War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Valentin Berezhkov, 1986 [1]

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES B00002-B00005 VALENTIN

BEREZHKOV [1]

Non-Aggression Pact

Interviewer:

THE FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT THE NON-AGRESSION PACT. IN YOUR

ESTIMATE, HOW DID STALIN VIEW THE NON-AGRESSION PACT?

Berezhkov:

Well...how Stalin viewed the non-aggression pact...certainly it is

difficult to say exactly what he has been...his idea was about that.

But I think that it was sort of say, forced upon us, upon our

government. There was actually no other choice. Because our

negotiations with the Western powers that went through the summer and

autumn of '39 actually showed us that the Western powers are not

prepared to have a serious agreement with us. And that their main goal

was to channel Hitler against the Soviet Union. So that the Soviet

Union would be then the first objective of his aggression. And so when

at this moment there came a proposal from Berlin to conclude a

non-aggression pact, certainly I think that our government has to think

about that, what to do. They had actually two choices: To reject it, or

to accept it. If they would reject it would certainly put our country

in a disadvantage because then Hitler would say he has proposed to the

Communists a non-aggression pact. They have rejected it. They probably

harbor aggression intentions. So they are threatening not only Germany,

but all Europe, European civilization and all this kind of rhetoric. So

then Europe must unite to fight the Bolsheviks to destroy the Soviet

Union because it is a threat. It is a danger. That's something like

what we hear now, you know, about Soviet threat. So...so this was

actually not a choice. This was not possible. Because then we would be

actually the first attacked by Germany and at the same time, at that

time there were still in Paris and in London, there were still the

München-ite politics, the Munich politicians who actually, if they

wouldn't join Hitler at any rate, they would stay out of it or be

neutral or maybe help him economically. Looking how he's going to

destroy Bolshevism. So actually there was only one choice. To accept it

because it was actually not a proposal for an alliance, or for some

joint action. It was a proposal for non-aggression pact. So we accept

it. A non-aggression pact. And at the same time, I think, Stalin had

been thinking about that it meant that our country will be out of the

conflict for some time. Nobody could expect that France would be

overrun in several weeks. Or that Norway and Denmark and Belgium and

Holland would be actually occupied in some five or six days. So one

could actually estimate that this war in Western Europe among actually,

or between actually capitalist camps, Germany, Italy on one side.

Britain, France and some others...and others on the other side. Maybe

would fight for years and years and we, the socialist country would be

out of...the only socialist country in the world at that time would be

out of this conflict. So actually, this was, it is...it is actually for

every government the main task is to actually to get them...to help

their people out of the war. Because war is certainly a terrible thing.

For as long as you can stay out, you should stay out of it. So this was

also a possibility to stay out. But at the same time must say that he

never actually believed that Germany...Hitler's Germany would keep its

obligation under the pact. And he has repeatedly said that war will be

coming. That we have to prepare for war. That some time the Germans

will attack the Soviet Union. So this was an attitude, you see, which

gave us this possibility, but at the same time didn't mean that he

believed it in believed that Germany will now not attack us. Because

the main aim of Hitler was always to destroy Communism. To destroy

socialism in our country.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS? IN CONCLUDING THE

PACT.

Berezhkov:

Well certainly you must feel -- You certainly must imagine the whole

situation which was after very harsh rhetoric, and actually

confrontation, between socialist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Because

we were actually the only country that was warning that Hitler

aggression will be coming in the League of Nations and later on trying

to create a collective security against Hitler. And so Hitler

understood that our government and our leaders actually have, so we'll

say, have seen through his ideas and had been warning other people of

the danger that is coming. And now, their representative is flying over

tomorrow. It's interesting also that Ribbentrop used an airplane. He

came with an airplane. Although at that time people still used trains

and sometimes boat...boats. The British delegation that came to these

negotiations, the final negotiations before the pact, they took a

freighter and it took them two weeks to get from London to Leningrad.

So they were not in the hurry to conclude an agreement with us. But the

Germans were really in a hurry. They certainly already had made up

their mind to start war against the Western powers. First Poland, and

then the other countries. This is also interesting, you see, I have

been thinking about that why actually Hitler decided that the first

victims should be the Western powers. I think that he was still not

quite, first of all, not quite sure about his might and about his war

machine for starting a war against Russia. Also, feeling probably that

the spirit of our people, you know, that we were certainly prepared to

defend their country. On the other hand, you know, that before the war

or even during this phony war, how it was called, this there was a

special name, phony war, yes. That actually the French were... they had

no fighting spirit after all. They were just sitting by the Maginot

Line thinking that they'll be safe. And he understood that this is a

very sort of the easy prey. So it was easy to get them too. And that's

why he decided. And certainly he had been thinking that after the

defeat of Western powers he will have at his disposal all the

industrial potential and war potential of continental Europe to start a

war against Soviet Union. So I think that was what he made up. And that

is why he was in a hurry. That's why Ribbentrop took a plane to come to

Moscow. And the beginning you know, was not very successful. They had

been talking for several days and still nothing came out of it. And

Hitler was very concerned about that. And we know now from Speer's

memoirs. Speer said that he was at that time in Berchtesgaden with

Hitler. And they were walking there somewhere on a terrace in the

evening. And there was still no word from Ribbentrop about the pact.

