The MacNeil/Lehrer Report; Afghanistan: War Continues

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ROBERT MacNEIL [voice-over]: For nearly two years, a large Soviet army has been trying to crush guerrilla resistance in Afghanistan. Now. there is fresh evidence that the Soviets are failing.

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MacNEIL: Good evening. While the United States is freshly worried about threats to its friends in the Middle East, military planners in Moscow may be getting more worried about Afghanistan. For nearly two years, a force of some 85,000 Soviet troops has been bogged down trying to subdue scattered bands of Afghan tribesmen who maintain their armed resistance to the Soviet occupation. In Washington, the Soviet presence there is often cited as another reason for American anxiety about the security of the Persian Gulf area. But in Moscow it may increasingly look -- as some in the West have been predicting -- mat Afghanistan would become the Soviets` Vietnam. Tonight, with a journalist who recently visited the Afghan guerrilla forces, we examine the state of resistance to the Soviet occupa-tion. Jim?

JIM LEHRER: Robin, for the record, the Soviets deny their invasion of Afghanistan was, in fact, an invasion. They claim their troops, tanks, helicopters, and other military hardware are there as friends -- friends of the government of President Babrak Karmal, invited by him to stabilize matters against the Afghan tribesmen, who have been in a state of rebellion since 1968. That`s when a coalition of three Communist political leaders, with Soviet help, overthrew the government and established a Marxist state. Karmal was one of the three instigators; the other two, Hafizullah Amin and Noor Mohammad Taraki, preceded him as president, and are now both dead. Taraki was fatally wounded in September of 1979 in a gun battle between his supporters and those of Amin. Amin then took over as president; two months later he was captured by Soviet paratroopers and executed. Karmal was immediately proclaimed president, as the Soviet army crossed over the border to do what neither Taraki nor Amin had been able to do: subdue the rebels once and for all and control the country. Robin?

MacNEIL: In 1980, Christian Science Monitor reporter Edward Girardet visited Afghanistan twice. He`s just made a third trip to compare impressions. His month-long visit involved a 700-mile trek, crossing the border from northern Pakistan. His destination was the Pansjir Valley, near the strategic highway linking Kabul, the Afghan capital, with the Soviet Union.

EDWARD GIRARDET [voice-over]: The Pansjir Valley is one of the major resistance centers against the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. Traveling with a 50-horse caravan laden with weapons, ammunition, and medicine, it look us ten days to get to the valley. Our trail led through some of the most rugged terrain in the world -- the 20,000-foot high Hindu Kush Mountains. At any one time, the caravan was spread out over several miles to avoid patrolling Soviet helicopters. Two groups of Afghan guerrillas formed this particular 19th century-style caravan, one of dozens along the secret route during the snow-free summer months. Fifty were returning to fight the Communists from their haven in the Pansjir Valley. The others, about 20, were heading inland, before branching off to the north to join partisan units along the Soviet border. Also in the caravan were a French medical team on their way to operate a clandestine hospital. Apart from the occasional distant thunder of a MIG, we saw little sign of the Soviets. But there were mines. Shortly after crossing into Afghanistan, one of the guerrillas stepped on a Soviet booby trap. The doctors had to perform an on-the-spot amputation using a pen-knife and their emergency medical kit, as their surgical instruments weie loaded on a horse several hours to the rear.

Our arrival in the valley was marked by the lushness of irrigated green fields and terraced orchards. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 80,000 Tajik inhabitants of the Pansjir Valley have offered stubborn resistance. Four times in the past 18 months, Soviet and Afghan government troops have launched massive offensives using tanks, helicopters, and MIGs, in an attempt to crush the guerrillas. But on each occasion the Communists were forced back, leaving a trail of wrecked equipment. The man behind the Pansjirs` resolute determination to resist what the Afghans consider to be the infidel repression of the Communists, is a 27-year-old former engineering student, guerrilla commander Ahmed Sha Massoud. Both his resourceful leadership and acute knowledge of modem guerrilla warfare has earned Massoud a reputation not unlike that of Che Guevara. The main problem facing Massoud is still the lack of weapons. But the Afghans are certainly better equipped than in the early days of the occupation. Most military supplies in the Pansjir Valley consist of captured Communist material. Many of Mas-soud`s hardened front-line fighters carry AK-47 and the more modem AK-74 assault rifles. Only one quarter of their weapons is said to come from Pakistan. Despite reports of substantial foreign assistance from the United States, China, and the Gulf nations, resis-tance groups inside the country bitterly complain that even if outside aid is filtering through, they see very little of it.

