War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Richard Powell, 1986

So the first thing to which it is can you remember. What the reaction among people that you yourself is in the Ministry of Defense was in 1946 to the. Passage of the man to the United States which cut us off from atomic secrets. Well I wasn't in the ministry of defense in 1946. I was still in the Admiralty Well all right I was in defense circles I was the reaction not the people who had directly consented to it a very limited number of course the thing was kept extremely close was Wolman considerable shock but I think the circumstances in which it happened the defection of Klaus Fuchs all that. And the reaction of the Americans I suppose was understandable but it was a break in the special relationship which had persisted all through the war on which had had its first knock of course by the abrupt end of Lend-Lease by Truman immediately after the war ended. Yes. In fact I don't think class until two three years later.

I think is that well I went on Shall I comment. Didn't cause the war was the immediate goal. Congress does cause it really I mean they thought it was their secret. You leave that bit out. Well I'll just ask what I saw before I have made in Iraq and I'll just have another crack at it. Not that I care. I mean just this week was it not bit stronger than if you could give us some sense of why it was shocked. I mean I think you said to me on the phone before that you know we've been involved in the thing all the way through the war and have been to some extent our idea. Yeah. You just finished it. OK. All right very good. Well I mean what was it what was the reaction to the men on it. Well I think the reaction was well among the people who were directly concerned and one of considerable shock because their original work on me asked about me being done in this country had been transferred to the United States during the war because our resources were not great enough to produce a product in a reasonable time and to be some cut off from that

corporation which had gone on and we have been joint teams on everything all the time of obviously a great shock. Do you think it's still true to say that one of the motivations for deciding to go ahead with Britain's bomb. Was what will show them or perhaps that if we manage to make our own then they'll let us back in again. I don't think it was a sort of tit for tat. I don't think they actually saw Altenburg it and thought that again the decision was taken by a very small group of people the cabinet didn't know was that it was necessary to go on because of the power of the word putting in the need for the UK to have it. Did you just talk about the secrecy that was held. I mean did anyone in your circle the ministry of defense or on the Admiralty see them where did they know about that decision in fact you were.

Well I knew what it was. I knew that it was a group of people in the ministry of supply onto the poor fool who were doing this work. But beyond that I knew very little. Why do you think it was kept quite so secretive. I mean can you give us an idea of the atmosphere surrounding the decision. Well I can't say that I'm in need that was probably the way I actually work. I think he was always one for keeping things. Note that it was possible and I don't think he thought it was necessary to say anything particular. And of course when it was announced by ABC Alexandria in May 1948 that we were developing an atomic bomb. It passed almost unnoticed in parliament and by the public certainly wasn't too controversial. No not at all. Why do you think that was. I mean why why did it. Can you give us an idea of the the atmosphere of how Britain thought of itself perhaps at that point. I think we still thought of ourselves as a world power at that time and that this was the sort of weapon the world power needed to have.

Yeah. I mean nowadays English people tend to think of themselves and certainly Americans tend to think of Britain as a European country. It was a very different atmosphere in those days when you could just elative. Well I mean the period immediately after the war was devoted to picking up the pieces and reconstructing the empire by getting Singapore back Hong Kong back and recovering the position that we'd had before the war started. And that was right up to 1955 I suppose it was we still although thinking of the chiefs of staff and politicians was that Britain was still a world power and had to equip itself accordingly. Well you were in the minister of defense and as fairly early as 46 48 20 in Europe the defence of Europe figure in British defence

priorities were what were those primary didn't really figure out all that much. I think because again and said that the offensive didn't fit. I think the defense didn't figure as more important than other aspects of defense policy and it was the defence of the United Kingdom that was one of the three pillars of strategy at that time and it was only when the Berlin airlift the Berlin blockade and the airlift began in 1948 the thoughts turned to the defense of Europe and with that of course the defense of the United Kingdom and that led directly on to the establishment of Western European Union and subsequently to the NATO alliance in 1949. So you mentioned three pillars of strategy what were the three pillars if you could just well this relates really to the paper by the chiefs of staff to which you referred in your own

notes the 1952 policy which was done after the Conservatives came back into power in 1951 and was done. Mr Churchill took the position of the minister of defense himself for the first few months of the government and the chiefs of staff were asked to produce a paper on global strategy which they did and that was based on three pillars one the defense of the United Kingdom which involved of course the defense of one to the Middle-East the protection of British interests in the Middle East and three in the Far East with bases in Hong Kong and Singapore. And that was the that was the policy of the UK as a global power really. Right. Right up till much later than that of course there were some people in the in the government and some in the

