United Nations Security Council

I have asked to speak now because I think you would claim that I have a duty to explain in some detail. To the members of this council the reasons the United States has proposed that the Security Council formally be seized with the problem of bringing about negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese situation. I wish to address myself at this point where the agenda is under consideration to the reasons which impelled us to take this step. There is no more urgent task confronting the statesmen of the world. And the Security Council. And the United Nations as a whole. And that a finding first a way to terminate the fighting in Vietnam. And second. A settlement which will bring enduring peace to the Vietnamese people.

It is the undeniable urgency of this task. The failure of every other effort made to date to bring about negotiations over Vietnam. The primacy of the Security Council's responsibility under the charter for maintaining international peace and security and our respect. For the accumulated experience and wisdom represented on this council which have impelled my government to ask for this urgent meeting of the Security Council I resort to the Security Council despite what anybody may say or speculate about it. Is briefly and simply further evidence of our resolve to settle this conflict peaceably and stammers from

a deep and abiding belief that a negotiated settlement rather than a military solution is manifestly in the best interests of the Vietnamese people as a whole and all parties to the conflict as well as to the entire international community. Our request that the council meet and consider this problem signals is not the end but a new dimension to the peace offensive. We have been engaged in and which we are determined to continue as President Johnson put it yesterday our pressure for peace will be as stern and unremitting as the pressure of our military strength. On the field of battle. Our role in Vietnam is now and has

been from the beginning. Based on the indisputable fact that North Vietnam has consciously and flagrantly violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Particularly Article 19 of the agreement on cessation of hostilities. Orient North Vietnam was enjoined to ensure that its territory would I quote the accord not be used for the resumption of hostilities or defer there an aggressive policy. Despite this written plaids North Vietnam aided by peeping has led a quick and sustained the fighting in the south has sent tens of thousands of trained and Imam including units of its regular army into battle into Vietnam for the purpose of imposing its will upon the people of South Vietnam by

force. While we have them and while we remain unflinching in our determination to resist this aggression we have never lost sight of or hope for the need of a peaceful settlement. And this is our mission in the council today. I doubt if there is any parallel in recent history of the pressure for peace which my government with the advice and assistance of many welcoming hands has exerted over the past year. Time and again United States government has itself sought and encourage others to seek the formula which will move this tragic armed conflict to the conference table. We have made repeated appeals for whatever help the United Nations

collectively or individually through any of its organs including our distinguished Secretary-General might be able to provide in bringing about. Unconditional discussions or negotiations for an acceptable formula to restore peace in Vietnam. Mr. President I wish to pay particular trip to the ruminating effort of our distinguished secretary general to bring about the peace we all hope and seek to achieve. We supported and encouraged the United Kingdom when it proposed to the Soviet Union that there are two governments as cochairman of the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1960 to. Undertake to explore the possible basis of a Vietnamese settlement with all the Geneva

Conference countries. On April 7 1965 President Johnson made it on the stake oblique clear that the United States remained ready for unconditional discussions with all or some of the governments concerned with the Vietnamese conflict. The following day we responded affirmatively to the appeal for the right quote There were negotiations without precondition made earlier by 17 non aligned nations. When the government of India proposed the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and the policing of the border between North and South Vietnam by an Afro-Asian force. We publicly expressed our interest in this idea and privately sought to

pursue the proposal in greater detail. Manifesting the most affirmative character to disappear. We undertook a brief pause in the aerial attacks directed against military targets in North Vietnam in mid May and May the purpose of our action known to the North Vietnamese. But despite this and every effort we or others made there was not a single sign from Hanoi or from taping that they shared our desire to move this problem to the conference table or it ought to be a result. Not withstanding. We persevered in our quest for peace. Although the sincerity of our desire to move from the battlefield to the conference table was questioned by very few. There were