Yet, the combat effectiveness of Massoud`s roughly 1000 disciplined and well-armed guerrillas illustrates a striking improvement in the overall ability of the Afghan resistance to fight an increasingly successful war of attrition against the Soviets. Rather than launch-ing large free-for-all attacks against Communist bases and convoys, carefully planned strategy, using small but more incisive units, well-versed in guerrilla tactics, has become the name of the game. Massoud has sought to mold the traditional Afghan tribesman into a modem guerrilla fighter. Since the Communist takeover, he has trained more than 5000 men at bases in the valley. So impressed are other resistance groups, including political rivals, that they have begun sending supporters to the Pansjir for schooling from else- where in the country. Recruitment continues, despite the fact that graves of guerrilla fighters are a common sight.

Up to 80% of the valley`s houses, mosques, and schools have been damaged or destroyed during the Communist offensives. But the Pansjiris are determined to survive. New modem stone dwellings emerge from the ruins. Farmers thresh mounds of ripened wheat, and shopkeepers offer anything from fresh meat to melons and tomatoes in the village bazaars. Schools have been re- established, and the French doctors, apart from treating war victims, have begun to create a general health service for the valley. In many respects, the Pansjir Valley is run like a semi-autonomous state. Loosely affiliated with the Pakistan-based Jamaat-i-Islam, one of the seven major Afghan political parties, Massoud heads a resistance council with eight ministries responsible for defense, finance, information, and other activities. The resistance also operates its own POW camp for Afghan communist teachers, government officials, and military officers who`ve either been captured or kidnapped. As a rule, the guerrillas take no Russians alive; a major factor in contributing toward demoralization among Soviet troops. The Pansjir is but one valley; political disunity remains among the Pakistan-based parties, but as I left, it was clear that growing numbers of guerrillas from Afghanistan`s vast patchwork of resistance groups are prepared to fight together.

MacNEIL: That report was by Edward Girardet of the Christian Science Monitor, who also took most of those pictures, and who is with us this evening. Mr. Girardet, how has the situation changed since your last visit, about a year before?

Mr. GIRARDET: Well, about a year before, the--I was in the South, and one other region of Afghanistan, and the guerrillas were, on the whole, extremely disorganized. They were also poorly armed, and would tend to make these large, swarmed attacks of maybe 100 to 200 men, and I think were rather ineffective. But going back a year later-- the situation had changed almost completely, particularly in the Pansjir Valley. Not only are the guerrillas there better armed, but they`re also better organized, and they`ve begun to use tactics. strategy. For example, they would use small, tightly-knit groups, with better armed guerril-las, and they would really plan their attacks, which was also not the case about a year ago. Another important point is that they also coordinate with other rival political groups in other areas, as long as they respect these areas.

MacNEIL: How rival are they still? I remember, from your reports and some others, a year and longer ago, that the rebels seemed to be squabbling among themselves -- almost as much as they were fighting the Soviets. Has that changed?

Mr. GIRARDET: Well, I think one has to remember that there are these seven major political groups in Peshawar, but this is not Afghanistan. Afghanistan is basically divided up into a patchwork of resistance groups, that perhaps maybe 200-300 resistance groups could be-- perhaps the valley, such as the Pansjir Valley, or an entire region, such as the Hazar-ajat, which is in central Afghanistan. This is, I think, is where the resistance really is, and--

MacNEIL: Are they still all operating on an uncoordinated freelance basis, just as they each see fit?

Mr. GIRARDET: There is no central leadership, but they coordinate attacks - - which is one major development.

MacNEIL: Are they in communication with each other?

Mr. GIRARDET: Oh yes, yes, their main system of communication is messengers; it`s very, you know, 18th century, 19th century.

MacNEIL: But there`s no national leadership?

