The Robert MacNeil Report; Angola

Thank you so much for watching, and I'll see you in the next video, and I'll see you in the next video, and I'll see you in the next video. Good evening. The United States Senate today rejected the arguments of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and voted to cut off secret U.S. military aid to two factions in Angola. The President immediately made a statement saying the decision would profoundly affect the security of this country. He asked the Senate to reverse the decision. The decision was a setback to the Ford administration, which had argued strongly that the United States needed to aid the forces in the former Portuguese colony, fighting against another faction backed by the Soviet Union in Cuba. The issue has been brewing ever since the disclosure recently that the CIA had secretly funneled some $33 million in arms and equipment to counter Soviet efforts.

Many members of Congress feared the country was sliding into a new Vietnam. For more on the moves in Washington, here is Jim Lehrer. The Senate's 54-22 vote cutting off that military aid to anti-Soviet factions in Angola came on an amendment to a $112 billion defense appropriations bill. Some senators favored delaying action until after the Christmas recess. Once appropriations, Committee Chairman John McClellan had promised not to allow funds to be reprogrammed for use in Angola without the Senate's approval. But defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld seeking passage of a military appropriations bill urged an immediate vote. And then the Senate vote went against the administration. Now the bill must go to the House, which also has to endorse the cut-off amendment if it is to become law. Thank you. Angola is nearly twice the size of the state of Texas, and 14 times the size of Portugal, which governed it for 400 years.

Angola has 6 million people, at best 30 percent can read and write. There's a joke told in Luanda, the former colonial capital. After the creation of the Angola's ask, God, tell us, Lord, why have you blessed us so? Other countries have desert, and we have lush lands. Where other support we have diamonds and oil and coffee, why? And God is said to have answered, just wait until you see who I'm sending to colonize you. Portuguese rule was cruel and unenlightened. It encouraged splits in the independence movement and left a legacy of civil war. Angolans have been fighting for independence for 14 years. Last November 11th, when the Portuguese left, the country was divided into three factions, the popular movement for the liberation of Angola, or the MPLA. It controls central Angola and the oil-producing enclave of Cabinda in the north, where Gulf oil has leases that give the MPLA a half billion dollars yearly.

The Soviet Bank, MPLA, is led by Agarstino Natu, a poet and militant socialist, and has attracted the bulk of the educated classes. The national front for the liberation of Angola is led by Holden Roberto, brother-in-law of the ruler of neighboring Zaire. Both China and the United States have helped the national front, which recently formed an alliance with the third revolutionary group, the national union for the total independence of Angola, or Unita, led by Jonas Savimbi, a one-time follower of Roberto. Unita represents the largest ethnic group in Angola, the Avimbundus, who are 38% of the population. The MPLA, which denies its tribal base, primarily represents the Kimbundus, who are 28% of the population. The national front are the Bakungos, who are only 13% of the population. Unita's observer at the United Nations is Jeremiah Tautunda,

who is the Minister of National Resources in the short-lived coalition government of last January. First of all, Mr. Tautunda, how do you feel about the rejection by the Senate today of aid for the two factions, one of which you represent? I think any time that a source of assistance in aid is cut off or not available to Unita, particularly during this critical period, definitely the situation represents more problems, more pressures with the whole struggle. Is it going to be fatal for your struggle? Will that mean you will lose the struggle against the MPLA? No, I don't think so. It will not be fatal to it. Yes, other efforts will be made.

Where will they come from? Well, it's very difficult to elaborate on it. Now, since this Senate vote, this news has just come out now. It has just come to you. And you have had a chance to get in touch with your people in Angola. Yes. Do you agree with those people in the United States, including the administration, who argued that if your opponents, the MPLA, who control the Loanda area in the North, they win that that would result in the Soviet domination of Angola? I think the whole concept of trying to resolve the Angola problem by armed way has been rejected. We have been striving for a political solution in which the three factions must be taken into account for lasting peace. And I don't think that by meat I take over,

by any one of these factions, we are going to have peace in Angola. But what happens if that is the result in the MPLA wins, the Soviet-backed MPLA? What happens if they win a military struggle? First of all, it's not possible for any of these three factions to win military, to have an absolute victory in Angola. These victories may be only temporary, but the struggle will go on. Fighting will not stop. You mean there's going to have to be negotiations and a compromise sometime. I definitely think so. What difference has the U.S. military aid that we've just learned about made to your group and Holden Roberta's group, the other one fighting the Soviet-backed forces? I don't know exactly the magnitude of these assistance, but I'm quite sure that you need, has been assisted by Western countries.

