War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Fred Ikle, 1987 [1]

Then you know. OK this is C 10 C T 10 0 28 interview with Dr. Freddy clay 27 October 1997. This story really begins I guess with the SS 20 missile which was first tested in 1974 in September 76 you were probably one of the first people publicly to express concern about these missiles. Nor was it particularly that concerned you about what I would call well expressing strong concern on September 7 or 6. About the deployment of the SS 20 which we realized was going on or was about to unfold in front of us and what upset us so much and what I focused on was the fact that there was no provocation for that missile no justification. We had stopped having intimate range ballistic missiles in Europe we had taken them out a long time ago and had not replaced them. And now here we had a solid agreement solid Wanya negotiations almost solid too. And suddenly the Soviet Union came with this large deployment

of intermediate range missiles to which we had no Condor Department. What did you think the Soviets was in developing the missile. Well we can only speculate I would assume we're trying to do in deploying the SS 20 against Europe and Asia. Properties in order to crease the dominance the weight of their nuclear threats potential use of nuclear blackmail. To have an edge in the overall nuclear correlation with the United States which was limited for the intercontinental missiles will be sold to the humans. Could you just explain to us a little bit more detail what the significance was of the fact that they were intermediate range that they were aimed at Europe. The why would they have missed all the aimed at Europe where they had all these other things already entity or why would they have extreme is not. Going to sort of realized is that the stalled

negotiations and possible follow on agreements. Were limiting the intercontinental range missiles and their desire to have an edge over the Atlantic alliance was therefore blocked in these intercontinental forces but indeed the media Granges there was no agreement. So they figured they could go ahead. The door was open and they they plowed through. What can you tell us very briefly why the cruise missile was developed. The cruise missile permitted exploiting the new technology that began to emerge in the 1960s for accuracy for I could guide and so one can deliver. A munitions with persuasion and you don't have to destroy a vast area in order to hit a military target. And the important

application of the cause a missile was recognized early on was for conventional munitions. In 1979 the dual or double truck decision was taken to deploy cruise and Pershing but also to pursue arms control talks with the Soviets. In your opinion not of like minded members of the Reagan administration had not been a good decision from the from one side we can now say that the alliance decision and so on in 9 to deploy of the missiles Pershing's and cruise missiles at the same time to negotiate the elimination of the Soviet missiles in exchange for taking out ours was a real success. At least it seemed now with the agreement that hopefully will be viable for the indefinite future. The Alliance had the preference all along not to. Begin a new generation and then another one yet of missiles still line

stopped deploying missiles way back after the 1950s when we took out a dummy to range missiles in Europe they're deployed in Italy Turkey other places and Bush heard not to have such missiles threatening both sides. So when a steward came the unit came with their SS 20s. We want to make one more try to get rid of this whole competition. Hence the proposal of 1979. Dirty clay. Do you think that the reg ministration 81 to 83 was united in its attitude to arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Was there a coherent policy. I try to think whether the disputes and discussions were in the early years of the first Reagan administration about arms control. Obviously there were differences different ideas how to proceed. There was some hesitation I recall about making the proposal for 0 0 for abolishing the missiles entirely

that is us and go and call people in the State Department thought this would never be accepted by the Soviet Union and it would be provocative or bad to make an agreement that could not be accepted. But the president Reagan liked that idea and of course promoted ever since then. Can I put to the argument which is sometimes made by people in Europe which is that no one expected Soviets to agree to it at the time. I never have since. But that is the argument that they now expect them to agree to it up. Time. What is your question. My question is did you at the time expect the Soviets to agree to the zero option. Was it a serious negotiating position. One couldn't know whether they would agree to abolish the missiles because. There was that Pershing in a threatening missile from a point of view or so enjoying it and it stood to reason that it would be desirable for them to get rid of it. They had a lot

of intercontinental forces and if they could overcome their room concern of. Matching European forces with a large missile forces. It would seem not unreasonable for them to leap to agree to the proposal of a 0 0. Do you and I think the Soviets made any serious negotiating proposals negotiating at all seriously in that period up until 1983 when they withdrew from the talks. Do you think they they were serious at all during the time you made the first proposal for a 0 0 missiles and the breakables of talks 93. The Soviet Union tried primarily to mobilize opinion in Western Europe against the deployment and was what we're trying to outwait also the elections taking place in the United Kingdom Germany to see whether the positions of the left in Europe would lead to a non deployment of a missile so that they could continue to expand their SS 20 force

without being challenged to negotiate. The abolition of these missiles. As you said they have been deploying a system to consider numbers can you give us some idea of the scope of the scale of the expansion of the US and what was it immense or do made an immense monetary investment in developing the muscle of research and development phase then and building all these missiles on the spares and the support facilities and the manpower costs it is not just the cost of the missiles themselves but the personnel that goes with it. So it is really a large decision for them to go ahead with it in the 70s which result was very bad and foolish and the now seems to get rid of them and compliance with the IMF agreement. I was going to ask you that I mean how do you interpret the change of heart on the line of the Soviets. Before.

