War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Powers, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES D04026-D04028 DAVID POWERS

Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

I WANT TO START BEFORE THE MISSILE CRISIS AND LEAD UP TO IT. WHAT WERE

THE FEELINGS OF THE KENNEDYS FOLLOWING THE...DISASTER OF THE BAY OF

PIGS? WHAT WAS THE FEELING AMONG JACK KENNEDY AND ROBERT KENNEDY?

Powers:

You know, the day of -- the Saturday after the Bay of Pigs he met with

President Eisenhower up at Camp David. And he felt a little bit better

afterwards. You know, the plan had originated with President

Eisenhower. And when President Kennedy came in the 1,500 Cuban exiles

had been training there all these months, and they were anxious to go.

Now, when you ask me how he felt, I think it was the first thing he

ever really lost. And he felt pretty bad. That he... felt like he

wasn't sure that Allen Dulles of the CIA and the Joint Chiefs thought

the plan was as good as they had told him it was. And he also thought

that maybe they believed that a man that had been President less than

three months could start off with a failure. And I know that they were

shocked when he called off that second strike, and took all the blame.

But to answer your question, he felt pretty bad. And I believe that it

made him a much greater President for a much tougher decision 18 months

later. Because I know, he knew the men he could count on. And when he

formed that group that morning, Tuesday, October 16th, 1962, when his

National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, showed him the proof of

offensive missiles in Cuba, then he knew he could count on. He set up

that meeting -- the first thing he did was not to change his schedule.

And he looked at the schedule, I brought the schedule into his desk,

and there was about an hour after his last morning meeting and before

he had a luncheon planned with the crowned Prince of Libya, and that's

when that first meeting of the men he called together, men like Bob

McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, his

brother, Bobby, who was the Attorney General Maxwell Taylor, and of

course, Bundy, our National Security Advisor, White House Staffers who

were a part of it, besides Bundy, would have been Ted Sorenson and Ken

O'Donnell.

Interviewer:

LET'S JUST STOP YOU THERE. I'M SORRY. I WANT TO ASK YOU A LITTLE MORE

ABOUT AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS. WHAT WAS THE FEELING OF THE PRESIDENT AND

BOBBY KENNEDY ABOUT CUBA AND ABOUT CASTRO AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS? I

MEAN, WAS THIS SOMETHING THAT KIND OF REALLY RILED THEM? YOU SAY IT WAS

THE FIRST TIME HE HAD LOST SOMETHING...

Powers:

Yeah, well, the... actually, he talked about the meetings, see, and

then afterwards, he was disappointed to hear some of the, some of the

rumors from the Pentagon saying it was a CIA operation and they hadn't

-- had not been properly briefed. And the White House records,

appointment books, show that General Lemnitzer sat in at about 15

meetings, and Curtis LeMay, Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations --

these were people that President Kennedy looked up to. As he said

afterwards, I was Lieutenant, junior grade on a PT boat 78 feet long.

And I read about Arleigh Burke, great hero, and when General Lemnitzer,

and of course Allen Dulles, who was then chief of the CIA, they acted

toward him like it was a good plan.

Interviewer:

HOW ABOUT PERSONALLY, THOUGH? YOU SAY HE'D NEVER LOST--

Powers:

Oh, no, he was hurt. He was hurt badly, that his first major...

decision was practically a disaster. What he felt worse about was the

young men that had been killed and the young men that were captured!

And he felt a responsibility for getting them out. And that was

constantly on his mind.

Interviewer:

I UNDERSTAND CUBA WAS ON HIS MIND A LOT, AND ON THE MIND OF ROBERT

KENNEDY.

Powers:

Well you couldn't think of the men being imprisoned in Cuba without

thinking of Cuba and Castro. So that, I mean, he thought about them

often, yeah. But it isn't that he was obsessed with it. As he said one

time that in eleven weeks he went from Senator to President. And in

that short time, he inherited not only Cuba, but Laos and Berlin and

the nuclear threat and all the rest. So that never in the White House

was he focusing on any one thing except the 13 days during the Cuban

missile crisis, from October 16th, 1962 until October 28th. And that's

all he talked about. Even though it was the off-year election, and we

were campaigning all around the country, that every night he'd come

back to the White House, and his brother, Bobby would be waiting at the

airport to brief him on what happened with the other members of the

Executive Committee. And it was, even our last night, our last night

away on the campaign, and we were at the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel in

Chicago, and the President had campaigned that day in Cleveland, Ohio,

he had -- all through Illinois. He visited Lincoln's Tomb that day. And

now, he's at a big dinner with Mayor Daley in Chicago, and now Bobby is

calling. And I was handling the command post. And Bobby at that time

said, "He has to come home right away." And when the President finally

talked to Bobby, it's close to eleven o'clock at night, and he ended up

by saying, "Well, Bobby, I am depending on you to pull the group

together until I get there." So the next morning, as you know, that --

this would have been Saturday the 20th, and he had the White House

physician, Admiral Berkeley came to the suite. And the President picked

up a, the hotel block, and he wrote, "99.2 percent degree temperature,

upper respiratory infection, doctor advises me to return to Washington

immediately." And he handed it to Pierre, who had to brief the press

for our sudden change of plans. So we flew back to Washington. And let

me tell you that the rest of that Saturday and all day Sunday, and

Monday the 22nd until he went on the air at 7 o'clock were three of the

most hectic days that I have ever witnessed in the White House. That --

coming in different doors, and trying to slide and sneak people in

without the press being aware -- how do you get all the Joint Chiefs

and half of your Cabinet in the White House without having the

newspaper men wondering what is going on. I think it was the best-kept

secret in the history of Washington...for at least six days.

