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General you pioneered the work on the ABM system. What did what did that until and I'd like you to begin this question by using the phrase if this meant building a missile which could shoot down another missile. Well this involved building a missile. Now that you've got another missile everyone said it was impossible. I go by the expression generally used but you can't hit a bullet with a bullet. However I felt when you do something the Air Force for starting in intercontinental missile Russia would soon be doing the same. So I felt we needed it to start a defense against it. And but as I say I had some opposition but the organ which finally responded to my suggestion that they employ our contract with Bell Telephone labs to study the problem. And from that initial study gradually evolved the ABM project. In other words we did find there was a problem there was the prospect of
having a missile defense with another missile and that was the ABM project however. I've left the army by that time and retired but thinking was that we should control the defense. In other words we agreed with Russia that we could triple the number of ABM so on each side. Well that wasn't bad enough but after you agreement was signed Russia continued with building an ABM project around Moscow and then later started a big radar system which expands a defense and I believe that was in violation of the treaty whereas we decided to abandon the one project we had for an ABM which is around a missile site. Now I could never understand that line of thinking. The argument seemed to go that if we build a defense
that would make Russia think that we were about to have a first strike as it were that we could safely deliver a nuclear attack and then defend against a retaliation. But I don't agree with that Terry. Yes because I believe that for every weapon if you look at it historically we've always been able to downgrade that weapon in time by having a defense against it. That doesn't necessarily mean a perfect defense but warfare is really a contest between what you can do aggressively or offensively and what the defense against your particular on offense might turn out to be. And it's part of the problem of deterrence. Now the word I think the reason that we have had you know better than 40 years of peace is because of the deterrence of the nuclear weapons.
No one in their right mind is going to start a war with nuclear weapons unless they can think they can get away with it with a quick easy victory in other words not have response. And as long as Russia thinks that where we will strike back and has a capability to strike back I doubt if we have a war with USSR. However you're going to have it is a first strike. Russia is now building weapons warheads that in time they will have enough of them that can endanger our retaliation because they can strike at our missile sites and they're not high enough for the size of warheads that they are now putting on some of their missiles. In addition they're going in for a do you think it's at the verge of civil defense and they have working on various forms of defense call it Star Wars if you want
to. And yet they try to stop us from going into it mainly by convincing our public that we shouldn't have it. And of course there are some of our so-called intelligentsia that think that's right. We shouldn't have a defense. It's too costly. And we never can make it perfect. We don't need to make it perfect. Now the verge if we can get a defense that's 60 to 80 percent effective. It will give the Kremlin a lot to think about if they're considering a first strike. The division not only have to worry about how many missiles they can knock out but also how many of theirs we will knock out in their defense. Now that is like a stud poker. Now there were defense of your hole card. That's a Pirate Day. They can't evaluate. In fact we can't be too sure either but at least there's one more factor that an aggressor would have to evaluate before they would ever think it's safe to launch a first strike. So
that is what I'm. My own line of argument as to why we should have a defense and I'm very pleased that our president President Reagan finally came up with the idea of a strategic defense initiative. No I don't think anyone at this time can say how effective it will be in time but we need to work on it with the hope that we can make a reasonably effective defense. As another major part of our deterrence program to keep Russia in hand. And so I hope that the public will support SDI. And to my mind it's not Star Wars as just a name given to it because they think the media thinks that probably is more objectionable to the public than just saying it's a defense. I want you statements you just made separately separately so I can so they can be useful for me.