Other than the United States? Yes. Do you care to name which ones they are? The United States is not the only Western country sending aid to your forces. It's not the only one. There is because you're in the same area of Angola to the South, which borders on South-West Africa, Namibia, and the Africans, the South Africans, are sending forces in to defend their interests there. There is a strong suspicion that the South Africans are aiding you. Is that the case? Well, South Africans are in Angola. It is true. There are four aspects of our explanation to the presence of the South Africans in Angola. First of all, of course, the continental river dam project, which they have wanted to safeguard. That's a hydroelectric project.

It's a hydroelectric project. It was initially safeguarded by Portuguese troops. Once Portuguese forces were withdrawn from the country, and the three liberation movements, were unable to safeguard the project jointly. South Africa moved in and mounted. It set up somewhere near 1,000 troops to safeguard it. Of course, we also have the problem of swappled fighters. Those are the freedom fighters within South-West Africa who are fighting against the South African government. Yes, for the liberation on Namibia. The most concentrated on southern parts of the country, and of course South Africa makes several incursions in its efforts trying to track them down. Trying to track down its own gorillas. Could I just ask you this question, though, simply? Is the South African government helping you? It is not helping you. South Africa is there for its own interests.

But they coincide to some extent with yours, do they know? South Africa doesn't want to have in Angola, in the hostile region. South Africa thinks it's to its own interests to fight the Cubans in the Russians in Angola. And they're doing that. They're doing that. Maybe they're doing that. Just finally, Mr. Chitunda, why, when the MPLA, the Soviet Back Group has won the recognition of so many countries in the rest of Black Africa, why do you not regard it as the legitimate government of Angola? I don't think the recognition is the legitimization of a government, not for the case of Angola, where the situation is much more complex than that. We think that the official position of the OAU has been since the very beginning

to support the formation of an international organization of African unity. To support formation of a government of national unity, in that government, the free liberation movement, should naturally participate. There was such a coalition at first last January, and it fell apart. Why did it fall apart? Well, there were so many differences. First of all, our war summit conference, which was held in Portugal, and during which the formation of this transitional government was established, the conference didn't resolve the basic problems among the free liberation movements. Without going through all the differences, there were among the liberation movements, for sure would take us a long time. Can I ask you this one question? Did the United States, politically, or through covered operations, contribute in any way to the breakup of that coalition? Not that you're not.

Mr. Chitunda, thank you very much indeed for coming this evening. Leslie Gelb, who is a Washington correspondent for the New York Times, has devoted, covered the diplomatic angle of the Angola story. Mr. Gelb himself, once with the State Department, is in Washington with Jim Lara. Jim? First, Mr. Gelb, to this summit vote today, surprise you. Yes, it did surprise me, and it surprised me in the sense that the administration pushed for it, knowing it was almost certain to lose. And it surprised me in the extent to which there was such large opposition to our involvement in Angola. I think it showed the extent to which Vietnam is still such a raw nerve in American politics and still so close to the surface. Is there any evidence at this point as to why rumspell did what he did today and brought this thing to a head when he could have delayed it until after Christmas? I really can't figure that out. I don't see the advantage. Well, what about these stories that, number one, the administration itself was not even unified on this particular issue.

There were a lot of discrepancies. A lot of disagreements within the administration. Is that true? That's absolutely true. There's always a gap in every administration between a handful of policy makers and the area specialists in the intelligence community that state department of the Pentagon. But I've never seen a gap so unbridgably wide between the specialists on Angola and Africa and the policymakers who made the decision to get us involved in this covert operation. Well, now what were the policymakers telling, I mean, what were the experts telling the policymakers that they didn't go on with? A lot of things. First, they argued that the balance of power in Africa did not hinge on the outcome of the Civil War in Angola. That if the United States stayed out of it, the nations of Africa would not look only to Russia as the only outside power that counted in Africa that the Africans have shown great sophistication

and being able to ward off outside power influence and would do so again. They also disagreed that this was somehow an important test case of American credibility in Moscow that if we didn't act to oppose the Russians in Angola somehow they would begin to test this elsewhere. It was a domino-like rationale. Well, who carried the, who carried the day? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger? Yes. Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa, who is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman of the Committee's Subcommittee on African Affairs is also here. Senator, what's your reading of what happened up there today? Do you agree with less it? It was all a reaction to Vietnam or what happened? You led the fight. Well, I think it was a combination of things. I agree with Mr. Gelb, and I think what we saw was an indication that the administration had not made a good case for continuing over to covert activity in a civil war, really a tribal war in Central Africa.