Interviewer:

BACK TO LEAVING CHICAGO, I THINK I READ IN YOUR BOOK THAT'S THE ONLY

TIME HE EVER WORE A HAT OR SOMETHING?

Powers:

Yes, well, he wanted to get off the, of the -- he had a serious enough

look because of the situation. And with a hat on, he did look sick, to

some of the reporters. I had them ask me about it afterwards. And the

next day, Saturday, they're all out in the White House lobby, "How's

the President today, Dave?" And, in fact, that Saturday after -- just

before that first meeting he -- we spent about 30 minutes together in

the White House pool. The temperature of the water was 90 degrees, and

it would help him unwind. And then Bobby came over, and they had this

great talk and before that big Saturday meeting. And he and Bobby felt,

at that time, going into this meeting that they had enough votes for a

blockade. This would have been Saturday, October 20th.

Interviewer:

THE THING YOU TOLD ME ABOUT SWIMMING IN THE POOL WITH HIM WAS HIS --

WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT THE MISSILE CRISIS, HE TALKED ABOUT CHILDREN AND

HIS CONCERN...

Powers:

That was his chief concern, that not only children in America but

children around the world who would suffer and die if he made the wrong

decision. And he was so aware of it all of the time.

Interviewer:

I THINK YOU TALKED ABOUT, OR THE PRESIDENT TALKED ABOUT CHILDREN WHO

WEREN'T EVEN BORN YET.

Powers:

Yes. Well, children that had no knowledge of what was going on, and who

would suffer and die just like the soldiers in a nuclear war. He said

it isn't fair. And you know, that's why, he just fought for that

blockade. There were, there were men there at the meeting, you know,

people that loved their country as much as President Kennedy, and yet

they were in favor of a bombing followed by an invasion. And he just

fought and held out for the blockade and toward the end he -- a -- the

President said afterwards, that the great break he received from the

pictures, the experts at that first meeting on October 16th, said that

the missiles were 10 to 14 days away from becoming operational. And he

said -- to give him credit, he didn't want to take all the credit for

the decision -- he said, "I am not sure what my decision would have

been if they'd told me they'd be operational in 24 hours." He knew the

time was on his side. But during the next week, as more pictures were

coming in, and you could just see the -- many of them are getting

closer to completion, and now the -- members of the Joint Chief and

others are saying "We do not believe that the blockade is a firm enough

measure."

Interviewer:

KENNEDY HAD TO -- I REMEMBER WHEN WE TALKED THE LAST TIME, YOU WERE

TELLING ME ABOUT KENNEDY'S RELATIONSHIP OR REACTION TO THE JOINT CHIEFS

WHEN HE HAD MEETINGS WITH THESE GUYS WITH ALL THEIR BRAIDS

Powers:

Well, you know, there's nothing more impressive than having the Joint

Chiefs show up at a meeting. You see all that strawberry shortcake, and

these are men you've read about for years. There'd be the Admiral,

Admiral Anderson was the Chief of Naval Operations at this time.

Arleigh Burke had been Chief during the, during the Bay of Pigs. And

it's so impressive. I would have a list of the people that would be a

-- be locked into the Cabinet room for the meeting, and the Joint Chief

would come down, and very, very impressive. So that maybe the first

meeting, during the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy may have been overly

impressed by the Joint Chiefs. But as I said, the -- 18 months later,

he knew the men that he could count on. And, as I mentioned, one of the

key men would have been General Maxwell Taylor. And he was Chief of

Staff at that time. And he depended an awful lot on Bob McNamara,

Secretary of Defense, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and his brother,

Bobby, who was the Attorney General.

Interviewer:

WHEN THE PHOTOS FIRST CAME IN, YOU KNOW, SENATOR KEATING AND CAPEHART

HAD BEEN GOING AROUND THE COUNTRY SAYING, "THERE ARE MISSILES IN CUBA,

AND WE'VE GOT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THAT." AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE

UNTIL THOSE PHOTOS CAME IN. WHAT WAS THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION WHEN HE

FIRST SAW THAT THERE WERE, IN FACT --

Powers:

It was sort of "My God, maybe they did have something!" Because here he

is, campaigning -- you know, the worst time, it's the off-year

elections, but everything broke, you know, that he only --

Traditionally, they lose 30, 40 seats in an off-year election, and I

believe he only lost two. But, he's... they only had rumors. Nobody had

any proof until the two U-2 pilots took the pictures on Sunday, October

the 14th, which he saw on Tuesday the 16th. So that, you know, they

only had rumors up to now.

Interviewer:

WAS KENNEDY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL, THE SORT OF DOMESTIC

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS?

