The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour

MR. MacNeil: Good evening. Another extraordinary day in the Soviet Union dominates the news this Thursday. A defiant and resurgent Mikhail Gorbachev moved quickly to purge those involved in the failed Kremlin coup. Gorbachev said he would have chosen suicide rather than cooperate with the conspirators. He called the coup the most difficult crisis of his tenure and promised to work with Boris Yeltsin to further democratic reform. We'll have details in a moment. Judy Woodruff's in Washington tonight. Judy.

MS. WOODRUFF: On the NewsHour tonight we'll let you hear for yourself how Gorbachev described his ordeal and we have a conversation with the man considered the father of U.S. post war policy toward the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan.NEWS UPDATE

MR. MacNeil: Mikhail Gorbachev today emerged from a three day ordeal that left him angry and deeply shaken by the betrayal of people he had trusted. He said all the coup plotters were under arrest, although there was a report where one had committed suicide. He appointed a new defense minister, Gen. Mikhail Morseyev, to replace conspirator Marshall Dmitri Yazov. He also named a new head for the KGB. He said he would move swiftly to purge the Communist Party of hardliners but said he still believed the party could contribute to reform. At an emotional and highly dramatic news conference, Gorbachev said he would have committed suicide before he submitted to the rule of the plotters. He said that among them were men he had once believed in.

PRES. GORBACHEV: [Speaking through Interpreter] People whom I myself promoted, whom I believed, whom I trusted, and they turned out to be not only participants in that plot but organizers of that conspiracy against the President, against the constitutional structure, against perestroika, against democracy.

MR. MacNeil: At his news conference, Mr. Gorbachev pledged to work with Boris Yeltsin to push forward democratic reforms. The two men are expected to meet tomorrow to discuss the formation of what Yeltsin described as a new government of national trust. Gorbachev said he would also be meeting with the leaders ofthe other Soviet republics tomorrow. Earlier, Yeltsin told a rally of 100,000 people outside the Russian parliament that they had defeated the hardliners. He said the last three dark days must never be repeated. Penny Marshall of Independent Television News has more.

MS. MARSHALL: Tonight Moscow's skyline was ablaze with the sound and sights of celebration, fireworks over the Kremlin to mark the people power that brought President Gorbachev home. The euphoria was evident from dawn this morning when the last tanks withdrew from the city streets. But these were not hostile forces which had fought to depose the President, rather loyal Russian soldiers who'd stood to defend Boris Yeltsin and his pro-democratic supporters -- relief as the symbols of conflict were removed. Inside the Russian parliament this morning, they rose for the republic's national anthem and Mr. Yeltsin was given a standing ovation by the MPs who joined him throughout the coup. The Russian leader paid tribute to the heroic Muscovites who for three days were on the barricades and who today turned their struggle into victory. Outside the thousands were no less enthusiastic, roaring approval for every fresh announcement. Theirs was a new voice of confidence.

SPOKESMAN: [Speaking through Interpreter] For the first time in Russian history, the Russian people have stood up straight and come down to the streets and have been willing to die for their political institutions. They've always been willing to die for their country. This is something new and I think very important.

MS. MARSHALL: Mr. Yeltsin, Russia's hero and figurehead, appeared on the balcony. The crowds vowed continuing support. His bodyguards held a bulletproof shield in front of him, proof of the tension that still exists even now. Armed guards were poised and alert, security men ready to protect the man who for three days has protected Russia. His supporters called for Boris Yeltsin to be made a hero of the Soviet Union. Amongst the crowd, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former foreign minister, who for so long has warned of the forces now defeated. Amongst the crowd a young tank commander who defected during the coup. Mr. Yeltsin was in an extravagant mood. "Russia, he said, "has saved democracy, saved the Soviet Union, saved the world." "We have won," he told the crowd, "and this must never happen again." And in two immediate decrees, Mr. Yeltsin ordered the end of Communist Party cells in the armed forces and declared the old pre-revolutionary Russian flag would once again be flown by the republic. And then silence, breathtaking stillness as the crowd stood to remember and honor the victims of the coup. It was the only moment of reflection during a day of proud and peaceful attacks on the symbols of Communist Russia. The new Republican flag was hung on the headquarters of the Central Communist Party headquarters, the crowd reveling in the party's humiliation. The flag was also hung on the KGB headquarters, the Luvianca, and as the crowds moved in, painting accusing graffiti on the Soviet Union's most awesome instrument of power, hardliners like Viktor Alksnis voiced fears of a backlash.

