Vietnam War Report; Milton Sachs - Constituent Assembly

Vietnam war report weekly detailed look into one of the many aspects of the war in Southeast Asia earlier this month you heard keen on 1066. A report on a New Zealand surgical team dealing with civilian casualties in a provincial hospital. The report was prepared on the scene by Patricia Pena a freelance journalist based in Hong Kong tonight learned about an entirely different part of the situation in Vietnam. The history and progress of the country's constituent assembly to tell about this. I Milton Sachs of Brandeis University Professor Sachs is an authority on political affairs in Vietnam. He returned to Boston only last September after two years in Southeast Asia. While there he served as a visiting professor at Saigon and who universities now his analysis the Constituent Assembly now nearing the end of its work in creating a new constitution for South Vietnam. Has not occasioned the degree of interest that its functioning would warrant in the United States. Perhaps one of the worst

reported events going on in the crucial Vietnamese War. The constituent assembly in a measurable sense represents one of the most important political undertakings now going on in South Vietnam. One has but to refer to the recent interview of North Vietnam's premier farmer with Harrison Solsbury of the New York Times. To recognise how important the political events in South Vietnam are as contrasted with the military happenings. It is my intention to briefly review some of the material with respect to the background of the constituent assembly its current meetings and the prospects that it holds out for South Vietnam in the future. To begin with it is important to note that since the overthrow of

President Hadi in November of 1963 there has been continued governmental instability in Vietnam up to and including the Manila conference and thereafter. It is not necessary to review all of the changes that have taken place. The fact is that even the government of Prime Minister green Kalki which came to office in 100 and 65 in June itself has undergone three reshuffling as a consequence of political instability. Even though Prime Minister Kyi himself has weathered the storm. The constituent assembly his birth was itself a product of a pronounced struggle in South Vietnam. It should be remembered that in one thousand eight hundred and sixty six in the month of March two events simultaneously produced a major crisis in

the affairs of South Vietnam. One was the firing of General Ne and T by the ruling directory in South Vietnam and the other was the unleashing of the struggle movement by the then very strong Buddhist leadership primarily in central Vietnam although it had its repercussions in Saigon. This combination of circumstances the firing of tea and the unleashing of the Buddhist struggle found its center in the demand by these forces for the convening of a consist of an election in Vietnam and the promotion of a legislative assembly. The ruling generals clearly did not believe that South Vietnam ought to have elections. They had taken power in June of 1985 by displacing the then civilian

government that existed and they were in no mood to allow the civilian government to come back to Vietnam. Their own timetable called for elections some time in late 1800s and 67. As a consequence of the struggle unleashed by the Buddhists and the firing of Gen. T. There was enough dissatisfaction and enough political turmoil created to force the ruling junta to give in to the widespread demand for elections and civilian government. As a consequence of this. There was a decree passed which in on June 19th one thousand nine hundred sixty six provided for the election of a national constituent assembly. This assembly had as its membership one hundred eight deputies to be elected directly one for every 50000

eligible voters and nine additional deputies who would be elected indirectly representing primarily the peoples of the Highland regions who still live under tribal conditions. They are known as the mountain yards and are the principal minority in South Vietnam. As for the hundred and eight deputies to be elected directly at least four of them from four provinces in South Vietnam had to be of Cambodian descent reflecting the great size of a Cambodian minority within the borders of South Vietnam. The election itself saw some six hundred twenty four candidates file for office by July 14th the closing date and some five hundred thirty two of those candidates validated for the September

11th one thousand sixty six elections. A total of five million two hundred and eighty nine thousand six hundred fifty two people registered and on September 11th four million two hundred seventy four thousand eight hundred twelve voted making a large total of eighty point eight percent who actually cast ballots in the election. It was clear on the basis of the reports of observers and in terms of my own having been in Vietnam and seen what was happening that a great effort was made by the military to get the vote out as a demonstration of the control of the South Vietnam regime of the largest part of the population of South Vietnam on the basis of such a large registration and voting it could effectively be demonstrated that some two thirds or at least 70 percent of the population

of South Vietnam were in what are called safe areas of government control in South Vietnam. What is equally clear is that although the military pressured large numbers of voters to go to the polls the outcome and results of the election did not correspond to anything which the military would have wanted as a result. Because the fact of the matter was that of the some fifty eight odd military candidates who were proposed for office some 20 were elected and even of these 20 there is sufficient evidence to indicate that they were not people who were committed to a military government in the future for South Vietnam. In fact some time after the first meeting of the Assembly a notice from the Department of Defense in Vietnam was sent to the 20 members of the assembly who were military men

indicating to them that they were subject to immediate reassignment on the completion of their tasks as members of the constituent assembly. This move was correctly interpreted as pressure on these deputies to bring them in line for military desires with respect to the constitution that was being written. In fact however a number of these deputies have demonstrated that they do not wish to go along with the military government in its desires. The assembly itself as far as its composition was concerned then turned out to be a representative assembly representative in most respects although observers here again pointed to two distorting features of the assembly. For one thing as far as the background of the assembly men are concerned it was clear that a larger number of