And then Hitler said, "When I don't get the message that I need by

tomorrow, I'll fly myself to Moscow." So that's why he, it means that

he really wanted to have this pact. He wanted us to be out of the war

which he already planned against us. But it is wrong to say, you know,

that because of this pact, the war started. The war would start anyway.

But if we would reject the pact, then we would be the first victims.

And that was actually I think, our diplomatic victory that we had

safeguarded, you know...and had got some...nearly two years of peace

and have watched the war and the tactics in the west and understood

what we will face when Hitler will attack us. And also another point is

that after what Hitler has done to the Western powers and then also the

attacks on Britain, the Blitz against Britain, the situation was such

that when he attacked the Soviet Union it was no possibility for

Western powers already to be on the German side. It was the only way

for them to join the Soviet Union. And that is why I say that the

non-aggression pact paved the way for the anti-Hitler coalition.

Without the non-aggression pact, there may have been no anti-Hitler

coalition. Maybe even an anti-Soviet coalition and not an anti-Hitler

coalition. So the pact was very important.

[END OF TAPE B00002]

Interviewer:

...AND I THINK THAT WHAT YOU WERE SAYING, THAT IT WAS A VERY UNEASY

ATMOSPHERE BECAUSE PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD THEIR MOTIVATION... NEVERTHELESS,

APPARENTLY STALIN WAS SURPRISED WHEN THE PACT WAS BROKEN...

Berezhkov:

Yes. That is right. That is right. And there were several reasons, you

see, for that. First of all there was certainly a considerable German

propaganda to deceive us about this. I had been at that time working in

Berlin at our embassy as first secretary of the embassy. And there was

a constant flow of information to the effect that the German government

is preparing a very important document which they want to discuss with

us concerning the development, the further development of Soviet-German

relations. And this was connected also with Molotov's visit to Berlin

in November 1940. It was actually a return visit, because Ribbentrop

came in '39, and Molotov came in '40 to Berlin to talk with Hitler. It

is...not everybody, you know, knows now or remembers what they had been

talking about. During this meeting they had three days of talks and

they had three meetings with Hitler and one meeting with Ribbentrop.

And actually, by that time, already after the France was defeated, the

Germans troops were being concentrated on the Soviet border at that

time already. Not only the troops, but also all the equipment, all the

weaponry, tanks and aircraft and artillery. Everything was amassed on

our border. And what Molotov wanted to know was an explanation from

Hitler what it means. We still had a non-aggression pact. What it

means? And Hitler has another... had another idea. He invited Molotov

because he wanted to involve him in a talk about the British Imperial

heritage. He said that Britain is actually defeated. That it's only

months or weeks until Britain will collapse and the whole empire will

remain, so to say, claimed by nobody. So who's going to claim this

empire? And he said that he had been talking already with Mussolini and

with Japanese. The Japanese want to have free hand in South East Asia.

The Italians and the Germans want to have influence on continental

Europe and Africa. And then remains another part of the British Empire,

India, Burma, and going south. So he said to Molotov, "This is a good

chance for you to go, your country always wanted to have warm ports and

access to warm waters, so now you may move to India, and we'll all

divide the British Empire and everything will be fine." So Molotov

certainly immediately understood that it was actually a trap. If we

would be prepared to be involved in this kind of negotiations or

exchange of opinions he would immediately probably make a leakage to

the British and then they would never deal with us after that. And

maybe even their attitude would be different what he had been thinking

when he attacks the Soviet Union, then he will say, "The Russians

wanted to grab India. Now join us to destroy these terrible

Bolsheviks." And so... Molotov said that he didn't come to discuss such

kinds of things. He came to Berlin to find out why the German troops

are concentrated on the Soviet border. What they are doing there. What

they are doing in Poland. What they are doing in Finland. In Romania.