Powers:

He certainly was. And you know, he -- Not that it would have altered

his decision. But he certainly was. And you know, the election was

going to be about two weeks away. And he put great confidence -- It was

the first real test between the United States and the Soviet Union

where nuclear missiles were involved! And I do not believe, as we sit

here today, that the world has ever been as close to a nuclear

confrontation, up to that time or since that time. And that's when (?)

he thought about all the time. "God help me make the right decision."

You know the day after, the day after he saw the pictures, it turned

out to be the National Day of Prayer, Wednesday, October 17th. And

before we went to campaign in Bridgeport and New Haven and Waterbury,

we stopped in at St. Matthews Cathedral. And we used to joke about

going into a church and making three wishes -- it's an old Irish story.

And I whispered, "Don't forget the three wishes." And serious-like he

said, "I only have one wish today." And that was the same wish that

everyone who was involved with the Cuban missile crisis at that time

all had that same wish.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS THAT? WHAT WAS THE WISH?

Powers:

That Castro -- That Khrushchev would take the missiles out before one

had been fired by Castro.

Interviewer:

JUST TO GET BACK TO THIS QUESTION OF THE ELECTIONS, I THINK IN YOUR

BOOK YOU TALK ABOUT THE KENNEDYS SAYING, YOU KNOW, THIS IS GOING TO --

KEATING'S GOING TO BECOME THE NEXT PRESIDENT OR SOMETHING.

Powers:

He joked about that, you know, just that that it made it made it look

like Keating -- he said, "With all my intelligence here, the Defense

Department, the CIA and everything else, how come he knows something we

do not?" And they assured him that he was only guessing. And that this

was the first proof of all that. Remember, up until that Sunday,

October 14th, the weather had been bad over Cuba. And it was that --

this was the first day in about two weeks that they had any clear

pictures. So that if Keating or anyone else knew anything, it would

have been in that period where the U-2s failed to get a clear shot of

what was going on in Cuba. But, I doubt it very much. I think it was

just a rumor.

Interviewer:

BUT ONCE THE PHOTOS WERE IN AND KEATING WAS PROVED RIGHT, IN A WAY,

EVEN IF IT WAS JUST A GOOD GUESS, WHAT WAS THE PRESIDENT-

Powers:

Now, the reaction was, people -- he's being, he's being hounded by the

press, why'd you know what he knew. It was almost an embarrassing

situation for him. See?

Interviewer:

BUT ONCE THE EVIDENCE WAS THERE, WASN'T THE PRESIDENT CONCERNED THAT

THIS WOULD HELP THE LIKES OF KEATING AND CAPEHART?

Powers:

No, he didn't think so. In fact, Capehart lost, you know, that

election.

Interviewer:

THAT'S RIGHT.

Powers:

Wasn't that the year Birch Bayh beat Capehart? Yeah, Yeah.

Interviewer:

HOW CLOSE WERE THE KENNEDY BROTHERS DURING THIS PERIOD? I KNOW THE BAY

OF PIGS --

Powers:

No one, no one any closer and, I -- he depended on Bobby. For instance,

while we kept our regular White House schedule the five days that we

kept it a secret, really six, Bobby was his eyes and ears. Bobby was

there. And it wasn't and it worked out better, because people would say

things in front of Bobby they wouldn't say about the President. So that

he was kept informed of everything that was happening. And no, Bobby,

at one time, that's what he had said. I -- I was with him Black

Saturday, October 27th. And he had sent Bobby down to talk to Dobrynin

the Russian Ambassador, and I'm having dinner with him. And Jackie and

the children are at Glen Ora in Middleburg, Virginia. And Bobby came

back, and all the news is bad. Oh, they're talking about the Captains,

and they're talking about the contradictory letters and whether

Khrushchev has lost control and, I continue to eat, nervously, while

the two brothers are discussing the -- this terrible situation. And

finally they had finished; and I continued to eat nervously, unaware

that the conversation had stopped. And then I heard that great voice,

the President said, "Dave, you are eating the chicken and drinking the

wine like it is your last supper." And I looked up, embarrassed, and

said, "Mr. President, after listening to you and Bobby, I'm not so sure

it isn't." And I slept in the White House that night. That he had

another meeting. In fact, that night, he and I went to a movie to get

his mind off the terrible incident, and we saw a movie called Roman

Holiday with Audrey Hepburn and Gregory Peck. And he partially fell

asleep towards the end of the movie, and I tapped him, and I said,

"It's all over, Mr. President." And he said, "No, it isn't." I was

thinking of the movie, and he was thinking of the missiles.

[END OF TAPE D04026]

Interviewer:

OK, TELL ME HOW YOU FIRST HEARD ABOUT IT.

Powers:

Well, I had the Tuesday morning schedule. And McGeorge Bundy was

already upstairs, which was unusual. He'd usually -- the first one to

see the President in the morning from the staff would be Ken O'Donnell

or myself. He was the appointment secretary, I was the assistant

appointment secretary, and I handled the schedule. And we had one of

the early appointments was Wally Schirra, the astronaut, and his wife

and children. And the President liked to give the children a gift when

they came, maybe a PT boat tie pin or something like that. So I went up

to talk to him about that a few other things. And now, you know, I

could see the serious discussion. I went back to the office, and when

he came in, he said, "Get Bobby on the phone," the first thing he did

in his office that morning. And he called Bobby, and Bobby came over.