Northerners. That is to say people who had been born in the north and moved to the south primarily during the period when Vietnam was split at the 17th parallel in 1954. These Northerners were disproportionately represented in the assembly and equally Catholics were over represented in the assembly. But observers in. Evaluating this pointed to the quite true fact that the Catholics were among the most active a political group in Vietnam a best organized and quite intent on having their presence felt in the elections and the election results bore out that better organization. The assembly in general is quite representative of most of the political tendencies in South Vietnam. The

Principal Group which has figured in the news is the southern bloc whose leadership was that of the current chairman of the constituent assembly from Heike Hsu who it may be remembered was chief of state in the previous governments and also one of the elected deputies in the ZM period who opposed the Godin ZM or authoritarian rule. The second leader of the Southern bloc trun Van Van was assassinated a short while ago and his murderer is recently brought to trial and condemned to death. Clear indication being that they were selected by the Viet Cong to carry out that terrorist mission excluding these two the two other prominent members of the assembly who

have figured somewhat in the news. Number from Kuantan who is probably the outstanding spokesman in the Assembly for civilian rule and civilian government. He too was subject to a grenade attack recently which saw him wounded in both legs he happily escaped death at the hands of his assassins. The fourth prominent man is Dungan shome who is the editor of a major newspaper in South Vietnam and is credited by observers with being one of the most influential people behind the scenes in the functioning of the assembly. This assembly then meets under extraordinary circumstances. Power in South Vietnam is in the hands of the generals. The assembly itself was forced by the struggle of the Buddhists.

It represents a reluctant acceptance by the generals of the desire for a legitimate government in Vietnam emanating from the people itself. The military hoped to avoid difficulties by writing in to the election rules rules which saw to it the famous article 20 that a one third plus one of the delegates coupled with the action by the chief of state who is General to you would permit the generals to. Veto actions taken by the constituent assembly. In fact however the assembly has been able to get more than a two thirds majority for almost every one of its propositions that could be expected to be disputed by the generals. They have demanded successfully so far that elections

take place in Vietnam at every level of government starting at the village going on through the hamlets the districts and the provinces. And this would in effect mean that a large number of military people would have to go back to the Army because they would play no role in civilian administration. If this becomes a functioning part of the new constitution of South Vietnam. The constituent assembly has also occasioned some difficulties within the rectory itself. The general is being divided in terms of their desire. As far as dealing with the assembly is concerned there are those who feel that the Assembly represents a threat to military rule and that the country is not ripe for civilian rule. There are others who are recognizing the latent strength of the assembly in the population and wishing to curry favor

with them. As the spokesman of the people of South Vietnam are inclined to compromise with the assembly and not to override. It's the sessions and recent indication is that the assembly will in all probability have its way on all matters on which it has legislated. Even those possibly where a two thirds vote was not achieved. The fact that Prime Minister Icke has already undertaken in a quiet way to implement the election at the village and hamlet level of. Representatives of the people is itself an indication of the trend in South Vietnam. This is a major step forward in providing for popular government at the local level in Vietnam. It should be remembered that President Godin ZM

had abolished traditional Vietnamese elections at the village and hamlet level and this marks the first step and is itself a sign of growing confidence in the ability of the government to maintain itself when it in fact gives back to the villagers their right to choose their local leadership. Because of the conflict between the military and civilian It may be expected that there will be some degree of instability occasioned by the transition over to a new. Constitution as formulated by the Assembly. We can expect that some of the generals will be very reluctant to come to terms with the civilians on the other hand. One should also expect that the civilians recognizing the difficulty inherent in a transition of power will be constrained

not to totally exclude the military from rule in Vietnam under the new constitution. I personally for see some kind of a solution along the lines of a predominantly civilian ticket running one or two military leaders as figures for the new government that will affectively attempt to reconcile and make possible a military civilian alliance in the elections. But the unmistakable fact is that the government itself will be predominantly civilian under the new constitution and be the result of the electoral process. The constituent assembly has in effect chosen to. Maintain the presidential system that existed under the previous government but under circumstances where the

power of the assembly would be much much stronger then the rubber stamp assembly that existed under the ZM government. There is a combination of a presidential and Prime Minister Ariel system with the Prime Minister responsible to the assembly as are the members of his cabinet. The president himself will of course be a strong figure and serve as a check on the assembly and vice versa. The assembly and its prime minister will presumably serve as a check on a strong president. The rest of the constitutional arrangements call for elections as I've already indicated our province and district chiefs which will replace the present practice of having province and district chiefs. As members of the armed forces. This then is the picture of