So a decision to finally agreed to the zero zero outcome on the missiles may have something to do with the change in government in the style of the government in Moscow. A new effort to engage the West may be a long term ideas about. Getting the benefits of a detente of trade credits. Flowing. The obvious competition on the western side of promoting there for the Soviet Union to slow it down and yet stay ahead by their measures in their. Felt needs. So it could be a long term phenomenon that is related with their economic problems as well. I just would like to return very briefly to something I should've asked you before. In the 1982 there was this one proposal which did sort of in the so-called walk in the woods. What is your opinion of that and why was it rejected in Washington the so-called walk into

words. Proposal had a rather complicated structure. It would not have gotten rid of all the SS 20s. Ad and would therefore have left us with a major verification problem one of the important benefits of getting rid of all the SS to it is is that it makes very few cation somewhat less difficult it's difficult enough even to zero. It's well nigh impossible possible. If you forward some misses because then you have to count them. And how did con mobile missiles. Was it a problem also that it would get rid of the of the P2 which in some ways was the most potent part of a part of the 1979 package. The main defect of the so-called walk in the woods proposal was the. Failure of it to come to grips in a fundamental way with the SS 20 and secondarily at the same time to or. To. Inhibit our forces by taking out one important component probably the most

important goal of all. Not a sudden one of euphoria around and in the public prints in summer and autumn about possible deals you in your public statements and in your interviews and things are sounded a note of some caution. Why do you think we still need to be so cautious and. Have a question when I go to show this. Next July next year. I mean I we won't we obviously we won't. We would involve anything you say. We would not exist to the relationship to the fans. Whenever we go through a period of our arms control agreements and summits and such things there is a tendency in the West that this is a sea change in. The East-West relationship but let us recall that the Soviet Union has been hostile to the west since its. Beginning. That they have violated many agreements and here I

was thinking less of the arms control agreements but our Yadav understanding of. Promoting. Democracy and in. Poland of. Leaving Czechoslovakia. Independent like Finland not part of Soviet bloc. The attack on North Korea the long history of the Berlin crisis and so on up to the invasion of Afghanistan in 79 the troops still in Afghanistan. So one has to have a historical view of these fluctuations I think in the long war no one should Clyde to promote. A less hostile relationship or less threatening relationship and particularly a contraction of the massive sort of military effort but we have to realize that the competition doesn't stop just because we have reached an agreement. There'd be attempts made to greater than banter truth could do a little cheating or even do some large cheating to press ahead in areas which are limited

to reach out into the third world again or what have you. It was our experience off of the 1972 agreements that there was a most biggest nuclear build up and so is history. After those agreements contrary to the spirit and preamble of the ABM treaty and also there was the expansion and abrasion of land into the sort of world. Final question Dr. Kay what post Secretary Gorbachev when he made the so-called double zero proposal if I may call it that of 1987 in other words when he offered to take out the shorter intermediate range missile problem it's a bit dark again for next drew on duty in the military jargon. OK fair enough. At the least it isn't because the least some you know live a mere memory make another point here on one of the Movietone of it will be one of the. Maneuvers and tactics that the Soviets have been pursuing and arms control negotiations very often has to be has been to inhibit testing

of the U.S. or NATO weapon systems. And here we have to be very careful while on the one hand many people who are of. Their work and think about arms control. Find limitations on testing whether its nuclear testing missile testing the testing of anti-satellite systems. And those limitations were attractive. They do get really to the. Core of the Western capability to compensate for the quantitative advantages over so we're doing to them to Warsaw Pact. They have far more tanks they have far more artillery pieces there far more soldiers. Now how have you been telling ourselves through all these years to be make up for that. We make up for that by somewhat better weapons technology. But if we stop testing then our compensating capability will eventually disappear. So we have to be careful on these test potations only very few will really are in our joint interest.

Finally doctor when this when if a deal goes through the IMF deal and I think for the purposes of this discussion we should assume that it will writer what does not. Why how does that leave the overall position in your opinion trash from the offices of even some of your illness and leave the balance. Well as we look back at the Diet FDA will see increasingly the main impact of it will have begun that its political effect. And. A stimulus to further arms control run negotiations and agreements. Giving a certain feeling of detente and initially raising concerns about the U.S. nuclear guarantee or the so-called coupling. But militarily there are there compensating measures militarily. There are a lot of nuclear weapons still in Europe and nuclear weapons in the world. Which of course are being addressed through the start agreements. So the military importance is less than the political importance. Thank you. I got that.