many friends of ours and friends of annoying who worried that another longer suspension of the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. Might create an atmosphere conducive to negotiation. I respect for this opinion. All respect for this opinion is a manifestation of the opinion of a substantial part of mankind combined with our own desire to leave no stone unturned in the search for peace. Let our government to suspend that bombing again on December 24 and to continue the suspension for thirty seven days over five weeks. That's more than honoring the counsel we receive. This suspension I must emphasize was undertaken against a

background I'm hung on yielding intransigence boated words inaction to every peace move made by us or others for more than a year. It was undertaken with no assurance whatever that it would move us closer to peace or to negotiation. That suspension had two parallel objectives. To ascertain whether as many claimed but none could prove the bombings were in fact the decisive and final barrier to discussions or negotiations and also to ascertain whether Hanoi shared our desire to reduce the intensity and the reign the armed conflict in Vietnam and to bring about a peaceful self. We explained these objectives by means of an unprecedented

diplomatic offensive through consultations with His Holiness the Pope. Who has properly as a great spiritual leader manifested great concern about the peace of the world a concern which he eloquently expressed in his unprecedented and welcome appearance here. Our last general assembly we consulted with the distinguished secretary general of the United Nations who of course shared the pope's concern. As an organ of this body devoted to peace. And we consulted with more than one hundred and fifteen governments. Virtually all governments in the world. By sending six special presidential envoys to 34 capitals to confer with chiefs of state or heads of government and through personal

communication from President Johnson to the chiefs of government. Many more equally important. We explained our objectives to Hanoi. Indeed before the suspension of bombings was one week old. In other words more than four weeks ago we directly informed annoyed by the suspension and advised them that if North Vietnam would readers separate by making a serious contribution towards peace it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspense. And I want to remind this distinguished body that

the suspension of the bombing was continued for more than 30 days after we were in direct touch with North Vietnam. And after our message relating to the suspension of the bombing was communicated and received by North Vietnam. But our restraint and patience and regretfully went unrewarded there was no positive response from him. It was only a continuing of insults name calling and vituperation. I should like to say to you Mr President I do not understand how the cause of international peace and security is a tall forwarded by insults. Name calling and vituperation when

what is required is a solemn attention by all nations and all members to the overriding cause and assess ity for world peace only last Saturday. Annoying made public a letter which President HO G man had sent to certain heads of state or government. This letter together with the editorial in the official organ two days later made it clear beyond reasonable doubt that Hanoi is no more prepared to work for a negotiated settlement or a reciprocal reduction of hostilities at the present time than it was a year ago. G-man interpreted our search for a negotiated solution and as and I quote him an excuse for war and he laid down three preconditions

and demanded acceptance of them by the United States before he would even commence negotiations. And these preconditions were first that the United States. And I quoted to quote his letter. Let's accept the four points stand the DVR of the government and prove this by actual deeds. Second that the United States must and unconditionally and for good. All bombing raids and other war acts against the R.V.. And third a new precondition. Mr. President I emphasize a new precondition. More an objection not more responsive than before the suspension that the United States and I quote must recognize the National Liberation Front and as the sole I emphasize sole genuine representative of the people of

South Vietnam. Exchange for these demands upon the United States. The president has offered absolutely nothing no let up in the war acts on his side. No reduction in the infiltration which had been continued continuously through the bombing pause no reduction in terror which had continued throughout the bombing as it has been going on long before. No reduction in the supply man in arms which continued during the bombing pause no willingness to negotiate. Or even to talk quietly through the channels of diplomacy. With a view to bring about negotiation. In short the man as has been

recognized by all organs of public opinion. In all capitals friendly to us and friendly to annoy. In short ho G-man flatly rejected both objectives we had sought to achieve by the prolonged suspension of our bombing and a move towards negotiations and a peaceful settlement and the reciprocal reduction of hostilities. In so doing oh Jean me and other leaders of North Vietnam assume full responsibility for the decision that the bombing suspension could not be continued. The thirty seven day the United States is not responsible for resuming the bombing ho Chih man is

responsible for resuming the bombing by rejecting a plane offer from the United States. To sustain it to continue it. If there were to continue this expensive if there were a reciprocal response from North Vietnam we have sincerely hope for a different response from Illinois. Mr President of Investigation deemed it essential to state that it objects to the convening of the Security Council for the discussion the question of Vietnam.