civil service who thought that. Europe was the dominant theme. I mean I did myself I would myself have wished us to see to go into the Schuman plan and the European coal and steel community as well as the first link with Europe. I would also like to see us go into your Wrotham and still more calls later on in 1958 to go into the machine treaty and become part of Europe. That was not. Sold right that time and the government preferred to be independent. And that feeling still lingers on I noticed with Mrs Thatcher's attitude to the mess in which old ideas die hard I think. But how was the bomb again going back to this period immediately post-war and when Britain was trying to develop its own bomb. How was it thought of at that time was the term deterrent knocking around in defence circles of the people just think that it was a weapon that if another war came we would need to at

that stage it was a weapon that we all might have to be used and it wasn't really until they 1954 I suppose it would be that deterrence began to dominate thoughts. My understanding was that that level strategy paid for 52 very clearly spelled out. The notion that really for the first time that you could rely on atomic weapons to deter war and therefore didn't need the huge conventional forces that might otherwise be necessary to fight one. I mean does that your that coincide with your recollection of the global strategy you played. Well that would be true if you were thinking purely a global strategy. But of course everything will be governed by the need to maintain forces in Europe and the allert. And that was why conscription went on until 1957. So you were actually involved quite closely with the Lisbon conference when you and the.

Well I was I was at it when I went to the military committee. In fact I suppose it was February the beginning of February 1953 1952 and I went through all the meetings that it was the false goals were discussed by the military committee. I was there with Jack Slessor and at the other the other the chiefs of staff were all there of course as well. And then the king died and all the top brass had to go back to London for his funeral so the humbler members of the group such as myself were entertained by the Portuguese government for a couple of weeks before the ministerial conference took place. So what do you mean by. That that conference was a very. Considerable conventional forces call for an end to this. Can you perhaps outline what the decisions were at that conference and.

How. Soon people decided that it wasn't realistic. Well I think they the military had worked out what forces were needed to do what they were required to do which would be to repel or deal with an attack by the Russians. In Europe there was one and the ministers accepted that and accept and gave an undertaking of good intentions I suppose is the right way to describe it that they do their best to fulfill them. But it soon became obvious because that the internal political considerations financial constraints economic problems were going to put the brake on and make it very difficult to do that. This of course had all come out of the three wise men exercise the bed sharing exercise in Paris in 1951 which led to that led to all this. Now slightly out of order. But of course that was round about that time that Churchill had come back. The conservatives were back in power by the time of October 51. Right.

Is it not true to say then that the global strategy paper with its emphasis on atomic weapons and deterrence by the threat of retaliation was an alternative to the kind of massive force levels that were being advocated. No I'm in favor of taking into account in the false goals that were produced with no distinction drawn between the two. And it wasn't really until considerably later. That people began to. Think that conventional forces could be reduced because of the deterrent power of the strategic nuclear forces. Now of course the Americans from from earlier on have been quite keen on bringing what term determined the west Germany would have to contribute to Europe's defense. What are your recollections about the prolonged negotiations that ensued between France and Germany. Could you tell us where you are.

You're quite right in saying that there was there was great pressure from the Americans in particular for the rearming of Germany and the French of course did not wish to see the revival of German national armed forces if it could possibly be prevented. While admitting the case for having German manpower available for the defence of Western Europe and this led to the production of the plenum plan which I suppose was 1952. And two very prolonged negotiations in patres from 52 to 54. I spoke with at which my court in which I participated as British observer which eventually of course was vetoed by the French really because they were not prepared to see their national forces submerged in anything in anything else even had the idea of a European defense community prove practicable which I think it was very doubtful it ever would have been.

What what do you recall about that period. I mean as you would observe as you say what with those guys Haitians like well prolonged. I think it it. Well I would you say or no beat round round the subject without really ever getting anywhere in particular. And there was a great deal of skepticism that I think about the basis of the plan all the way through what was the plan. In fact I mean it was to produce a European defense community with European armed forces and the supranational C'mon which would have been to which the individual nations of Western Europe would contribute. Knowing what we know of the history of France and the go wrong it's not really surprising and I think that it didn't come off. So in 1954 that collapsed and Europe was faced with what. I mean what was the result of the collapse of the European defense community.