In Bulgaria. And said that we demand that you withdraw these troops

because we consider it a threat to our security. And so the

conversation was, you know, rather sharp. You know, Hitler was

immediately excited about that. He said, "What are you talking about

these small things...they're just resting there before attacking

Britain." And Molotov said, "Well why do they need then their tanks and

their airplanes and the artillery and so on?" "So, in order to deceive

the British. They must think that we move other way, but we will bring

them back and we will attack Britain." All these kinds of things. And

Molotov said, "I'm not satisfied. I want you to..." And this way they

talked for...all this way they talked you see. But when Molotov left,

it was the last...the last conversation and we...the delegation was a

big delegation, but actually in the conversation there were only four

men on each side. There was Molotov, there was his deputy in the

foreign ministry, and then there were two interpreters. I was one of

them. And on the German side also; Hitler, Ribbentrop and also two

interpreters: Schmidt, his permanent interpreter, and the other was

counsel at the German Embassy here in Moscow, Mr. Hilger. And so, and

then but this moment when Hitler said that he cannot...he has no time

to continue the talks in the evening and so Ribbentrop would wind up

his talks. And then he went out to accompany Molotov to the entrance of

the Imperial Chancellery. And it happened that there was only Molotov

and Hitler and I was between them or a little bit behind them, just

translating some small talk that was going on while they were walking.

And then by the moment when he already was nearly out of the

Chancellery, he stopped and turns to Molotov that he's convinced that

Stalin is a great personality, historic personality. That he will go

into the history as one of great statesman. And that he, Hitler, also

thinks that he will get into history, see. So, he thinks that these two

leaders must meet. And that he's seriously thinking about a meeting

because he wants to discuss with Stalin important things. And he asks

Molotov to convey this official invitation to Stalin. Well, where do

they meet? That's another point. Well, Molotov with rather dry answer

he said, "I'll tell to Mr. Stalin about that," and then he went out.

And the next day he went back and then he came back and stayed at the

embassy. And so, during this time, just before the war, it was the end

of '40 and the first months of '41, there was all the time this kind of

leakage that something is going on in the Imperial Chancellery. Otto

Meissner was the head of the Imperial Chancellery. And he came to our

embassy. And all the time, don't you know Hitler is preparing

something. At the same time we got all this information about

continuation of concentration of the troops. Also some dates about the

possible attack. All this sort we communicated to Moscow. But Stalin

still has been somehow thinking that maybe he can still postpone the

war for some time. Maybe still we can continue these talks with Germany

for some time. At this time intervened the Balkans, the Balkan

operation of the Germans, because the Yugoslavs had overthrown their

government, had went out of the pact with the Germans, and so he

decided to invade Yugoslavia and Greece. And it took him a couple of

months, so he lost half of the summer. So the other point was that

Hitler will never make such a mistake to start the war with Russia in

the middle of the summer, and he lost already half of the summer. And

so he had been thinking that now we are through, now until next spring.

And the other third point was that Hitler also is a very shrewd

politician, will never start a war with Russia without somehow settling

the problem with Britain. Either have a political settlement, or actual

destroyed, again by some new blitz air attacks or something like that.

But more realistic it looked to Stalin, I think, that there will be

some type of a conspiracy with some, not with Churchill, but with some

other people. And it was reinforced by the flight of Rudolf Hess who

flew over in May '41. Actually we know now that the proposals were to

guarantee the British Empire, if they would stay out of the war, the

German war with Russia. But I guess you know, he had to use the

parachute. He run out of fuel, so he didn't get to Duke of Hamilton,

but he got to Churchill authorities and they got him, but Stalin didn't

know that. He had been thinking, now negotiations are going on with the

second man in the Reich who is now in Britain, and they will probably

negotiate, it will take some time maybe to remove Churchill and to

bring people like Halifax and Chamberlain again back to office. And by

that time it will be winter, so spring starts only so war starts only

in spring of '42, That was, I think his idea, and his calculation

proved to be wrong. And that was why he was really shocked by this. You

see, I didn't see Stalin before I went to Germany. I was working for

Molotov, and I didn't see him. I saw him only in...when he came back,

and exchanged with the German diplomats. It was in September, when

Averell Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook came to Moscow to negotiate on

their supplies and the Lend-Lease actually. And this was the first time

when they saw Stalin and started to translate for him and for Mr.

Stokes, and Harriman and Beaverbrook, and then also other leaders. And

I must say that I was actually shocked by the way how he looked. He

looked really terrible, you know, at that time. Well, I never saw him

but I saw his pictures. His portraits, you know, his sculptures. And in

the movies you know, always before the war he was so self-assured, you

know, and looked very healthy and strong. And here he was, you know, in

a terrible shape. Quite exhausted, very gray face, all with this pox,

what was it? Smallpox. This smallpox, his whole face was smallpox. Very

thin. His jacket, you know, was just hanging from him. He was in

terrible shape, you know, because he still, it was really a time when

the Germans moved very quickly. Whole armies were you know, taken

prisoner. All our supplies were destroyed, communications were

destroyed. It was a terrible thing. But you know, looking this way, so

frail, and so somehow sick I would say, he still was inside, you know,

morally somehow was very strong. And I must say that when Harriman came

to Moscow the first thing that he got from his military attach鬠it was

I think, Eaton, it was Commander Eaton, he said, you know, to Harriman

they should stay in Moscow no longer than three or four days because

the Germans may be here any moment. Or the German paratroopers. So he

said, "Finish up, wind down these talks and go back to Washington or to

London because Moscow will be taken by the Germans." And he came with

this feeling, see, to Stalin.