Mr. GIRARDET: No national leadership.

MacNEIL: Or, no national directive going on?

Mr. GIRARDET: Nothing at all, nothing at all.

MacNEIL: Now, on the matter of arms, you said, in the report we`ve just heard, that they complained that if there was aid coming in, very little of it was reaching them. Did you actually see any evidence of American or Western military aid getting through?

Mr. GIRARDET: First of all, I think it would be impossible to say, because, as Sadat said, he has been,-- or, the American aid has been coming in through Egypt -- mainly Soviet-type arms. But, a lot of the arms you see with the Afghans are Soviet arms. I--

MacNEIL: So you wouldn`t know whether those were captured or whether they were--

Mr. GIRARDET: No, no. I came in with this 50-horse caravan, which was carrying mainly Soviet weapons. Now, these could have come from the Pakistani bazaars, or they could have come from Egypt, but I think one can`t determine that.

MacNEIL: You have no way of knowing that?

Mr. GIRARDET: No way of knowing that.

MacNEIL: Did you have any hint that the rebels are in any kind of clandestine contact with the CIA, or other Western agencies?

Mr. GIRARDET: Nothing at all. I think-- the Afghans, this is their main complaint. They feel they`ve been totally neglected by the West, particularly the United States. And they kept asking me, "Why is the U.S. not doing anything?" This is their main complaint, and I think contacts with the CIA-- I haven`t seen any evidence, and neither have other journalists I`ve talked to, or French doctors who are inside -- there are about 20 French doctors working inside Afghanistan.

MacNEIL: Do you have any way of knowing how typical that very stable situation in the Pansjir Valley, which you described, is of the rest of Afghanistan?

Mr. GIRARDET: I think it`s probably more stable than a lot of other areas. Again, because of this patchwork system of resistance groups, you have some which are more organized and more efficient than others, but, I think from what I`ve heard from other parts, there is a growing sense of efficiency among the Afghans -- although I think the Pansjir Valley was particularly well-organized, particularly because of Massoud, who himself is, as I men- tioned, the Che Guevara, in a sense, of the Afghan resistance.

MacNEIL: In general, would you be able to say whether the Soviets have extended their control over the parts of the countryside, or whether that area of control has shrunken in the last year?

Mr. GIRARDET: I think it`s shrunken, because, I mean, walking into Afghanistan, we walked through a lot of lands, through the mountains, and there was really no sign of the Soviets -- except the mines. And, you know, very often you would feel that you were in Switzerland. You know, it was peaceful, idyllic, and no sign of the war, except bombed buildings from the earlier days of the occupation. But, I think from what I`ve been hearing from Afghans, from other journalists, from the doctors, the Soviets really only occupy--- and I wouldn`t say control, but they occupy the towns, and of course use the highways-- but at a risk.

MacNEIL: Finally, what is your own reading on why the Soviets seem not able to deal decisively with the situation there?

Mr. GIRARDET: Well, I think the main reason is the terrain, because-- the Pansjir Valley is a good example; it`s very mountainous country, and to get in, you have to go through a narrow gorge. And what the Soviets have been doing so far, in these past four offenses, has been to drive in with tanks. And, this is rather easy to block for the Afghans who are getting better arms, you know, with anti-tank guns, and rockets, and the Russians have not been coming out, except in a few cases. I think if they do come out more, and fight on a man-to-man basis in the mountains, they`ll suffer more casualties, but probably it`ll be more effective. But, then I think also the Afghans have become more effective as guerrilla fighters, using tactics.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Another perspective now, from Robert Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghan-istan in the late `60s and early `70s, and currently a member of the Afghanistan relief board, a group working to get arms and money to the Afghan guerrillas. Mr. Neumann headed the Reagan State Department transition team, and afterwards served for several months as the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He resigned over differences with Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and is now a senior associate at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Ambassador, what kind of support are the guerrillas receiving from the West?