That's a pretty hard case to make in itself. But we got so many different stories, really, from the Secretary of State on the one hand and from the CIA on the other hand as to the justifications that I think even those people who would normally support the administration could not in good conscience do it on this occasion. Senator, you know, the president really took out after you guys in his statement this evening and said that this vote hurt the interests of the United States and applied America's honor was involved. How do you respond to that? Well, I think if the president feels that we're justified in being in that civil war, that he ought to be willing to come to the American people and tell us what to tell them what to do. To tell the Congress of what our involvement and what our interests there, it ought not to be done in a secret way without advising either the Congress of the American people. If he feels that it's an honorable kind of thing and that he wants us involved there, that's the least that he could do. All this amendment does is to say no more secrets or if you wish to come before the Congress and make a case for this war, we'll take it into consideration,

but we're not going to do it anymore in secrecy. That's really all the amendment judges. All right, was that the basis of your opposition rather than the specifics of Angola? It was just the basic concept of a secret war not being fought with that Congress knowing about it and acquiescing. Is that what the basis of your opposition? Certainly, I think when has opposition on many of us have opposition on two levels, but the motion that I offered, for example, and the Tony emotion as well, did not prejudge whether we ought to be in Angola. It simply said we're going to end the covert activity if you think you have a case. Bring it to the Congress and to the people in the open and we'll consider it, but we're not going to consider a secret war now. I'm very confident that if the President were to do that to come publicly to the Congress that he'd be turned down, and I think the President knows that, and that's why we've got a secret war rather than an open war. Do you think that this vote is too much to interpret this vote as a signal that covert actions of this type, no matter where they are,

or through as far as the United States is concerned? Well, I think it's too early to make that kind of judgment, but I think for the first time, the members of the Senate got a very good idea of the difficulty of carrying on a covert activity and at the same time having any reasonable kind of control over it. I think the two are contradictory. In my own judgment, you cannot carry on, particularly a major kind of military covert activity. At the same time, have the member, all the members of Congress advised of it. They're contradictory. I think that we cannot continue that kind of covert activity for a great variety of reasons. Senator, thank you. Thanks, Jim. Thanks, Jim. The MPLA representative at the United Nations is Elizio Figurado. Mr. Figurado, how do you react to the vote in the Senate today? Is that mean a great victory for your side since you're getting aid from the Cubans and the Russians? Well, we've simply delighted to know that here in America, there is a group of senators and members of the Congress who seem to be quite objective about the realities

that exist in Angola. Therefore, the vote today in this country simply represents once again that our Americans' interests in Angola and therefore hope that this sort of opinion can continue indeed. I see. If your side wins, the fear of those who wanted to continue aid to the other side, if the MPLA wins, they feared that that would lead to something like Soviet domination or at least a stronger Soviet foothold in presence in South Africa than the United States wanted. If you win, if you become the only government of Angola, will you be dominated by the Soviet Union? Well, definitely not. We are a nationalist in Angola. We are patriotic. It is imperative for the American people

to know here that throughout the 14 years of our armed struggle against the Portuguese, we appeal to Western nations to give us help, but no country really would give us a grenade to fight against the Portuguese at that time, the socialist countries, and also including Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and various progressive groups around the Western world helped us. Now that we have attained our independence on the levels of November and created a government, the People's Republic of Angola, all of a sudden there is a breakway in many Western capitals, accusing us of communist or Soviet-backed or whatever. Well, this certainly does not fit the realities within the country today. We are a known aligned nation. We intend to establish diplomatic relations with various countries, including the United States, as long as our territorial integrity is respected. I see.

But why is the USSR backing you? Why have they now stepped up their aid? I know they backed you for a long time during a long independent struggle against the Portuguese. Why are they backing you now? And what are they going to want in thanks for that? Well, definitely that backing us now, they have established diplomatic relations with us. We certainly have asked for some military armament on the face of the South African invasion into Angola. And therefore, and it is important also to know that there are no Soviet military personnel in Angola. But there are Cuban. Yes, we have invited some Cuban instructors to train our militants. Only instructors. Are they not Cuban actually fighting? There might be some in the war zones, but however not as some, the numbers, that some of your newspapers have reported here. What is the correct number? I have no defigils with me at this particular time, however, certainly not that exaggerated number that appeals in various papers.