Tehran Conference

Interviewer:

LET'S GO TO THE GRAND ALLIANCE.

Berezhkov:

To what?

Interviewer:

TO THE GRAND ALLIANCE. THAT WAS POSSIBLY SORT OF THE HEIGHT OF THE

ALLIANCE THEN. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE ATMOSPHERE DURING THE TEHRAN

MEETINGS? ALSO, SORT OF ADDRESS THE QUESTION THAT ON ONE HAND GREAT

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WERE STILL CAPITALIST POWERS, THERE WAS

STILL AT LEAST AN IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEM, HOW DID IT FEEL THEN?

Berezhkov:

Mmm-hmmm. See the relations between the countries -- our country, which

was at that time the only socialist country, and the capitalist

countries, they were in the same way as now, also governed by the main

principle worked out by Lenin that there is a possibility of peaceful

coexistence between different social systems, between the socialism and

capitalism. Certainly it was a war at that time. It was not shall we

say quite a peaceful coexistence. But among the members of the

anti-Hitler coalition it was actually a peaceful coexistence and some

kind of elements of peaceful coexistence in that relationship. And

actually when we were, before the war, striving for a collective

security with Britain and France and whoever wanted else to join

against fascist aggression it was also based on the possibility of a

cooperation, of an agreement of the socialist state with capitalist

state. So in this sense it was actually a continuation of a line which

was adopted by our party, and by our government through all this

existence. You know there was in the beginning just after the

Revolution there was a great debate about that, whether such a

coexistence is possible or not. Some people like Trotsky said that it

is not possible. That we must strive for a world revolution. Only then

there will be really peace and so on. And as long as capitalist

countries exist there will be always war, so we'll have to prepare for

war and not for cooperation. And this was rejected by Lenin. He said

that this is quite the wrong conception. Actually, Lenin's principle

was accepted by the party and so this relationship that developed was

based on the possibility of cooperation. At the same time of course it

was a common enemy, which made it possible for us to work out such an

agreement and joint actions and so on in the face of this common enemy.

And there were many contradictions also. There were many. You know, the

Second Front, the problem of the Second Front. The problem of the

supplies which were also much smaller than they were promised to us and

sometimes even stopped like in '42, in a very dangerous period of time

for us when the Germans approached Volga and Caucasus, actually this

was supplies stopped entirely. Because you see there were also

different forces, like this debate which they told in our party that it

was just after the Revolution. But in America there was still a debate

whether to help the communists or not to help them. Or to help them to

the extent that we make them weak after the war and will...the result

will be then a destroyed Germany, a weakened Soviet Union, and

certainly then the Soviet Union has to accept whatever demands the

other members of the anti-Hitler coalition will put before it. So we

felt that there is a...some kind of controversy going on. And I think

that Roosevelt here was on the side of those who were serious about the

possible cooperation with the Soviet Union, in the post-war period

based on equality and equal security, I think this was his idea, you

see I was...

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT AGAIN...ABOUT STALIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE

DIFFERENT PARTNERS OF THE COALITION. HOW DID HE FEEL ABOUT THE BRITISH?

HOW DID HE FEEL ABOUT THE AMERICANS? THE FRENCH?

Berezhkov:

Well, the French were actually out of it. They were. They came only

later. They were not there in the coalition. There was the British, and

there were the Americans, and more and more the role of the American

got more and more important and the British not so. And of course he

had already a... very long experience in relations with Churchill

particularly, the British leader, who was often involved in the

intervention after the Revolution. And I would...I witnessed many

times, you know, when they have talked, you know, that Churchill came

several times. The first time he came in '42, and then he -- they met

in Tehran, then he came in '44, so they had more chances to speak to

Churchill here in the Kremlin, and you know, Churchill liked rather

much Armenian cognac or brandy, yeah, Armenian brandy. And after a day

of work, you know, they would have a supper, then they would go to a

small room and have coffee and some brandy. Though Stalin didn't drink

actually nothing at all, or very little. But Churchill drank very much.

And then he always would come back to the time of intervention and

would say to Stalin, you know...you know that I was involved. What I

did to Russia at that time. You know, that I was -- Can you excuse me

for what I have been doing here at that time? You see, so Stalin, you

know, took it as a joke, and said, you know, "I'm not God or somebody

to excuse you, and it's up to, so to say, to your God to excuse you."