Amb. ROBERT NEUMANN: Well, that`s of course a secret. They do get some, but it goes in so many channels --- it has to -- and is, as Mr. Girardet said, of-- all of Russian make, or copies of Russian make, so you can`t tell. Since there are so many groups, it`s very difficult to say who-- which equipment goes to whom. And I`m not also sure that-- first of all, I know the Afghans very well; they always complain, and even the weapons come out of their ears they would still be complaining, because they want some more -- that`s only natural. But, they`re doing very well with what they have, and they have to operate in small groups, because if they were larger groups they would be larger targets.

LEHRER: What are their major needs, from-

Amb. NEUMANN: Ammunition. Mr. Girardet-

LEHRER: What kind of ammunition? I mean, small arms ammunition?

Amb- NEUMANN: All kinds, especially rocket launchers, especially against the helicop-ters. But, all kinds, because, while they make a great deal themselves, still, there`s never enough, and also they have to pay for them. Even though the Afghans make it for Afghans, or tribesmen on the other side of the border make it for them, they have to paid for it -- and, sometimes the price is quite high. The people are working and fighting for Afghanistan, but they don`t forget their natural tendencies about making money.

LEHRER: Sure. Mr. Girardet just said that many of the guerrillas said, "Why isn`t the United States, why isn`t the West, generally helping us?"; what you`re saying is: they are -- they just don`t realize it.

Amb. NEUMANN: Well, that`s true, but also, if it became a major action, I don`t think it would benefit Afghanistan; it has to be a somewhat clandestine operation -- very clandestine -- and, one of the reasons is the attitude of Pakistan. Pakistan is in a very delicate position, because all this assistance has to come through Pakistan; there`s no other way of getting it into the interior of the country. Consequently, the Pakistanis would be very upset if there were a very open kind of a railroad going to the insurgents. Consequently, it is well that it is very quiet.

LEHRER: Do you agree with-- what`s your assessment of the unification, or the unity, of the guerrilla forces now?

Amb. NEUMANN: Well, it is exactly as Mr. Girardet said. It is more operational unity. There is also some among the politicians in Peshawar; I don`t think they amount to a great deal. But, the main-- there is one very important division. There are those who are funda-mentalist, the Hizbe Islami, and they are very close to the present Pakistani government. But, they desire an Afghanistan along fundamentalist lines. Now, there are many other Afghans who want a modem Afghanistan, and they`re uncomfortable with that, and that division is likely to continue. But, on the-- in the field, operationally, they seem to be able to do what is necessary, and, the smaller the groups are the better they fight and the less the target. This is, after all, a country -- as we have seen in the picture -- that has relatively little vegetation. We have seen some green pastures, but there are not that many in Afghanistan. It`s not like Vietnam, with its lush vegetation. So, a larger group would find concealment very difficult.

LEHRER: Is the situation to an almost permanent state of stalemate now?

Amb. NEUMANN: Well, if you can call mutual killing stalemate, yes. Of course, the Afghans cannot drive out the Russians, but it`s very clear now that the Russians cannot master the situation, and both sides are settling down to a fight that may last for years. Certainly, I know that my Afghan friends are-- expect that.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Finally, we look at how the Afghan situation may be viewed in the Kremlin. Robert Legvold is a political scientist at Columbia University, a senior fellow in charge of the Soviet project for the Council on Foreign Relations. He returned only last Sunday from a visit to Moscow, where he talked with Soviet policy makers and foreign policy analysts. Mr. Legvold, how do the Soviets view their struggle in Afghanistan?

ROBERT LEGVOLD: Well, if you set aside the official version of what`s happening in Afghanistan, and how well they`re doing it, how well they`re doing in Afghanistan, I think their judgment is roughly the same as Ambassador Neumann`s; that is, that it has now emerged as both a military and a political stalemate, and I think they feel that it is going to remain that stalemate for some time to come. It`s important that they see that stalemate as at a relatively low, intolerable level, and thus, they can think in terms of the long-run.

MacNEIL: I was going to ask you, is there any hint that the cost may be getting too high for them, in one way or another, to cause them to want to pull out?

Mr. LEGVOLD: No. I think not-- I don`t think it`s come close to that point, any way that you measure it -- in terms of the material cost of the war, in terms of the human loss to them, soldiers -- in terms even of attitude within the Soviet Union on the score of the war, even though the war is unpopular, so far as I can gather, among important segments of the Soviet public.