Now, the President's looking at his, the schedule, he -- and what's on

his mind is what he and Bundy talked about. They talked about getting a

group of key people together. And as I mentioned, the only time on the

schedule was eleven-fifty to one. And they met there. The President

left about five minutes of one, because he had a luncheon for the Crown

Prince of Libya. So up to that time, we're looking at the schedule, and

now, when the group came in, the first meeting is not in the

President's office, it's in the cabinet room. And they're all coming

in, I have a list of these people, and the CIA there'd be experts on --

who can look at a picture and determine just what's happening and how

many days away it is. And they're all in there. And I know it's

something...about Cuba, and I do not ask, and the rest of the day went

by, had a swim with the President and you know, I knew there was

something on his mind. The next day I have the schedule for the three

stops in Connecticut, and we stop in at St. Matthews Cathedral. It

turned out that it was the national day of prayer. And we old Boston

Irish used to make three wishes when we went into a church for the

first time. And although we had been there before, I reminded him of

the three wishes. And very serious he said, "Dave, today I only have

one wish." So now, when we came back, we campaigned all over

Connecticut, and when we returned late that evening, Bobby is waiting

for him. And I've never seen Bobby as serious as he was. And now they

-- we ride back to the White House, and Bobby started to talk about

this group that became known as the Executive Committee of the National

Security Council. Originally there were 14, but the President would

invite anyone -- in Washington, there's a group of men known as

Kremlinologists -- anyone that had any knowledge of Khrushchev, he

would invite in to join this group, because he's saying, "Has he gone

mad? What would ever make him believe he could put offensive missiles

90 miles away?" And other people joined it from time to time, and but

the original group started off as 14 men that he counted on at all

times. Now, Wednesday I went home and even...we had talked about it,

but it was such a serious thing there was no conversation. And I'm

saying in my mind Castro and Cuba are up to something, because all the

maps had pictures of like San Cristobal and stuff like this. So now

it's Thursday. And Andrei Gromyko is scheduled to talk to the

President. Now, the blow-ups of some of these pictures President

Kennedy kept under his White House desk. And people concerned, he'd

show them, like if McNamara or Rusk, he might say, "Well why San

Cristobal? Why here and not there? "And General Maxwell Taylor. But he

had some of the blow-ups under his desk. When Gromyko came, it was for

a different matter, it was a customary thing. He had been at a meeting

I -- we -- at the United Nations or something, and he came in to pay

his respect. But President Kennedy led Gromyko into this conversation,

and they talked about Cuba and that, and again Gromyko said, "You can

rest assured. There is not now or never will be offensive weapons in

Cuba." And that evening in the pool, President Kennedy said, "I had all

I could do to control myself from taking that picture from under my

desk and saying, 'What does this look like?'" And he mentioned what --

he mentioned the word missiles, and without saying anything, I think I

almost flopped in the pool. But we never talked about it the next day

in we're in Chicago when Bobby called, and I could tell by Bobby's

voice that it was very, very important for him to come home and when

Jack and he finally talked But I mentioned it was such a great secret

that when Pierre Salinger, the press secretary, came in to our suite at

the Sheraton Blackstone on Saturday, October 20th, and the President's

telling him we're calling off the schedule, he has to go back, Pierre

said to me, "There's something up." And now, we all ride back on the

plane together, but there wasn't any conversation, because the press

were there. And the President just sat, alone in his private

compartment aboard Air Force One. More so to lead the press that he's

not feeling good, you know. So that walking through the aisles, I had

two or three newspapermen say, "How's he feeling now?" And I just,

"Fine, just a temp, a little temp." And but when he said to Pierre,

"You're better off not knowing," I was thinking to myself, yes, I would

have been better off not knowing.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER THE DAY --THE POINT IN ROBERT KENNEDY'S BOOK THAT

SEEMED THE MOST DRAMATIC AND THE MOST TENSE FOR HIM WAS WHEN THEY KNEW

THE SOVIET SHIPS WERE APPROACHING THE QUARANTINE LINE. DID YOU TALK TO

THE PRESIDENT, DID YOU HAVE A SWIM WITH THE PRESIDENT?

Powers:

That day, but no, he -- when the President was thinking about something

a-and not talking, y-you didn't talk to him. You know what I mean?

Like, I used to try to -- I saw him every one of the 13 days. And he

was completely in command. You know, I was so proud, I was never more

proud of the man in all my life. And here I am thinking of all the --

just knowing about it was such a great pressure, and he was calm, I --

I listened to him talking in Bridgeport, Connecticut and Waterbury, New

Haven, and Cleveland, Ohio, and here he is talking, and with this ...

problem on his mind, because when we did talk in the pool, and he must

have said it two or three times, because his chief concern were the

children in America and children around the world, who had yet to live,

who would die if he made the wrong decision. Then I remember one of the

nights, we had a swim in the pool, and this would be getting close to

black Saturday, it may have been Friday the 26th, of October, and the

President had left some papers down that said, "President's eyes only."