[END OF TAPE B00003]

Interviewer:

OK, SO THE FIRST MEETING AT TEHRAN.

Berezhkov:

Yeah, so I wanted to say in connection with the anti-Hitler coalition

that there was a different, a little bit different attitude between

Stalin and Churchill, and between Stalin and Roosevelt. The first

meeting was in our embassy in Tehran, where actually Roosevelt stayed,

because there was a decision that he should stay because of possible

terrorists, terrorist actions and so on. And it was before the

conference started, and Churchill was not there. Churchill was at his

embassy. And they wanted just to get acquainted. There was nobody with

Roosevelt. Roosevelt was alone, brought in by his, in his wheelchair by

somebody. And Stalin was already, I was also there in the small room,

near the conference room waiting for Roosevelt to come over. I must say

that the first impression when they met was like something people who

knew each other for very long time. You know, there was no certain,

some awkward you know, silence or some kind of uneasy feeling when

sometimes people meet for the first time, you see. I think it was

connected with the fact that they have a very, had a very intensive

correspondence. They had been writing to each other sometimes every

week, sometimes twice a week, on all kind of subjects: war problems,

supply problems, all kind of things, politics, big politics and so on.

And that is why they made just, they had some small talk about smoking

whether it is healthy or bad, what the doctors say and so on. And

because Stalin came without his pipe, he came with the papirosa, with

the cigarette, and Roosevelt asked why didn't you bring your pipe? And

he said, "The doctors don't advise me too. But I'll bring it next time

at the conference meeting." So it was like that. And then they

exchanged some information about the situation on the fronts. Stalin

said about our situation Roosevelt said about the...mostly about the

Pacific operations in the Pacific. And then all of a sudden Roosevelt

said, you know, "I'm very glad we have this meeting without our dear

friend Churchill. That I wanted to speak with you about something that

Churchill doesn't like." And then he said that you know, "I think that

the colonial empires will not survive after the war and that something

must be done about that." And I wanted, it is a preliminary talk but I

wanted just to tell you that I am sure that they will not survive.

Stalin was very cautious, because just two years ago, three years ago,

it was Hitler who said that we must do something about the British

Empire, and here all of a sudden comes Roosevelt and says, in the

absence of Churchill, we must talk about what to do with the British

Empire. It was really, I was in both places, you know, so for me it was

really interesting to listen to this kind of talk you see. And Stalin

was very cautious, you see, and he said, "Certainly I agree that the

colonial empires will not survive. Not only...are not going to survive.

The British, the French, the Belgian, the Dutch, they'll all collapse."

And then Roosevelt says, "Well, we must think you know, there will be a

vacuum," you know, so as I said there are hundreds of millions of

people living there, but usually some big power politics, you know,

think that it is immediately vacuum, so they must come into the vacuum.

So I don't think, they didn't speak much about that. It was just like a

you know, just like feeling each other about that. I don't think that

ever, they spoke about it later again at other meetings, in Yalta also.

But it was interesting that somehow Roosevelt decided to take Stalin as

his confidante so to say, and to talk about something that concerned

another capitalist country, an imperial country, and...speaking with

the leader of a socialist country about it. I think this was not an

indication that he wanted to propose us a part of the British Empire.

He certainly had been thinking that certainly America has to deal with

this vacuum. That is clear, you know, America is strong...country and

not destroyed, mmmm, certainly which will become even stronger after

the war. Of course they have to take care of this. That was probably

his idea. But the fact that he was speaking about that I think was very

interesting because I think this was one of the indications showing

that he was serious about the post-war role of the Soviet Union. That

there shouldn't be attempts again made to weaken the Soviet Union, or

to destroy socialism or to destroy Bolshevism, but they have to take

the Soviet Union, really there was intervention, there was this

terrible blow by the German war machine, and we survived and became

even stronger in military terms and in economical terms. And so this

was, I think a very interesting indication of Roosevelt's attitude.

Potsdam Conference and America's Atomic Bomb

Interviewer:

I WANT TO MOVE TO POTSDAM. WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE ATMOSPHERE IN

POTSDAM?

Berezhkov:

In Potsdam was a...certainly a different atmosphere, and it was a

different environment so to say. War was not anymore there. And at any

rate in Europe. But war was in Japan which was important, in the

Pacific. The enemies in Europe were defeated, collapsed, so there was a

victory and so on. This is one hand. On the other hand there was a new

President coming over who already showed that his attitude is different

from Roosevelt's attitude. It was when Molotov came in April '45 to the

United Nations Conference in San Francisco, on the way stopped in

Washington, had a conversation with Truman, which was very harsh, you

know. And I would even say it was somehow very undiplomatic on the part

of Truman, trying to put some demand towards us, to threaten by

withdrawal of all economic help. He said, "That if you are expecting to

that America will help you have to change your behavior, you have to

change your politics." All kinds of things like that. Which certainly

was some talk which never has been used before. And everybody certainly

remembered what Truman said in '41 after Soviet attack, you know, that

the Americans should help the Russians when the Germans win, and help

the Germans when the Russian wins, and let them kill each other as much

as possible. And then after the war we will come and so to say,

organize the post-war situation. So this was of course, already that

Stalin had an indication. Actually, I remember talking to Averell

Harriman when he said that he was very distressed about this talk with

Truman. That Truman gave Molotov actually the possibility to inform

Stalin that Roosevelt's policy has been abandoned. And that the new

President is a different one, although he said officially that he will

continue Roosevelt's policy. And that is why that when he met, when

they met in Potsdam, it was certainly a different, there was not such a

feeling, you know, of considerable degree of trust, which existed in

Tehran and in Yalta and in correspondence between Roosevelt and Stalin.

And this was already some kind of tension, as far as I can understand

from what I read about that, and so on. So...

Interviewer:

ALSO, THE FAMOUS EXCHANGE BETWEEN TRUMAN AND STALIN FOLLOWING THE

RESULTS OF THE TRINITY TEST?

Berezhkov:

You mean of the test, of the bomb test, yes?

Interviewer:

YES. HOW DO YOU THINK STALIN UNDERSTOOD THIS?

Berezhkov:

Well, we know now from the memoirs of the people, except from Marshall

Zhukov who were there, that Stalin understood it immediately, and

certainly Stalin understood it as blackmail, actually, as a blackmail

for us. So that this was for us already, because you see it was also

connected with the points that they discussed that very day when he

after the joint meeting Truman approached Stalin and told me about this

device as he said, very destructive device, that they had developed.

And it was a problem of Polish borders, which actually was accepted by

all the others in Tehran, and then also confirmed in Yalta, about the

border in the east, which was along the Curzon line, and the border in

the west which included some former German but very ancient Polish

provinces. And this was actually not only accepted, but even the new

Polish coalition government by that time was already acknowledged, not

only by the Soviet Union, but also by the United States, Britain and

France before the Potsdam Conference. So actually there, practically

the problem was settled. But all of a sudden, Truman raised then, this

very day when he already got the information about the bomb, that he

doesn't agree with this and that now they have to revise the decision

that he is against the frontier, the western frontier of Poland, and

this meant that he is changing the whole thing, you see. And he has

also some new ideas about the composition of the Polish government. All

kinds of things like that, you see.

Interviewer:

SO YOU THINK THAT STALIN SAW THIS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF

TRINITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE ABOUT POLAND?

Berezhkov:

Not only that, but the dispute about Poland was an indication of a new

attitude --

Interviewer:

MAKE IT A FULL SENTENCE.

Berezhkov:

Yes, it was...it was an indication, yes, they the dispute about Poland,

not only, I mean, I mean not only so to say to use the bomb in the

dispute about Poland, but also in general in the attitude toward the

Soviet Union, because this was actually an attempt to sound the

attitude of the Soviet Union of a fresh demand of changing something

that was accepted. If the Soviet Union probably would accept fearing

the consequences and the fact of the existence of the bomb in American

hands, then they probably would press on something else. I don't know

what the kind of demands they would make at that time. But I must say

that at the same time Truman was not pressing farther, and it was

because he still was at that time, even after the bomb was tested, he

was interested in Soviet Union joining the war in the Far East. And I

think couple of years ago his latest correspondence with his wife was

published in a book form, and there is a letter when he writes to his

wife saying that, "Today..." -- one of those days during the Potsdam

Conference -- "...I got what I wanted at this conference, Stalin

promised to enter the war. It means that my most important aim in this

conference was achieved." So this is interesting how his attitude was

at that time. Later there were all kind of speculation that he didn't

need already the Russians, he had been thinking the bomb would finish

up the Japs, and then they would have said, well, okay, without the

Russians. But this was interesting that he was a little bit cautious,

but still he gave a hint you know that now they have this terrible

weapon and the Russians must behave if they don't want to get in

trouble. See, something like that.

Interviewer:

HOW DID YOU PERSONALLY HEAR THE FIRST TIME ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Berezhkov:

Well, certainly, after the bomb actually. I heard after the bomb was

a...was exploded, and dropped on Japan, or I don't remember. Was it?

Yes, there was already a statement after the. Yes, I think it was...it

was soon after the after the test. After the test which was -- no it

was not published. No, no, it was not published no. No. So we can...we

can just so throw it away, really I learned the bomb after the bomb was

actually dropped, and there was information also that some destructive

device was dropped. And then, but then war was going on. We entered the

war before the bomb and we were fighting the Japanese, and then it took

nearly a month before the Japanese capitulated. They capitulated in

September. The capitulation was in September of the Japanese.