COL. VIKTOR ALKSNIS: [Speaking through Interpreter] I think a purge will now begin and that most of the people will be tracked down and I fear we will fall into the mire of neo-Stalinism. Only now, it will be under a different banner.

MS. MARSHALL: By this evening the demonstrators outside the Luvianca were preparing to tear down the statue of Felix Derjinksi, Lenin's original police chief. Such is the confidence ofthe Yeltsin supporters that tonight they dared to deface this KGB monument. Their faith in their own victory has now taken them out beyond just the Russian Parliament Building. They're beginning to claim Moscow as their own -- claiming it back from the Communists, whose credibility has been destroyed by Boris Yeltsin, whose power has been crushed by these demonstrators, and whose general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, is tonight back in the Kremlin.

MR. MacNeil: Later this evening, with the help of five giant cranes, the 14 ton statue of Felix Derjinski came crashing to the ground. Judy.

MS. WOODRUFF: Lawmakers in the Soviet Baltic republic of Latvia moved today to outlaw the Communist Party. They also said they were seeking the arrest of hardline Latvian Party Leader Alfred Rubics. Gorbachev condemned Rubics today for his support of the takeover. Most Soviet troops withdrew from the Latvian capital last night but security around the republic's parliament building was increased today after lawmakers said they feared an attack by elite Soviet Black Beret forces. Latvia, like Lithuania and Estonia, has declared independence from the central government. Soviet forces began their pullout from the Estonian capital of Tallin in the early morning hours. The army had seized television stations and communications facilities in all three Baltic republics following Monday's coup. People cheered their retreat today. President Bush commented on the Baltic situation during a news conference at his summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine. He was asked what he expected from Gorbachev in the aftermath of the coup.

PRES. BUSH: I've long felt that, that the quicker independence can be granted to the Baltics the better, and let's hope that out of this now we will see genuine negotiations between the Baltic states and the center to accomplish this end. And I've talked to President Gorbachev about this before. I've talked to President Yeltsin about it as a matter of fact, and so perhaps recent events will speed the day when you have an agreed path set out for, for independence of these states. In my view, that would do more to, to enhance good will in the United States than almost any other single thing that could be, could be done.

MR. MacNeil: Pres. Bush also said he was lifting the economic - -or the freeze on economic aid to Moscow. Soviet aid began to flow today from other parts of the world. The European Community announced it would resume its more than one billion dollar aid program suspended after the coup. Japan said it was ready to lift a freeze on more than $100 million in food aid. Britain also lifted its aid freeze and promised to review further assistance. Prime Minister John Major spoke to reporters after a phone conversation with Mr. Gorbachev.

JOHN MAJOR, Prime Minister, Britain: He sounded very fit, very well, very buoyant, and very anxious to take advantages of the opportunities that lie ahead.

REPORTER: Won't you inevitably be talking to Pres. Gorbachev who can never be the same man again? He's weakened in his power base and perhaps weakened in himself.

PRIME MINSTER MAJOR: Well, I don't know why you're so keen to write him off. He sounded pretty buoyant to me, pretty powerful to me, pretty confident to me. He's reshaping his government. He has great plans for the future. He sees how he can carry reform forward. He sounded to me like a man very fit, very confident, and raring to get on with the job.

MR. MacNeil: Mr. Major also said he hoped to travel to Moscow to meet face to face with President Gorbachev soon, possibly in the next month.

MS. WOODRUFF: Just ahead on the NewsHour, what happened to Gorbachev in his own words and a conversation with George F. Kennan. FOCUS - DEFIANT AND DETERMINED

MS. WOODRUFF: The international press conference has been a favorite forum for Mikhail Gorbachev and never has he put it to more dramatic use than today. For more than an hour, the Soviet President described to an audience of reporters and to television viewers around the world how he learned that a coup was being mounted against him. Here is an extended excerpt.