And declared itself to big to be crucial. The present item in the agenda of the council the Soviet Union as is known. For the just position of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. That the Vietnamese question should be settled within the framework of the Geneva Accords. And it is clear to all of the proposal of the United States of America and God in the consideration of the question of good Naaman the Security Council. Is aimed not at all towards a genuine settlement of the question of Vietnam.

But is a diversionary tactic undertaken in order to cover. By means of talks regarding a so-called settlement. And get the measure of the Pentagon to expand their aggressive war. Special attention is well and a series of circumstances under which Washington has brought about the convening of the Security Council. As is known. In the government of the United States has renewed the Barrick air raids upon the Church of the silver m socialist state.

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. And it is in this situation the State Department has felt the need for an agent session of the Security Council for the purpose of getting in the council. As well. So they are continuing their criminal aggressive policy. By the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This constitutes a flagrant violation of the charter of the United Nations and all of the basic principles of international law. The lengthy and rather inappropriate statement of the representative of the

United States. And which he hastened to make before the approval of the agenda of the council and in which. The genuine situation was grossly distorted. Mr President is public confirmation. Of the fact that in Washington they haven't yet begun to think of a genuine settlement of the Get non-problem. And that they have addressed themselves to the Security Council for the purpose. Of staging a propaganda show. The fact the acts and the plan of the United States speak louder than their words.

That the United States are not at all trying to achieve a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Washington is more intensively unfurling its aggressive actions in Vietnam and it's increasing the numbers of its troops in Vietnam. It is fabulous for the aggression in Vietnam. It is expanding the criminal intervention in South Vietnam. The United States rejects the just and well founded program of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of soffit. Regarding the conditions for a political settlement of the Get non-problem.

They are unwilling in fact to revert to a strict compliance with the Geneva Accords of nine thousand fifty four. They refused to recognize that the solution of the problem can be effected only with the participation of the National Liberation Front. Which is the genuine representative of the people of self in the United States. Continuing most flagrantly turn to fear in the domestic affairs of it it is they that have set up the puppet Saigon regime. And by means of the interventionist forces are trying to throttle the struggle of the people of South Vietnam for independence and freedom.

The United States continue to act in the question of Vietnam from a position of brute force. With the language of threats and ultimatums which cannot but bring about indignation. Through a showing of this policy proceeding from a position of strength they have also started or resumed their air raids of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. If the United States Mr. President. Genuine you wish to achieve peace as they went so eloquent about it then is the.

Resumption of the bombings a way of producing an atmosphere conducive to a political settlement of the problem in Vietnam. It is known that the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and striving to put an end to the war in Vietnam recently again demonstrated its readiness to achieve a just settlement of the about of the problem which should be in keeping with the interest of the people of Vietnam at the end of January. The president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Directed to the heads of states and governments of many countries of the world messages in which he stated that if the government of the United States in actual practice is interested in a peaceful settlement it must recognize the position of the full points of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

and must confirm this by means of concrete measures that must unconditionally at once and for all put an end to the bombings and all other military acts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only in this way is it possible to provide for a political settlement of the question. In the statement of the Soviet Government published on the 1st of January of this year. Mr. President it is stressed that the resumption by the American Air Force raids upon the carriage of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam two days after the statement of the head of that government with a further initiative in which he's got a further initiative indicates that in fact

the United States do not wish to see an end of the war in Vietnam and the so called peace initiative was a diplomatic ploy designed to disorient Well public opinion. And to pave the way for a further expansion of aggression against the Vietnam people. Mr. President Those are the considerations which we have deemed it essential to state in the course of the consideration of the agenda of today's meeting of the Security Council. Mr. Chairman the pension explanation I think it's offered in support discussion by the