Interviewer:

NO, THEY CAPITULATED ON THE 14TH, A WEEK LATER.

Berezhkov:

You mean after the bomb? No, the capitulation was in September. Let's

check it, because as far as I know the capitulation was in September.

And and it took after the bomb, nearly a month after the bomb before

they capitulated. When was the bomb, in August?

Interviewer:

IT WAS AUGUST 6 OF 1945. THEY CAPITULATED ON AUGUST 14TH?

Berezhkov:

But at any rate, I learned after that. You see, but maybe I could say a

few words, because afterwards studying this whole thing, I think that

the fact that the Americans were producing this bomb and actually did

not inform the Soviet Union about that this, and then when we got to

know it, when our government got to know that you have already the

bomb, not just working on it, but you actually had the bomb, and that

you didn't inform us beforehand, it certainly also increased the

suspicions that were before. I think initially it was connected more

with Truman's politics. But now we have from documents, you know, that

actually it was also the decision of Roosevelt and Churchill not to

inform the Soviet Union. And by the way, at the Yalta Conference, the

second day of the conference, Roosevelt approached Churchill and said

that, "Maybe we should still reconsider it and tell Stalin about the

bomb." And Churchill said he is shocked by this proposal and that he

will never accept it, and then Roosevelt said, "Well let us drop it."

But this was really another chance you know, because I would do it,

even without specific details. Just saying that this is -- it took only

a few months to get the bomb ready, you see, so it wouldn't change very

much American security. But at any rate it would be a gesture, you

know, that would somehow, you know...somehow help to cope with all

these problems. But in general thinking about Roosevelt, I have an

impression personally that if he would live longer, maybe a year longer

or so, you know, we could have a different kind of initial part of the

post-war developments. Certainly we would come up with difficult

problems. The problems were there, and they were, you can see from

their correspondence that they were so to say more and more building

up. But with the fact that they had a considerable amount of trust with

each other. They knew each other for several years, you know, they met

each other. I think they would find a way somehow to cope with these

immense problems that came up in a better way, than we did actually.

Post-war Europe

Interviewer:

WHAT WERE SOME ISSUES IN THE POST-WAR ORDER OF EUROPE? CAN YOU JUST

THINK OF WHAT BY SOVIET PERCEPTIONS WERE THE MAIN ISSUES AT THE TIME?

Berezhkov:

Well, of course, the main issues in the European concept and in the

relationship in this connection, of course, was connected with the

attitude towards I think a very important document, the "Declaration on

Liberated Europe." The Declaration was passed in Yalta, and was signed

by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. And the main point which when we

look back is, the Declaration is rather long, but the very important

point is that after the war, the liberated countries and the formerly

countries belonging to the German Alliance or the Hitler Alliance

should have the right to choose their form of government. It was never

said that the form of government should be capitalist or socialist. It

was a problem to choose. And even the fact that they have to choose is

they have, if you think that there should be only one system then they

have nothing to choose. Then the wording is different than they would

be to "restore the previous form" or something like that. Or "restore

the previous system", because in all these countries there was a

capitalist system before the war. But saying that they have the right

to choose, when Stalin signed it, I think he had been thinking that

they have to choose. You know the reason, anecdote about how Adam was

created, you know. And then after that God created Eve. And then He

said, "Now Adam you can choose your wife." But there was only one he

has to choose. So Hitler was only one system, so they had nothing to

choose. And then came this problem, what kind of system should be? And

we were accused that we were enforcing socialism or similar systems on

countries close to the Soviet Union, and they were trying to enforce

capitalist like Greece, which was actually liberated by the Resistance

movements headed by the communists before the British came there. When

the British came there were no Italians, there were no Germans. The

country was actually run by some local authorities headed by

communists. And the British have arrested this man and sent him to the

former German concentration camps, on the Greek islands, and actually

destroyed the system which was actually there, and imposed a capitalist

system. Well, this was...this was...

[END OF TAPE B00004]

Interviewer:

LET ME JUST BRIEFLY, CAN YOU TALK, IN THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, WHAT

WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE?

Berezhkov:

The purpose of the Truman doctrine as far as we saw it immediately was

actually an attempt also actually to threaten the Soviet Union by first

of all creating blocks, military blocks against the Soviet Union, using

the immediate Soviet neighbors as bases, military bases actually,

against the Soviet Union, and encircling actually the Soviet Union, and

preparing actually for I don't know...even maybe a military

confrontation is what he had in mind. Certainly also an economic

blockade actually, an economic blockade also.

Interviewer:

I'M GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT, OBVIOUSLY, ABOUT THE MARSHALL PLAN. HOW WAS

THE MARSHALL PLAN VIEWED?