PRES. GORBACHEV: [Speaking through Interpreter] On the 18th of August about 10 to 5 PM I was told by the head of my guard that a group of people had arrived asking to see me.d 2>xZyhrhW<>o WLxexpecting anybody, hadn't invited anybody, and hadn't been told of this. I decided to find who had sent them since I had all kinds of telecommunications -- on one of the phones in my office where I was working I picked it up, it was -- it had been cut off. My third and fourth, I picked them up, I picked up the internal phone, all dead. I was cut off, incommunicado. Then I understood. This was not the kind of mission that we normally have to deal with. I went out to another part of the house and summoned my wife and daughter and I told them what had happened. I didn't need to be told anymore. I realized that something very serious was happening, that there would be an attempt to arrest me or something very bad was about to happen. Anything could have happened I realized. I said to Raisa and Divina that if policy and the essential issues were good ones, then I would stick to my position right to the end, no blackmail, no threats, no pressure would have an effect on me. And I wouldn't take any other decisions. I thought it was essential to say this. The family members said that that should be my decision and they would share whatever -- endorse whatever I said -- they would go along with it. An ultimatum was issued to me, that I should transfer my powers to the Vice President. I said before I answered any questions I wanted to know had sent them. He said the committee. I said, what committee? He said the committee on the state of emergency of the country. I said I never set that up, the Supreme Soviet didn't either. Who created this committee? People had already got together and a decree from the President was needed and you can issue the decree and stay here or transfer your powers to the Vice President. And he said the situation in the country is such that the party is moving towards the sliding doors of catastrophe. Measures have to be taken and the state of emergency is necessary, nothing else will save us, we can't have any more illusions, I was told. My answer was that I know the situation in the country better than anyone, political, economic, social situation, the right of people, the position, and the hardships they are now enduring. I knew all that better than anyone, I said. I said that you and everyone who sent you are adventurists. We're essentially going to ruin you, he said, to hell with you. That's your problem. Not only that, however, you will also ruin the country and everything that we've been doing. Now we've gotten to the day before the signing of the union treaty and we've been working for months and prepared major decisions on the food stuffs problem, on the energy, solution of financial problems, so to stabilize the political situation, the economic situation, and move fast to the economy, market economy. At that time we were giving people to develop themselves more fully in all spheres of activity. After agreement has been achieved, it wasn't complete. There were certain suspicions on various sides in relations between the republics and the center and between political and social movements. That's true. But it's the only way I've had to make progress. Only suicidal people could propose the introduction of a totalitarian regime in the country. I was told that I ought to resign. I said, well, you are never going to get either of those things after me and pass the message on to those who sent you here, I said. I've got nothing to talk to you about this. I asked them, what happens if you introduce a state of emergency tomorrow, what then? Just look ahead into the future, a few steps beyond that. What then? The country will reject you. It will not support on these measures. You want to exploit the difficulties of the people, the fact that people are tired, that they prefer to support any dictator. This scenario, in my opinion, is disaster. It will be a dead end -- would destroy everything that we have been -- that we have now achieved. I'm prepared to have a session of the congress of people's deputies and Supreme Soviet. If there are doubts among the leadership, let's get together to discuss the matter. If the deputies are all there, let's work together and adopt, if necessary, emergency decisions, if necessary other measures, but I will support the idea of further reforms in cooperation with the West. These main thrusts in these areas have to be synchronized, especially as the peoples have shown that they really want to cooperate with us at this decisive phase. But this was like talking to a deaf mute. They were already prepared, the machine had been set in motion quite clearly, so there was no point in any further conversation. I said, you can report back that you will be defeated if you go ahead with this. I fear for the fate of the people and all that we've done over these years for the people. That was the end of that. When they got my ultimatum in response to their ultimatum, and I told them to pass on my conclusions, and then everything proceeded according to the logic of concentration, full isolation from sea and land. I had 32 guards left with me who decided to stay to the end. Seventy-two hours of full isolation ensued. This idea, obviously, was to break the President psychologically. It was very rough. But that's how it went on. Each day, morning, afternoon, I made demands that communications be restored to the President, that a plane should be brought immediately so that I could fly back to Moscow to work. After the first conference, I added I demanded my rejection of this nonsense about my health should be published by those healthy people whose hands were shaking obviously. Everything was shut off, but there were some old radio sets and the people from the guard managed to hook up an antenna and find out what's going on. We got the BBC first of all. That was the one that sounded most clear -- then Freedom and Voice of America. I must tell you that my six years with such hard work and difficult quest, arduous quest for a way ahead does not seem in vain. Society rejected the coup plotters. They proved to be isolated. They couldn't get the army to support them. The army was in contact with the people and they couldn't fit anywhere. Today it failed and they knew it. The republics took a negative stance and first of all I wish to emphasize above all the position and principle of the Russian parliament, the Russian deputies, the Russian government, and the outstanding role of the President of Russia, Mr. Yeltsin.