Well I think the thing that directly led to so far as the UK was concerned news the pledge to keep two divisions on the Continent for a period of 50 years which was a commitment that no British government had ever contemplated giving before and this is the stuff that we are. So once again I mean what was the result of the breakdown from the British point of view the breakdown of the European defense community. Well it was a very severe blow of course to the morale of the Western European countries and it was in order to help in dealing with that and to prevent a total collapse. All that the British government agreed to make the commitment to station British armed forces on the continent of Europe for a period of 50 years which is an unprecedented commitment for the British government to make. But why did it need to do that. I mean what was the connection between that and Germany and France. Well it was a gesture on our part an indication on our part that

we would not ourselves withdraw from Europe which would have been the traditional British policy of course to withdraw into the United Kingdom and retain one's freedom of action. Tell me were you aware that all around this time seeing 52 to fifty five. Around that time of the developments within NATO within the shape of of strategy policy towards tactical nuclear weapons and the decision by Eisenhower and successive rounds and so on that that tactical nuclear weapons were going to be the answer to the force imbalance into it. I mean was that something that you were aware of in the British Ministry of yours. But I think it came a little earlier than your suggesting. I think they were actually in position by 1952 if I remember correctly. Now I don't think so. I think the first tactical weapons with political tactical really I mean they might have been freefall bombs available to some aircraft. Fifty two. I the

first cannon for example was like 53 long Tarmoh whatever. But I can't remember exactly that but I have my own recollection is that you know the exact tactical nuclear weapons had been accepted. Suddenly within the period that you are mentioning that I would have thought myself slept perhaps slightly earlier. Well let me ask you another question. December 1954. It was a NATO ministerial meeting in which Sacu was authorized to plan on the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. I mean without a change without a welcome change. And I think this time I'm guessing you have to check this but I would guess that tactical new nuclear weapons were first deployed in the Americas and falls on the continent and it was only subsequent to that that they would extended to other. Forces in Europe under what was called the key of the cupboard

policy whereby the other armies had the. Disciples themselves. But the warheads were retained by the Americans would only been issued in a crises in time of need. Do you actually recall the. Announcement by the Americans the public announcement that they had tested an H-bomb which came in 54. That the test had been 18 months earlier. Yes I recall that. What sort of impression did it make on you. Well it was a new and extremely alarming development of course and the enormous increase in the power of the weapons. And that again changed they changed the picture greatly from the atomic level to the thermonuclear level of destruction that could be caused. And it led on of close to a decision by the British government that they also

should develop a hydrogen bomb or a nuclear weapon which was announced in 1955 I think can move in the way and the Defence white paper that. Was not a controversial decision at all. As you recall I mean I didn't recall that it was controversial in any particular way. Of course most defense policy subjects of this kind were controversial and called trade divisions politically. I don't remember this one being more so than any other kind. But what about within the defense community. Was there any lobby for saying well really you know I would not be able to keep up with this or we can do it. It was it was a pretty good consensus within that I think it was a consensus to go on within the community here and I don't recall any statement by scientists or anybody like that that it was beyond our capabilities to develop it and it grows. It was well before the time when you had to consider manufacture.

Let me just go back to the time that Churchill came back into power. Was he surprised to find how far advanced the atomic program was. You know. I think they were surprised too. Yes. I think that they were surprised to discover that they had gone on and been sustained from the time in 1947 that actually took the decision to go ahead. Do you recall what happened to about the money and how the how is that. Because the money was never passed at home was it. Do you recall anything about no it was nothing to do with it. All I can say is it was nothing to do with the defense budget which I've been very much concerned with the funds for that were provided separately. Now Churchill went to see Truman and Eisenhower frequently during those first couple of years of his tenure and was trying hard really to

reestablish the atomic special relationship which them that long broken down earlier I mean we are all involved with those attempts. And you remember I went with him on the first visit to Truman on over the new year in 1950 to us all we would do if we went into Queen Mary and we reviewed and save on New Year's Eve and B and got stuck in the halls pipe so we were delayed 24 hours much everybody is concerned. That we made the time up on the on the edge and I was also a humble participant for all said Churchill's reception in New York when we arrived and we were taken off the Queen Mary by U.S. Coast Guard vessel at the light and then steamed up into the river east river with our floats playing. All on all sides and every sort of thing to be greeted by that I suppose the largest guard of all neither have ever been laid off by any country for any body.

And that was a tremendous moment actually now. So the special relationship was alive and well. But what about the atomic special relationship. Well it wasn't one that did touch or try to get debarred from doing that. And I think it was clear at the time that the political atmosphere in the United States was not such as to make it feasible to do so think you could turn that into a statement and did Churchill try to get something done on that. And if so perhaps you could tell us so I don't know whether he did it or not but he certainly didn't do it in any media. When I was president. But he had all sorts of interviews of Crawl's private interviews with the president and whether he did that or not. I don't. But OK what then can you just tell us again about the. Where things stood as far as the sharing of atomic knowledge was put into a sentence for so that we can understand it without my question going before it.