Berezhkov:

When we viewed the Marshall Plan you know we look a little bit back,

because we look at what Roosevelt has said to Stalin at Tehran, and in

Yalta about the obligation of America first of all to help the Soviet

Union, to rebuild what was destroyed. Especially when he came to the

Crimea then he was traveling from Simferopol to Yalta. He said that he

has seen now this terrible destructions and that now he more than ever,

he thinks that America has first of all to help the Soviet Union.

Stalin said you know that he's very thankful that he's accepting this

proposal but they should not be accompanied by any political or other

preconditions or demands or something like that, and that the Soviet

Union getting this help will have to, himself to, so to say decide how

to use his help. And Roosevelt said okay and I was speaking about ten

billion dollars at that time it was a big sum, for 35 years, to start

to pay back after 35, so we would start paying back some five or ten

years ago, only 2.5% interest it was a very favorable proposal. But it

never came to it again when Truman came to power, they never proposed

it. And actually we know new that the Marshall Plan was worked in such

a way and all the devices and preconditions have been put into it, in

order to make the Soviet Union reject it. And we know now that in the

State Department there was such a nervous situation, they were waiting

for the Russian answer fearing that all of a sudden if Russia accept

this what will happen, and all that...because actually the Marshall

Plan was directed against the Soviet Union, actually to help the former

enemies, the Germans, first of all trying to use them then in some

combinations which actually happened in North Atlantic Pact including

the western part of Germany because they couldn't...that's why Germany

actually was divided, Germany was actually divided, because they

couldn't use the whole Germany, so they wanted to use part of it which

was under their control. And certainly the conditions of the Marshall

Plan were certainly unacceptable for us because it was actually an

American, I would say, inspection or something like that, and decision

how to control to use this help and all kind devices which certainly

had nothing to do with the initial proposal of President Roosevelt.

Russian Troops in the War Against Japan

Interviewer:

LET ME JUST COME BACK TO ONE QUICK QUESTION. WAS THERE A FEELING THAT

AT ANY TIME AFTER HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA WAS HELPING SOVIET SOLDIERS FIGHTING IN MANCHURIA?

Berezhkov:

To help Soviet soldiers fighting?

Interviewer:

...NOT IF IT WAS INTENDED, BUT WAS IT?

Berezhkov:

No, well you see it was certainly the Manchuria troops that were quite

autonomous, they were not that the connected actually with the Japanese

mainland. They have all their supply and factories and all kinds. So

they were really formidable forces. We had to destroy them before and

something could be done against the British Isles. But I think that it

was also used not in order to...in order to make the Japanese

capitulate as quickly as possible. And also to get, maybe also to make

an impression on the whole world, to show this weapon in action. I must

tell you that when Stalin and Truman met for the first time in Tehran,

Stalin actually visited Truman in Babelsberg, he went over to him, to

his villa where Truman stayed to meet him for the first time, and he

said that just a couple of days ago the Soviet Government has got a

proposal from the Japanese for their readiness to capitulate, and they

actually, but only there wouldn't be a word "unconditionally" but

actually they will capitulate unconditionally, with the only condition

that the Emperor should be preserved. And it is interesting that Truman

immediately rejected it. He said, "We will have no conditions" and

actually the Emperor was preserved, you see. This condition, this

"unconditional-condition", was accepted actually. But he didn't want

probably because he in that case, there would come up the question also

of Soviet occupation of Japan, maybe would come up. And he was

certainly against it. By the way, we get now in his memoir, we get the

sense that when he left Potsdam he said that he is never going,

actually when he closed, he was the President at the Potsdam

Conference, when he closed the conference he said, "And so goodbye

until the next meeting." But the same evening he wrote in his diary, "I

will never participate in a meeting like that. And I will never let the

Russians participate in the occupation of Germany, of Japan. You see,

so this was also very interesting play you know at that time, connected

also with the bomb already. And it was a possible a possibility, and

then he says that "I have been thinking that we will need maybe 20

years on..." General Groves, he even said, "50 years"...before the

Russians will have a bomb." So they were sure that they will actually

be dominating the whole world with this weapon. Well, but it took us

only four years, you see, to make the bomb. And then came the same

mistake again with the MIRVs, the cruise missiles, and all kinds of

things like that.

[END OF TAPE B00005 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Valentin Berezhkov, 1986 [1]

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-m901z4228j

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-m901z4228j).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Berezhkov, V. M. (Valentin Mikhailovich), 1916-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: b56633caf57a21c703800f1ea17e2c99e5893ff8 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Valentin Berezhkov, 1986 [1],” 1986-03-25, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed May 15, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-m901z4228j.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Valentin Berezhkov, 1986 [1].” 1986-03-25. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. May 15, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-m901z4228j>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Valentin Berezhkov, 1986 [1]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-m901z4228j