And that was the highest classified document we would have in the White

House, all kind of confidential, top secret, but "President's eyes

only," and I knew it was something that he would want to read for the

morning meeting. It could have been from Bundy, it could have been from

Dean Rusk or McNamara. And after he finished the swim, he got dressed

in a hurry and went upstairs. And I picked up the papers, giving him

time to be like 5 or 10 minutes ahead of me. And when I went up to the

mansion, which was called the living section of the White House, he's

reading Caroline a story. And I had the strangest feeling, as I put the

papers down with his night reading that he may have thought it may have

been one of the last stories he'd be able to tell her. It -- it was

that type of a period, the 13 days.

Interviewer:

WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR OWN...?

Powers:

Oh yes. You'd leave the m -- you'd leave the White House, you'd leave

your apartment in the morning, and often the children would still be in

bed, you know. You'd leave early. And you'd be coming home, and they'd

be asleep at night. And you know, during that stage. I found out

afterwards, once the President went on the air, you know, at 7 o'clock

that night, that would have been Tuesday, October 22nd, from that time

until the Sunday, the 28th, when Khrushchev agreed to take the missiles

out, my neighbors would not go to bed until I drove home in a White

House car. And I -- I lived in a cul de sac, and you know, on Black

Saturday, October 27th, I slept in the White House. And when I showed

up Sunday afternoon, some of them hadn't been to bed since the night

before, they had been celebrating now, and I was quick to join them.

But I slept in the White House Black Saturday, and I'm up early in the

morning. And the Situation Room is right by the Navy mess. And that's

where I found out the news. And now I'm rushing over to meet the

President because we were going to mass. And as he stepped into the

White House car, he said "Dave, this morning we have an extra reason to

pray." And we sure as hell did. But I thought that in this ten-day

period, he was great. Not like the time of the Bay of Pigs, when, you

know, for even a week or two or a month afterwards it was still on his

mind. But I believe that once they had a consensus of the blockade, it

was strictly wait and see. And there were tense meetings, you know,

when you're getting the reports in the Cabinet Room or the President's

office that they're close to the line and now you're wondering if

they're going to stop. And then there was the day where they reported

that there was a Russian submarine among them. And they're talking

about, you know, that-- do you know that the President afterwards said

one of the best pieces of advice he received came from his old friend,

David Ormsby-Gore, who's the-- our ambassador from Great Britain at the

time, but a friend of the President's for over 20 years, he knew him

way back in London when -- when his father was ambassador to the court

of St. James. He said, "What is the difference, you're saying 500 miles

or that? The more you back up, the more time Khrushchev has, and that's

what you have to think of." And the President called McNamara and told

him to do exactly that, why have a rigid line and say, "You come here

and we'll fire." So that, they just wanted to have it at a point where

they couldn't be affected by bombers or anything, so and -- but David

Ormsby-Gore was great during this period for him.

Interviewer:

BLACK SATURDAY, I UNDERSTAND, THE SORT OF HAWKS IN THE EXCOMM WERE

REALLY STRAINING AT THE LEASH.

Powers:

I do not believe the President would have been able to hold for maybe

24 -- maybe 48 hours, because they were talking about surgical strikes

and things like that. But the President always said that how long would

it take to a surgical strike to wipe out the island, and somebody would

give him a figure. He said, "Yes, it only takes 10 seconds to fire a

missile." And he always thought that was the wrong plan, you know,

right from the start. But if the missiles were still there, I

understand after mass there was another meeting scheduled. And he would

have had some difficulty with that one. You know, some of them would

have started to change. And so thank God it, you know, thank God it

never happened. The President afterwards said, he thanks God for

several things: one, that he had time enough to order a blockade, or as

he said a quarantine. But if he only had 24 hours at that very first

meeting, on Tuesday, October 16th, if they said they're about 24 hours

from becoming operational -- he said, "Thank God I did not have to make

that decision."

Interviewer:

I UNDERSTAND YOU HAD A SWIM WITH HIM AFTER-CONCERNING THOSE JUPITERS,

THE BUSINESS OF THE JUPITERS, THAT HE WAS UPSET ABOUT THOSE JUPITERS?

Powers:

He did with -- what bothered him was Saturday -- Friday and Saturday

the two different letters, you know. The Friday letter... fitted

perfectly for everything that we could do and they would do. And then

the Saturday morning letter was full of saber-rattling. And at the

meetings all day Saturday related to what will we do, and that's when

Bobby Kennedy said, "We'll answer Friday's letter, and act as if we did

not receive Saturday's." And it turned out to be the right thing. But

why we called it Black Saturday in the White House... everything was

going wrong, Major Rudolf Anderson, one of the two U-2 pilots who took

pictures on Sunday, October 14th which President Kennedy saw on Tuesday

the 16th, was shot down and killed by a ground-to-air missile. And

everything was going wrong. Another one of our planes from the

strategic air base went off into Russian territory and, that's when I'm

having dinner with the President and that's when he sent Bobby down to

talk to Dobrynin.

Interviewer:

TELL US ABOUT THE DINNER AGAIN, BECAUSE I THINK YOU MIGHT HAVE GOT A

LITTLE TECHNICAL.

Powers:

OK, well, the Jackie and the children had gone up to Glen Ora for the

weekend, and I'm having dinner with the President when Bobby returned.