Well there was no sharing of atomic knowledge because it was dabar by my own act and it wasn't until 1958 that that situation was changed. But what was the climate in 52 53 that prevented that happening. You mean you have them. Well I think going back to what we were saying before Klaus Fuchs had defected by that and the fact that a great deal of knowledge had been fed to the Russians was no good and of course would have obviously prejudiced any possibility of getting any change in the United States legislation. Was Churchill himself upset by that. You know was he was concerned with the Anglo-American he was a great fan of the Mendosa. I think he was more concerned with the political relationships between the United States and the UK and the special relationship in that sense rather than in any specific

way related to atomic matters. So what was in fact did you discuss with the Americans when you went over. I mean what were what was being discussed of atomic matters word. Oh they had all of the European situation as to Russia of course there and a general political global survey that was the main object of the visit was to reestablish the relationship goes What was the feeling and I didn't know what was the feeling in Europe at around the time that we discussed discuss the Lisbon girls period when we of course we had the Korean War raging on the other side of the world. Was there a genuine. Fear of imminent invasion from the Soviet Union. No I don't I don't think I would say that there was a fear of an imminent invasion but it was great uncertainty in armies about the intention of the Russians which of course dated back to Galatea and the abandonment

to reality by the Russians and the general attitude of hostility the iron curtain and all the rest of it is indicated by the Berlin blockade of course and then subsequently by the Korean War which is another manifestation of communism in action. And I think it obviously made everybody feel very uneasy. What was the actual state of European defenses in 50 51. I mean what what was there to stop the Russians if you like. Well the American forces in Europe the British forces in Europe and the French forces in Europe. Those would be a bad part about them. I wonder what did that amount to. What I'm really asking me. Well it is still very large forces that because of the occupation forces will still hadn't really begun to be run down all that much. So there's still great numbers of people on the ground. But of course with conscription they weren't all that highly trained or highly effective.

I mean it's there's a phrase that's used by a great many people I talked to about there was nothing to stop the Russians but the only thing the Russians needed to get to the town was shoes or boots. I think that's true. I think that would have been true. Do you think because some of the reason is the story and certainly feel strongly that the figures that were given at the time and the people did believe in a 175 Soviet divisions and we have 12 or what have you guys had 12 at the beginning of NATO's that that kind of massive imbalance as it was portrayed at the time. Do you still think that was fair. True portrayal of the of the of the state of play. Yes. You know I don't think I I think the figures are perfectly accurate. Perhaps you could. And so how would you describe that. I mean what you've said there's quite a large number of

occupation troops in Germany. So how would you describe the force balance of the time because nature. Well I was overwhelmingly in favor of the Soviet bloc. So again if you could put it into a sentence for us I mean what was overwhelmingly. The preponderance of. Ground forces in particular. If I could just get a statement out of you so I don't have to use my questions to. I mean what how would you describe the situation in the different situation in your time. Well I would I would describe it as by saying that the Russians and the Soviet bloc had enormous forces on the ground in right up to the frontier of eastern front to the west in Germany and that the forces on the other side were first very much smaller and much less well-trained and organized.

Right. Why do you think you said yourself that the bomber force was finally decided on 54. What were the main justifications in British eyes for this very considerable expenditure of time and effort and money of course on a British deterrent. What was it two ounces really for that first that was thought to be necessary for the position of the UK as a world power that it should have this force within its armoury. And the second. Subsidiary that I think still important consideration was that it was an insurance policy against the risk of the United States turning isolation is to get in at any particular date. And even though the United States had committed troops to Europe which was never done before.

I mean that was still felt to be a real danger in 54 that time date. Well I think it was felt to be sufficient of a risk to justify having an independent deterrent falls out. But the main reason of course was one that it was thought to be militarily necessary for a global power as the UK then considered itself to be. And yet there was never any consideration really was that anything other than a Soviet aggression in Europe was likely to trigger the use of that term. I mean was there ever any idea that to defend Singapore or to something nuclear weapons were not at that time I think later on they if I remember correctly the V Balma forces based in Cyprus were committed to sento I think it was this was later of course in 52. It was just about 54. But again without

any as far as I know anyway and they planned to use them in that in that threat. But they would have been used again against Russia as the object to send to Jim Sciutto where was the containment of the Soviet Union. What was the effect of Syrians. As you recall it on on the on British defense thinking was there any effect have any lasting effect. Well it had a it had a tremendous effect I think in the sense that it destroyed many illusions. It had been demonstrated the kind of operation it was thought we were really not feasible in the world of that of that time. And but we were we had to rethink opposition of course by then a great deal of rethinking had gone on too. We were shown to be too vulnerable to external events and to make it

possible to plan for in a similar kind of independent operation or operation of the kind that Suez was from that time on the French reacted to it with considerable feeling of business against the United States and therefore a feeling that they couldn't rely on the United States and the United States alliance with United States was unwise or at least in commitment to that severe weather opposite reaction here in Britain. Don't you think. What was the reaction to the United States as it was out of Syria militarily. Well the reaction was I think for want of great bitterness at the time when the pound nearly collapsed and everything everything happened about it was followed very quickly by a feeling that as soon as possible the relationship must be repaired and restored. I was I went with Dan sands in January 1957 to New York and Washington to begin the process to try to begin the