REPORTER: [Speaking through Interpreter] I have evidence that these eight people at the time you were elected and before then were clearly scoundrels. It was written all over their faces. I have evidence of that. The question is how come you appointed them.

PRES. GORBACHEV: [Speaking through Interpreter] I just spoke on television. I said this has been a lesson for me and in particular I can see that the Congress is quite right when it didn't elect the Vice President, it didn't wish to elect the Vice President, and I insist on it. This is my mistake. And it's not the only mistake I've made. I can see now.

REPORTER: [Speaking through Interpreter] Don't you think that the time is going to come to focus serious attention on the Communist Party and Soviet Union as a political body which is just out of keeping with the present day?

PRES. GORBACHEV: [Speaking through Interpreter] I believe that your questions are the most important ones in the light of the realities, the actual situation with respect to physical forces, this is a reality which we had to look in the face and understand. And if we all analyze these realities and take them into account, one of the realities is that of the Communist Party, and it is my duty -- I shall do everything in my power in order to -- to drive out the -- forces from the Communist Party on the basis of this new program which we've put forward. There is every opportunity to unite all best of the thinking forces, when you speak about the party as a whole and the force of the party as a political force, I don't agree with it, because I know thousands of people, hundreds of people, and they're sitting here, in fact, people who are real democrats and who are devoted to perestroika, they're devoted to the struggle, and do not bend or flinch, and this has to fashion a new program of the Communist Party, for example. I shall never agree that the program which was elaborated should be transformed into something which will suit those who have enough nostalgia for the gold old days. We have to do everything in order to reform the party and make it into a living force for perestroika.

REPORTER: [Speaking through Interpreter] Mikhail Sergeivich, do you believe that Boris Nikoliavich is -- has more real power at the present time than you?

PRES. GORBACHEV: [Speaking through Interpreter] I wouldn't ask the question in that way. We're doing everything we can to meet together with Boris Nikoliavich in recent days and before that to ensure that the cooperation agreement between us will actually be a genuine factor in the combining of all democratic forces together with all the republics, and let's think about this -- this is the most important point. Many people would like to try again to by any means try and sow the seeds of discord. So many lies have been spread regarding these people. That is very difficult, but the situation has grown rather tense. We know what's happened. As someone said, we know who is who.

MS. WOODRUFF: For the record, Boris Nikolaivich is the familiar way of identifying Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Still ahead on the NewsHour, the men who helped design U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for the past half century. But first this is Pledge Week on public television. We're taking a short break now so that your public television station can ask for your support. That support helps keep programs like this on the air. PLEDGE BREAK SEGMENT

MR. MacNeil: For those stations not taking a Pledge Break, the NewsHour continues now with more excerpts from President Gorbachev's dramatic news conference and he used one question to talk about the nature of political discussion and the role of the press.