And all the news is bad. And I remember like it's yesterday. I'm having

-- it's a chicken plate with a nice glass of wine. The President's

having chicken with milk. Bobby came in. All the news was bad. And I

continue to eat nervously, listening to the two brothers. And finally,

I'm not aware that they had stopped talking, while I continue to eat

nervously. And then I heard that great voice, the President of the

United States, saying, "Dave, you are eating the chicken and drinking

the wine like it is your last supper." And I looked up, embarrassed,

and said, "Mr. President, after listening to you and Bobby, I'm not so

sure it isn't." And I slept in the White House that night. I w -- we --

I went to a movie with the President to help get his mind off the

terrible times. And, when the movie ended -- it was "Roman Holiday," I

tapped him on the shoulder and said, "It's all over." He had fallen

asleep during the movie, and he said, "Not yet it isn't." I was

thinking of "Roman Holiday," and he was thinking of the Cuban missile

crisis. But Sunday made up for it all. You know that when I met him to

go to mass on Sunday morning at ten o'clock, he looked like a man -- he

looked ten years younger, there was such a weight off his shoulders.

And the one thing he did, he was familiar with the Bay of Pigs and the

criticism when he said that the victory has a hundred fathers and

defeat is an orphan, but at this meeting he went in, and some of the

EXCOMM thought he ought to go on TV, and he said, "No," he said,

"Khrushchev has eaten enough crow for one day and you know, we -- he

was in a corner, and let's let him out of there." And he was

magnificent in victory.

[END OF TAPE D04027]

Kennedy's Fearlessness

Interviewer:

YOU TOLD ME LAST TIME ABOUT AN ASPECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONALITY

THAT I WAS FASCINATED BY, THAT BECAUSE OF HIS ACCIDENT WITH THE PT BOAT

THING, BECAUSE OF HIS SPINAL FUSION OPERATION AND THAT SORT OF THING,

HE HAD A KIND OF A FEARLESSNESS ABOUT HIM. CAN YOU RELATE THAT?

Powers:

Yes. Even, you know, during the Cuban missile crisis, the one thing I

want to make clear that you know, he was completely in command. He

never had any fear of dying. That he thought after he survived the

Japanese ramming PT-109 and the double fusion operation at the New York

Hospital for special surgery, that he thought, you know, that was it,

how many times do you have a skirmish with death. And he had no fear

whatever of dying. But his chief concern all during that 13-day period

were the young children in America and around the world, who would

suffer and die if he made the wrong decision. I remember one time we

were talking in the pool, and he said, "If it were not for the

children, it'd be much easier to press that button." And I always

believe that I looked at him strange-like, because he quickly said,

"I'm not talking about Caroline and John, Jr. I'm talking about

children all over the world, who have yet to live, who will suffer and

die if I make the wrong decision."

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT IT'S GOOD TO HAVE SOMEONE WHO'S SO FEARLESS?

Powers:

Yes.

Interviewer:

AS A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN A CRISIS LIKE THIS? I MEAN, THAT

WOULD FRIGHTEN ME.

Powers:

Oh no, really, no he -- it made him -- it's why I believe he was so

much in command.

Interviewer:

EXCUSE ME, CLEAR YOUR THROAT AND START AGAIN. WOULD YOU LIKE SOME MORE

WATER?

Powers:

No, that's all right.

Interviewer:

WHENEVER YOU'RE READY. WE HAVE PLENTY OF TIME.

Powers:

No, Peter, it's a good thing. It's one less thing to worry about. You

ever hear them say a hero -- a coward dies a hundred times, a hero dies

but once. So that the fact that he had no fear of his own life, and his

chief concerns were the children and the nation, made him a much better

President at that time. Even when we left for Dallas, he had, he had

talked to people that had been there, he was familiar with what

happened to Adlai Stevenson and Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson, and he

just said, when a President of the United States can't go anywhere in

this country without being hemmed in by a bubble top and secret

service, that means that we're in bad shape. So that, again, he did not

have any fear. And I guess when you go through it a couple of times --

he had received the last rites of the church, his temperature was up to

106, and he survived. And he just felt that somebody up there likes me.

That I'm able to do things, or maybe he felt it's about time to win

one.

Interviewer:

THAT WOULDN'T CAUSE A CERTAIN KIND OF RECKLESSNESS?

Powers:

No, because, if there were any wrinkle -- he could have gone along

early with a half a dozen people that were in favor of a bombing

followed by an invasion. And at that time, his answer was that the men

that had made the missiles operational or were working on it, the

technicians were all from Russia. And their families are there. And if

a bomb had been dropped and a Russian had been killed, the decision in

the Kremlin might be far different. This way, let's try the blockade,

and we'll go from there.

Effect of Cuban Missile Crisis on Kennedy

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THIS WHOLE EXPERIENCE, THIS 13

DAYS, CHANGED PRESIDENT KENNEDY?

Powers:

Definitely. I believe that it made him a more confident President. A

lot of people, the country was divided, they thought at the Bay of Pigs

he could have sent the Marines in, he could have used an aircraft

carrier a-and things like that. But it would have been the wrong thing.

You know, the, one of our favorite exhibits shows restraint with power.

And it really wasn't our war. Those exiles believed they could go there

and conquer. They had the wrong information. That -- that Castro

evidently, through spies in Miami knew almost to the hour they were

coming, he was waiting for them. And so you know, it was a bad plan.