And you know they'll be in response to some of my questions. OK now I like you to use the phrase when you respond to my first question I like to use the phrase hit a bullet with a bullet which I think it will be far more. Really would hit a much more responsive chord in the American you know there were you understand that. Yeah I can understand that. So why don't we try that again. You buy any of the work on ABM and what the DOT entailed boat and I've a defense entails the ability for one missile to strike another missile. Another way to knock it down. Many people say that's impossible and they use a term which is more understandable. You can't hit a bullet with a bullet and that is a very reasonable assumption at least it was back in 1952. However as time goes on you can improve your
your possibilities and back in 52 I thought it advisable to start studying the problem in spite of all the people who said it can't be done and I encourage the Army Ordnance to contract with Bell Telephone lab to study the problem and from that study eventually evolved the ABM project in other words a Anti Ballistic Missile Defense. Terrific. Then after that after ABM proved at least technically successful you could have an explosion which would destroy an incoming missile. We will scan soul who comes will this this this ABM system. I don't know for sure who canceled it but I give credit to it for what I call the intelligencia in our government who have theoretical thoughts about war and I don't believe they
really know the psychology of war and the will to fight and what's involved in that type of thing and I think the best demonstration of that is that the people who conducted the civilian chiefs who conducted the Vietnam war I'm sure will not go down in history as a great strategist. Would you like to hear that again from you without the reference to Vietnam. And. You mentioned to me before something that they were worried about the numbers game and I'm looking for really is for you to say the intelligence you've cancelled it and because they were only thinking about numbers and you can think about a war like that. I mean how do you know me in the study before you repeat that for me. Well it was cancelled. I believe bad intelligencia who think more in line and numbers and cause rather than a psychology of war and the will to fight. You know what I don't think they are really good at studying their past history. What wins for what
losers war and why will people fight on one issue and not another and it's that type of thing involved and it's the reason I just numbers and costs. Good. Do you think that should have canceled the ABM system. Definitely not. Well I should have continued to get to work on it because no one knows at the beginning of a project just how successful it will be and what new discoveries will come out. For example an ABM you need a nuclear warhead because you couldn't insure an actual hit as a one missile actually hitting another. I didn't think that was possible either but today you can do it with a later laser guidance. The Army has hit a missile launch from California with a defense on the island of Khwaja line actually physically hit another where you didn't. You wouldn't need an explosive warhead. That doesn't say you won't use nuclear weapons on as part of the defense. But the
accuracy of missiles with new types of guidance and computer systems are what they strive to be made into computers have changed the whole prospect of what you might do in a line of defense. Let's see how I would like to have that again. Let me I mean the reason I'm trying to repeat these is because there are races that I'm going to want a piece of it. Yeah. Well the key phrases that already are in the script. Right. And for example I'd like you to say that maybe give me give me a close look a closer shot than that a little further back OK. And I'd like to begin to answer the same question without taking it on to the press and and just simply begin by say they shouldn't have counseled him and then continued to talk. They should not have canceled the ABM in my opinion. It I think it was a mistake and it should never have agreed to control
the number of ABN that I think I will determine IBM before because you never cancel the ABM. And they should never have a good sign the agreement to limit the amount of. Defense we would have put the two together. To my mind is a terrible mistake as to neglect an offense defense and rely on an exchange of it a deterrent to where say Russia threatens to bomb New York City. Our only defense at present would be to say well we will hit Moscow and that which set off a thermonuclear exchange and that to my mind is not satisfactory to anyone in other words we need to deter war and part of deterrence should be a defensive system. A fence is probably the main feature. But if you have a defense that throws one more factor for
Russia to appraise the Kremlin to appraise on any decision on whether or not they could get away with a first strike to where they would not have a severe retaliatory attack from us. Now as long as they know they will receive a severe attack in return I doubt if Russia would ever start it there in the nuclear war. They argue one of the reasons you mention that the intelligentsia had canceled or agreed to trade off the ABM system was because they thought that it would create the fear in the Russians of a first strike. Could you repeat this statement for me and tell me why why why would a wooden ABM system one phone system create the fear of a first strike in the Russian's statement that might create their fear in the Russians that we would be planning a first strike. It's certainly giving a lot of credit to the ABM and the major Russian had an
ABM at that time I think about equally effective. We both knew it would not not stop and then the nuclear weapon should work really be effective. So I don't see. And also the same people now detract. From the possibility of creating a defense yet if you can create a defense that people believe in and why it's not going to bother Russia for a first in thinking we're having a first strike defense to my mind never threatens anyone unless they have aggressive attention intentions. So why should we worry about Russia worrying about our defense. Let's make it as good as we can. And if that is an added deterrent which it will be why that's so much in favor of another 40 years of deterrence. What about how what are the mechanics of the defense becoming a first strike see how do you see
them working. If you have a defense. Well in regard to defense tied in with the fan Center for a strike I doubt seriously doubt if United States ever would tolerate any thinking of a first strike against USSR. We had a little of that right after the war and still call the preventive war a concept from ordered by one or two Air Force general which I disagreed with very heartily. As we are not made up of people. Who I think would tolerate the idea of a first strike. However I don't give Russia the same credit in other words I think Russia would if they felt they could get away with a first strike even if there is going to be a serious retaliation as some of their generals say we can. We suffered 20 million casualties in World War 2 and came back to win. They are more apt to think unlined of a very stripe that is what we should be thinking about their
possibility of a first strike not our own. McNamara argued and I don't and you know again we've discussed this and I don't need you to retort you know to refute the argument directly but he one of his arguments was that you couldn't have a perfectly fence system and I believe you may be able to less of this directly actually. We couldn't have a perfect defense system. We could only have a defense that would guarantee that in the case of war 60 million Americans would die. A 30 percent to 70 percent surviving of the population. And he said that he couldn't see any way in which we should spend money to do this how would you you know what do we need a perfect defense is that. I doubt if rather put it this way I do not believe we need a perfect defense in setting up a defensive system against the nuclear weapon. I would hope we could achieve 60 to 80 percent effectiveness. You never could achieve a 100 percent effectiveness on defense in my mind so we shouldn't plan on it.