process and we were definitely right in the deep freeze at the time. I remember a very chilly. Lunch with Henry Cabot Lodge at the United Nations that United Nations delegation in New York and then going on to Washington and doing the rounds with all people at the moment I saw him being greeted with considerable frostiness wherever we went. But two months later that was repaired at Bermuda of course and in March 1957 and that milliamp McMillan was determined to restore the old relationship so far as he could and this was the first Bermuda view that meeting in 1957 more of a bridge building exercise which was very very successful. Well can you remember about that conference. But I can remember being that reality but time again I mean most of the restoration of relations were done personally by Miller and

Eisenhower and Selwyn and Foster Dulles and we were the briefers and they and they all tour. I draw an active participant at that time. The one pretty important decision that was taken then at least in principle was that it was going to host. Intermediate missiles which is that for us Iran next year. And that was when I was directly involved in that in the discussions of that because what I mean why this was after all six months before Sputnik which gave a great deal more meaning to that agreement. But at that time why did the Americans feel that they wanted to have intermediate missiles and really it was a strengthening of the deterrent thing. Can you elaborate on what a new weapons system which in that was and I think in British eyes strengthened the effectiveness of the deterrent. Was there a quid pro quo arrangement. It was really a consequence. It was really a follow up of the earlier decision at the time of the Berlin Airlift

to have American B-29 bomber forces stationed in the UK. Was a natural development as the evolution of weapons went on. Now during this period say the need of March 57 through July of 58. There was a whole series of meetings between Miller and Eisenhower and so on and whether there were two that I I remember and members the the Bermuda on in March and the Washington money in October which was immediately after the Titanic when Toppan creature Crawl's revealed to the west the state of Russian technology. And and it was at the Washington meeting that the. Decision was made to request Congress to repeal the monarchy and to allow nuclear cooperation again between the two countries.

Now why why was what were the factors that led to that decision. Do you think with Sputnik very relevant to them. I think so. I think it was felt you know to the overwhelming superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons might not last all that long. The Russians were in a state to produce them themselves and to do that themselves and of course that proved to be incorrect. And of course now that no one did have an expert in his pocket by that time and effectively I mean Britain had let off an age bomb just before we had the Montebello test in 1950. Now this is Christly parliamentary H-bombs Christmas Island and for Christmas Island that's I think he said. That's right. I mean the other one of is that they are out there where they get that right. But I mean did did the fact that Britain that produced and responsiveness so quickly really and so effectively. Rather faster in terms of the development time and the Americans have taken that. So I think it is it certainly must have affected the Americans in thinking that they really hadn't

got all that much to lose if we were so far advanced as we were. What what do you think were the factors that influence the Americans to green to try to change in that manner and to get back to a special relationship. I think that the chief reason why the American government decided to ask Congress to change the act. Why. First of all the evidence that the UK had made a great deal of progress on it. And without the American information being available to it and that then that was not so much to lose as they might have feared otherwise. And I think the other reason was the tensions of the time which made them wish to make a political gesture of great value to us. I think those were the two main reasons I wasn't value the

whole years. But what can you tell me what the advantages were that we got from that to well not directly because I wasn't myself personally concerned with the technicalities of development of nuclear weapons I would be very much more in the field of the scientists and engineers and the Atomic Energy Commission and the United Way the Atomic Energy Authority and the United States Atomic Energy Commission where the relationship was reestablished and there were really no policy issues of the kind that I might have been involved in that I was concerned with at that time. I think it was entirely a scientific collaboration. The one other thing that did happen was that the. War plans began to be. Coordinated much more to that not the targeting and those kinds of things. Were you involved with that side of things.

No not really. I mean that was done by the military the chiefs of staff and then the actual targeting. I was not directly involved with that. But I mean do you recall what Moon's reaction was to that decision in October of 1957. Can you can you tell us how he how he reacted to it. Well I think it as it was the principal thing which Mr. Miller had in mind when we went to Washington in October 19 57 for those meetings I think it was one of extreme satisfaction that he got. It was the one prize that he wanted to get and did get from the from these meetings. Do you think it's fair to say in a sense that it was the culmination in the way of at least one object of the British effort to develop nuclear weapons over that whole period. I think it was the culmination of Macmillan's own wish to rebuild the relationship with the United States and to