PRES. GORBACHEV: [Speaking through Interpreter] Regarding the way after the information meeting on television, I don't really see any other choice but to maintain what has been won by democracy already along these lines. Otherwise I don't think we would have what has happened in our country at this time when dictatorship was successful. I think this is part of the whole process, including the democratic press, our press, but I'd like to say that you should think about, seriously, about the lessons we have to learn. You can't -- you have to have political maturity when it's possible to have political dialogue as part of this process, when we have to know -- when we have to know how much acid -- how much oxygen is available to our press -- sometimes we feel that it's, umm, it's, uh, hyperventilating sometimes, something which I can't accept. I can't accept, for example, lack of tact and rudeness. I'm always open to chew the fat with the people. This has been true of me since I was a young person, and I said this when we had the congress, but I don't like the press to be cynical about individuals, particularly when they hold a different opinion, culture and responsibility. There's no harm in either of these things, neither political -- or a political struggle in relations - - or relations with the press -- think about this and take whatever decision you see fit. I'm convinced that some well founded statements have some effect. For example, I've seen Mr. Hellman here. He's one of the first who reacted with his short essays and Mr. Torganazyeta, but generally speaking, he's been one of the participants in preparing for perestroika. So this is the logic - - a combination of political thinking and literary gifts. I understand and I appreciate his thoughts even when I don't share them, but this is the way it should be after all. And these conspirators who came, I told them, I said, fine, you have a position, you regard the situation this way. Can you believe that I have to take this decision -- I have decided a state of emergency -- I have a different opinion from you. So let's go to the congress and let's decide what the actual state of affairs is so that's what we have to do. But you see I know -- I know how some people make fun of others in the press analyzing my position and so on and so forth, this is not analysis; this is just physical nitpicking and I've stopped reading a number of newspapers for that reason. There's -- the most difficult sentence that when the good arguments are presented -- even sometimes when the arguments are good and I don't share them, are not in accordance with my ideas, but when you can see that the person which is to understand and presents his understanding and does this, this is something I respect.

MR. MacNeil: Gorbachev also said the entire episode had been a very difficult lesson for him. He called the three day coup "my drama" and said it had been extremely painful for his family, particularly his wife, Raisa. CONVERSATION

MR. MacNeil: Finally tonight a conversation with George Kennan. Often called the foremost scholar and analyst of U.S.-Soviet relations, Mr. Kennan first articulated the American policy of containment to respond to Soviet expansionism after World War II. Mr. Kennan capped a long career in the foreign service with ambassadorial appointments to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. He has devoted years since to improving U.S. scholarship of Russian studies. His own contribution to that scholarship includes 18 books, among them 2 Pulitzer Prize winners. I talked with him this afternoon and asked him to reflect as a student of Russian history on the significance of this moment.

MR. KENNAN: I think it's of tremendous significance. I don't mean to underestimate the difficulties that Russia is going to have in the immediate future, but I do think that this is a turning point of the most momentous historical significance. I find it difficult to find any other turning point of modern Russian history that I think is so significant as this one.

MR. MacNeil: Why? I mean there have been plenty of turning points.

MR. KENNAN: Plenty of turning points, but by what happened on those streets of Moscow and Leningrad in these last three or four days the Russian people for the first time in their history have turned their back on the manner in which they've been ruled not just in the Soviet period but in centuries before. They have demanded a voice in the designing of their own society, their own future, and they have done so successfully. And I can't think of any precedent for this in Russian history, even 1917 had nothing quite like this. It's the most hopeful turning point that I've ever seen in Russian affairs and I think it's a very basic one. I think the fact that from now on Russia is going to be in its political composition, its political habits, its political way it's run, it is going to be a different Russia than it's ever been before.

MR. MacNeil: How do you explain it, how this could happen in this way?

MR. KENNAN: Yes. Part of it, of course, is the communications revolution. Part of it is the fact that you now have a far higher proportion of the people of Russia who are educated people, who do read, who do listen to what comes out over the media, but part of it also is the revulsion after the seven decades of mistreatment that they have had at the hands of a Communist regime and I think you see they did realize in 1917 that the czar's government was not a very good government anymore, that the czar was not an impressive person, in fact, that he was a rather foolish man, and they lost their confidence in that sort of a government. Many of them naively thought this one would be a better one, a Communist one, but there was never a greater disillusionment of any people than that. And I think again as I say that it is partly the revulsion of what they've just been through that gave them the courage and the determination not to accept it anymore.

MR. MacNeil: Many people have worried that after centuries of repressive or paternalistic government that the habits, the psychological habits would be so strong that when things became messy and uncertain as they have been with this perestroika that the temptation to go back to something secure and strong just for stability would be irresistible. Why do you think that hasn't happened?

MR. KENNAN: Well, I've worried about --

MR. MacNeil: Excuse me interrupting, but plenty of Soviet people have been telling reporters that on the street, well, we'd rather go back to the strong stuff than put up with this chaos.