We shouldn't count on it. And if we get it we're lucky but I doubt if we ever would. Do you think we should spend. Do you think that in 1960 in 1960 we should have gone ahead and spend the necessary money to save 30 percent of 770 percent of the US population increase in case a nuclear war broke out. Do you believe that. I think we should have continued working on defense from the very start we should never have any time lessen our emphasis on it. Now that doesn't mean spending billions and billions of dollars every year it means spending the number of billions that you can spend effectively as a word as you get a new discovery. For example laser came in since. You Nischelle decision on the ABM as a method of guidance computers have been frood and all these things make it more possible to get a better defense. So we say there's nothing static about warfare.
You have to keep on trying to improve your methods of offense and defense. The too much of one for the betterment of the other is wrong. What is the contribution of the sense to the whole question of the tyrant. What is your defense. I mean just lessens the effectiveness of a Russian attack. In other words they have if you have no defense you know there's nothing to stop their missiles from reaching the objective except malfunction of the missile itself. So if they say four missiles to get one effective or four to get to affect you if you add defense why it means you just had need that many more missiles to try to overcome the defense. And it's also they can test their own missiles to where they can have a pretty good idea of what the effectiveness might be in other words your accuracy how many they need for a particular target. But if you add the factor of a defense that just gives one more
variable that they have to estimate and they do not have all the facts on it. So that it does add as a deterrent. What about the argument that the only thing that would have to do is add more missiles and then you would keep adding more missiles and the other size sold you would have us an arms race more defensive missiles no more and it is going to be argumentative but I would hope is if you had a defense both sides might realize it. First strikes go out the window. And then there might be more inducement to have what I consider their real control of weapon is to start reducing them. So far all we've done is agreed with Russian plans for the future where they won't build any more and what they presently plan but then when they need some more about it go right ahead. What's happening today. You're only supposed to be working on one extra new missile and at least two. And they also are producing missiles now that are
trying to put them in production in numbers that can knock out our hardened missile sites. So they are striving for a first strike capability and that is one thing we missed you can only match them in two ways One is by defense the other is by bigger and better missiles on our part. Now you can continue this forever no one thing that I said well this is an exact cause of why they want to have more missiles and why we should have more missiles. The thing we should be looking at now is how do we both agree to reduce missiles and in my mind a defense would make it safer to reduce missiles. Then no defense. And if you ever got the ultimate which is zero missiles which I think there we probably never will get to I don't you have to worry about the Doppies. Mad Men you know it might secretly bill five or six missiles and launch them on New York City. And the other
thing you would have to worry about then is how do you increase your conventional forces so that Russia can sweep through Europe with a conventional attack. So there no no real peace. Until you get a meeting of the minds that we're going to live on this planet together without consciously striving to take over the whole business which is the announced Russian intention in other words to commune the whole world. And in my mind we have good. I'd like to do. I like to do to go again and tell me do you feel very strongly in the 1960s in 1967. Do you feel really strongly about the cancellation or reduction in limitations and maybe you know in regard to my feelings in 1960s I think everyone should keep in mind that I was often working on conventional particular I'm a nuclear as a nuclear
power. And I was busy trying to help people develop shave plans and get them into power production. And I listened to what was going on with considerable unhappiness. But I was in no position to do much about it. Understood but you were I mean ass as the person who originated and who got the first order than it's going and who took the first $50000. Bell Telephone labs for the system most of them meant a lot to you when the council did in the 1960s. It did me no shock to me in other words the ABM system meant a lot to me and I wonder she continued but I was in no position to really be effective. Why did it mean someone told me you know I mean I understand that you were not in the position to be effective. But what I think is interesting is that you saw its beginning and you were the one who started it and you saw it in the and I like to have a statement like you began that statement and then telling me why you were so