MacNEIL: How do you know it`s unpopular? I mean, that`s a very rare thing to be able to say with any confidence, is it not?

Mr. LEGVOLD: Yes, and I don`t think it reflects any precise knowledge of public attitude within the Soviet Union, but, I think it`s unpopular because I was told, by Soviets during my visit, that it was unpopular.

MacNEIL: Did you find that surprising, that they would be that candid about it?

Mr. LEGVOLD: No. no. I wasn`t that surprised. I`ve had conversations about similar topics, where they`d been candid on that score.

MacNEIL: Is it the casualty rate that is causing the unpopularity of it?

Mr. LEGVOLD: I don`t think so. One of the problems here, though, is that because the regime doesn`t share information about the actual level of casualty, the rumors circulate wildly within the Soviet Union, and it may be that there is an exaggerated notion of what the losses are in Afghanistan. Our estimates are that they`re losing between 20 and 25 people a week, which would be casualties in order of between 1000-1300 a year. But, the rumors that circulate are not only that there are Soviet soldiers dying in Afghanistan -- which is an unpopular idea among their people -- but, there are also ugly rumors of the way in which the soldiers die, which I think adds to the effect of the loss.

MacNEIL: What does that mean? The way the tribesmen mete out justice, or--

Mr. LEGVOLD: The way the soldiers are mutilated.

MacNEIL: The way they`re mutilated. Is there any sign, conversely, that the Soviet Union might be getting so impatient that it would be willing to throw a lot more force in, and try and make an end to it?

Mr. LEGVOLD: No. I don`t think so. Again, as I said, an important consideration is that they see the war continuing at a relatively low level. They think that the United-- while they believe the United States is making its contribution, they`re struck by the fact that that contribution remains at a low level, and the Americans appear not to be interested in trying to escalate the war to a much higher level. They feel that in the long run, they can pay -- for a very long time -- they can pay the price that they`re paying, and there is no need to-- as a matter of fact, there is a need not to try and escalate the war in the present circumstances.

MacNEIL: Why is Afghanistan so important to them?

Mr. LEGVOLD: Well, originally, I think they took a decision to become-- to undertake the invasion of Afghanistan, because the way in which they thought a regime with which they had aligned-- that is, Amin`s regime was losing on their border, and that ii would create a situation in Afghanistan unlike anything they`ve had before. That is, a potentially unfriendly regime; over the years, they`ve had, at least, a deferential regime, and, many would say, even aligned with the Soviets in one fashion or another. And, I think they thought that situation would be lost, at a time when the entire region was increasingly unstable, parti-cularly in the context of recrudescent Islamic fundamentalism in the area. And so they moved in. I think they moved in essentially because they thought this was an important measure in order to secure their border. I don`t think that they moved in in order to take a first step toward the oil fields. That`s not to say that the action wasn`t dangerous for whatever reason they undertook it, and that it wasn`t dangerous because they would not be wilting to duplicate the same thing if there`s instability in Iran and they feel that they`re losing control of the situation in Iranian-- Azerbaijan, for example -- so it is a dangerous move.

MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Mr. Girardet, the tribesmen you talked to, do they ever talk in terms of a negotiated settlement to stop the fighting?

Mr. GIRARDET: No, they were adamant that the only way they would accept a solution would be for the Russians to leave. And they`re also adamant that there would be no Communists left. In fact, there are probably between 3000 and 5000 party-carrying [sic] Communists in Afghanistan -- Afghans. And, I asked them, "What would you do with these people?" And they said, `"Well, obviously they cannot live here; otherwise, we`d kill them."

LEHRER: What`s your feeling for that, Mr. Ambassador? Is a political settlement for this possible?

Amb. NEUMANN: Well, there`s no doubt about it, there cannot be a settlement; it wouldn`t matter. If you made a settlement on paper, the Communists who remain in the country wouldn`t live to see the evening of that day. Nobody could control that kind of visceral action. In regard to some of the earlier statements, with which I entirely agree, I think the Russians didn`t know what they were getting into. First, they helped a Communist revolution in `78; and, after all, that sort of thing worked in other countries, so why shouldn`t it work in Afghanistan? Except it didn`t; the Afghans are very different people. Well, then came the situation that was just referred to. The native Communists couldn`t hold, and the Russians marched it; and with their tremendous show of weaponry, they thought that that would do it -- and it didn`t, because nothing does with the Afghans, they`re that kind of people.