Security Council. Yes. Question Despite the fact that he's himself convinced that position was actually might have not been shaken because of the following considerations appeared to me the most you know outlining that my government does not believe that the United Nations is the appropriate forum to achieve a peaceful solution. Conflicts because of the position. Consideration presented have an authentic representation

member's discussion conducted in conditions of question before the Security Council confrontation question of question conference. It is only a

negotiation of the principle corporations in those records can be produced through a negotiation within the framework of nations. Apart from the increase in absence of produce this is why my education dangerous to support the proposal to include this security. Thank you. Thank you Mr. President. At this morning's meeting I attempted to explain in some detail the reasons which I have impelled my government to bring the question of to the

Security Council. I shall not repeat that explanation but I shall endeavor to deal briefly with doubts which have been raised by other members. As to the usefulness of Security Council consideration of this problem at this time I have listened very carefully. To the discussion which has taken place this morning and this afternoon. I agree with the observation made by our colleague the distinguished representative of New Zealand. That the discussions today which of necessity have extended somewhat the agenda item have already demonstrated. Our discussion in the Security Council is to be anticipated and although reflecting varying points of view

about the main problem at hand as well as procedure has been tempered to the surprise probably of some reasonable and informative. I particularly am appreciative of the interventions of the new members of the Security Council. There's been a high quality. And I have listened to them and to the older members very carefully. I have tried to do so in the spirit so well expressed by our esteemed colleague my friend Chief the distinguished representative of Nigeria. I know he will not mind if I say that assessment to consider. The whale argument is one common to all members of the council whether aligned or not no. We are as I said this morning the Security Council.

We have a corporate responsibility to the maintenance of peace and security. Now I shall turn to some of the questions raised by the members in the course of our discussion. And I should like to deal with what was first pointed out a friend or former president the distinguished representative of France Embassador Satan whose wisdom I have learned to appreciate very much and whose friendship I deeply. The question you raise a very important one has been raised by other distinguished representatives sting was representative of Uganda and has been averted. Two distinguished representative Gary and I think was mentioned also our esteemed investor fettering. And their point is this has been pointed out by them that the Geneva Conference

which all parties to the conflict are represented. Has been the international body which has in the past dealt with the problem. And it has been claimed that it still remains the appropriate body to do so. But the United States has no Koro with this contention. The first of the 14 points which represented a summary of our policy states that and I quote. The Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. Are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. We have repeatedly said that we would welcome the reconvening of the Geneva conference for this purpose. Indeed the government of the United Kingdom one of the cochairman

of this conference has specifically addressed a request by the government of the Soviet Union the other cochairman. They issue a joint call for the reconvening of the conference. But how is this proposal received. Soviet Union refused to join in any steps to reconvene the cunt left the joint chairman issue the call of today and we will be in Geneva to morrow at a conference and then indeed there would be no necessity for the Security Council to deal with this mess. It has been correctly pointed out that the purpose of our resolution is to assist in what thus far has not been possible to be realized. The reconvening of the Geneva conference and that have been not possible to realize

not because of any opposition on the part of the United States. Quite the contrary. Under those circumstances therefore the choice before us members of the council whether to deal with this problem in the Security Council or to deal with it in Geneva. But whether to deal with it at all. The door to Geneva is at least for the time being closed. And the question we have to decide is a plain and simple one. Do we wish to close the door to the United Nations. What will the people of the world say if we do. It has been pointed out by a distinguished members here that several of the parties to the conflict in Vietnam are not members of the United Nations and therefore are not in a position to present their case.