re-establish it. I think his principal concern was political rather than technical about the technical benefits of cross-bow very great. But I think the chief feeling he had in mind was that this really put the crown on his own efforts to rebuild the relationship with the United States. And that really not all that long after the Suez episode and the deep freeze into which the relationship is gone. As a consequence of that it was only nine months after all. Do you think that some particularly nuclear weapons were much more important for their political political symbolism as it were for them than for the actual. Necessity for that for the defense of Britain for the state. Well I think they had great political significance to him. There's no doubt whatever about that. But I don't think you could say that he wrote The

off as a military weapon and to ignite that and that therefore it was exclusively political I think it was a combination of the two. But with politics as always really in his handling of affairs being uppermost in his mind because he dealt so very largely in terms of his personal relationships with people like the president or Dr. Adena other other other statesmen in the world. Well around about that time of course a very startling of a towering statesman came back into into action in the middle of 1958 to go fly around. Now his reaction to the the culmination of this process to the British agreements with the Americans that were signed in July of 58 following the memory of my man which included the nuclear propulsion system of submarines it was British.

His reaction to that was to ask for similar treatment or even better treatment for the French and he didn't get it and he was very upset by that. Do you think you did you know anything about that at the time. What's your read that you think the French should have been treated similarly. Looking If you regard the situation with hindsight I think one might say reasonably that there wasn't any sensible reason for saying that the French should not be treated in the same way. But when you are dealing with things of this kind which have such enormous significance it's understandable I think that the United States should not be used to extend the cycle more widely than they were they felt it necessary to do and that was why I think it was kept to the United Kingdom. I think the other reason was that the United Kingdom had was much further advanced than the French in the development of the weapons. What was did you have anything to do with the. Well you know what that Millan's relationship with the girl was that period was to go up more and more

hostile to the Anglo-Saxon dominance of NATO's he saw it. I mean what did you think about that. Do you think that that was justified. Well I wasn't personally concerned at all with the relationship between the girl and McMillon or to go in there and the United States frozen in time. Did you have any contact with the this of course I mean in the sort of general prickliness of relationships with the French and particularly in nature at this time when the French really pretty well withdrew from Iraq from collaboration in nature. What do you think the French were all justified in regarding NATO's being basically sort of Anglo's Anglo-American club at any rate that its leadership was so dominated by. The British and the French well I think the French did feel it was an Anglo-Saxon primarily an Anglo-Saxon relationship but I think they also saw that it was of great significance to them as part of it for the defense of an era which France formed such an enormous

part. But it caused tremendous problems of course on if and when it was thought that the passage of forces through France might be denied whether any emergency and that it certainly didn't make things easy. The the Duncan sounds 1957 white paper which which more explicitly than any other said that Britain would rely on nuclear deterrence and reduce its conventional manpower. What you were involved with that. Yes well I wrote it I think to say at least that wouldn't be. That's not literally true but I certainly had a great hand in the in the press are placed on hold. So if you could do that for us I mean could you outline for us what was what were the main strands of that white paper in 1957. Quote perhaps with a little background first time in McMillon became prime minister when he resigned and Anthony Head was

then Minister of Defence and Macmillan wish to have economies made in defence expenditure and he asked Anthony Head to stay on as minister on certain conditions including a policy of reduction of expenditure and dad would not accept that. So Duncan Sands was appointed instead on the same basis so that the scene was set at that time for some reduction in defence expenditure and one of the main elements of defence expenditure. Well of course the maintenance of very large forces of conscripts and this was one of the principal reasons why the 57 white paper announced the ending of conscription. It would be fair to say that long before that time the Chiefs of Staff and the service ministers and the Ministry of Defense had considerable doubts about the value and cost

effectiveness of conscription as a means of maintaining the British forces. The other two elements in the white paper which I think when you were one the statement that in addition to and maybe later in substitution for the V bomb falls ballistic missiles would be developed. And the other statement which calls the greatest thing of all was the one that said the role of the Navy in a future war was somewhat uncertain which caused immense consternation of course in my own way than in the Navy. Could could well be understood. And the role of British forces in defence of overseas territories was also redefined in the old commonwealth relationship was pretty well destroyed in that paper by statements that we had to

defend colonial territories overseas and make a contribution to defence. But the old idea of the Commonwealth as a entity of significance in defence policy it really disappeared at that time and as a corroborative of the first part of what I said they was much greater emphasis placed on the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and all of this on the significance of the British element in the deterrent forces as contributing to that. Now why was that do you think that was for convenience sake or because it was a change of heart about that or what. Is this re-emphasis on this emphasis on the British deterrent. I dont think it was really a re-emphasis of it I think it was as I said

before a crystallization of statements that had been made over and the thoughts that have been sold over a considerable period probably five years before that the defence by faith and that it wasn't really anything new in itself. It was the fact that it was stated that as part of a cohesive defence policy I think that made the impression that it did. Now another thing that that I'm not sure is stated in the white paper but it certainly implied was that the British army on the Rhine was going to be reduced considerably in numbers and was going to rely itself on tactical nuclear weapons which would to be eventually. Bought from other delivery vehicles which we bought that will be supplied by the Americans. Now they if I were if I remember this correctly I think the statements of the British forces on the continent was reduced Grah army forces was reduced to 78000 to 64000.