MR. KENNAN: That was a little bit -- it could delude you, hearing these things from them, because every time there has come a showdown, at least in the great cities, they have come out in favor of an attempt to have a democratic development. I am not sure how all this proceeds out in the countryside. I think there is much less understanding in large parts of the countryside far from the great cities for what democracy has to offer than there is in Moscow or Leningrad. On the other hand, these places are the center of the political vitality of the country and there's no doubt about it now, that there's no doubt about the way that public opinion, Russian opinion, inclines. There's been test after test of it, but none ever as complete as this and none where the answer was ever made as dramatically evident as it has been in these last days.

MR. MacNeil: So do you think that six years of experimenting with glasnost, freedom, has really changed the political psychology of the Soviet people?

MR. KENNAN: Yes. I think it has. And I think we do owe this in very large measure to Gorbachev and that should not be forgotten. He has had his faults, his weaknesses, his blind spots too, but this is his -- has been his great service to Russia. This is partly the result of it. He was the one, after all, who made all this possible by making glasnost possible, by permitting the press to speak again, by permitting people to speak, all this by throwing open the contacts with the outside world. That all is part of the background of what has now happened.

MR. MacNeil: It's really ironic in a way, isn't it, that -- I mean, as he admitted in his press conference today was in some ways the author of his own -- of this misfortune by putting so much trust in so many hardliners close to him, and yet, in another way the author of his salvation by having created or permitted some of the freedoms -- freedom of expression -- that saved him.

MR. KENNAN: That's quite true. And I'm sure that he will hear many accusations that he has a measure of responsibility for these events that happened because of his indulgence of these people. After all, he did appoint several of them and the most important ones to the positions they occupied. But one can be too tough on him here. He was well aware that the party and the police still had great power in large parts of the country, perhaps not as I say in the big cities, but way out in the provincial areas, and I think he wanted, if he could, to keep them aboard and not to push them off into a position where this short of thing would occur. He may have gone too far in acting with them, in giving them positions, in talking with them, and he may suffer for it now, but I think we have to realize that it was not easy for him and also because he still clung for a long time to his belief that the party could be made a suitable instrument of change.

MR. MacNeil: I don't know whether you heard that part of the press conference, but he reiterated that today, that he would stay in the party and that he thought that those -- that those forces that were in favor of democratic reform could be encouraged and that the party it sought could be reformed and made an instrument of change.

MR. KENNAN: Robin, here too I would not like to be too hard on him. Loyalty is the only absolute human virtue which is always respected. It's better to be loyal in a way to your shabbiest friends than the opposite. And I know that he parts with great difficulty from his belief in the party. It was in the party that he grew up. It was there that he got his position, and in a way I respect him for his fidelity to it. But I think he's wrong.

MR. MacNeil: But could he miss? If this is the historic turning point you've said, could he miss that turning point and be left behind because of that loyalty?

MR. KENNAN: Yes. Partly because of that. Mind you, I think that his contribution to the development of Russia was largely exhausted before these recent events occurred. He had -- what I mean by that is that he had done pretty much, what was his historic mission, which was to break the hold of the party over all of Russian life and to throw open freedom of speech, and the other things that he did open up. That was an historic contribution and I'm sure that he will be given credit and good perspective of history for what he's done, but he did, as I say, have one of these blind spots. One of them was his belief that the party could be an adequate means of change and another was of course his hope and belief that the -- the country could be kept together, that the empire could be kept together, that the other republicans -- republics could be held in, I think that too was a failure of insight and judgment on his part. The day for that has passed. The day for the great empires is gone. The day in particular for the unilateral -- the unilingual and the uni-national empires is gone. But that I mean the ones that embrace a number of nations and a number of languages. The others have gone, the old Turkish empire, the old Austria-Hungarian empire, the British empire; they have all yielded to the forces of modern nationalism and the -- it was clear that the Russian-Soviet empire was going to have to yield to these forces too eventually.

MR. MacNeil: Do you think what happened in the last few days accelerates that?

MR. KENNAN: Yes, I do indeed. I do, indeed, I think is going to affect his position because he had hitched his wagon to the star of the central authority in the Soviet Union. Now what has happened in these last few days is going to increase the authority of the individual republics. And by that same token, it is bound to decrease the importance and the scope of power of the central, of central governmental apparatus. And to the extent that that is diminished, so will be diminished his role in Russian affairs, his influence.