But others have pointed out the NAE need only invite the Council's attention to Article 32 of the charter which says in part any state which is not a member of the United Nations if it is a party to the dispute under consideration by the Security Council should be invited to participate without discussion relating to the dispute. And it is to remember also there is a charter which reaches the members of the United Nations. Article 2 paragraph 6 the organization shall ensure. That states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles. So far as may be necessary for the international peace and security. And this organization of course has had experience with this matter before this is not a new

subject for our consideration. We have considered matters in the past and presumably will do so in the future. Were members or nonmembers of the United Nations have refused to participate. The government of South Africa. Has consistently refused to participate in proceedings of this council dealing with the problem of apartheid. The council have rightly we believe never permitted itself by this refusal to be prevented from dealing with a problem which it believes clearly fell within the scope of its responsibility. It isn't sad. Why has the United States not brought these problems to the council before. I should like to remind the members of the council that in 1964 we brought an aspect of the problem to the

security of the Gulf of Tonkin incident was no fault of the United States. That was not fully explored. I should also like to remind the members of the council that in Security Council documents we have repeatedly repeatedly appealed and all of its organs for assistance in the settlement of this dispute. One of my distinguished colleagues has suggested the council should not attempt to deal with a problem unless it is assured that it can do so successfully to do so unsuccessfully claims would be a blow to its prestige. Let me point out that the council has not been inhibited in the past from dealing with threats to the peace of the world because it could not be assured of doing so. Success indeed. Did you know early expect to have any such assurance in advance that it added to their answer. Probably

the matter would not have to come to the council. My distinguished colleagues will remember that only a few months ago a full scale war broke out between two great members of the United Nations India and Pakistan. Neither sought a ship to bring this conflict before the Security Council. Nevertheless the council almost rightly decided that it must seek to bring an early end to this threat to the peace of the world despite how the parties to the conflict might feel. Well success was far from assured when we began our deliberations. The council did deal most vigorously and most unitedly with this war and within a matter of weeks it did overcoming very serious obstacles. Bring about a cease fire which still update. In other cases candor compels the statement that the council has not been successful and many untractable problems still remain on its agenda which is

apparent from the monthly distribution of the agenda which takes place. For the council however to refuse even to attempt to carry out the obligations laid on it by the charter what credit Christie could hope to have in the works. And I must say that I completely failed to understand how those states which repeatedly insist that the Security Council and the Security Council alone has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Tonight it's kind of permit me to say only to my fellow members of the council at this critical juncture of its history that what is at stake here is not the United States position. We have brought the matter to the council.

What is at stake here is how will the world judge the council if it refuses even to discuss and consider that problem which public opinion almost everywhere considers to be the most serious threat to the peace now confronting mankind. Let reliance then confidence will the peoples of the world henceforth place in the Security Council in the United Nations itself without having made the attempt. To deal with this mess. Finally Mr. President I would remind my colleagues once again what I said a few minutes earlier what the United States seeks from this council. And I add is apparent from the draft resolution which we have placed before the council. We do not expect the council itself to solve the whole problem of Vietnam either with or without the other parties to the country.

What we ask is only that the council and its tremendous weight and precede my calling for immediate discussions without precondition among the appropriate interested governments to arrange for a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Accord of 1954 and 1960 do. What we're asking the council to do is no different from what the online countries did in their appeal on this subject. What we ask is only that this council offer its assistance in bringing about peace in Southeast Asia perhaps through the provision of arbitrators or mediators. There's only as the pope has suggested or perhaps to some other appropriate means. This much Certainly we can do. And let us not underestimate the effect of our doing this much the fact that we are attempting to fulfill our responsibility to the peace of the

world by taking action along these lines would not in any way inhibit or prevent any government or governments from seeking to promote negotiation or conciliation through other channels. And a recent example of how that could be done has been provided by the welcome intervention of the Soviet Union which supplemented the efforts of this council in helping to bring about a better understanding between India and Pakistan and that action which I'm sure every member of this council would commit. We would welcome any efforts to the end of a peaceful settlement as we have been attempting to do. But in the absence of such efforts at this time showing any prospect of success and confronted by the refusal of the government of North Vietnam to take part

in unconditional negotiations. Under the auspices which we have tried we continue to believe that the body primarily charged with the maintenance of the peace of the world has every right and more important every duty to explore earnestly and without fear of failure. What it can do in this critical turning point in world affairs.