upset that they had not continued doing that you already told me this but I just wanted to write in a different package. Well when I saw the cancellation of the ABM I was very unhappy about it but was not in a position to do anything about it effectively. But I have had strong feelings because I have thought about this problem from about 40 to 1942. In other words when we started working on the atomic bomb on nuclear bomb the atomic bomb that was the name of it then why i realized it many others did not we were introducing into warfare something that was going to be new and destructive and beyond anything that we'd ever conceived of before and it was going to change the warfare. And when we delivered the first strike on Hiroshima. My hopes and the same Hope same many other people like Arthur Compton had the same hope that it would prevent war in the future. In other words I had always had the hope from the
time of Hiroshima on. That that would be the last Nagasaki but I mean did they end the war but that would be the last time you ever have to use them. But you had to be ready to use them at the drop but I had if to stop aggression and I would hope stop all wars began little now we have been successful in voiding a confrontation between Russia and US but we have not been successful in deterring small wars. That's pretty much of what we are going the cycle you were going from the Nike Zeus does in that he acts and I know again that you were not I don't know they call it that to me. Unlike you I see the segment that second system they call the night. Yeah yeah yeah but you weren't there yourself one from working on Bomber defense to working on missile defense health dept and so should have been how do you go from one to the other.
Well initially. She of course the only way Russia could strike us is by bringing one hidden in with the ship hidden in a ship in a New York Harbor or something like that or by air. Whew that was a period balls through the fifties. Before intercontinental missiles became effect you know where we went after defense a strong defense during that period. We built to do mine. We went moved over to guided missiles primarily because people asked me to do it the idea of getting a defense against a possible Russian attack in other words we wanted defensive missiles to strike down bombers by missiles or air to air and the Nikkei was a big ground to air missile. We put in a very effective and extended system of Nike to defend against Russian bombers. You probably would have had to be one way bombers but we felt there are plenty of
Russians to fly that type of mission. But we were strong on defense at that time. So I never understood this sudden change to where defense is no longer important. Would that was that because of the missile. Because of the so-called intelligencia concept. What is and what is that concept of the concept is that it would be up to the intelligentsia if you can begin that by saying Tell agency intelligence yes thought that it would be better to have no defense because that defense might make Russia think we were planning a first attack. Our first strike and that would destroy their confidence Russian confidence that they could execute what they call a Mutually Assured Destruction MAD. I think the term is very appropriate. We're still we're still going. No I think that's a that's a good
answer. We have I mean I've covered pretty much what I want to cover but I you know what I like to do I don't know if you know I've tried different different ways of getting at this but the one answer I like I still like best is the answer that we have on film. You know when you say everybody said it be done you can hit a bullet with a bullet. Well I just took the view you have to try and then follow that on by a statement saying The Intelligence Council did and I thought I knew no they shouldn't have learned because I mean for whatever reasons you would like to tell me they shouldn't have done it. But I like to be you to begin that statement with saying this man building a missile which could shoot down another missiles. Everybody said it can be done you can hit a bullet with a bullet. Well I just took the view. I mean that's really the nicest way. That's because it's really a very nice statement on your part. So what did it mean building a defense against a defense against
the missile age what did that mean. That meant that we had to have to develop a missile that could knock down another missile. And in 1952 when that was first proposed by everyone shouters impossible they used the term. You can't hit a bullet with a blow like. Well I did nobody you could or you couldn't but I felt that you should study the problem. And so I urged the Ordnance Department. They were responsible in the Army for missile development and ordinance. I do have signed a contract with Bell Telephone labs to study the problem and from that initial study it gradually developed that there was there were prospects for knocking down a missile with another missile. And you finally develop the ABM project. And that unfortunately was hindered by his
so-called intelligentsia who agreed with Russia as a part of control to have only I believe one system for each country. Ours was to defend a missile site. Russia selected to defend Moscow I suppose we couldn't do that because politically that is difficult for our government to say well we're defending ourselves but not the rest of the country. But to make matters worse after the agreement we then canceled our effort to defend a missile site and as a result why work and defense was interrupted. And in my mind that is wrong and a terrific mistake. You should continue to find a defense no initial defense there we thought we need to do you nuclear weapons or economic warhead because you couldn't hit a missile. But you had big enough explosion you could knock it down.