LEHRER: Have the Russians pretty well gotten away with this thing, though, politically? You`ve heard what was said about the feeling in the Soviet Union was, that the United States wasn`t going to escalate this thing. This thing is -- you`ve said it yourself -- this thing is probably going to go for years and years and years. Is the heat off?

Amb. NEUMANN: The heat is off as far as the foreign countries are concerned, especially Europe, which is a little bit soft on that, and other subjects; if it were closer, it might be different -- and also, the eyes of Europe are more on Poland than on Afghanistan. However, there are other hidden factors. The first troops that the Soviets sent in were from neighboring provinces in the Soviet Union, were Moslem troops. They proved to be dubious to unreli-able. And, they were quickly moved out. Now, by the end of this century, the majority of the Russian-- Soviet population will be non-Russian, many of them Moslem. The Russians have been very sensitive about that problem, way back to the days of Stalin, when he was Commissar for Nationalities. So, there is a sensitivity here, then. If we don`t know what`s going to happen in Iran, and what the Russian relation to that-- well, that`s another Moslem nation they have to be concerned about that -- and, while, of course, Russians are hugely superior in manpower and equipment to the West, it is not unlimited. If they had an Iranian situation to handle, and the Afghan situation on their hand, and then something broke in Poland, well, their resources would be strained. So, there are limits.

LEHRER: Yes, Mr. Legvold, let me ask you. Did you get the feeling, when you were in the Soviet Union, that the Russians feel, okay, they took some heat at the beginning -- the Olympic boycott and all those other kinds of things -- it`s low-key now, and for all practical purposes the rest of the world has accepted their presence there in Afghanistan for now and to the end of time?

Mr. LEGVOLD: The general way you put it is true; that is, I think the Soviets do feel that the heat is off, or reduced. I don`t think they feel that the rest of the world, including the Islamic nations, have accepted what they`re doing in Afghanistan, but, as a central problem of their foreign policy, I think they feel the worst is over.

LEHRER: They feel that nothing`s going to be done about it, as long as it doesn`t get any worse, is that--

Mr. LEGVOLD: Essentially. One person said to me, "Look." He said, "It`s a mess." He said, "`There`s no going back. We`re not going back. It`s a test for the Red Army. The Red Army cannot be defeated by the insurgents. We cannot defeat the insurgents. In terms of a political settlement, there`s nothing that we can offer that the other side -- that is, Pakistan. Iran, or the West -- will accept. There`s nothing that they`re going to offer which will allow Babrak Karmal`s regime to be established which we can accept. And therefore, here we sit.`` And, the essential hope was that the issue would not be a central issue in Soviet-American-- the problem wouldn`t be a central issue in Soviet-American relations, or heated up in a fashion that seriously-- that causes serious problems for the Soviet Union. One last point. I agree with Ambassador Neumann. I heard from the Soviet side that they feel there is an interconnection between Afghanistan and Poland. People have said to me that one of the constraints on their action in Poland is Afghanistan, and one of the constraints on the degree to which they escalate in Afghanistan is Poland.

LEHRER: Mr. Girardet, finally -- in a few seconds -- do you have the feeling it`s also going to go on for years and years and years and years, and do the guerrillas you were with understand that and accept that?

Mr. GIRARDET: I think so. I think they realize it`s a no-win situation. But, before leaving. I asked them, "What are you going to do when you get more weapons?" and they said, "Well, we`re going to move into the cities." And, I think this will be a problem, because with the troops that the Soviets have now, in Afghanistan, I think they`re going to suffer more casualties, and they are suffering heavy casualties, I think.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Yes, Ambassador Neumann, thank you for joining us in Washington, Mr. Legvold in New York, Mr. Girardet, thank you very much. Good night, Jim.

LEHRER: Good night, Robin.

MacNEIL: That`s all for tonight. We will be back on Monday night. I`m Robert MacNeil. Good night.