MR. MacNeil: Some of the new republics, including Boris Yeltsin's Russian Federation, have talked about having their own armies, their own security forces. Since the United States was so anxious to see the Soviet Union stay together so that it would have one military super power to deal with, does this disintegration or de-centralization you're predicting pose security problems for the West? I mean, you have that massive number of nuclear weapons and everything.

MR. KENNAN: So far as the nuclear weapons are concerned, this union treaty which was to have been thrown open for signature by the republics three or four days ago and that incidentally is probably the crucial fact that caused the timing of this effort to overthrow the regime, this union treaty did, it seemed to me, in its provisions take care of the danger that -- of nuclear weapons getting into the wrong hands. As far as that is concerned, I think we can be relieved, and otherwise, I think that we should recognize the inevitability of the decentralization of this state and not put ourselves in opposition to it.

MR. MacNeil: You said a moment ago that loyalty is prized often above everything in politicians. But so also in successful politicians is a degree of opportunism. Is Mr. Gorbachev nimble enough and adroit enough and opportunistic enough to seize this moment and revitalize his leadership, or is he really on the wave of the past do you think?

MR. KENNAN: In my opinion he will not be able to do that. I can't really go into all the reasons why not. They're partly ones of personality, partly ones of what has happened. But everyone, as you know, in public life has his hour and his period. You can't expect to have really many more than one. And I think Gorbachev for whom I have high respect, I think that he, as I say, has pretty well exhausted what he had to give to the Russian situation. We're going on now to another generation, to another group of problems. And I doubt that he can expect to exercise a kind of leadership with relation to them that he has exercised in recent years.

MR. MacNeil: Where does Mr. Yeltsin fit into that picture?

MR. KENNAN: He comes out, of course, as "the" great personality of the hour in Russia and in the Soviet Union. He too is a man for whom I have respect. He has qualities quite different from those of, of Gorbachev. Gorbachev was not good really with the contact with the people. Yeltsin, just the opposite, and he has, of course, increased his stature in the public eye enormously by his behavior in recent days. He's shown himself to be a courageous and strong man in a difficult situation. And they all appreciate that. But more important than that too is the fact that he was popularly elected and those who elected him are all aware of that and they are reluctant to be deprived of the choice they made when they came to that decision.

MR. MacNeil: Finally, as the man often credited with being the author of the policy that the West adopted which succeeded in the containment policy, brought the Soviet Union to change, internal change, what do you think the posture of the United States should be now towards the new realities in the Soviet Union?

MR. KENNAN: I think that it should be the posture that John Quincy Adams outlined in a Fourth of July speech in Washington a great many years ago when he said that America is the guardian of the liberties of all the world -- or she is, no, she is the friend of the liberties of all the world, she is the guardian only of her own. I think we have to give all the encouragement we can to the Russians in this situation, but in doing so, we cannot regard it as one great undivided country. We have to take account of the decentralization which is in progress and we have to address our efforts, our help, our attention partly to the individual republics whose needs vary, vary greatly among them, and not all to the central government.

MR. MacNeil: Well, Professor Kennan, thank you very much for joining us.

MR. KENNAN: Thank you. NEWS SUMMARY

MS. WOODRUFF: In other news today, Cuban inmates continued to hold immigration and prison workers hostage at a federal jail in Alabama. A prison spokesman said the inmates threatened to kill the 10 hostages if demands are not met. The inmates reportedly are protesting their scheduled deportation back to Cuba. The Phillips 66 Petroleum Company today was fined a record $4 million for safety violations that led to a 1989 explosion at a Texas chemical plant. Twenty-three people were killed in the blast. The Occupational Safety & Health Administration charged Phillips with 575 violations. Investigators said the explosion happened after highly flammable gases escaped from an open valve. RECAP

MR. MacNeil: And once again the day's dramatic events in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev emerged from his three day ordeal with a vow to punish those who plotted against him. He said he would have chosen suicide rather than submit to what he described as the crude and crafty conspirators. He expressed gratitude to Boris Yeltsin for leading the opposition to the coup and promised to work with him to further the process of democratic reform. Good night, Judy.

MS. WOODRUFF: Good night, Robin. That's our NewsHour for tonight. We'll be back tomorrow night with a look back at this week in the Soviet Union. I'm Judy Woodruff. Thank you and good night.