That of course is a questionable use particular over your own land. But if we had kept going we did to a certain extent but not to. You might say I always say use the optimum amount of money depending upon the state of the art. Well these lasers came along. We improved guidance as computers improved you could do the calculations faster. So it actually we did achieve and one test flight to where we launched a missile from California where the defense sat up and clouds an island for a missile actually struck another missile. In other words we hit the missile with a with solid material which would be enough to destroy at speed just going you didn't need a warhead. Now that doesn't mean you wouldn't use warhead because you might have near misses or what you would achieve with a warhead. But this state of the
art military is never static. You constantly have to work at it. And whenever a new weapon is introduced. You should do as I sponsored and worked on introduce a defense and in time in most cases the defense gets good enough to where it will blunt the effect of a new missile. Just look back on the history of gas terrific effect the first time you but eventually way you get enough defense to where you are discouraged. You used to work people agree not to use it. Same way the first tanks were very powerful. But then you soon find a bazooka can knock one out the later takes more but you have to constantly keep at this thing and to stop development on any type of offense or defense. To my mind is wrong. As long as you have. Countries in the world that threaten your existence.
Terrific guy you know I think I've you know I cannot find any better ways that are so there are so many different take about 15 pages all together in my book. Would you like to add something I mean that you think I missed seeing or that I had anything to account. You know I think I've given most of the arguments. CARD The other strong factor is the psychology to the people and that's going on in peacetime. That's a whole different aspect. If you were I should waging psychological warfare on us right now just like Gorbachev speeches he doesn't mean he's talking about he knows you know is that our Congress has people that support the views he's expounding. So he expounds them. It's psychological warfare and you think that the Fed plays a role in the psychological war. But do you think the fence you know place are all well you know he's trying to.
Why is he so darn anxious to kill SDI. Figure that one out you know.
Series
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Raw Footage
Interview with Kenneth Nichols, 1986 [3]
Contributing Organization
WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/15-gh9b56dc0v
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Description
Episode Description
Kenneth Nichols served as Director of U.S. Army Research and Development, worked on the Manhattan Project and was the Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. One of his principal roles was to help with development of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. In discussing the concept, he concedes that it may never be perfect but that even at 60-80% effectiveness it would be an important factor for the Soviets to consider. He adds that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) should be seen in the same way. He blames the civilian "intelligentsia" for cancelling the ABM program - a decision he deplores - criticizing their reliance on abstract numbers and cost figures and their ignorance of the "psychology" of war. He goes into some depth explaining and defending the program, arguing that a missile defense system would encourage not first-strike thinking but genuine control of nuclear weapons.
Date
1986-07-01
Date
1986-07-01
Asset type
Raw Footage
Topics
Global Affairs
Military Forces and Armaments
Subjects
Bell Telephone Laboratories; United States. Dept. of Defense; Hiroshima-shi (Japan) -- History -- Bombardment, 1945; Nagasaki-shi (Japan) -- History -- Bombardment, 1945; Antimissile missiles; Strategic Defense Initiative; Civil Defense; Communism; Deterrence (Strategy); First strike (Nuclear strategy); Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Laser weapons; Nuclear arms control; Nuclear Disarmament; nuclear warfare; nuclear weapons; United States; Soviet Union; mutual assured destruction; Soviet Union. Treaties, etc. United States, 1972 May 26 (ABM); United States. Air Force; Reagan, Ronald; McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009; Compton, Arthur Holly, 1892-1962; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Qaddafi, Muammar; United States. Army
Rights
Rights Note:,Rights:,Rights Credit:WGBH Educational Foundation,Rights Type:All,Rights Coverage:,Rights Holder:WGBH Educational Foundation
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
00:33:24
Embed Code
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Credits
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Nichols, Kenneth D. (Kenneth David), 1907-
AAPB Contributor Holdings
WGBH
Identifier: 1aa28026719ec1297d11d23e61bed270d5b2867a (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00
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Citations
Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Kenneth Nichols, 1986 [3],” 1986-07-01, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed May 18, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-gh9b56dc0v.
MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Kenneth Nichols, 1986 [3].” 1986-07-01. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. May 18, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-gh9b56dc0v>.
APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Kenneth Nichols, 1986 [3]. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-gh9b56dc0v