I see. Why do you not support as the other factions do a coalition of the three groups? We are not a faction. Mr. McNhel, of course, we were a liberation movement until the levels of November. We certainly became a party. People's Republic of Angola. It's Vanguard is the MPLA. This is the party in Angola. We represent the people of Angola. We championed their aspirations, and we have defended since 1961 up to this particular moment. Now, the two groups that you spoke of, you need to end the finale, they are closed associated with South Africa. The South Africans are in Angola due to the visit of the B.A.D. to South Africa three months ago, due to some representatives of N.A. B.A.D. also to Namibia. The combination of all this made the South Africa even put them in a position of strength to the extent that they are now in Angola,

fighting against us, 500 miles inside our country. We presented some white South African regular prisoners in Lagos, Nigeria yesterday. We saw their pictures. We have some in Angola. As long as South African army racists remain in Angola, there won't be any salt of negotiations. Thank you for the moment. Can I bring in Lord Garrison, who's with the New York Times in the Congo and Angola in the 1960s, and is currently working on a book on Africa called The Distant Drum? You've now heard two versions of the political reality in Angola, one from Mr. Jotunda, and now from Mr. Figurator. How do you balance what they've said? How do you assess what they've said? Well, I think that neither have said anything at the moment that would set off any sparks between the two. I would take a small exception to your assertion that the MPLA is a movement that represents all of Angola,

an assertion that Mr. Jotunda from Anita did not make. I think the MPLA, historically, is very strong. Among the, it's the congruent of people. And in Rwanda, I don't think any government or any faction or group in Angola can govern without you. But the same token, I don't think that you can effectively govern the rest of the country without the assistance of the powers that be in those two other areas. Please, if you hear, well, it's also happened that, as you know, Mr. Garison, the MPLA, evolves all the evolves, the congruence of inbundus, kimbundus, and onbundus within the MPLA. We are not a tribal party, really, but our party, indeed, tends to agglomerate all these members of all these three various groups.

And, of course, to state that the MPLA is only strong in Rwanda, really, it's somehow terminologically in an exactitude out there, because even in Southern part of Angola, the B2-Pangela, these are areas militarily controlled at the present time by Anita and the Finale, but people are certainly with the MPLA. Mr. Figurators, thank you. I'd like to ask Mr. Garison and then bring in, Mr. Galvin, Senator Clark and Washington, to conclude, what do you think should be our policy towards Angola if the issue is not at rest yet, the Senators, the President's Office, the Senate to reverse its decision? What should we do, Mr. Garison? I think we did the right thing in cutting off all aid at the moment. I think that there has to be a total reassessment of our position in Angola. I think that the association with South Africa, it was a major blunder on the part of Mr. Kissinger, I think it was unpalatable in the Congress,

we've seen the results of that. I think it certainly is certainly unpalatable in Africa and in much of the rest of the world. I cannot, for the life of me, understand why the United States would link its objectives with those of the South African government, unless there is a longer range plan or policy to ultimately defend South Africa, should there be African incursions from the North that don't happen to suit the point of view of? The particular anomaly, it seems to me, the Marlon anomaly, is that the country bordering Angola is actually Namibia, and we have been one of those countries which has consistently urged South Africa to divest itself, according to the United Nations regulations of Namibia, have we known? That's correct. Can I ask Senator Clark, what do you think our policy should be from here towards Africa? Well, I think we ought to get out of Angola and set that example. I'm confident that the Soviets will have no long-term advantage in having done that, that they will not create a satellite state there

any more than they have in other places in Africa with one exception in Somalia, a very poor country. They really had no success at that. So I think it would be a great mistake for us to stay in there for all the reasons that Mr. Garrison has just given. So I think our attitude in Africa ought to be one of looking at these independent individual African states of them for themselves. That's something we've never done. We've never had a president. We've never had a secretary of state. We even has visited the continent of Africa. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Galba, final word. What do you think we should be doing? Well, I'm surprised we got involved in the first place. And I think, again, reflecting the views of the people in the administration who know something about Africa and who have been following our relations with the Soviet Union that we still are chained to a mentality that somehow continues to define our interests in the world in terms of what the Soviet Union does or doesn't do. What I would like to say hasn't happened yet, namely a strong initiative from the organization

of African unity, calling on all outside powers and Angola to leave and to let the people of that country settle the issue themselves. Thank you, Mr. Galba. Sorry to interrupt you. Thank you, and Senator Clark. Thanks, Jim. Lord Garrison, Mr. Figurative. Thank you. Jim Lara and I will be back on Monday evening. I'm Robert McNeil. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you.