And then some of them thought that well, maybe we get a toehold there.

Afterwards, he had his brother, Bobby, and General Maxwell Taylor make

a study of what went wrong and what would have happened. Anyone that's

ever been involved said, it's impossible to make an amphibious landing

without air cover. A couple of the jets knocked out their ammunition

ship, and it was all over. They fought bravely and well, so that what

was hurt -- the President -- we talked about the Bay of Pigs earlier,

his concern was for the men that had been killed and the ones that were

captured. I believe there was a hundred and fourteen killed, eleven

hundred and eighty-nine in prison! Now, he felt responsible for them.

Interviewer:

BUT AFTER THE MISSILE CRISIS, DO YOU THINK IT CHANGED HIS REGARD FOR --

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS KHRUSHCHEV,

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS --

Powers:

Definitely.

Interviewer:

-- TEST BANS?

Powers:

Yes. Definitely. And do you know that from that time on -- see, a lot

of people were saying that a weakness at the time of the Bay of Pigs,

the thing the Russians look for is, you know, he didn't wipe them out

and you know, this sort of thing. And they-- some of the experts are

saying that they recognized that as a weakness, or they wouldn't have

tried what they did, see? But now, here's a President that was

completely in command for 13 days, during the first test, the first

direct test between the United States and the Soviet Union where

nuclear weapons were involved. And Khrushchev this time had to back

down. So you had to feel good about it. And he gained more stature and

more respect throughout the world. I remember Macmillan talking about

President Kennedy, that it was two things: that he not only showed the

courage of the warrior, but it was his statesman like approach in

notifying Great Britain and De Gaulle and the nations around the world,

and he said that there never had been a time where the other countries

were more confident of being on the side of the United States than

during that -- after that time. Now, if we're talking about what he

would have been proudest of, I would say the signing of the Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty 46 days before his assassination. And you know, the 13

days will always be remembered. But that's what he was proudest of. And

Khrushchev signed it along with a hundred and s -- a hundred and seven

other countries.

Interviewer:

WHY WAS HE PROUDEST OF THAT?

Powers:

That he -- that he thought that was the first time that there had been

any sanity over the use of nuclear weapons, when they signed the use of

nuclear weapons, and do you know, not only that, I do not believe we

ever had a time, up to that time, you know, from the start of the cold

war, where our relations with the Soviet Union were as good as they

were, during that time.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS IT ABOUT THE TREATY THAT WAS SO IMPORTANT TO HIM?

Powers:

The sanity of it. You know, he made this great speech at American

University on June 10th, 1963. And Khrushchev in his memoirs -- the

reading of that convinced me of the sincerity of President Kennedy --

in Khrushchev's memoirs he had, he had nothing but respect for

President John F. Kennedy.

Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

Interviewer:

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE MOST ESSENTIAL LESSON TO LEARN FROM THE CUBAN

MISSILE CRISIS, THAT WE CAN USE TODAY?

Powers:

Yeah. The miscalculation that, see, there was the 13 hours different --

that you'd write a letter, a-and you're waiting. So while we're awake,

they're asleep, and vice versa --

Interviewer:

CAN I ASK YOU START YOUR ANSWER BY SAYING, THE MOST IMPORTANT

LESSON...?

Powers:

Yes.

Interviewer:

GO AHEAD.

Powers:

The most important lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is keeping the

lines of communication open. That... he sent five letters to Chairman

Khrushchev and received five answers. And th-there was a period, the

EXCOMM group would be meeting in the day, and they'd be sleeping in the

Kremlin, and vice versa, so some of the people would get impatient. "We

sent that letter yesterday, we haven't heard from them." And this is

what -- now that we have the hot line to Moscow, I don't believe it

would ever happen, because that, there are no winners in a nuclear war.

Everyone knows that. And so that if you keep the lines of communication

open, it's the best thing. Remember one of the letters, Khrushchev said

to President Kennedy, "It's like a tug of war. And the harder we both

pull, the tighter the knot gets. And the tighter the knot gets, it

becomes more difficult to unravel."

Kennedy and Khrushchev's Relationship

Interviewer:

WE'RE ALMOST OUT OF TAPE. I JUST WANT TO ASK YOU A COUPLE THINGS ABOUT

VIENNA, SOMETHING WE SORT OF SKIPPED OVER. YOU WENT TO VIENNA WITH THE

PRESIDENT.

Powers:

Yes. I stayed with him at the embassy, we had the Saturday meeting at

Interviewer:

I DON'T WANT TO CUT YOU OFF -- SORRY TO CUT YOU OFF, BUT WE DON'T HAVE

TOO MUCH MORE TAPE. THERE'S A MOMENT IN YOUR BOOK WHERE YOU DESCRIBE

KENNEDY'S FIRST MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV ON THE STEPS THERE OF THE

EMBASSY. CAN YOU REMEMBER THAT MOMENT AND WHAT KENNEDY DID AND HOW HE

REACTED TO KHRUSHCHEV AND WHAT HAPPENED?