But I think it was accepted by NATO and the military at the time that with the equipment that those forces would then have had they would be as effective as the larger forces had been before and that of course implied they use all the holding of tactical atomic weapons in those with those forces. In fact that was some years before they got tactical atomic weapons from the Americans wasn't it. So it was a big apple but. I think it was. I mean did did you in the Ministry of Defense actually think about. Was there much thought given at that level to the strategy of the use of tactical nuclear weapons if I can use those words and juxtaposition as opposed to the strategic the terror the bombing. I mean did the people really think that these things wouldn't work or weren't going to work or could they concern themselves with how they were going to be used. I said that they were intended to be used across forward as against opposing

forces advancing upon them. But at that time when the state of knowledge about radiation and fallout and all the rest of it they would accept it as being perfectly reasonable weapons to use in a tactical battle on corn in continental Europe. I mean the fact it would have devastated quite a large part of Germany had to be accepted causes as part of that. But I think. Looking back on it now with the knowledge that there is talk about that one one wonders whether it was ever really a sound policy to have to adopt it. But in the state of knowledge at the time I think it was. Were you aware do you think did you worry at all in the British Ministry of Defense about. The numbers of these weapons that one way or another either the British army or the Dutch or the Belgians or the Germans whatever it was. And the Americans themselves of course were being poured into Europe over this quite short period.

No I don't think so because the warheads were retained by the Americans and would not have been. Issued to the forces on the ground except at a moment when the alliance itself had taken a decision at that point had been reached when it was necessary to do that. So the mere presence of the carriers of the weapons of the forces I don't think caused any particular concern at that time but I can't remember that it did. With warheads of course with that too. I mean they were here but they were in American custody. They were all on the ground. They were in in the in the country of course then they might have concerns you that there were 7000 warheads over custody. That was it. Well I don't think it's I don't think it did. I think it was thought it was necessary that they should be there. And they mean this was long before that. I don't know what you whether you mean somebody might have gone in and pinched a.. I just mean that the sheer quantity given as you say the devastation that would have resulted if even a small proportion of them had been used. I wonder if people were I suppose what I'm asking is

Why are people asking. To your knowledge either in NATO's shape or surprising about what was going on there when the British and its defense. How many of these things that we really need. Oh they were that they'd certainly have thought about that. I mean that would be part of the false plasma's and the false goals and the numbers allocated to each army it would have been worked out by the military as the minimum that they needed to do the job that they'd have to do if they were used to the minimum they were issued. No high wide and handsome in any way like that. What about the did I mean to the British. Did you have any. Say over that at all in the sort of strategy area. Abridgements the defence of how many of these things were going to be necessary to defend the northern sector of Germany was the British were responsible for that would have been down in the military committee of

NATO in which the British Chiefs of Staff were of course represented. So they'd been participants to that decision and of course they'd form their own view. Mithal that about what the British forces the British element of the NATO forces needed around about this time the time thornless was arriving and the next contest had happened and so on the beginning of of an upsurge in which which led to the really quite widespread protests of the early 60s in Britain C and D and so on. And the Labour Party. What was the reaction to those protests if any. I mean what was your reaction personal reaction to to those protests that you think that they what you think of them. Difficult to say I think this at this length of time I think I felt myself that it was legitimate for them to protest

about the protests were not significant enough and that arguments were not strong enough to justify a change of policy about the use and possession of all of the weapons. Can you describe the reaction of the white paper especially in Europe what was the reaction in Germany. Well I think the reaction in Germany after the 1960s just again I'm sorry I all the talking. I think that the reaction in Germany to the 1957 white paper was one of considerable shock and alarm that British conventional forces might be much reduced. And it was for that reason that Tony McMillan decided to go to sea and in which he did in May 1957 and gave a masterly exposition to him of the policy in the white paper which I think went a considerable way to reassure the Germans that there was no weakening

of British intentions to play a full part in the defense of Europe and that the abandonment of conscription in particular would increase rather than reduce the effectiveness of the British forces. So the numbers would obviously be smaller than they had been. It was a very successful visit. That bomb went off in a very congenial way. Yes memories of us too. Well I remember McMillian making a masterly speech at the dinner after the first formal meeting that we'd had with with at an on which he gave a magnificent survey of history and fitting the white paper into its historical context which he was extremely good at and very much liked doing. I've heard him do that with Eisenhower as well and other people and that term and the two things I remember. First of all added our being a great connoisseur