the new assembly and I can only return to my earlier theme in suggesting that the election to this assembly as well as the successful outcome of the constituent Assembly's deliberations in the promulgation of a new constitution and the election of a new government in South Vietnam will go far to demonstrate the legitimacy and validity of the leadership in South Vietnam and at the same time destroy whatever claims there is to the opposition National Liberation Front to representing the people of South Vietnam. Professor I'm Milton Sachs of Brandeis University discussing South Vietnam's constituent assembly Professor Sykes's questioned briefly by WGBH reporter Crocker snow. Professor Sachs one of the first statements that you made was that you consider the Constituent Assembly one of the worst reported aspects of the whole situation in

Vietnam and I wonder if you would expand or clarify the statement a bit. Why do you think this is so. In fact I think this is partly so because a large number of the reporters in Vietnam. Do not believe that their papers and their magazines are really interested in turning political events in South Vietnam. They feel that whether correctly or not that the American public is more concerned with the American presence in South Vietnam and should get reports about the American presence in South Vietnam and as a consequence of that they tend not to talk very much about internal political developments. Since my return from Saigon at the end of September of this year I have found it extremely difficult although I think I spend a considerable amount of time reading the bulk of the news reports that come from Vietnam to find concrete information of a hard character about what is

going on in the assembly in South Vietnam and it's based on that that I made my remark when I was second saying a lot of a lot of what you said had the implication to me anyway of tension and a certain a certain tension between the military leadership and the civilian leadership in Vietnam and I wonder if you think that this tension is gradually resolving itself. I don't think the tension is resolving itself. But I do what I do believe is that the civilians fearful of some kind of a coup directed against them and the complete unknowing of any electoral arrangements will be willing to make some kind of a step on their part to provide at least one or two of the major positions within a subsequent civilian government to the military as some indication of their recognition of the importance of the military

in the current state of Vietnam's politics. In that way they will hope to buy off at least the section of military opposition to their rule and thereby make it possible for them to move into power without too much difficulty. What I had referenced this doesn't mean that there is no tension. What it means is that conscious of the tension that exists the civilians will not risk everything on simply excluding the military which does have power from government under the new constitution. What I note in an AP report that a group of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly have. Are proudly boasting almost that they have got some sort of a an agreement out of the military leadership that the military leadership will lay off its veto power which you talked of. And I wonder if you think that this is a significant step or that they are

perhaps this is wishful thinking on their part. No I think it's a very significant step. They have been agitating for some time for the recognition by the military of the injustice of Article 20 of the election decree laws and this effectively represents them a successful conclusion to that agitation. The civilians want guarantees in advance that the military will not. Take action to modify the constitution because they are afraid that once those modifications are made by the chief state and resubmitted for revoting to the assembly there may be members of the assembly who will give in under that military pressure. If they can in advance get agreement from the military to accept the constitution as it is that is as promulgated by a majority of the assembly. This facilitates their were considerably. And if these deputies have said this is

the case then it certainly means that the assembly has scored a signal success and the. I would reckon that the generals are sufficiently divided so that they have come to a conclusion that they had best go along with the action of the assembly. What sort of a role do you think that the American influence and so forth poisonous whole relationship vis a vis the military and the civilian regarding the constituent assembly. I think the American presence plays an enormous role in this respect and its the kind of lead given by our embassy in Saigon and also by Washington that can have an important impact on political events in South Vietnam. I certainly don't believe that the government of South Vietnam is a puppet government. If they were we surely have been terrible stage managers in all these years since the overthrow of the ZM government. But if one looks at the. Current arrangements it is quite clear that there are legitimate

differences of opinion which extend not only to the Vietnamese but also to the Americans the difficulties of holding elections in wartime and the difficulties of command with respect to areas where there is strong military activity by the VC. The problem of adjusting between civilian rule and military rule in other areas of Vietnam. All of these constantly generate differences of opinion. The difficulty however has been that there has been a body of American leadership which was not in favor of elections which does see the military as the principal force for stability and and the force which has the power in Vietnam as there are now. Other significant group which sees the problems of Vietnam being solved not only in military terms but in political terms. And there is tension between these groups on the American side as there is within the Vietnamese side and in so far as I have any opinion on this matter. I tend to favor those actions which

not only provide for elections but also provide for a civilian government because I believe that is the most effective counter weight to the political aspect of this war as waged by the National Liberation Front. As your professor I mentioned sacks of Brandeis University talking with Crocker snow about self Vietnam's constituent assembly Professor Sachs studied the situation closely while it's gone and who are universities last year. Listen again next week at the same time for another Vietnam War report.