Powers:

Well, you know, he was sizing him up. It bothered him that people, he

never underestimated Khrushchev. He had met him in '59 when he was on

that Foreign Relations Committee. And he knew that -- Khrushchev

reminded him of it, he said, "I've met him before." What bothered him

was the way it was reported, that, it's two different systems. And he

afterward said, when he was reading some reporter about what had

happened, he said, "What was I supposed to do, take my shoe off and

bang the table?" But he said, "The one thing you want to remember,

nothing that Khrushchev threatened me with ever happened." He came back

home and he called out the reserves, he made that great speech over

Berlin, but that -- that bothered him, that they thought that

Khrushchev overshadowed him. Because afterwards he'd say, well, what

happened? He did a lot -- he made a lot of noise, but nothing he

threatened me with ever happened.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT MEETING ON THE STEPS? AND ( )?

Powers:

Well, he -- Khrushchev was coming up the stairs, but more important

than that, O'Donnell and I lived at the embassy, and now -- they had

had the meetings -- but now they went out in the grounds! And Ken

O'Donnell and I are looking out the window, and they each have an

interpreter. And they're walking along, and Khrushchev is -- you know,

shouting loudly and pointing. And later that afternoon, the President's

taking a tub for the dinner that evening at...Palace, and he's telling

us what happened, he's talking about what the Germans had done to

Russia. And talking about the women and children and everyone that died

there. And the President said, "We're talking about two different

things, East and West Berlin. That has already been decided. We can't

do something about it." And so it was difficult. You've got one man

talking about Germany in relation to Stalingrad or, you know, the --

how many died in Russia, millions! And that's what was on his mind.

Interviewer:

DO YOU REMEMBER THE MOMENT WHEN THEY SAID GOODBYE AT THE END OF THAT

VIENNA CONFERENCE?

Powers:

Yes. It was a friendly -- that was the next day, that was Sunday --

Interviewer:

ON THE STEPS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY?

Powers:

Yes. And, you know, we flew then over to London, and the President was

going to be godfather for one of the Radziwill children, and you know,

all he said on the plane was, "He's tough and he believes everything he

says."

Interviewer:

THE UH... KHRUSHCHEV WAS OBVIOUSLY MUCH MORE EXPERIENCED, HE'D BEEN IN

POWER FOR QUITE SOME TIME. THIS WAS REALLY THE FIRST SORT OF

INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT MEETING FOR KENNEDY --

Powers:

And he moved around a lot. You know, he brought in... Well, one of the

-- one of the President always chuckled when he talked about, when they

stood up to go to lunch, and Khrushchev was wearing this medal, and the

President asked him what it was. He said it was the Lenin Peace Medal.

And the President said, "I hope you always wear it." And I don't think

that Khrushchev ever then got the significance of it at that time,

because he was, you know, beaming as if, well I'm glad you like it.

Interviewer:

I'VE SEEN THE FOOTAGE, THE NEWSREEL FOOTAGE, WHEN KENNEDY SAYS GOODBYE

TO KHRUSHCHEV AT THE END OF THE VIENNA SUMMIT, AND HE DOESN'T LOOK VERY

HAPPY. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT MOMENT ON THE STEPS?

Powers:

Well no, he -- Yeah. He never believed that you should be smiling at

them when you meet them. They evidently think they only understand

force, and he was proud of Ken O'Donnell, Ken O'Donnell gave Khrushchev

one of those looks like sometimes Kennedy looked like he was a member

of the IRA, you know, real sullen. Because he said to Kennedy, "I think

he -- I think he -- Khrushchev got your message."

Interviewer:

BUT WAS KENNEDY ALSO TRYING TO CONVEY SOME SORT OF A MESSAGE IN THE

HANDSHAKES, IN THE--

Powers:

Of firmness. Of firmness.

Interviewer:

THOSE 13 DAYS SEEM TO BE VERY, VERY CLEAR IN YOUR MIND STILL TO THIS

DAY--

Powers:

I'm thinking of having an exhibit, you know, we're having a redesign,

and I would love -- today, you say the Cuban missile crisis to this

generation, and it means nothing. And I'd like to take the 13 days, day

by day, show what happened, and have the correspondence blown up and

that sort of thing. And...

Interviewer:

OK, LET ME ASK YOU ONE LAST... DO YOU THINK THE MISSILE CRISIS CHANGED

KENNEDY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH KHRUSHCHEV IN ANY WAY?

Powers:

No, I always thought it made it better -- that if the reason for

putting the missiles there was because he underestimated him, he no

longer would. If Khrushchev believed that after the Bay of Pigs he

could get away with putting offensive missiles into Cuba, well he

learned from Kennedy that he couldn't. And I believe that after that

Jack Kennedy was a more confident President and Khrushchev had more

respect for him.

Interviewer:

AND THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KENNEDY?

Powers:

It was. I understand from reading all the Kremlinologists that all they

understand in the Soviet Union, especially the group in the Kremlin, is

force. And President Kennedy gave them all the force they could handle.

[END OF TAPE D04028 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with David Powers, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-vh5cc0v57d

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-vh5cc0v57d).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Powers, David F. (David Francis), 1912-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: ff98bc88393925d619c18f99656bf6da572dd6c2 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Powers, 1986,” 1986-02-28, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed May 15, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-vh5cc0v57d.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Powers, 1986.” 1986-02-28. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. May 15, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-vh5cc0v57d>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with David Powers, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-vh5cc0v57d