. My only regret is that the room was.