of German wine and displayed great dissatisfaction with often been laid on for us at the official dinner. I think there were 12 different kinds of wine laid on and he sent his secretary of Chancery who was a very senior civil servant down to the cellar to bring something better than wanted meaning provided. And I can remember Doc Glubb coming back with his arms filled with bottles of different kind and that nobody inspecting the majesty and passing them for himself. Fit for consumption at the dinner. The other thing I remember is a large home of Rhine steamer the next day at which we had a small table of about eight spells with McMillon and onas the two principal characters myself and others in attendance. When I had an i gave us a great disquisition on the effect of climate on politics

but punctuated this by periodically rushing to the side of the ship and waving frantically at another one that was going by we realized afterwards that this was all part of his election campaign and stewed. Man was he well he didn't miss any help in duty of registering himself for the job and vote so that those are the sort of personal matters that I'm afraid remain more firmly in the mind than many of the policy issues about which we've been talking. Did you. Did you meet friends of straße around this time. Yes. What were your impressions of him. Oh he was a very strong buccaneering type of character a very powerful minister of defense very good and very easy to get on with and and we had many discussions with it with him Duncan sands and I would go over and see him and Holsteiner or one of his secretaries of state in the Ministry of Defense. Very

friendly relationship. What was happening. What was his attitude to nuclear weapons as far as you know either the tactical ones or other ones. Well I think he accepted that they were necessary as part of the Organization for the defence of Western Europe. He certainly didn't raise any specific issues about them so far as I'm aware and certainly I never remember in suggesting that Germany should have them or anything like that. You don't because I mean there was some concern in some quarters that he was hinting that that that that indeed might be an object of the policy. Well I can't recall him doing that in my presence. He may you may well be right about that. All I can say is that my own recollections do not include anything of that kind. As if there was an American diplomat I was talking to before I came over here who's who described him as probably the most dangerous man in Europe has no judgment you would have given what you know at that time.

I don't think I would. Well I don't know. I not even know it but I don't think so. He was very robust and had no very strong views on everything. Do just looking back on the whole decade reading in 1946 and 19 of the late 50s which led to well which was a period of quite successful development by the British nuclear weapons on the run and was shortly to be superseded by a period that's lost it ever since almost of dependence. Some would argue anyway. Dependence on on United States relationship. Do you wish that we had been able to sustain and retain the position of complete independence as the French have done in retrospect and hindsight. I don't think it would have been realistic to expect that we could have maintained the position of completed independence if only for the

reason that the build up on the Russian side of those short range and long range strategic weapons has been so immensely great to them and nobody foresaw at that time and I think the significance of the British element in the Allied deterrent forces naturally shrank with the build up of the Americans in to match the aid in keeping pace with or ahead of the Russians. I think the perspectives change. Not that I would say that that is you know saying that the British forces are insignificant and role. When you think of naked do an enormous amount of damage I think sufficient damage to make the effect on the Russians would not have great hesitancy in using them on the outside. To me Ivan the deterrent is it's a balance of fear

or a balance. The irony is if you say that even if you unless you can guarantee that you can knock out the other side's deterrent forces in the first go. So they have no chance of hitting you back in a significant way. Then the effect of terrorism remains in my opinion. And I think that is still true. And I think we've become perhaps rather obsessed with the balance of forces and the buildup of enormous forces far larger than necessary for any military purpose. This is obscured the real significance of even a limited number of weapons capable of doing such vast damage as they can with the great extent that buildup was going on during the years. We can talk about the United States though they ended up with an arsenal by 1960 that is big and megaton as it's ever been. Were you conscious of that at the time. Were you concerned about it too. Did

you of course reflect on it. Well I think it was not a thing that I reflected about very much because I don't believe in reflecting about things and about over which one has absolutely no control or pointless. Is that why you think that possibly people who demonstrate against nuclear weapons are being ineffective. I mean people do feel they have no control. Well certainly that's true. And that is an emotional problem and a logical reaction I think and I think basically that he's CND is a moral and emotional force and. Does not in my opinion stand up now on other grounds other than that I respect him I myself couldn't agree with him and that he said do you think that there's any any sense in

which. There is morality is involved with the kinds of decisions that you have had to make professionally or other people in that area have to make professionally. I think you have to you have to consider whether you've never go beyond all bounds. But on the whole I think I support George Kennan saying keep keep that sort of consideration out of politics to a to the maximum extent you can have a sort of. In my view you can have him sound and effective policy if you base it entirely on that sort of consideration. What sort of considerations of moral and emotional thoughts about what kind of weapons you use or particularly in the case of the deterrent when the whole of its effectiveness depends on its not being used.